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INTRODUCTION; Aid Policy shift and State Transformation as expressions of 
Globalisation
Conjuncture, historical shifts: introducing the problem
The collapse o f real-socialism in Eastern Europe both expressed and instituted considerable 
changes in international relations, state transformations, and aid and security policy.*
With the end of what was called the ‘second world’ and the consequent reshaping of the 
global order, the whole socialist development model was dead. Furthermore, a whole new 
space was opening up for global capitalism as well as for the international aid regime. The 
very project o f the socialist state, itself for many decades a model for many developing 
countries, now became an object o f aid policy.
Initially there was great optimism for the post-Cold War order, and western neo-liberal 
prescriptions for how the former Eastern bloc should transform their systems were advocated 
with great confidence. At the same time, however, the whole project of ‘development’ was in 
question. The crisis in Eastern Europe was preceded by a marked crisis in much of the 
developing world. Through the 1970s and more notable in the 1980s, the development gap 
between the rich and the poor increased, as did the number o f aggravated social and political 
conflicts, and there was a rise in civil wars.^ The trend continued in the 1990s.
The shift in aid policy was reaffirmed, developed and consolidated in the post-bipolar world, 
but its contours had emerged earlier. The crisis of development already appeared in the 1980s,
* The temi ‘real-socialism’ was introduced by Rudolf Bahro in the 1970s, initially with a negative connotation 
(implying that socialism was not implemented in practice), but the term was taken up by Soviet leaders 
(Breznjev and followers) who used it with a positive connotation. For the latter ‘real-socialism’ denoted that 
socialism had become realised in tlic Soviet Union and its satellite states. Real-socialism has since become a 
term referring to the actually existing socialism as opposed to the ideological or theoretical teachings or socialist 
political part)' programmes in the liberal democracies. I would like to thank Kristian Gemer fora clariiS ing 
discussion on Uiis tenninolog)'.
* Although subject to definition the number o f wars increased from the 1960s to the 1990s. with an 
accompanj'ing trend towards internal (civil) w ars. Compare: Gantzel. J. K (1994) “War in the Post World War II 
World: Empirical Trends. Theoretical Approaches and Problems on the Concept of Ethnic War” Paper presented 
at Symposium on Etlmicity and War, San Marino Centre for Inter-Disciplinai>- Research on Social Stress (1994).
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especially in relation to Africa, when western aid policy departed from its traditional post­
colonial concerns of uneven development within the international system and its earlier focus 
on state and nation building. In the 1990s a duality developed within both aid policy and the 
increasingly related field o f refugee policy. Based on trends from the preceding decade there 
was an increased focus on the character of domestic relations, institutions and form of 
governing in unstable areas, effectively locating the problem of ‘transition’ as well as 
‘development’ in the nature of domestic social and political relations o f the concerned 
country.^ Then, accompanying the erosion of asylum regimes in the West, came a number of 
measures to prepare refugees for reintegration into their home societies, which was coupled 
with initiatives for social reconstnaction.
The features of the changing aid policy have become increasingly clear and general during the 
last decade, and have been analysed as a logical response to the emergence of a number of 
regions marked by protracted political crises and institutional collapse coupled with internal 
wars and complex humanitarian emergencies."^
One aspect of this change was the idea of linking relief to development combined with the 
reprioritization of aid budgets leaving larger budgets for humanitarian assistance, conflict 
management and social reconstruction at the expense o f  conventional development aid. In the 
post-bipolar world the problems o f development and security became increasingly merged 
into a single problem complex.^ Underdevelopment became defined as dangerous, while 
development projects and the idea of ‘social reconstruction’ have become prime instruments 
in the growing field o f ‘conflict management’. Underdevelopment has generally become 
interpreted as a risk factor for conflict and war and, consequently, social reconstruction and 
aid measures have become central to conflict management. If the concern in the 1980s (and 
early 1990s) primarily was that underdevelopment, and especially conflict and internal war, 
produced refugee-flows, there came in the second half o f the 1990s an increased attention to
 ̂DAC (1997) “DAC Guidelines on ConflicL Peace and De\ elopmcnt Co-Operation”, Paris: Development 
Assistance Committee. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
'' Duffield, M (1997) “Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and Methodolog) ’. Discussion Paper 
(Bergen, Christian Michelscn Institute)
Duffield, M (2001) “Global Governance and tlie New Wars” Zed Books: Ch. 2
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conflict and underdevelopment as harbouring international criminal networks.^ As such they 
were a threat to global order.
A fundamental component to global orders in general is the relationship between state, nation, 
and political economy, as well as the delineations between them. The term globalisation aims 
at aspects of redefining those relationships, not least between the state and the political 
economy, and has widely been interpreted as a force behind the collapse of real-socialism.
In this context, development aid during the Cold War focused on nation and state building and 
on economic growth and material production within those states. In the bipolar order the state, 
its role in the development process and in governing the economy, had been central in both 
the socialist development model and in western liberal thinking. The state, and models of 
corporatism, had played the crucial role to the whole welfare state project in post-war Europe, 
and this was reflected in post-colonial aid policy. For the United States too, the most market 
liberal version o f capitalism, the strengthening of nation states - after the colonies had been 
shaken loose - was essential as a form of organising political and geographical space for 
global economic liberalism.^
From the 1980s on the role o f the state as an agent in development was de-emphasised. This 
marked the beginning of a trend which accelerated in the post bipolar world. Aid policy now 
aims at intervention in the society as such. Both aid and security now take life as their referent 
object, rather than states, and has in this sense become bio-political.* Indeed it is because 
security has life as a referent that ‘development’ becomes important. Central to this process 
has been the concept ‘human security’, which became widely used by the UN in the 1990s.^
* Thus for example drug cartels in Latin America has been a central concern for the U.S. Government in the 
1990s; following the collapse of the Soviet Union a great concern has been Russian mafia and the possibility of 
‘nuclear drift'; and following 9/11 the problem of areas haibouring terrorist networks have become central.
’ Cf. Smith, N (2003) “American Empire: Roose\ elt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization” University 
of California Press: for c.\ample chapters: 6 ,7 ,12 ,13  in passim.
* Tlie concept will be discussed further below, cf. Foucault. M (1976/1978) “The Histoiy' of Sexualit>- Voi 1: The 
Will to Know ledge” Penguin; Brigg, M (2002) “Post-development, Foucault and the colonisation metaphor” in 
“Third World (Quarterly”, Voi 23, No 3:421-436; DufTield, M & N. Wadell (2004) “Human Security and Global 
Danger Exploring a Governmental Assemblage” Department of Politics and International Relations, University 
of Lancaster, Dillon, M & J. Reid (2001) ) “Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security' and War” in 
“Millennium” Voi 30, No 1,2001:41-66; Hardt, M & A. Negri (2000) “Empire” Harv ard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.
 ̂I ow'e great tlianks to Mark Duffìcld w ho has endured numerous discussions with me, as weU as shared 
thoughts and diails o f his own work on aid policy' and global governance. C f Duilield, M & N. Wadell (2004). 
For the concept o f human security' in post-conflict aid in the Balkans see: UNDP Human Security Report (2000) 
“Human Security in South-East Europe”.
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Donor governments -  as well as international governmental organisations (UN) -  have 
increasingly come to finance and subcontract NGOs and private partners to work directly in 
recipient societies. The foreseen role for the receiving state is now primarily to provide the 
security and legal framework for reforms and their implementation, rather than to be an actual 
agent in a development process. In the 1990s an organisational reshaping of the aid sector has 
included the growth of public-private networks, with donor agencies, international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private agencies, and military units 
(such as peace-keeping troops or guarded aid transports) operating together in conflict 
management and post-conflict reconstruction.
In East European ‘transition’ states the networks do not include military units, but in areas 
like Kosovo or Bosnia, which are international protectorates, they are an essential component. 
These networks form the organisational structure for implementation as well as a space for 
policy articulation of an emerging system of global governance.
The process of ‘outsourcing’ and o f  operating through public-private networks marks a shift 
in the governing of public policy, which has parallels in all policy-areas, but the radical 
intervention into countries over which the donor governments have no legitimacy -  in 
international law -  and over populations to which they have no accountability, presents a 
particular phenomenon.
This is certainly the case where there is no UN mandate for intervention. For example, in 
much of Eastern Europe, since the 1990s, bilateral aid policy has largely been operating 
through NGOs. For the post-socialist states the term iram ition  has been favoured, rather than 
the term development, which is generally preserved for the ‘Third World’ (primarily in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia). The concept of transition focused attention on regime- 
change along with a tradition within political science (and economics) that studied 
preconditions for, and processes of, transition from authoritarian rule (especially with 
experience from Latin America and Iberian Europe). Regime change and systems change here 
implied both the institutional arrangements for liberal democratic forms of government and 
for market liberalism, with political and economic liberalisation assumed to go hand in hand. 
Within this framework the concept of civil society was eventually revived to imply a kind o f 
institutional and cultural infrastructure of associations operating independently from the state
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and assumed to promote and safeguard democracy. Here, the state was rather seen as part of 
the problem since it was either too big and bureaucratic, too autocratic, or both.
The disintegrating Yugoslav state both fitted the transition problem, while also requiring a 
direct humanitarian and post-war reconstruction response. Initially interpreted along the 
Soviet model, as countries breaking loose from a central communist dictatorship, it soon 
proved more complex. As a conflict area it was in need o f social reconstruction and 
reconciliation. Throughout the 1990s the Yugoslav crisis came to pose a fundamental 
challenge to central aspects of emerging policies in the EU, its separate member states, and to 
the United States. Security policy, including foreign, aid, and defence policy, were deeply 
affected through it.
A number of important historical problems are generated here. First, the change in discourse 
and structure o f international aid as part of an emerging system of global governance 
expresses a radical change in the relationship between centre and periphery on a global scale. 
Second, the transformation of relatively developed areas -  and even previous role models for 
development -  in Eastern Europe, such as the former Yugoslavia, into aid receivers, expresses 
a problematic change in the centre-periphery relationship. Both processes are related to 
changing relationships between state, nation, and the governing of the political economy.
The changes in centre-periphery relationships in the 1990s with the incorporation of post­
socialist states, and its consequences, are especially clear in the Balkans. In the process, both 
the receivers and donors of aid are continuously transformed. This involves the change of the 
entire security policy of Western states, including their military organisation, which is 
adapting to new tasks of peacekeeping or to fighting wars in the periphery. Moreover, the 
greatest effort, from a European point of view, in global governance and social reconstruction 
-  both in terms of military resources and in aid -  is currently in progress in Europe, in the 
Balkans, namely in the international protectorates o f Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Framed within a macro-historical approach, this research has a dual purpose. First, it analyses 
social change in Yugoslavia by exploring the nexus between statehood, ethnicity, and political 
economy and its relation to the global political economy. It is the reworking o f this nexus 
which constituted the Yugoslav crisis both in the 1990’s a//iZhistorically. Analysing the 
Yugoslav system in this manner takes into account economic and cultural factors as well as
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political and economic processes on a global level, thus enhancing an understanding of its 
trajectory from a model of development into a symbol of state collapse and a region subjected 
to international aid and military intervention. Second, this research explores aid policy, how it 
has changed and how it addresses the abovementioned nexus with particular reference to 
Kosovo. In the process, the research presents a critique o f aid policy in relation to the post- 
Yugoslav space, with a focus on Kosovo. The critique aims at how social change is 
conceptualised within aid policy as well as within the dominant theoretical perspectives on 
transition and social reconstruction on which it rests. Especially the ‘domestication’ of 
problems o f social and political change, where aid-providing countries are viewed only as 
external to these problems, is criticised. In approaching the analysis in this manner I have 
been guided by the following research questions.
- How has the governing of the political economy and the national question been dealt 
with in the socialist federal Yugoslav state? What specific problems was it confronted 
with, and how did it become a prime recipient of international aid?
- W hat is the character of social change and power relations in the ethno-nationalist 
societies that emerged out o f Yugoslavia, with particular emphasis on Serbia and 
Kosovo?
- W hat is the character of the political economy in the ethno-nationalist projects of 
Serbia and Kosovo?
- How have aid agencies interpreted them and how do they tackle these problems?
- How does the new aid policy, as represented by key donors and international 
oranisations, conceptualise central problems o f social change in the post-Yugoslav 





It is the contention here that both the changes within aid policy that have taken place 
throughout the 1990s, and the collapse of the Yugoslav self-management system as well as 
the dissolution of that state, are expressions o f a change in the form of governing (or from 
government to governance) that take place during a new phase of global capitalism.
mm
While the study o f change in Yugoslavia, and change within international aid policy, both 
require the framework of a macro-structural perspective -  that is, the changing dynamics of 
global capitalism -  they are in themselves a locus where the changing dynamics of global 
capitalism can be studied. In other words, they provide a concrete environment and context 
where larger processes, and principal questions, can be understood. Namely, as such, macro- 
historical processes, however important, are limited when pursuing an understanding of social 
change in a particular field or society. They must be placed within a historical analysis of the 
specific region. Local social relations, institutional settings, and general heritage, with which 
global and external factors interact, make up the particular set of opportunities, limitations, 
and scope for agency, on which the direction of social change in the particular area is 
contingent. The conventional separations between ‘national’ and ‘international’, ‘local’ and 
‘global’ are thus loosened up.
In order to frame my approach and develop the argument further, the remainder o f this 
introduction will firstly provide a critical review o f some prevalent approaches to the issue of 
transformation and international aid. It then proceeds to discuss how recent developments 
within critical political economy and macro-scope perspectives may contribute to more 
complex understandings. Finally, I will outline the dissertation’s theoretical and conceptual 
approach and its overall structure.
The transitional view. Social Reconstruction and approaches to post-Conflict: trends 
and persistent perspectives
The recent deep change in political systems and societies in Eastern Europe, as well as 
elsewhere, have been approached from a variety o f theoretical and analytical frameworks. The 
most dominant perspective has however been the classical neo-liberal (i.e. market liberal) 
view focusing on problems with a transition to liberal democracy and market economy. 
Interpreted in the framework o f démocratisation and liberalisation this perspective 
accommodates the (often explicit) assumption that the main trend h  a struggle for transition 
to democracy and market economy, accompanied by various policy prescriptions for how this 
is best achieved. This discourse has been widely criticised for ignoring specific national and 
regional characteristics, idealising western institutions, and for presupposing a linear process 
of change. Indeed, as for example Björn Hettne has pointed out, the very term transition
' f f f f f i
implies either a completed process, or one whose general direction is known, and therefore he 
prefers the term ^transformation'
The neo-liberal extreme o f so- called ‘shock therapy’, involving structural adjustment and 
privatisation, which dominated transitional thinking in the early 1990s was soon criticised fo r 
having catastrophic consequences, and was eventually replaced with a more gradualist 
orientation, in which the importance of state institutions was often acknowledged.^^ In the 
least developed areas there was also an increased focus on poverty.
Although the transition approach itself has undergone changes and varying conceptions in the  
1990s, such as for example the shock-therapy versus the gradualist approach, as well as 
variations in the importance acknowledged to institutions -  which have become increasingly 
emphasised -, the fundamental principles have remained much the same. Despite critique o f  
the approach’s implicit evolutionism, it has remained the dominant way of conceptualising 
post-communist change.*^
In cases where transition is perceived to be particularly problematic, and especially where 
violent conflict is in question, there has been a tendency to conceptualise society as suffering 
from social breakdown. Although the idea o f ‘social breakdown’ is particularly typical for 
societies that have experienced violent conflict, it has also been applicable to post-socialism, 
where it is considered the political and economic systems as such which have destroyed the 
economic potentials and social relations of society. The concept of ‘social breakdown’ may 
certainly have an attractive appeal when confronted with a post-conflict society, but it tends to  
draw attention away from process and from the fact that some form of social transformation 
takes place through war itself The concept invites to an understanding of society as 
something that can be ‘rebuilt’ or ‘reconstructed’ following the breakdown it is perceived to  
have experienced, without giving attention to the actual political and social transformation
Hettnc, B (1995) “Introduction; the international political economy of transformation’ in Hcttnc. B (ed) (1995) 
“International Political Economy -  Understanding Global Disorder” Zed Books, London.
”  For a critique of shock-tlierapy with arguments for gradualism sec: Amsden, A. H, Kochanowicz. J and L. 
Taylor (1994) “The Market Meets its Match -  Restmeturing the Economies of Eastern Europe”, Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Mass. For a general critique see Andor. L & M. Summers (1998) “Market Failure” 
Pluto Press. London. Joseph Stiglitz (former diicf Economist of the World Bank) lias agreed in much of the 
critique against World Bank policies o f Uic 1990s and was active in the policy -reorientation o f the Bank under 
the presidency of James Wolfensolm.
Compare: Craig-Natioru R, s\ nopsis presented at the conference “Europe and the Balkans”. Bologna, Februarv 
2000.
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expressed through the breakdown itself. Here then appears the policy view of how the 
reconstruction is to come about, and since it is not real-soci al ism which is to be reconstructed, 
this brings the matter back to the same recipe as for transition.
Social (post-war) reconstruction accommodates the same theoretical foundations and policy 
prescriptions as transition^ such as market-liberalisation and promotion of market relations, 
reducing state involvement in enterprise, political liberalisation and démocratisation. Political 
liberalisation and démocratisation typically includes support to local NGO’s, support to and 
training for independent media’, various ‘rights’ projects (women rights, gender equality) 
and so forth, which is interpreted as constituting ‘civil society’. In post-conflict situations 
these measures are seen as essential to overcome and prevent conflict, and are coupled with 
conventional relief and possibly development measures such as recovering infrastructure and 
fighting poverty.
Reliance on this general approach is evident in virtually all aid-policy and social 
reconstruction prescriptions by international agencies and donors in relation to the post- 
Yugoslav s p a c e .In  Kosovo, as well as Bosnia-Hercegovina, the effort is aimed at creating 
the legal conditions and social climate for a market economy, and the agents in this process 
are typically envisioned to be small and medium scale enterprise. In the Bosnian case this 
transition is written into the constitution by the Dayton Peace Accords. In Kosovo the 
situation is partly more complex. Bosnia-Hercegovina shows great complexity in inter-ethnic 
relations and lack of basis for consociationalism, but Kosovo has the additional problem of a 
highly contested and as yet unresolved political status. Cut off from Serbia in practice, and 
placed under international protectorate, Kosovo cannot (since it is not a state) enter into 
conventional relations with international financial institutions, obtain swift codes, or receive 
country loans from the World Bank. Being among the poorest regions in Europe, Kosovo 
displays elements of typical development aid and poverty reduction needs, but with its current 
status it cannot even obtain a poverty reduction strategy. In this manner Kosovo is a 
conspicuously strange universe within conventional development operations. Nevertheless,
Obviously it is also possible to think in terms of ‘social breakdown’ from a communist or communitarian 
perspective, and propagate the ‘building’ or ‘reconstruction’ o f socialist sociew. The metaphors o f ‘breakdown’ 
and of ‘building’ society are very common, but within the neo-liberal framework ‘reconstmction’ and 
‘transition’ are incorporated into the same model for change.
Aift' of the World Bank, UNDP, EU, or Stability' Pact documents referred to in this thesis will re^’eal this (the 
documents are so numerous that a detailed analysis of them separately would merely produce a trite analysis of 
details and might draw attention from the trend: a short ciraracteristic over\ iew is more fruitful here)
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what exists of development thinking for Kosovo is enmeshed in the assumptions that 
privatisation and small and medium scale enterprise provides the driving force for economic 
and liberal development.
Kosovo constitutes specific problems for international aid policy. In addition to its unresolved 
status, it is at the same time a post-socialist society and a highly underdeveloped region in 
need o f conventional development aid. Moreover having emerged out of conflict it is a 
classical post-conflict reconstruction case. The physical aspect of reconstruction is initially 
fairly straightforward in terms o f  rebuilding infrastructure, schools and houses. Moving 
towards classical developmental projects immediately poses a challenge where the status o f  
the polity is unresolved or where partnership and ownership is disputed or ambiguous. Social 
reconstruction however is much more complex as it aims to regenerate stability within 
political and social relations and institutions. In the dominant perspective conflict is 
understood as a temporary breakdown from the norm of harmonious development. It is 
assumed that reconstruction o f the societies through stable and effective institutions cum 
introduction of market economy through privatisation as well as the promotion of rule o f law  
(including securing property rights as a cornerstone for a functioning market economy), will 
promote a stable social climate for future development. This is symptomatic for how 
development discourse has come to be reinvented through conflict in the post Cold War w orld  
and for the idea that it is conflict as such which has destroyed the socio-cultural environment 
and increased poverty. However, as conventional ideas o f development (with the focus on 
state and nation building as a means of creating the polity for economic organisation and 
development) have fallen from fashion, the policy-prescriptions within transitional thinking 
have come to dominate also in post-conflict reconstruction.
While the emphasis on domestic relations has ensured that macro-structural processes are 
largely ignored for analysing social change, the transition perspective also fails to account fo r  
an actually existing transformation o f the domestic (or local) societies themselves, as for 
example the social transformation that has taken place through war in the former Yugoslavia. 
More recently transitional thinking has come to emphasise the role o f institutions, especially 
in relation to post-communist change. The focus on institutions came partly as a response to  
critique and partly to observations that the neglect of the state framework was highly 
problematic. The, certainly more viable, institutional approach gave new impetus to transition 
studies. Still, just as real-social ism had different forms (i.e. as central planning vs. self-
12
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management) so also does post-communism. In Czechoslovakia or Hungary the process of 
redesigning institutions was partly through conventional instruments, such as multi-party 
elections, but in the Yugoslav case, the experience of post-communism was different, with 
war and ethnic cleansing constituting a complete restructuring of society and not just its 
institutions. Here, ethno-nationalism, and not political parties, was the most important force, 
and most effective in reshaping society. An emphasis on institutions, from a liberal 
perspective, translated into aid policy, encounters the problem of distinguishing between 
formal and informal institutions. Whereas the transitional approach envisions a copying of 
formal western institutions the informal institutions cannot be copied. Historical heritage and 
social relations are particular to a region and the idea of transforming informal institutions or 
of creating informal institutions, which can support the change of the formal ones,
constitutes a continuity with the radical interventionist ambitions in modernisation theory 
from the 1950s, where institutional change presupposed athural change. Today, however, 
intervention has become more direct.
The new aid policy, whether in terms of ‘development’, ‘transition’, or ‘social 
reconstruction’ (and regardless of whether the recipient area is in Eastern Europe, Africa or 
elsewhere) here embodies the same theoretical heritage, and the same policy-prescriptions, o f 
exporting a particular set of institutions, both formal and informal, in order to promote 
integration and harmony in a society. The emphasis on ‘civil society’ has become such an 
effort at promoting or creating informal institutions, or at least institutions outside the state.
The revival o f the concept ‘civil society’ serves a number o f functions. While it generally 
replaces the earlier focus on the state, it has within a branch of transitional studies, which 
focuses on ‘consolidation of democracy’ come to serve as a locus for aid, where the overall 
ambition is to develop a political culture promoting the functioning of democracy. Here, the 
problem of démocratisation (and consolidation) is understood to not only involve a 
functioning institutional framework, but a political cultural climate, including attitudes and 
behaviour, where such institutions achieve meaning and can operate effectively. In post­
conflict areas, as well as underdeveloped areas, ‘civil society’ is understood as the 
associations o f the people, the ‘grassroots’ (as opposed to political institutions or elite 
networks), where the departure of social change can be promoted. Thus, projects of 
reconciliation, raising awareness o f ‘rights issues’, as well as certain local welfare provision, 
can be launched in this ‘local’ setting. The term ‘civil society’ is as vague as the term
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‘democracy’. In practice, since (aid) donors need partners (other than a state institution) this 
has largely come to mean non-govemmental organisations (NGOs), or ‘independent media’. 
Within the new aid policy NGO’s have thus become the principal tool for penetration into the 
societies of the aid-receiving state. As the problem of ‘conflict’, ‘transition’, or ‘development’ 
has become localised in the countries concerned, aid policy now has an extended ambition to 
promote cuhural change and to target attitudes and behaviour (as reflected in aid projects o f  
for example ‘human rights training’, ‘gender awareness’ and ‘reconciliation’).
Such a project to change social and mental processes in aid-receiving countries, through 
networks of non-governmental organisations, extends the biopolitical ambition o f governance 
to a global sca le .B iopo litics concerns the life of populations, of developing knowledge o f it  
in order to intervene and regulate it through techniques o f surveillance and management o f all 
aspects o f social life, such as health, hygiene, sexuality, and wealth. The ambition to change 
attitudes and behaviour is about as radically interventionist biopolitics can get. As Vanessa 
Pupavac has suggested the character of aid has in fact become therapeutic.’  ̂ In this manner 
the will to govern the peripheral lands is stronger than the promotion of cultural change as 
represented by aspects of modernisation theory in the 1950s, or than that o f classical 
colonialism, which was mainly concerned with geopolitical control.’’
Civil society has been conceptualised in a number of ways, which will be discussed further in  
chapter 9. However, we can already here point out that, as it is conceptualised within aid 
policy today, it is historically empty (that is, it is used in a different way than previously in 
history). In early modem times the term ‘civil’ meant to behave as a citizen and the concept o f  
civil society could for example refer to society being governed by law (i.e. and therefore 
‘civil’).
Various academic definitions are not really helping us here, as the primary interest here is in 
how the agents involved in the aid industry use them. With definitions being rare in policy
The term bio-politics was used by Michel Foucault and implies a form of politics \\ hich entails the 
administration of whole processes of life of populations: Foucault, M (1976/1978) and Foucault, M (1997/2003) 
“Society Must Be Defended” Penguin. Mark Duffield lias suggested the extension of tlic term to aid-polic>  ̂and 
he lias recently engaged in research on continuities and differences between colonialist and modem forms o f 
inten ention (personal communication).
Pupa\ ac, V (2001) “Tlicrapcutic Governance: Ps\cho-social inten ention and Trauma Risk Management'’. 
Disasters, Voi 25 (4); 358-372; Pupax ac. V (2003) “Gender, Human Rights and Therapeusing Development”. 
School o f Politics, University o f Nottingliam.
Forlliis ‘will to govern' sec Duffield (20016) “Go^■eming the Borderlands: Decoding tlie Power of Aid”, 
Disasters, Voi 25 (4): 308-320
14
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documents the conceptualisation o f this important notion must be analysed from the context in 
which it is used in aid discourse. Here, for all practical purposes, ‘civil society’ is apparently 
understood as a ‘thing’ or an ‘entity’ rather than as processes or social relations. The idea of 
promoting, or even ‘building’ civil society then achieves meaning, as it is the (non-state) 
associations with which partnership can be formed, that are being singled out as agents for 
social change. In this manner NGOs become the representatives for ‘civil society’, and ‘civil 
society’ becomes the representative for ‘culture’, which is supposed to be transformed in one 
way or another. Civil society (as embodied by NGOs) has, within aid-policy, become the 
infrastructure through which cultural change can be promoted. This way of conceptualising 
civil society is highly problematic, as shall be discussed further in chapter 9, and it may even 
stand in contrast to some of the theoretical heritage to which transitional thinking owes.
The concept of a ‘civil society* has a problematic relationship to ‘ethnicity’, since the former 
is generally associated with universal values and not to ethnic criteria, whereas the latter have 
been central in many conflict areas, not least in the Balkans. If ‘civil society’ is to promote or 
safeguard liberal traditions (i.e. democracy) it cannot be based on ethnic exclusivism and 
therefore the promotion of NGOs has had to take in consideration the orientation o f the 
individual NGOs. In many respects this may imply a conflict between actually existing forms 
of local loyalty and association as well as highlighting the question of how representative an 
individual NGO is.
Ethnicity, Nationalism, dan-structure, conflict and the state
The very notion o f ‘ethnic conflict’ also received new impetus in the 1990s. Following the 
internalisation of the aid problématique, parallel to the transition peak, and accompanying the 
mobilisation of conflict along ethnic lines in places like Yugoslavia a whole discourse on 
ethnic conflict has expanded. While often used (also here) simply in a descriptive manner, i.e. 
for conflicts where mobilisation essentially follows ethnic delineation and where identity 
politics and ethnic-national politics are a central component in the mobilisation o f conflicts, 
the dominant perception has however been that conflicts resurge in regions where they have 
previously been contained, or held at bay, by repressive regimes. Here we encounter the 
metaphor o f ‘pandoras box’ out of which numerous miseries escape once the lid has been 
lifted.
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Albeit often criticised this so-called ‘pressure-cooker’ view appears in subordinate clauses oi 
implicitly even in some academic studies where the general approach and macro-perspective 
is dynamic and does not require any static conceptions o f ethnicity. The pressure-cooker 
thesis holds a caricatured picture of ethnic groups, of social relations and o f the state. N am eb 
it largely neglects process, through which conflict mobilise and escalate, presupposes static 
relations between static group formations and assumes a purely repressive (and very 
effectively so) state apparatus isolated from the society over (not in) which it rules.
On the other hand some o f the critique, notably from the radical left or from radical 
constructionist camps (for example within cultural, feminist, or ethnic studies), have tended tc 
bereft the concepts of culture or ethnicity of any meaning at all, wishing to render any 
reference to them as ‘essentialist’ or even racist, and suggesting that they are mere ‘social 
constructions’.*̂  Such ‘cultural nihilistic’ approaches to social relations (including ethnic 
relations) appear to be unnecessarily one-dimensional and naive.^^ Culture, as well as 
traditional loyalties such as ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, ‘kin’, - their presence and character, or their
For e.xamplc Rcifcr, T&  J. Sudler (1996; 34) “The Interstate System" in Hopkins. T &  I. Wallerstein (1996) 
“The Age of Transition -  Trajectoiy o f the World System 1945-2025" Zed Books, London & New Jersey; 13-37 
Here the authors pursue an excellent analysis of post- World War II changes in the inter-state system and may 
not e\ en wish to propagate the pressure-cooker thesis, as they don't focus at all on internal conflict, but it is 
unfortunate that the power of this perspective is such that it may even appear unintentionally. My doubt of the 
actual intention follows from that their analytical framework is in fact important to the understanding of such 
conflicts, but that tlic focus on macro-scope processes often allows for a neglect o f local process and for 
sweeping statements over tlic latter.
Such extreme positions may be marginal, but lias received some influence in Sweden and, allliough I do not 
lliink this is particular for Sweden, my experience mainly comes from Iierc. where a number of politicians and 
academics have taken such a stance, w hich has been reflected in the debate over integration and in the debate 
over so called ‘‘honour-related violence'. Here, there are two problems related to the discussion of culture. One 
concerns a position w itliin mulliculturalism, w liich sees ‘cultures' as different but considers the consequent 
pluralism as mutually beneficial and therefore any critique of ‘oilier cultures’ would be narrow-minded or c\ cn  
racist a problem discussed by Carlbom, A (2003) “Tlie Imagined versus the Real Other", Lund Monographs in 
Social Anthropology' 12, Lund; Ch, 3. The other problem is cormcctcdto wliat I have called ‘cultural niiiilism', 
in w hich culture is largely rendered taboo as a relercncc to social beliaviour, and where some other faA Ouritc 
structure instead is b io u ^ t forward as sole determinant factor, such as socio-economic structures (a \ ulgar 
misrepresentation of Marxism) or ‘patriarchal stmetures’ (radical feminism). Tlicrc are tlicrcby also two 
ontological-epistemological positions possible for the ‘cultural niliilist’, one being positivist (fa\'ouring some 
other structure as sole determinant for e.xplaining some phenomenon) and tlie other e.xtreme relaii\ ist. I 
presented some criticism of this in Sdrensen, J. S (2002) “Balkanism and the New Radical Inter\ entionism" in 
“International Peacekeeping" Voi 9, No 1, Spring 2002, Frank Cass, London; 1-22; and more in Sorensen, J. S 
(2006) “Kultur. institutioncr och social Ullit; en diskussion av Rotlrsteins ansats och liistorisk kontexl” in 
“Stats\ etenskaplig Tidskrift" 2 0 06 :1, Lund (Swedish Political Science Re^ iew). An analysis of a part of the 
debate in Swedea with reference to abovemenlioned positions, is Ekstrbm, S (2005) “Vad mord vili saga", in 
Johanssoa K (Ed) (2005)“Hedcrsmord; Tusen àrav hederskulturcr” Historiska Media, Lund: 15-46. See also 
footnote 31 below.
As docs tlie so-called 'contact hypothesis’ w here increased contact and relations between ‘cullural’ groups are 
assumed to (necessarily) result in increased understanding, a decrease of stereotypes and essentially improved 
relations (tJiis is an empirical question and a matter of contingency, it ob\ iously can be tlie case, but it docs not 
have to be so).
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absence - have a profound impact on socio-economic relations, just as the state has (its 
presence and character or absence). They also have, at least statistically, a meaning for social 
behaviour precisely because they are 5oaa/dimensions. However, this certainly doeswo/ 
imply determinism. Although these are analytical concepts, they are necessary in order to 
understand society in Kosovo. A brief description of Albanian society may illustrate this.
Albanians are divided into two language or dialect groups, the Gheg and the Tosk, with the 
Tosk dominating in southern Albania and the Gheg in Northern Albania and the highlands 
(the division line is usually placed at the Shkumbini river). The Albanians in Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Serbia are Ghegs (with some exceptions for southern Macedonia)^*. 
Traditional structures, tribal or clan-based, as well as village-community based forms of 
social organisation have remained important among the Albanian population in Kosovo 
throughout the Yugoslav period. Few studies are available on how these have been affected 
by modernisation, but as a loyalty structure they have remained dominant. Anthropology 
work and other studies from the early decades of the twentieth century can be compared with 
studies from the 1970s, and to this one may add observations on loyalty stmcture, and on 
customary law (including the practice of blood-feud) from present time.^^ The terms ‘tribe’ 
and ‘clan’ are both contested, but we may instead use the Albanian terms. The Albanian term 
‘fis’ refers to a large group which claims descent from one common male ancestor. Each fis, 
unless being very small, is divided into sub-branches. According to lineage on the male side 
these are decisive for whom a person can marry. Marriage within the same fis (based on the 
male line) is considered incestuous even if the ‘actual’ relationship is, say, nine or ten
In soutlicm Macedonia (Ohrid. Bitola, and Rcsen) the Albanians are mainly Tosk.
~ Durliam, E. M (1928) “Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs o f the Balkans" George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
London; Backer, B (2003) “Behind Stone Walls" Dukagjini Publishing House, Peje. These arc two important 
contributions. Berit Backers work was carried out in the 1970s, but only recently published by ‘Dukagjini’ in 
Koso^•o. A study on tlic traditional form of extended family (the ‘Zadruga’) from 1976 showed that these still 
played an important role in Kosovo (they otherwise largely disappeared from the Yugoslav area in the 19**' 
Century', or at least by the early 20* Clentury) see: St Erlich, V (1976) “The Last Big Zadrugas: Albanian 
Extended Families in the Kosovo Region" and compare Grossmith, C. J (1976) “The Cultural Ecology' of 
Albanian Extended Family Houseliolds in Yugoslav Macedonia” both in Byrnes, R. T (1976) “Communal 
Families in the Balkans: The Zadruga” University' of Notre Dame Press. Generally see also: Duijzings, G (2000) 
“Religion and the Politics o f Identity' in Kosovo” Hurst & Company, London; M^colm, N (1998) “Kosovo -  A 
Short History”, Papermac, London: Ch. 1. Compare: Durliam, E. M (1909) “High Albania" Beacon Press. The 
latter focuses on ‘highland’ Albania, where the tribal system was particularly untouched by foreign (Ottoman) 
pencttation. It should be noted that Durham partly mixes the bajrak and the fis-sy stem. Today, according to 
observ ations by international mission staff in Kosovo, it is particularly in the judicial sphere where traditional 
loyalties are noted and pose problems to the present international administration. Thc>' also have a reflection in 
the political party' system.
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generations back (which does not apply on the maternal side).^^ In Kosovo there are about 
fourteen fises. A smaller group which traditionally has existed within the fis is a brotherhood 
or ‘vellazeri’, which is similar to the Balkan form of extended family, the ‘Zadruga’, but 
differs from it for example in that there was not a common budget. A ‘mehala* is another te rm  
for a subgroup consisting of a number of closely related houses. A house, or a ‘shpi’ could 
itself consist o f an extended family -  something still existing in Kosovo although they have 
declined considerably during the Yugoslav period. The term ‘bajrak’ was an Ottoman im plan t 
and denoted a territorial unit on which military recruitment was based. Depending on size a 
fis could be divided into several bajraks, or more than one fis could be incorporated into a 
single bajrak. In Kosovo the bajraks became incorporated into the fis-system, largely due to 
Serbian (as well as Turkish) penetration into the lands, which contributed to the territorial 
dispersion o f the fises. Decisions of communal importance are taken in a council of elders 
(traditionally a ‘kuvend’). Unlike the council of elders the ‘bajraktor’ (ruler o f a ‘bajrak’) w a s  
a hereditary position. In the 1920s and 1930s the Yugoslav -  or Serbian -  authorities aimed a t  
breaking up the feudal relations created though this system. Despite severe repression in th is 
period, the village community remained important. It should be noted that within the same f is  
some members can be Muslim and others Catholic. Among the Albanians there are both 
Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox. The orthodox prevail in south Albania (among the Tosk), 
whereas Kosovo is predominantly Muslim.^"*
The Customary law applied among the Albanians has shown great capacity to survive in and 
adapt to modernisation attempts and new state structures. The most important code (the 
‘Kanun’) is the ‘Lek Dukagjini’, which survived and developed in oral tradition over 
centuries and was written down by the Catholic monk Shtjefen Gjeqov in the early twentieth 
c e n tu r y .I n  her study from the 1970s Berit Backer suggests that what has survived of old 
legal structures could be termed ‘code of conduct’, and that this represents in a basic sense th e  
‘culture’ o f the A lbanians.A ccording  to Backer these customs have a tremendous capacity 
for survival and a fundamental characteristic here is the non-state character o f the codes (i.e. i t  
is both the right and responsibility of the family to settle a dispute without interference from
^  As noted by Edith Durham, the Catholic Church prohibited marriage to the 6‘*' degree, but on the maternal s id e  
much closer relatives might enter marriage. Cf. Durham (1909): 22. The practice of proliibiting marriage w itliin  
tliefis  remains today.
Among tlie Muslims there is also a considerable number of Slti’a derv ish orders. On religion in Kosovo see 
Duijzings. G (2000) “Religion and the Politics of Identity' in Kosovo" Hurst & Company, London.
It was translated into English in 1989; “Tlie Code of Leke Dukagjini" translated by Leonard Fo.\ (1989), 
Gjonlckaj Publishing Company, New York,
^  The following is from Becker, B (2003) "Behind Stone Walls" Dukagjini, Peje; 131-135
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outside, be it the ‘state’ or some other party). She suggests that these customs and rules 
concern the identity of the people as an ethnic group and essentially state what is Albanian as 
opposed to Serb or Montenegrin. As such they have resisted various assimilation attempts by 
Serbia in the first Yugoslav state and survived within the Yugoslav state. However, according 
to Becker, the attitude changed with the reduced Slav dominance after 1968, and the 
possibility that ‘ Albanian-ness’ could be re-codified and expressed in terms o f participation in 
modem institutions was accepted as an alternative.^^ She argued that increased autonomy here 
appeared to have worked as a stimulus to integration in the state. At the same time the federal 
authorities in fact had little insight into society in Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s, while Serbs 
living in Kosovo complained about discrimination and Albanian corruption (developed in 
chapter 5) and the eventual effect was in fact disintegrative. The fact that some 1000 blood 
feuds were reconciled in the campaign under Anton Qetta in 1990-1992 indicate the 
continuity of customary law in Kosovo, and this must have provided a basis for settlement of 
legal disputes in the parallel system, which the Albanians developed after 1990.^*
The emphasis on cultural continuity here suggests that issues o f culture, ethnicity and nation, 
must be seen in the longue durée. Anthony Smith has emphasised cultural continuity in the 
process o f shaping modem nations, and claims that modem nations often were formed around 
‘ethnic cores’, existing in the pre-modem p e rio d .T h is  appears a highly plausible thesis in 
many cases, not least in the Albanian, It should be noted that Smiths concept o f ‘ethnic cores’ 
referred to cultural aspects and by no means implied any racial or biological lineage.^® 
Nevertheless, for this Smith is sometimes, in my view incorrectly, categorised as a 
primordtalisL Smith himself o f course argued against a primordial view, and he particularly 
does not qualify as a primordialist if the term is understood to  imply tribal or biological 
connection. A good deal of the ‘left’ has often had problems with such conceptions as ‘nation’ 
or ‘culture’.̂ * M ost notably there has been an eagerness to emphasise fluidity and
'  Becker, B (2003): 135-136
^  For the campaign to settle blood feuds see for example Claik, H (2000) ’’Civil Resistance in Kosovo”, Pluto 
Press: 60-64; Vickers, M (1998) ‘'BeUvecn Serb and Albanian: A Histoi>' o f Kosovo”, Hurst & Company, 
London: 248; Maliqi, S (1994) “Self-Undeistanding of the Albanians in Non-Violence” in Janjic, D & S. Maliqi 
(1994) “Conflict or Dialogue”, Open University, Subotica: 237-247 (especially p. 242)
^  Smith, A. D (1986) “The Ethnic Origins of Nations”, Blackwell; Smith, A. D (1991) “National Identity” 
Penguin Books; Smith, A. D (1995) “Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era” Polity Press 
^  It is certainly the case that tribes from Albania and Montenegro, for example, inter-mingled, and that there has 
been a good deal o f mixing in this part of Europe prior to and throughout the Ottoman period.
This may be illustrated by a public debate that lias, and still is (2(X)2-2()04), taking place in Sweden in relation 
to so called ‘honour’-connected violence (cases where women in certain immigrant groups liave been murdered 
by their relatives for not agreeing to a marriage arranged by tlie parents, or for behaving too much like ‘Swedish’
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discontinuity of ethnic identity, culture, and of nation. The modernist school o f the 1980s, in 
which Eric Hob shawm, Benedict Anderson, and Ernest Gellner are the best examples, 
emphasised the novelty o f  the nation and the discontinuity with the pre-modem period.^^ T he  
emphasis on the state and rejection o f continuity has sometimes been unfortunate. In political 
practice there are plenty o f examples o f brutal assimilation attempts flowing from the 
rejection o f cultural or national dimensions of identification. The ‘modernists’ contributed 
considerably to the understanding o f social and political processes behind European nation 
building and the homogenisation o f culture through bureaucratic and administrative 
structures. One such example is Benedict Anderson’s elaboration o f the concept of ‘parallel 
events in tim e’, which followed the contraction of space-time after advances in technology 
and infrastructure, and the emergence of the idea of a ‘public opinion’. Another example is 
the role o f  the printing press, and o f literary production and circulation, emphasised by both 
Gellner and Anderson, as creating cultural homogenisation and a national identity. Benedict 
Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm restated the emphasis on language in the creation of a nation. 
While Anderson emphasised the nation as a ‘creation’, Hobsbawm probably went a step 
further by characterising the nation as an ‘invention’. An ‘invention’ has the connotation o f  a  
falsification and could probably be claimed to have less ‘thickness’ than a ‘creation’ or 
‘construction’. Still, it does not necessarily need to be understood as ‘invented’ exnihilo. 
Hobsbawm refers to ritual practices and repetition connected to schooling, the press, and 
public opinion. Although the modernist contribution to and understanding o f how identity is
women etc.). Tlic Swedish government lias wished to protect \-uIncrablc women in the concerned immigrant 
groups and a rather heated debate has appeared regarding whether the phenomenon is ‘cultural' or not. Here a 
group of feminists and academics from ‘etlmic studies’ cum ‘gender studies’ together with politicians from the 
Left Party (and some from Uic ruling Social Democratic Part\ ) liave argued that the phenomenon is due to 
patriarchal structures and tliat it has notliing to do with culture. Tlicy see ‘patriarclial structures’ as the only 
determinant to tlie violence, but since they reject ‘cultural factors’ they make no distinction between for exam ple 
Kurdistan, or tribal groups in Iraq on the one side, and Sw eden or Britain on the otlier. Evciyw here there arc 
‘patriarchal structures'. A fallacy they make is not to distinguish between necessary and sujficient conditions. It 
may be that ‘patriarchal structure’ is a necessary condition, but it is hardly sufficient for an analysis of tlic 
problem. As an analytical instrument it is far too blunt, since they see tlic same phenomenon (patriarcluil 
structure) evci^ w here, be it in Europe, Africa or tlic Middle East. In the end their position becomes absurd an d  in  
Sweden this standpoint has partly blocked botli a proper analysis of the situation and a political programme fo r  
tlie protection of the women in need. If w e compare this to the problem of ‘blood feud' among tlic Albanians w e  
can make the obser\ation tliat it is mainly ‘men’ who are targeted. Clearly it is liardly sufficient to suggest lliat 
this is due to ‘patriarclial structures’ unless there is some other analytical tool to distinguish Albanian sociew 
from another society where there is no phenomenon o f blood feud. The, in my opinion nonsensical, rejection o f  a  
‘cultural dimension’ is probably due to another fallacy made by this ‘leftist’ group of feminists, namely that th e y  
confuse the positive statement o f tlic existence of ‘differences’ with the normative statement of w hctlicr tliis ty p e  
of ‘difference’ should be the basis for ‘discrimination’.
Hobsbawm E & Ranger, T (Eds) (1983) “The Im ention of Tradition” Cambridge Universin- Press;
Hobsbawm, E (1990) “Nations and Nationalism since 1780” Cambridge University Press: Andersoa B (1983) 
“Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread o f Nationalism” Verso. London; Gellner, E 
(1983) “Nations and Nationalism” Blackwell, Oxford.
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produced in the modem state has been considerable, there is good evidence for ethnic and 
national identification prior to the modem period and for Anthony Smiths arguments 
following his emphasis on the longue durée^^ This does not imply a static form of continuity 
though; ethnic identity, as well as nationalism (which is related to the state), can be 
constructed around different criteria, have different meaning in different social contexts and to 
different people. As with all social categories they are historical products. An example of this 
is the emphasis on language by Croatian nationalists in the early twentieth century, and prior 
to the creation o f the Yugoslav state, which defined Croats as different from Hungarians and 
Germans, and more similar to the Serbs, whereas by the end o f that century Croatian 
nationalists instead emphasised (Catholic) religion which thereby defined them as different 
from the (Orthodox) Serbs. "̂  ̂Neither does an emphasis on the longue durée imply that the 
form of identity production is the same in the pre-modem and modem period, for clearly it is
not. 35
However, much of this debate, including the question of which elements should be 
emphasised for deciding on continuity or discontinuity between the pre-modem and modem 
periods, is of little concern to us here. It does not really matter how old or what the origins of 
these phenomena are. Moreover, rather than asking questions about what ethnicity or nation 
is, I am interested in when it is. Rogers Brubaker has emphasised the political 
institutionalisation of the ‘nation’ and while taking ‘nation* largely as a given, he looks at 
how it is reframed over time in changing political and economic c o n te x ts .F o r  the concern 
of the present study is the understanding that ethnic identity, and nationalism, is dynamic and 
changes over time. It is given political meaning in relation to social and political structures 
such as the state and the political economy (as we shall se in chapter 4). The dynamics of 
ethnic identity and nationalism, that is how it is (re-) configured and constituted, are thus 
related to the polity and to the political economy. This does however not mean that problems 
related to it can be reduced to socio-economic or institutional matters, because it spans several 
social and cultural dimensions, and once mobilised in a certain way ‘ethnic conflict’ has a 
dynamic of its own.
Not only in the Balkans, but also in relation to Scandinavia where expressions of national identity in Sweden 
and Denmark are documented in the 16**’ Centuty, as noted by for example Jojan Vadenbring (personal 
communication and forthcoming thesis in Histoty at the EUI: “The Integration of Conquered Provinces in 17* 
Century Europe”).
^  See further chapter 3 and 4
Delanty, G & P. O'Mahony (2002) “Nationalism and Social Theory”, Sage Publications: 87 
^  Brubaker, R (1996) “Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe” 
Cambridge University Press.
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The role o f external factors has generally received less attention than internal ones in the 
study o f nation building, perhaps especially by the modernists. Anthony D Smith has 
acknowledged this dimension, particularly the role o f external threats and war, and Charles 
Tilly has focused intently on war making in relation to state building.^^ Albanian nationalism 
was largely shaped by external factors. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Albanian 
tribes had little interest in creating a state of their own and even until the very establishment 
of Albania in 1913, they had favoured the preservation o f the Ottoman Empire, but follow ing 
the tenritorial distribution in the process of the Ottoman state breakdown, in which Albanian 
inhabited lands were annexed by Serbia, Montenegro, and so on, they were pressed to form a  
state o f their own. The role o f external factors, and o f war, is again evident in the post- 
Yugoslav processes of state and nation making.
Yael Tamir has suggested that cultural rather than political claim is at the heart of 
nationalism.^^ Nationalism, she states, should not be seen as a mere striving to control state 
power and institutions, because political power is the means while the end is cultural. Tam ir 
makes an important point as to what constitutes ‘freedom’. Freedom in her view is culturally 
embedded and it is within a cultural context that individuals are provided with meaningful 
ways o f life across the full spectrum of human activity.“*̂  It is because liberty is dependent o n  
cultural membership, that the latter becomes so essential and potentially politically explosive. 
It concerns individual autonomy, identification and choice. The idea of liberty as dependent 
on other social beings is an important acknowledgement."^* Within liberalism freedom and 
autonomy have too often been associated with the lack of interference in a sense that would 
make Robinson Crusoe the ultimate free man. Yael Tamir thereby makes a strong connection 
between ‘nation’ and ‘culture’ (today actually a most common position among theorists o f 
nationalism) and she suggests that by securing and stimulating cultural autonomy for m inority  
groups these will be more willing to take share in -  or integrate into -  the state, rather than 
necessarily opting for secession or state takeover. She provides a convincing argument and a
Smitli, A. D (1986) “The Etlinic Origins of Nations" Blackwell. Oxford: Smilli, A. D (1991) “National 
Identit>" Penguin Books; Smith, A. D (1995) “Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era" Polity Press; Tilly, C 
(1990) “Coercioa Capital and European Slates" Blackwell.
Sec furtlier chapter 3
Tamir, Y (1993) “Liberal Natioiralism" Princeton UniversiW Press.
A good discussion partly following Tamir is: Kymiicka, W (1999) “Misunderstanding Nationalism" in Beincr, 
R (Ed) (1999) “Theorizing Nationalism” State University of New York Press; 131- 140.
'** Jan Sokol (Charles University, Prague) made this point in an excellent interv ention at the Conference 
“Varieties o f World Making" on 14-16 October 2004, European University Institute, Florence.
fresh contribution to the force of nationalism, and what is at stake in it, but in relation to 
Kosovo cultural autonomy was not sufficient for the Albanians. They wanted a ‘republic’, 
first within Yugoslavia and then independent from it. Nationalism among other groups in 
Yugoslavia was sometimes culturally and sometimes economically motivated, as well as 
political. The process of how these claims developed will be studied in chapters 3-5, in which 
we shall also say more about how nation and nationalism was understood among the 
Yugoslav socialists.
Criminalising the periphery^ Cosmopolitan theory^ and the politisation o f  humanitarianism
In the transition perspective, the macro-structural context is either lacking or treated as largely 
unproblematic. One closely related approach, which has gained influence since the late 1990s, 
does acknowledge macro-scope processes as a departure to the analysis of conflict but then 
treats them as irrelevant to their solution. In this approach, which we may call the 
‘criminalisation o f the periphery’, the excluding and marginalizing effects of global 
capitalism on peripheral areas are often noted, and thus forms part of the analysis for 
explaining conflict, but it suddenly disappears when it comes to policy-prescriptions and 
instead mutates into a tool for moral condemnation.
Such a representation of underdeveloped or crisis areas in the periphery from the standpoint 
of criminality, justice and moral categories, not only misses a crucial point, but is also 
dangerous with regard to the policy effects and outcomes it comes to legitimise. An example 
is Mary Kaldor’s analysis of the ‘new wars’ as being a symptom of social change and social 
breakdown, where the political economy of the new wars is transnational and where the 
distinction between war and crime is blurred."*  ̂ She notes a cleavage between those who take 
part in global processes and those who are excluded and this enables a distinction and bipolar 
relationship between what she calls ‘cosmopolitans’ versus ‘particularists’ / ‘nationalists’ 
where the cosmopolitan view is modem, democratic, civic oriented, and with assets and 
resources available that the locals (‘particularists’) do not have. Empirical examples from 
Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) of ‘abnormal’ economic activity and criminal 
entrepreneurship are utilised in support o f the interpretation. Its structural framework is partly 
derived from classical dependency theory and later forms o f world-system analysis. The
Kaldor, M (1999) “New & Old Wars”, Polih* Press, Cambridge. The criticism here refers to this work en btoc, 
and was formulated also in Sorensen, J. S (2002).
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analysis itself describes a capitalist central core, which is developing and increasingly 
integrating into global processes with common features of market economy, liberal 
democracy, civil society, multiculturalism and safeguarded humanitarian values. The 
periphery, which is excluded from global processes, develops its economy partly on reso u rces  
drawn from global diasporas, trans-national criminal networks and ethnic economies, but is  
incorporated into resource struggles and corruption at the local level.
The demise of the formal economy in the ‘periphery’ is directly linked to their exclusion f r o m  
global processes and global capitalism and thereby connected (in the analysis) to changes in  
the macro-system. Following this structurally-orientated analysis one would anticipate the 
follow up of a connection between development and underdevelopment as in classical 
dependency theory. Instead, this framework is suddenly abandoned in favour o f a focus on 
agency, where the ruling elites in the periphery can be singled out as criminals together w ith  
the entire political and economic systems, which they are assumed to propagate. Regardless 
the macro-structural conditions, which had earlier been so important, these ‘local’ econom ies 
are now measured and depicted as abnorm al.C uriously, the very processes which were 
found to make ‘sense’ o f the local economies are suddenly irrelevant to the policy- 
prescriptions.
This mutation in perspective from a rather typical neo-Marxist macro-stmctural approach 
towards a focus on local actors makes it difficult in the end to know whether the problem o f  
the political economy of the new wars is due to macro-systemic processes or to 
entrepreneurship among local agents.
The perspective comes in fact then to accommodate several elements from early 
modernization theory as it was interpreted in the 1950s. Within it we encounter the view th a t 
these societies are subject to ‘unfinished’ and ‘failed’ modernisation projects, which have 
fostered an ‘unhealthy’, or ‘criminal’ trajectory. They need accordingly to develop in a m o re  
liberal direction by imitating western patterns of social change. The key, again, is ‘cultural 
change’, as in modernization theory, and as exemplified by modem post-war social 
reconstruction. In the last resort it can be achieved by enforcement as in what Kaldor calls 
‘cosmopolitan police-keeping’. Again, cultural change is to be fostered by focusing on
Compare Kaldor, M & V. Bojiiic (1999) “The Abnormal Economv' of Bosnia-Hcrccgovina” in Scluenip, C-U 
(1999) “Scramble for tlie Balkans” MacMillaa Basingstoke: 92-117
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educated, entrepreneurial, modem agents within the periphery: that is the cosmopolitan 
elements among the ‘particularists’. The relationship between radical, social reconstmction 
policy, bio-political power, and Kaldor’s 'police-keeping* is thus an intimate one.
This dichotomy between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘nationalists’ reinvents an old dichotomy in 
which space is bifurcated into a ‘civilised’, ‘stmctured’, ‘rational’ and ‘progressive’ block, 
within which democracy, civic values, individualism, and respect for human rights are 
reproduced progressively in parallel with economic development and integration into global 
processes. The reverse side of the coin displays the excluded, non-civic, particularistic, 
undemocratic and underdeveloped ‘rest’. Kaldor’s dichotomy not only borrows key elements 
from modernization theoiy, but also hosts a reproduction o f colonial discourse according to 
the moral taxonomies of which human populations can be divided spatially and morally into 
superior and inferior segments. We here encounter the savages and the ‘new barbarians’ 
whom the civilised world has a moral responsibility to educate or eliminate.
While ruling elites, dictators and warlords, are undeniably engaged in human rights abuses, 
war crimes, and corrupt or criminal economic activities, these features are not in and by 
themselves the keys to understanding social processes in the periphery. It is not simply a case 
of poor leadership and awkward mentalities. These issues can only be tackled via their very 
embeddedness within cmcial structural features o f the political economy on which they are 
contingent in the first place. They have to be scrutinized in relation to the exclusion and 
inclusion of global processes, which, to a large extent, they act upon and react against.
Kaldor’s empirical description may faithfully fit the terminology and logic of liberal 
representations of what is normal and civil. But it is simply not satisfactory to conclude that 
global exclusion creates criminals who must be removed. The simplistic logic seems to point 
at a crucial theoretical and analytical inconsistency in Kaldor’s framework. Initially there is a 
structural argument, according to which the periphery was excluded from global processes. 
But, subsequently ‘structure’ vanishes from the canvas and suddenly the local elite appear as 
the root cause, the removal of which, under the auspices o f human rights and impartial 
economic rationality, will cure the patient. Although it may well be that the elite must be 
removed, one must assume that the structural relationship remains. In Kaldor’s analysis, cause 
and cure are mysteriously disconnected. When applying the terminology o f ‘criminality’ as a 
response to globalisation (as Kaldor suggests) one can in fact question whether the
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‘exportation’ of this to the periphery is sufficient. It is quite possible that there is an ongoing 
transformation of values more generally in the capitalist core itself, not least in light of re cen t 
scandals with the United States (and Britain) systematically utilising torture in prisons, 
abusing basic human rights and violating the Geneva conventions.'*'*
Nevertheless this perspective has become highly influential. It is a version o f cosmopolitan 
theory, other advocates o f which include David Held, Richard Falk and John Keane. 
Cosmopolitan theory emphasises the weakening of state power, the rise o f ‘civil society’ 
networks, and favours alternative models for governing that go outside government and 
thereby complement it.'*  ̂It embraces the idea of a ‘global civil society’ in which universal 
values and (civil) norms are cultivated. Further, many within this tradition favour military 
intervention as a means o f promoting such values and safeguarding the moral good. A great 
number o f human rights organisations, peace organisations, feminist organisations, and so m e  
humanitarian organisations have come to embrace it. Thereby many of them have come to  
advocate more military interventions in the periphery.
This perspective underpins and highlights several other major changes within aid and sec u rity  
thinking and practice in the post-bipolar world. First, humanitarian aid has increasingly 
become subjected to conditionality. Traditionally, since the founding of the international R e d  
Cross movement and humanitarian law, this type of aid was considered a moral imperative. I t  
should be provided to people regardless of race, gender, political affiliation and so forth, a n d
But consider also the wide range of scandals in many western countries: in the United States for e.xamplc tlie  
‘ENRON’-affair, or the links between the Wliite House and ‘big business’ in the militaiy industty. as well as 
'Vi'ith Saudi Arabia and tlie Bib Laden family; in Germany the ‘Deutsche Telecom’-scandal; in Sweden the 
‘Skandia’ affair, and a number of affairs with politicians and company directors; in Italy the im esligalions o f  
Prime Minister Berlusconi on cormption; in the EU an entire Commission was brought down following 
corruption; in the UN-s> stem there lias been a series o f scandals in the Congo and in Kosovo; not to mention th e  
s>'stcmatic violations of human rights and of Genc^'a Conventions by U.S and UK forces in Iraq (in No\ em ber 
2004 the UN expressed concerns over the ‘conduct’ o f British troops, and the treatment of prisoners by US 
soldiers in Abu Ghraib in Iraq has become subject to investigations and trials); the indefinite detainment o f 
prisoners without trial by both the US (for c.xamplc ‘Guantanamo Bay’) and the UK raise concerns about the ru le  
of law, and so on. Docs this just indicate ‘normal’ cormption, mie of law, abuse of power, and human rights, 
concerns in the liberal wo rid, orare we w itnessing a gradual value transformation?
For example Held, D (1995) “Democracj' and the Global Order: From the Modem State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance" PoIiN Press, Cambridge; Falk, R (1995) “On Humane Governance: Towards a New Global 
Politics” Polity Press; Keane, J (2003) “Global Civil Society?" Cambridge University’ Press. Influential social 
science institutions such as the LSE (London School of Economics) have developed w hole programmes 
ad\’ocating ‘Cosmopohtan theory’.
A brief but good overview o f cosmopolitan thcoiy is provided in: Pugh, M (2001) “Tlic Challenge of Civil- 
militaiy Relations in International Peace Operations”, Disasters, 25 (4): 345-357
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was to be neutral and without political calculation/^ Following the debate on the political 
economy of war and the calculation of risk that aid may be utilised by conflicting parties and 
thereby fuel conflict, humanitarian aid has gradually become subjected to conditionality. 
Conditionality has thereby been expanded from development assistance to also cover 
humanitarian assistance and relief operations. Conditionality was generally introduced to 
development aid through the World Bank in the 1970s (under the US Carter-administration) 
and it was central to structural adjustment policies of the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Gradually it has become a political tool throughout the aid-agenda to also cover the 
humanitarian aspects of aid, something which Joanna Macrae has called the ‘death of 
humanitarianism’.'** In this process human rights, gender, and humanitarian NGO’s have 
played a considerable role. The moral imperative to assist, and the ‘right’ to life, has thereby 
been eroded in the 1990s, and aid has increasingly become provided not on the basis of need 
only but on the basis of desert,
A second major change is the ideological shift towards military intervention in conflicts and 
sovereign states in order to protect civilians. Justified as a humanitarian action this has been 
labelled ‘humanitarian war’ (an oxymoron some might have thought). The crisis in former 
Yugoslavia has played a crucial role in both the politicising of humanitarian aid (as in Bosnia) 
and in cementing the right to intervention (K osovo).Preparations for enabling more and 
faster military intervention are currently being undertaken in the West, with the EU having the 
ambition of a considerable intervention capacity of its own by 2008 and with expressions in 
UN reports of the need to make military action easier.
These reawakened and proliferating debates over ‘just wars’ are symptomatic of these policy 
changes and are capable of merging many traditional left-wing oriented organisations, social- 
conservatives and market-liberals. Here, certain ‘rights’-advocates on the left and right, such 
as peace-organisations, women and human rights organisations, as well as church 
organisations, find a common cause with a strong emphasis on morality. Capable of allying 
various forces in this manner the project is hegemonic. Market liberals can in this agenda
The journal ‘Disasters* has liad sc\'eral special issues in relation to this. See ‘Disasters’ 1998.22 (4) and 2001, 
25 (4) especially the various articles by Joanna Macrae, Michael Pugh, Fiona Fox, and Mohammed Hanccf 
Atmar. An excellent overv iew and analysis o f humanitarian aid-policy change is provided in the ‘Humanitarian 
Polic>' Group’ Reports from the ‘Overseas Development Institute’, London: especially HPG Report 8,10,12,14 
and 18.
Macrae, J (1998) “The Death o f Humanitarianism?; An Anatomy of the Attack’’, Disasters. 22 (4): 309-317 
^  Pugh, M (1998) “Militai}' Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues” in “Disasters” 1998,22 
(4): 339-351; Woodward, S (2001) “Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?, Disasters 2001,25 (4): 331-344
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further the moral good o f privatisation and liberalisation (including démocratisation), whereas 
feminists, human rights activists, ecumenical missions, and conserv'atives, can all have a stake 
in the new moral agenda.
Here there is a utilitarian calculation. The new military interventionism is capable of 
tolerating considerable collateral damage as it pursues its goals, and the provision of aid on 
the basis o f desert accepts the selective principle that some humans deserve life and 
livelihood more than others. The utilitarian calculation includes the acceptance that some 
people need to be sacrificed and allowed to die for the furthering o f the good cause.
The cause is to spread universal values and improve the world according to western liberal 
standards, but in order to legitimise this it is necessary to first bifurcate the world into a 
civilised cosmopolitan population and a "particularistic* or savage population. Here, the 
criminalisation o f the periphery serves a purpose for legitimising new power aspirations in the 
centre. There is an inherent logic between conditional humanitarian aid, bio-political 
intervention through aid, and direct military intervention. The latter comes in where the 
former fails. Transitional thinking, which internalises the problem to the country concerned is 
in this sense more logical than the version forwarded by Mary Kaldor in which the global 
order is actually producing criminals, but then irrelevant for preventing this reproduction. The 
trend is nevertheless the same in both versions, and as embodied in the new aid and security 
policy. The world can be improved not by material provision and development in the 
periphery, or by a more equal deal in the global political economy, but by education, moral 
training, therapy, and eventually war on the ‘new barbarians’. The cause embedded in this 
new interventionist agenda has enormous implications. It has a mission to create ‘modem 
man’, to civilise (or eliminate) the ‘new barbarians’, and by extension it includes a 
normalisation of w ar and institutes a permanent state of exception for war on the third world.
Globalisation, New Peripheries and Adaptation - Critique of the orthodoxy
From critical political economy and macro-historical approaches we find a contrast to the 
dominant views within transition thinking and to the conception o f ‘social breakdown*.
Mark Duffield has analysed conflict and the political economy of war, from a perspective of 
social transformation and has noted that the trend of redefining political authority within 




the global e c o n o m y .A s  the trend within the global political economy since the 1970s has 
been increasing integration within three economic blocks (North America, Western Europe, 
South East Asia), the areas outside have been excluded and increasingly marginalized.^^ In 
the process of marginalisation and peripheralisation, earlier achieved development gains were 
rolled back in many regions and new forms o f political economy are fostered as forms o f 
adaptation. Political separatism and regional fragmentation has accelerated in the new 
periphery in relation to processes o f integration in the centre. While some states have been 
redefined as ethno-nationalist projects there has in other areas emerged war-lord structures, 
which have fashioned so called weak or failed states, where the resource base has been 
insufficient for a formal state m onopoly.Follow ing Duffield, the contention is that rather 
than merely being excluded from global processes, we have seen the emergence o f alternative 
ways o f integration into the global economy after the loss o f the patronage received in the 
Cold-War p e rio d .W h ile  the formal economy has been marginalized or collapsed, the 
informal economy may be well integrated into the global economy, albeit in non-liberal or 
illiberal ways. Moreover, just as the form of governing of the nation-state has moved from the 
hierarchical form of government towards wider public-private networks, through contracts, 
partnerships, and outsourcing, as envisioned in the term ‘governance’, so has there been a 
similar trend in the periphery, but here the authority exercised through networks has 
expressed fragmentation.
In relation to this a whole new field o f research into the political economy of the new wars 
has emerged, with empirical evidence mainly from Africa and previously classical 
development countries.^'* Here, for example, William Reno has studied war-lord politics in 
Africa and notes the rationality of war in relation to the intensification o f trans-national
^  For example Duffield, M (2001) in passim.
Ikeda, S (1996) “World Production": 47, and Reifer, T & J. Sudler (1996); 32. both in Hopkins, T & I. 
Wallerstein (19%) “The Age of Transition -  Trajectory of the World System 1945-2025”, Zed Books, London 
& New Jersey; Hoogvelt, A (1997) “Globalisation and the Post-Colonial World” MacMillan, London: Ch. 4; 
Duflield. M (1997); Amin, S (1992) “Empire of Cliaos”, Monthly Review Press, New York. Compare similar 
arguments in Cox, R (1995) “Critical Political Economy” and Gill. S (1995) “Theorizing the Interregnum” both 
in Hettne, B (1995) “Intcmational Political Economj' -  Understanding Global Disorder” Zed Books. London.
Duffield. M (1997); Reno, W (2000) “Sliadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars” in Berdal, M 
& M. Malone (2000) “Greed and Grievance -  Commercial Agendas in Civil Wars”, Lynne Ricnner, Boulder & 
London: 43-68
The thesis compressed in tliis section is from Duffield, M, various works including (2001); On global criminal 
economy cf. Castells. M (1996) “The Rise of the Network Socien ” and (1998) “End o f Millennium” Blackwell; 
cf; Cenw', P (1998) “Neomedievalism. Civil War and the New Security Dilemma; Globalisation as Durable 
Disorder”, in “Civil Wars” 1998. Spring; 1(1): 36-64
^  For example tlie articles in Berdal, M & M. Malone (2000) “Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil 
Wars” Lyrme Rienner, Boulder, London; Ballcntine, K & J. Sherman (Eds) (2003) “Beyond Greed and 
Grie%’ance” Lvnnc Ricrmer, Boulder, London.
29
commerce in recent decades in a particular category o f  states, which he calls ‘shadow states’, 
where political instability was manipulated to become a norm so that clientelisi relationships 
could be rep roduced .T hus, in certain cases an alternative to controlling or building 
expensive state institutions would be to  conserve resources and devote them to payouts to key 
strongmen in return for loyalty. In Bosnia, Hugh Griffiths observed that the ethno-nationalist 
elite not only exploited and robbed the local population in their own area o f control, but in 
addition used displaced persons and refugees as an instrument for maintaining the instability 
necessary for preserving and recreating patron-client relationships.^^
Whereas the economic dimension of conflict, such as for example access to resources, in 
many cases has helped sustain hostilities and conflict, it is in most cases not possible to reduce 
the ‘causes’ of conflict to purely economic factors.”  In a number of case studies the 
assumption of the new wars as being motivated by individual greed, and essentially being 
‘resource wars’, has been effectively challenged in favour o f a more complex interpretation 
where political and economic factors, including insecurity bred by systematic exclusion of 
minority groups, combine in particular ways specific to each case and region.^*
The important insight gained from this research, and the study o f  the political economy of 
conflict, is however not about the causes o f war, but about the adaptability o f the 
marginalized areas. Obviously, as is the first observation in reconstruction aid policy, the 
formal economy (and the parameters along which formal economy function) is damaged or 
destroyed through war. This is the very rationale for reconstruction as the term reveals. The 
insight from the abovementioned studies is however that the ‘real-economy’ has changed and 
is connected to new forms of authority and new lines o f  exclusion / inclusion. Conflict itself 
may be an integral part of this social transformation.
Such analysis generally opens up the question of the relationship between power (coercion), 
capital, and state building (or state disintegration).^^ Now, the state is typically the framework 
within which authority and governing o f the political economy take place, and it is also the
55 Reno, W (1998) “War-Lord Politics and African States”, Lynncr Ricnner, Boulder Colorado; Reno. W (2001) 
“Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars” , in Beidal, M & D. Malone (2001) “Greed and 
Grievance” Lynne Rienner, Boulder & Londoa
** Griffiths, H (1999) “A Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict, Ellino-nationalism and Organised Crime” in 
“Journal o f Civil Wars” Vol 2, No 2 (Summer 1999), Frank C^ss, London; 56-73 
Ballentine, K (2003) “Be> ond Greed and Grievance”; Lynne Ricimer. Boulder, London; Ch. 10 
^  Ballentine, K (2003); Ch. 10
Compare TUly, C (1990/1992) “Coercion, Capital and European States” Blaclovell Publishers
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framework in which ethnic nationalism and nationhood are being defined. In this way the 
question of legitimacy of the state and governing structures, the governing of the political 
economy, and the articulation o f  nationhood are intimately linked. They form a matrix in 
which social change can be studied: that is the configuration and reconfiguration of the 
borders and relationships between the categories. We can also define four dimensions - 
capital, power, state, nation. -  o f which the two former (capital, power) have to be considered 
in a global, as well as local, context, for how they interact with the latter (state and nation). 
The 'state" is essentially a question of organisation, and of creating a framework for the 
political economy, and 'nation" is essentially a question of mobilisation of people in the 
pursuit of organising the state.
Framing the analysis of the Yugoslav state and society in relation to these dimensions in a 
historical context (that is a dynamic perspective where the relationships are reworked over 
time) enables us to better address the question of both why and how the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was successful as a state and political economy at one period in 
history, while unsuccessful to the extent o f breaking up at another, as well as the question of 
the relationship between ethnic identity, nationalism and the state. In this framework we can 
follow the trajectory over which the Yugoslav state was transformed from a development 
model into a fragmented group o f aid-receiving polities. This framework also provides the 
wider context o f the whole project of development, following the Truman doctrine, the 
growing field of studies and various theories concerned with development, as well as with the 
practice of aid-policy. These are all particular to their historical period and contingent on, as 
well as part of, wider processes o f change.
Once identified in relation to these wider dimensions, the analysis of the processes must be 
pursued in the local / national context. The changes of macro-structures, which originate from 
more powerful centres than Yugoslavia, have to be addressed in relation to the specific 
opportunities and limitations they produce in the local context, how they have been 
interpreted and addressed by local actors, and how they interact with local institutions, 
cultural characteristics, and power-relations.
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History as Soda! Science: historical sociology and macro-historical structures
The kind of methodological and analytical approach drawn upon here has a long tradition 
within both history and social science, although it has never dominated any of those fields. 
Critical analysis o f capitalism as a world system, is generally associated with the Marxist 
tradition and one of the problems it has encountered, and for which it has received its fair (and 
unfair) criticism, is the tendency to economic reduction!sm or to macro-determinism. Later 
developments within this tradition, such as for example world-system analysis as developed 
by Immanuel Wallerstein, has been criticised for collapsing the various levels of analysis into 
one, where social change is determined by the macro-system, whereas critique of this 
sometimes has tended to reduce the national and global level to being determined by class- 
relations.^ While the analysis has to have some level of focus and some starting point, there 
is a risk with the multi-level analysis o f  allowing one level to determine over the other. Indeed 
if  multiple levels are incorporated into the analysis it is hard to avoid more weight being given 
to a particular level where the research questions may have their focus. The idea o f a ‘total 
history’ is partly elusive. Nevertheless a central contention as regards the approach applied 
here is that the analysis o f a particular society has to take place within the broadest possible 
context, which is the capitalist world economy. This was the position held by Karl Polanyi, 
for whom a central concern was the relationship between the changes in the global order of 
the capitalist world economy and the pursuit of governing the political economy within a 
particular state.^* Karl Polanyi’s work has played a central role in the development o f 
historical sociology, and more recently it has seen a revival within the study of international 
political economy.
® World-system analysis as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) “The Modem World System: Capitalist 
Agriculture and tlic Origins of the European World-Econom>' in the Sixteenth Centui>\ Academic Press. New 
York; and the focus on class-reblions in Robert Brenner (1977) “Origins of Capitalist Development; A Critique 
of Neo-Smithian Marxism", New Left Review 104, July-August 1977; 25-93. Wallerstein was further criticised 
by Theda Skoepol (1977) “Wallerstein’s World-System" in American Journal of Sociolog>' 82, March 1977. For 
an excellent discussion of lliese approaches and the Polanyian frameworic drawn upon here sec: Block. F & M. 
Somers (1984) “Beyond the Economisüc Fallacy: Tlic Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi" in Skoepol, T 
(Ed) (1984) “Vision and Method in Historical Sociolog}” Cambridge Uni\ crsit>’ Press: 47-84. Note tliat 
Wallerstein continuously has refined liis analysis in more recent studies and tliat it may be considered an ongoing 
work-in-progress.
Polanyis most famous work, and to which I will return further here, is “The Great Transfonnation” 
(1944/1957) Beacon Press. Compare Fred Block and Margaret Somers (1984) have outlined and analysed the 
central points and methodology of Karl Polanyi.
For the historical sociolog>' tradition sec the various works o f Barrington Moore, Tlicda Skoepol and Charles 
Tilly, especially: Moore, B (Ì966); Skoepol, T  (1979), (1984), (1985); Tilly. C (1990/1992). For Critical 
Political Economy and International Political Economy see especiallv: Cox, R (1995), (2002); Gill, S (1995); 
Hettne, B (1995).'
32
Although these traditions have been dominant within neither history nor social science, they 
have nevertheless represented an important and highly fruitful attempt to bridge the separation 
between history and social science, or indeed to introduce history to social science or to utilise 
history as social science. A central theme in historical sociology for example is the study of 
the nature and effects o f large-scale structures, as well as on how they change.H ow ever, the 
former is given meaning when analysed in the context o f the interactions with a particular 
locality.
It should be noted here that the term ‘political economy’ implies the rejection that the 
economy is a sphere that can be isolated from the social and political. It rejects ‘pure 
economic’ factors, and instead suggests that the study o f change on the local level cannot be 
isolated to ‘economic’ effects or factors. To many people this may seem obvious, but it is of 
course exactly this ‘non-political’ and ‘non-normative’ conceptualisation of the economy 
which was brought about by neo-classical economics. The term political economy stems from 
the seventeenth century and was then intended to denote the management of the state 
economy in contrast to that of the family household, but in the coming centuries the use of the 
term changed and in neo-classical economics the social and political dimensions were 
eliminated.^ Here I use the term to emphasise that economic relations and institutions are 
shaped within, and are an integral part of, a political, social and cultural context. The 
economy is here understood as a ‘polity’ and the other way around. In a similar manner Karl 
Polanyi used the term ‘embeddedness’ to emphasise that the economy was embedded in 
institutional frameworks.^^
The Polanyian concept of opportunity structure provides us with an analytical tool for moving 
between different levels while avoiding the determinacy of one level.C h an g es  in the global 
order and in global capitalism do not determine social change in a given society, but they
For e.xample Skocpol, T (1984) and (1985).
^  Horvat B (1982) ‘'PolitiCka Ekonomija Socijalizam” Globus, Zagreb: 10; English edition (1982) “The 
Political Economy of Socialism" M.E Sharpe, Inc: xh-. The tenn was coined by the French writer Montclirctian 
dc Wattcr\ illc in 1615. Cf: Hoog\ clt, A (1997): .1 (also referring to Horvat).
This does not imply a position tliat the political s> stem or the state has full potential to govern or control the 
modern cconom>', but merely that the economy can not be analytically separated from the cultural, social and 
political context. This was also the premises in a inter-departmental seminar outline by Christian Joerges. Bo 
Strath and Peter Wagner on “Economy and Politics in Europe after tlic erosion o f tlic Nation-state" 2002-2003. 
European University Institute.
^  As interpreted by: Block, F & M. Somers (1985): 73
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provide for a change in the opportunity structure for local agents within that society.
Similarly, changes in the political economy within a given state do not determine the agency 
of individuals or sub-units (a company for example) within that society, but they change th e  
opportunity structure. The adaptability of marginalized areas discussed in the section above i s  
in this way analysed as historically contingent on local settings and the changes in o p p o rtu n ity  
structure provided by the global order for these local settings. They can with another P o la n y a n  
term be understood as ‘counter-movements’ to the effects o f  a global political economy fro m  
which their formal economies (and social networks) are excluded. The new ‘biopolitical’ a id  
policy may be problematic in that it merely extends this counter-movement. On the one h a n d  
aid now wishes to intervene therapeutically because o f the ‘criminalised’ essentially ‘u n c iv il’ 
or ‘non-modem’ tendencies it finds problematic in the periphery. On the other hand, because  
aid no longer aims at supporting state structures in developing the capacity for providing 
material wealth, or facilitates integration within the global capitalist economy on a more e q u a l  
basis, but rather acts on people directly, the counter-movement or adaptability to alternative 
stmctures of provision and protection (which may be traditional or neo-traditional) may r e a c t  
violently against interventions which aim at destroying (changing and governing) them.
In adapting and extending Polanyi’s approach, which will be further discussed in chapter 2 , I  
argue that social change in Yugoslavia (and successor states) or the change in aid policy a re  
articulations within a new phase of global capitalism and within a changing global form ation.
 ̂ But this does not mean that local changes are determinedhy global developments, or that w e  
! are studying the effects causedhy  the latter, but rather that we are considering the context a n d  
I changing opportunity stmcture o f the former provided by the latter. Within this opportunity 
structure there are a number o f possible choices that can take place as well as social a lliances 
that can be formed, and thus a number of different possible directions of social and political 
Change. Rather than being determined by ‘structure’ we should look for contingency and 
conjuncture within these ‘limits of the possible’. Moreover the global context given does n o t  
mean that change in global capitalism or global order is conceived as an automatic or 
evolutionary process. However, the policy changes and the discursive, institutional and 
technological changes within global capitalism primarily originate from more powerful 
centres and agents than those within the former Yugoslav space, or even by those within th e  
institutional establishment o f aid-organisations, which is the concern here. Powerful
A term from: Braudel. F (1982) "Vardagslivets strukturcr -  Det mOjligas granser Civilisationer och kap italism  
1400-1800" Gidlunds.
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institutions regulating the international economy, such as the IMF and World Bank, are more 
affected by the changing policies from Washington (and to some extent London, Paris, 
Bonn/Berlin), than they are by Belgrade, Zagreb or Prishtina.
Structure and Organisation of chapters
Above, I have introduced the purpose of this research and its main guiding questions. I have 
then critically discussed the changes in aid policy and the incorporation o f new regions, such 
as the Yugoslav, into it, followed by a discussion of the dominant approach within aid policy 
and in conceptualising change in post-socialist states. I have suggested a framework -  
drawing on Karl Polanyi, historical sociology and critical international political economy -  in 
which the analysis of both aid policy and the question of creating a stable polity and of 
governing o f the political economy in the Yugoslav space, must take place. I have delineated 
some core concepts, in this introduction, which I will develop further in subsequent chapters, 
as well as introducing additional ones.
In order to pursue the study along these lines the book is organised into ten chapters, as 
follows. The next chapter (2) starts by discussing the general policy of reconstruction by the 
international community (embodied by the main actors: the World Bank, the UN, the EU) in 
the former Yugoslav region. Then since the Marshall Plan has often been used as an analogy 
for reconstruction in the Balkans the chapter contrasts current aid policy with that of the 
Marshall Plan, and contrasts the social configuration o f post-Yugoslav 1990s / 2000 as a 
peripheral region, with that of Western Europe in 1945, which was the context o f the Marshall 
Plan. The reference to the Marshall Plan is embraced here not so much for its parallels as for 
the important contrasts it give. Marshall aid is widely considered the most successful post-war 
reconstruction effort in history, and as such it provides us with a good starting point. In doing 
so it highlights the importance o f outlining the macro-historical changes which form the 
context of our problem. The chapter goes on to discuss the change in global capitalism, and in 
global orders, during the twentieth century.
After an outline o f these global changes we have the context in which to place the creation 
and destruction of the Yugoslav state and the trajectory of Serbia and Kosovo. The global 
framework is also the necessary context in which we can discuss the whole project of 
international development aid, the theories and debates within development studies and aid
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policy. The changes in these are briefly outlined, bringing the study to the character and lo g ic  
of the current shift in aid policy.
Chapters 3-7, are devoted to analysing the trajectory o f Yugoslav society, with special 
emphasis on Serbia and Kosovo, and on the problem of political economy and the national 
question. In particular the preserved, and expanding, role o f informal economy and social 
networks, in the process of modernisation and then re-peripheralisation, is considered. The 
level o f detail increases in the latter chapters in order to provide a more dense context for th e  
immediate prelude to the conflicts and social transformations in the 1990s and the consequent 
international protectorate in Kosovo.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the heritage of imperial rule and the first Yugoslav state 
until the Second World War and the partisan revolution. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the 
second Yugoslav state, that is, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was 
created after the Second World War. Chapter 4 chronologically covers the period until the 
early 1970s and chapter 5 from the new Yugoslav federal constitution of 1974 until the 
breakdown o f the state. It should be noted that this division partly is practical and partly due 
to changes both in the global economy and in the Yugoslav state at this period, but that it 
should tw t be interpreted as a historical break or périodisation. Rather, the two chapters are 
addressing a single period o f continuity and change. These chapters are more detailed than th e  
preceding chapter 3, and they focus in particular on political economy, national and political 
conflicts over the state and economy, and the consequent reorganisations o f  the state and 
economy. These are placed within a broader context o f the international political economy 
and bi-polar system. As such, these chapters identify a number of stmctural, regional, 
national, and political tension points as preconditions for aggravated social conflicts, which 
increasingly were articulated in ethnic nationalist terms. However, in rejecting direct material 
(political economic) causal links to political or national conflicts, we need to move to the 
level o f political and discursive strategies in order to interpret the severe ethnic mobilisation 
of the late 1980s and the 1990s.^^ This is addressed in the first half of Chapter 6, which is 
concerned with Serbia under the rule o f Slobodan Milosevic. Chapter 6 then discusses the 
political project and the political economy under this regime, with an emphasis on the
“  Compare also the theoretical and methodological position outlined by Stràth, B (1990) ’’Introduction: 
Production of Meaning, Construction o f Class Identities, and Social Change”, in Stràth, B (Ed) (1990)"Language
and the Construction o f Class Identities” Report from the DISCO II Conference on Continuity and Discontinuin' 
in the Démocratisation Process, Göteborg Universi^: 1-23
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adaptation of the economy to international marginalisation and isolation, essentially 
producing an alternative form of ‘illiberal’ economy. The profound social transformation and 
re-stratification under this project is analysed.
Chapter 7 moves on to analyse opposition and resistance in Kosovo during this period. 
Whereas opposition and resistance to the Milosevic regime essentially was characterised by 
political fragmentation and social atomisation in Serbia, the development in Kosovo was 
towards a complete separate ethnic opposition in the form o f self-organisation of parallel 
structures vis-à-vis the state. The character of the parallel society of the Albanians is 
discussed and the adaptive economy, responding to a double marginalisation in the global 
economy as well as within Serbia, is analysed. Here also, a large part of the economy moved 
towards illiberal forms, and the grey and black sectors. Drawing on pre-existing social 
structures and opportunities, and utilising diaspora networks, the adaptive form of economy 
constitutes an alternative integration into the international economy, albeit in illiberal ways 
and essentially articulating a global shadow economy. This is analysed in connection with the 
growing radicalisation in Albanian society, which followed after the Dayton Agreement for 
Bosnia (in 1995), in which Kosovo was ignored, and the increasing political challenges 
coming from the networks behind the Kosovo Liberation Army. The chapter closes with an 
overview of the process leading up to the Rambouillet ultimatum and the consequent NATO 
attack on Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Chapter 8 moves on to discuss Kosovo under 
the international administration, which followed upon the NATO war and the establishment of 
a protectorate. International governance cum aid-policy and the problems with which it is 
confronted in this environment are analysed. The chapter critically scrutinises international 
governance and aid from the first year (1999-2000) until the end of 2004 and the first months 
o f 2005.
Chapter 9 discusses the problem with ‘civil society’ building and the model o f working on 
populations by attempting to change attitudes and behaviour. It opens with a conceptual 
historical outline of the concept ‘civil society’ and then scrutinizes how the concept is used 
among international aid agencies in the context of providing financial support to non­
governmental organisations. The switching focus of aid towards non-governmental 
organisations, and private agents, is criticised from the context o f changes in the international 





THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID POLICY AND STATE TRANSFORMATION 
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION: From Government to Governance and from 
Marshall Plan to Stability Pact
Social Reconstruction in Kosovo
The premises of social reconstruction and the institutional form of governance outlined in the 
introduction are central in the former Yugoslav space. In Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina 
radical intervention is more possible than elsewhere, since they are administered directly by 
the UN. Post-Dayton reconstruction thinking for Bosnia-Hercegovina has in many respects 
served as a model for Kosovo following the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.^^
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was initiated by the EU following the war on 
Kosovo. It can be seen both as an expression of the EU countries’ efforts to achieve a 
common stance in foreign and security policy issues and as an attempt to avoid an ad hoc aid 
policy in the Balkans and replace this with an integrated post-war reconstruction approach. 
The Stability Pact was signed on 10 June 1999 in Sarajevo by all major donor governments, 
major international organisations, and most of the Balkan countries (Serbia and Montenegro 
was eventually included). It outlines a series of objectives for regional cooperation, 
reconciliation, refugee-return and prevention of forced displacement, various reforms towards 
démocratisation and liberalisation, efforts at so called ‘good governance’ including 
accountable and transparent institutions and to fight crime and corruption. The objectives 
explicitly include to ‘create vibrant market economies’, ‘markets open to greatly expanded 
foreign trade’, and ‘privatisation’, which are stated to result in a ‘widening circle of 
prosperity’ for all citizens.™ Further, as a component o f démocratisation, the Stability Pact 
states that the countries should deepen and strengthen civil society (my italics).
^  For Bosnia see Chandler, D (1999) “Bosnia -  Faking Democracy After Dayton” Pluto Press. 






The Stability Pact did not evolve into a donor coordinator itself, but affirmed the mandate o f  
donor coordination and priority assessments of international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank, and the European Commission.
The parallel has often been made between post-war reconstruction efforts in the Balkans and 
the Marshall Plan and post-World War II reconstruction o f Europe. This parallell was initially 
made for post-Dayton Bosnia, but was more enthusiastically emphasised following the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Former U.S 
President Bill Clinton and his Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright, the Council o f Europe, 
as well as numerous politicians, state officials, and eventually journalists have all wished to 
evoke this parallel and it is also elaborated on the website of the Stability Pact.^*
The Marshall Plan is widely considered the most successful post-war reconstruction effort in 
contemporary history, and as such it has a powerful seductive potential for aid policy 
rhetoric.^^ We shall scrutinize this parallel below, but first we shall look more closely at the 
actual policy initiatives for reconstruction in Kosovo.
The first outline for reconstruction in Kosovo following the war and the establishment o f a 
UN administration in Kosovo (as envisioned in UNSC resolution 1244), was - in line with the 
Stability Pact mandate - a joint World Bank / EU Commission (supported also by the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo) programme, called ‘Towards Stability and Prosperity: A Program 
for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo’. I n  the following assessment this is referred to 
as the ‘Program’ (with the American spelling). This ‘Program’ outlines a kind o f ‘damage and
'' For e.\ample Tom' Blair at a speech in the Economic Club in Chicago in 1999 (BBC News 23 April 1999); 
Madeline Albright used the parallel already in June 1997 at a Commencement address at Harv'ard UniversiU”
See also p 10 at information website of the Stability Pact fwww.stabilin Dact .org). The Council of Europe 
extensively draws on the parallel with the Marshall Plan in the economic committee recommendations for 
reconstruction in Kosovo (Council of Europe Parliamentar}' Assembly, 7 September 1999, Doc 8503 : 9-10). A 
lest on the Google web search using the keywords “Marsltall Plan" and "Balkans” gave 9.380 results (entered 24 
September 2004),
It sirauld be noted that Alan Milw ard. an authority on the history o f the reconstruction of Western Europe, has 
criticised the importance generally accorded to the Marshall Plan in Western European reconstruction as well as 
rejected the conventional view of Bretton-Woods. This w ill be discussed further below. See Milw ard, A (1984) 
‘‘The Reconstruction o f Western Europe 1945-1951” Methuen & Co. Ltd
Joint programme prepared by the EU Commission and the World Bank, w ith support by the UNMIK (United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo) "Tow ards Stability' and Prosperity" A Program for ReconsUuction in Koso\ o”, 
World Bank, November 1999.
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deficiency’ assessment (my term) o f Kosovo, and suggests concrete measures for rebuilding 
institutions, infrastructure, and ‘revitalizing’ the local economy.
The document classifies Kosovo as being both war-damaged and confronted with a transition 
p rob lem.Th i s  is also explicitly stated in the European Commission / World Bank 
information document called ‘Regional Reconstruction and Development Programme’7^
A fundamental understanding is that the societies and states in question have suffered a 
structural and institutional breakdown inducing, as well as being increased by, violent 
conflict. This is interpreted as an abnormal situation in contrast to a more harmonious 
development, which is the norm. It is also understood that reconstruction of the societies 
through effective and accountable institutions cww introduction of a market economy through 
privatisation as well as promoting the rule o f law, securing property rights, and so on, as a 
comer stone for a functioning market economy, will promote a more stable environment and 
consequently development. This is indicative for how development discourse has reinvented 
itself through conflict, and the ideas that it is conflict as such which has destroyed the socio­
cultural environment and increased poverty.
In these early documents following the establishment of a UN administration in Kosovo little 
was said in concrete terms about political problems, and the ‘Program’ indicated no political 
problem at all. In this document all the issues are technical(ized). First, the problem of 
Kosovo is firmly located in the concept o f ‘post-war trauma’ and o f ‘transition’.’  ̂Then, while 
it is stated that the future o f Kosovo lies in a ‘full reintegration within the region’,”  the 
priorities for support are a strengthening and reforming o f existing institutions,’* rebuilding 
infrastructure, small scale agriculture, small enterprise, and supporting transition to a market
economy. 79
In the same manner the documents recommendation for encouraging a private sector is 
located within a ‘transitional’ conceptual framework. Although the ‘Program’ acknowledges
“Towards Stability and Prosperity” for example p. i and p. 2 
■ ̂  Available from the World Bank, see reference list.
76 ‘Towards Stability and Prosperity’’ for example p.i and p.2 
Ibid p. 2 




that there are ‘worrying reports about the development of organized illegal groups, possibly 
linked to criminal networks in neighbouring countries or in the diaspora’ and although th e re  
are no functioning institutions and no existing the ‘Program’ indicates that the social 
agent for development is that o f private enterprises and entrepreneurs relying on a free 
m arket While the ‘Program’ notes that ‘markets have been lost’/*  the mere task seems to b e  
the creation o f a judicial climate and legal framework so that a market can be reconstructed, 
as well as to provide incentives so that the ‘grey’ economy can join the ‘formal’ sector/^
In effect the programme sketches out a reconstruction, or rather constmction, of an economy 
and political management that has never existed in the area before, and which is based on a 
theoretical model derived from a market-liberal perspective. In the reconstruction plan the 
social agent for development is neither the state, nor any corporatist model, but the rules o f  
the free market, where the institutional-political framework, and the state, merely are to 
guarantee certain institutions and regimes, such as property rights, contracts etc.
In documents o f this kind there is no room for analysis o f structural or systemic conditions fo r  
development, and agency in the development process is assumed to be operating on a free 
market (and the role o f the state is to provide the institutional setting for the free market). 
Indeed, an analysis o f agency in the development process has had to give way to a 
technicalized inventory list which functions like a manual for reconstruction and transition, 
much in the same way as manuals exist for technical devices. This might have been produced 
for any other developing, or ‘post-conflict’ country on the globe, with some o f the details 
amended.
Strong objections can be made to this manner of depoliticising and technicalising 
reconstruction. For example the strengthening of existing institutions is not treated as a 
political problem with regard to inter-ethnic relations but appears as merely technical. 
However, the institutional dimension is central to the problem o f  inter-ethnic relations and 
consequently also to future security and stability of the region as well as to any future 
‘reintegration’ or ‘regional co-operation’, and would therefore necessitate a detailed analysis. 
Moreover, as Susan Woodward has objected, the political formula and status for Kosovo will
®” lbid,p. 17 
Ibid, p. 12 
*'Ibid,p. 11
42
have implications on people’s loyalties and influence both institutional aspects and political 
behaviour.*^
In the same manner the whole question o f ‘privatisation’ is portrayed in the ‘Program’ as a 
means of quickly restarting various enteiprises and thereby economic growth.*"* The issue o f 
privatisation is howeverfundamentally political and an issue which in democratic contexts is 
typically subject to ideological and political party choice. Not only is this a matter of 
ideological-political orientation, but in the context of an ethnically divided society it becomes 
an even more politically sensitive issue. Kosovo is clearly ethnically divided, but in addition it 
is divided between different networks of loyalty (for example in terms of clan), and the issue 
o f  privatisation must be considered highly political.
Since the establishment of the international protectorate in Kosovo the ideas outlined in this 
programme have essentially been followed and refined. The European Union has developed 
its regional approach in the so-called ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’ (SAP), which 
was initiated in June 2000.*^ The SAP is intended to encourage regional cooperation and 
normalisation of inter-state relationships and to promote a number o f liberal democratic 
standards as well as market economy. Greater economic stability as well as respect for human 
rights, the rule of law, minority protection, compliance with the Dayton Accords and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) are central elements for which 
relations with the EU are conditional. For the purpose o f ensuring that reforms in various 
areas undertaken in Kosovo are in accordance with European Standards, and for the purpose 
o f developing technical assistance from the EU, a joint technical working group between the 
UN (UNMIK) the local provisional government (PISG) and the EU Commission, has been set 
up. This is called the ‘Tracking Mechanism’ (STM), and is essentially a tool to further the 
conditions set up by the international community and to evaluate progress along these 
conditions. In utilising such mechanisms, the EU support channelled through the so called 
CARDS programmes follow the logic of assisting the reconstruction of a liberal market
Woodward, S (1999) “Kosovo and the Region: Consequences of the Waiting Game”, Centre for Defence 
Studies, Kings College, London.
^  Towards Stability and Prosperitv ’, p. 7
See various programmes, such as the European Commission (External Relations DG) ‘CARDS Assistance
Programme to the Western Balkans - Regional Strateg>' Paper 2002-2006’ and other aid-related documents 
available onEU homepages:
http://europa.eu.inL''comm/europemd'projects/cards/publications_eu.hlm (consulted 29 April 2004) and 







economy and the institutional and social setting required for a stable polity, where small and 
medium scale enterprise eventually will be the engine for economic growth.
Responding to the Kosovo crisis the EU has created a new agency, the ‘European Agency fo r  
Reconstruction’ (EAR), which operates in Kosovo, Serbia-Montenegro, and Macedonia. 
Operating in Kosovo since 2000, the agency had by 2004 managed a portfolio o f more than 
900 million Euro, in a variety o f projects.^’ After an initial phase of physical reconstruction 
and emergency activities, the agency came to work on institution building and so called 
‘good-governance’, economic reconstmction cum reform, and civil society development. T h e  
overall focus for the ‘EAR’ in these areas (that is, institution-building, promoting ‘good- 
governance’ and so forth.) is to prepare Kosovo for transition to a market economy.^*
Various organisations and forums work here on multiple levels. Investment in infrastructure 
in the region as a whole is mainly to be financed by credit and loans which the countries h av e  
to pay back, but in the process the international organisations decide on the priorities with 
only a very limited influence from the locals. Kosovo differs from this pattern. Its contested 
and unresolved status means that there is no partner for international credit and loans, and 
furthermore by 2004 the World Bank had not resolved the debt issue with Serbia-Montenegro. 
For this reason the World Bank has not provided loans for Kosovo, but instead managed a 
grant programme of some 15 million US dollars per year.
Technical support for strengthening institutions follows a similar line, which in Kosovo 
involves the wholesale creation of a capacity for self-government. This field has been 
envisioned to involve the training of officials, as well as providing basic equipment.
The World Bank and the EAR both sponsor NGO projects, as well as infrastructure and 
institution building programmes. By means of coordinating various activities the ‘Stability 
Pact’ operates with three working tables divided to cover issues like démocratisation and 
human rights (table 1), economic reconstruction and development (table 2), and security 
(table 3). Within these divisions various sub-groups and task forces are set up, often 
incorporating NGOs as well as governmental organisations, such as for example the ‘gender
^  CARDS =Communty Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation.
European Agenej’ for Reconstmction at; \vvnv.ear.eu.im/kosovo/niain;‘'main.hlm (consulted 2 October 2004). 
See EAR Kosovo Annual Programme 2004 (p. 1) at; www.ear.eu.int/koso\'o/main^osovo-a 1 c2D.htm 
(consulted 2 October 2004).
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task force’. They help identify problems that need to be addressed as well as the mode of 
intervention, such as for example for how to help people and society become more ‘gender-
aware .
International assistance to Kosovo is thus aimed at a variety of spheres to create ‘societal’ 
reconstruction, which apart from physical recovery include institution-building and civil 
society creation along liberal standards. The underlying rationale is market-liberalisation, and 
an ambition to change not just institutions, but indeed attitudes among the population through 
training, conditionality and campaigns. Further, it involves conditionality of assistance and 
relations with the west based upon check-listing the performance of this attitude change.
The international administration of Kosovo will be analysed further in chapter 8. The 
premises on which its policy for social reconstruction and transition rest are however not 
particular to Kosovo. They are present in Bosnia, the whole post-Yugoslav space, as well as 
elsewhere, as the typical state-of the art in aid policy and in conceptualising post-communist 
change and post-conflict reconstruction. As such this policy must be placed within its 
historical borders and understood in terms of the conceptual changes taking place within the 
policy establishment and the theoretical trends in the donor countries themselves.
In this way, as discussed in the introduction, development has been re-elaborated in relation to 
post-conflict reconstruction. Heavily shaped by the transition approach, it involves -  along 
with developments in transition thinking -  institutions and ‘informal institutions’ (or culture), 
which need to be reshaped in order to facilitate the transitional steps towards the common 
goal. Apart from an evolutionary heritage we may also highlight here the implicit organic 
view of society, where institutions and spheres of society are essentially supposed to work in 
harmony. Intervention on various institutional levels, including that o f ‘civil society’ (that is, 
‘NGO’s and the media) is understood as promoting various aspects o f a new equilibrium of 
harmony along liberal and essentially marketA\htYz\ parameters. Social reconstruction 
expresses an ambitious will to reshape and govern society (as in Kosovo) through social 
engineering on a grand scale utilising different means o f penetration at different levels. Thus 
civil society is the location to change culture, people’s attitudes and mental states (for 
example by making them ‘gender-aware’, or aware of ‘corruption’), whereas the state 
institutions are to be reshaped so they can promote and safeguard the free market, in which 
enterprise can flourish and create ‘economic development’. The transition thus involves a
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profound ‘transformation’ and remoulding of society, but with the assumed and desired end- 
state dearly along the model o f western societies. In this manner there are profound elem ents 
of continuity with modernisation theory of the cold-war period, although other ‘development 
approaches’ such as participatory development seem to have been incorporated through the 
NGO’s and the rhetoric o f ‘grass-root’ levels projects.
It is worth noting that considerable critique has been launched from within the Balkan region 
against the reconstruction policies of the international community. Thus, for example a 
number o f NGOs from several Balkan countries have joined together in a ‘Stability Pact 
Watch’ and criticised reconstruction and aid policy for mostly benefiting foreign (that is, 
western) consultants and construction companies and that the money essentially flows from 
the EU to private corporations, while the bill in the end goes to tax-payers in the Balkan 
countries, since most of the ‘reconstruction aid’ come in the form of loans and credit which 
have to be repaid.*^ The large loans given for infrastructure will, they argue, worsen the debts 
of the Balkan countries, while bringing little return in the form of economic development. 
They are also critical that the Balkan countries themselves are not involved in making 
priorities and decisions for their own economies and that their governments have little 
influence on the strategies for development. Contrary to the rhetoric o f ‘civil society’ 
participation and grass-root support, as articulated by the donors and the western NGOs, the 
development priorities and strategies are essentially forced upon the people and countries in 
the region.
A Marshall Plan for the Balkans?
The broad concern expressed about the Stability Pact includes the necessity for regional 
cooperation and integration among the Balkan states, their integration within European 
structures, and a considerable and long-term commitment to social reconstruction. The 
political ambition has been underlined by the metaphor o f a Marshall Plan. But how suitable 
an analogy is the Marshall Plan and the post World W ar II reconstruction o f Western Europe 
and Japan, to current aid policy and post-war reconstmction in the Balkans and in Kosovo?
Stability Pact Watch consists of NGO’s from Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia-Montencgro, 
See the critique on: \vww.stobilitypactwatch.info (subheading ‘the problem’) (entered 26 September 2004).
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The reference to the Marshall Plan probably has a strong rhetorical and psychological power 
when it comes to expressing ‘joint effort’ required by separate states, such as the member 
states of the European Union, and the gravity of the problem one is confronted with in the 
Balkans following the Yugoslav wars. No doubt the metaphor also serves as an 
encouragement for the aid mobilisation necessary in the post-war reconstruction measures. As 
an historical analogy, however, it is weak. If anything, the Marshall Plan - or the ‘European 
Recovery Program’ (ERP) - and post-World War II reconstruction of Western Europe stand 
out by its uniqueness and its dissimilarities with current post-war reconstmction, rather than 
any parallels.
The Marshall Plan was launched in the wake of a complete restructuring of the global 
economy and international system. The gold standard had finally collapsed in the period 
before World War II, and new institutions were constructed for regulating trade and the 
international economy. The Marshall Plan was implemented largely in industrial societies that 
had cooperative governments or, as in the case of Germany, were occupied after an 
unconditional surrender. Unlike the present Balkans, the reconstruction of Western Europe 
following the Second World War was essential to the global economy and thus the United 
States. Karen von Hippel has criticised any parallels between current foreign aid and the 
Marshall Plan since the latter involved a significant transfer of resources. In the first year the 
United States transferred 13 per cent of its total budget to just sixteen European states (more if 
Japan is included), while in 1997 it transferred just 0.5 per cent in aid to the underdeveloped 
world generally.^® The actual quantity of foreign aid has often been criticised as insufficient, 
even dismal, in relation to the needs o f the developing countries in general. This has 
especially been connected to the colossal disasters in Africa, where in many places poverty 
and extreme poverty as well as health conditions are considerably worse than in Kosovo. Thus 
for example, the ratio o f official development assistance (ODA) in relation to gross domestic 
production (GDP) is below 0.3 per cent within the OECD-DAC donor countries taken in 
total.^* According to OECD figures for 2001-2002 the EU countries level of ODA in relation 
to gross domestic income (GDI) was in most cases below 0.5 %, while the countries making 
the proportionally highest contribution, such as in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, rarely
^  Von Hippel, K (2000) “Dcmocrac)' by Force -  U.S Militan' Intervention in the Post-Cold War World” 
(Cambridge University Press: 187
Figures from OECD /  DAC. Tlic level o f ODA/GDP rose from 0.22 % in 2001 to 0.23 % in 2002. Ho\ve\ cr 
few countries reach tlic UN goal of 0.7 %.
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reach 1 The goal that was set by the EU member states at the Barcelona summit in 2002 
was for a contribution of at least 0.39 % of ODA/GDP on each state’s part by 2006.
These illustrations are not intended as a figure exercise to criticise the level o f  foreign aid, for 
although the resources are important it is not necessarily the quantity of aid which is the m ost 
essential. If one leaves aside the issue o f quantity, there is in fact some disagreement over the 
actual role of aid-flow from the US for post-war western European reconstruction. Thus for 
example Alan Milward has claimed that it was limited and argued instead that it was the 
development o f a mechanism for intra-European trade in the form of the European Payment 
Union, which played a crucial role (we shall have reason to return to this argument below).
In fact the Marshall Plan was launched at a time when most o f  the European economies had 
already reached their pre-war industrial production levels (which none of the post-Yugoslav 
states, except Slovenia, had in 2004). Exactly how to explain the great post-war economic 
boom is still a matter of debate, where usual suspects have been the role o f government 
productive expenditure and public investment, the large transfer of people from the 
agricultural sector to industry, as well as international trade, but where other factors have 
recently been forwarded.^"* In any case, regardless of the role o f  aid-flow, a central feature o f  
the Marshall Plan is that it was launched against the background o f a Keynesian approach to 
economic development involving the state as an agent in this process.
By contrast, current aid and reconstruction programmes in the Balkans rest upon a neo-liberal 
framework emphasizing quite different agents in the process o f economic recovery. Falling 
short in comparison with Marshall aid, current social reconstruction theory and practice seem 
to be confronted with constant failures as for example the result after several years o f 
involvement in Bosnia or Kosovo would suggest.^^
Not only was the Marshall Plan the expression o f a completely different view on post-war 
reconstruction and on aid policy, but the social configuration o f  the post-Yugoslav space in 
the 1990s and early 2000, as a peripheral region within a neo-liberal global economic context
^  Only Denmark reached 1 % (2001). Figures are from OECD / DAC available at: n \\"iv.oecd.orgMataoecd 
(entered 4 October 2004).
^^Mihvard, A (1984)
^  Alvarez-Cuadrado, F (2004) “Growth Outside the Stable Path: Lessons from the European Reconstruction” 
Department o f Economics, University o f Washington.
For Bosnia see Chandler, D (1999). The escalations of violence in Kosovo in March 2004 indicated tliat 
sev eral years of international administration in Koso\ o had resulted in little progress: compare UNDP “Early 
Warning Report # 6 - Koso\ o” 2004 (and “Early Warning Report # 5 - Kosovo” 2003) UNDP.
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is considerably different from that of Western Europe or Japan in the post-1945 period, which 
was the context of the Marshall Plan (1948-51). Not only is it essential that the European 
states were highly developed before the war and played a fundamental role in the whole 
global order, but they constituted a series o f defined nation-states which were not contested 
(except in the issue of the partition of Germany) and which moved towards integration 
whereas the post-Yugoslav space is in a peripheral position and has contested states and 
disintegrating tendencies.^*'
In being so different, the historical analogy that has been made with the Marshall Plan 
actually helps us highlight the problem with current aid policy, rather than its merits. It draws 
our attention to history. The different contexts can therefore be further emphasised through a 
macro-historical outline, within which we can also locate the whole project o f development 
aid and the debates and trends within it.
Global orders and global capitalism through the twentieth century
The Yugoslav states, in three versions, were created and destroyed in the twentieth century. In 
this period, three different phases of global capitalism and four different global formations 
can be identified;
1. From the 1880s -  World War I
2. The interwar period between World War I -  World War II
3. World War II -  until ca 1967/73
4. 1970s -  followed by 1989/91 - onwards
Briefly summarised the first period is characterised by a balance o f power system between the 
major European powers, a new colonialism, a British-led capitalism and the use of the 
international Gold Standard under British hegemony. The polarisation of the European 
powers into two hostile blocks and the breakdown of the global economy led to the First 
World War The second phase is characterised by the rise of the United States as a leading 
power and the shift from British-based to US-based capitalism. The great Empires in Europe
V.
^  This includes how to define Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina (with persistent ethnic division) and c\ en Seibia- 
Montenegro (Sandzak, Vojvodina). Macedonia is a separate problem, both in terms of etlinic relations and 
e.xtemal relations (and highly dependent on developments in relation to Koso\ o)
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were crushed and with the backing o f US interests a number o f nation-states were carved out 
in Europe from the previous Empires (the first Yugoslavia being one of them). Three 
competing ideologies (fascism, liberalism, socialism) consolidated in Europe, and a number 
of attempts to return to the gold standard failed. Colonialism was a central feature through 
both these periods, up until about 1950, but the decline o f  British hegemony, the rise o f the 
U.S. and the constellation of three competing political projects (that is, the rise of fascism and 
communism) justifies that we single out the inter-war period as a separate global order. The 
third phase marks US hegemony in the liberal world and US attempts to open up the world fo r 
a US led global capitalism, one step being the shaking lose of the colonies and the creation o f  
(post-colonial) nation-states, but with the global order becoming locked into a bi-polar 
relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. The international economy was operating 
largely with the US dollar as replacement for the gold standard, but with the dollar linked to 
gold in a fixed price. The fourth phase, following the Vietnam War, marks a shift in the 
international monetary system, a move towards a complete dollar standard regime, and a 
reaffirmation of US dominance. Although there is a relative decline in US domination in 
production capitalism, this is replaced by a reaffirmation and consolidation o f US domination 
in finance capitalism, which now became more relevant as regulated exchange rates were 
rapidly replaced by a floating exchange rate system and as private finance was allowed to 
move to the centre o f the international monetary system. With the break-up o f the Soviet 
Union and the fall o f bi-polarism, new space was opened up for an unleashed market liberal 
(neo-liberal) form o f capitalist penetration and subjugation.
Karl Polanyi has provided a most powerful analysis of the dynamics within capitalist world 
orders and the transition between them.^^ In the following périodisation we largely follow, in 
compressed form, my interpretation of his ‘great transformation’, which analyses the 
breakdown of the old order and the strictures leading to the two world wars.
Writing in the midst of the Second World W ar Polanyi was concerned with the collapse of 
civilisation and the rise of nazism and fascism. Polanyi traced this collapse to the nineteenth 
century and especially to the ravaging effects of a free market which as he saw it, destroyed 
the very fabric o f society.
^  Polanyi, K (1944/1957) “The Great Transformation” Beacon Press, Boston. It is not possible to give a fair 
account o f Polanyi’s rich analysis here, but it is not required as we can sketch out the discussion along some of 
the central points he has provided.
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Polanyi argued that nineteenth century civilization rested upon four institutional pillars: the 
balance of power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the 
liberal state. These four institutions formed the pillars of the global order and the long peace 
between 1815-1914 (disturbed only by shorter or marginal wars), and it was the mutual 
economic interest in the laissez-faire trade, which maintained that peace. But in Polanyis’ 
analysis the self-regulating ‘free* market was utopian. In contrast to the conventional view, he 
claimed that the self-regulating market was not the result o f an evolutionary process, where it 
grew out of the expansion of (especially long-distance) trade and market activity. It was not a 
natural extension of mercantilism. It was created through deliberate mercantilist state policies 
and emerged as a unique new invention in the nineteenth century, but at the cost of deeply 
disturbing effects in society. The forces set in motion by the market and by the 
commodification of land and labour produced paramount social dislocation as it uprooted and 
alienated the countryside population and created a labour force with dismal living conditions 
and no safety net.^^ In the wake of the pauperisation and alienation that spread in the 
nineteenth century as a consequence of the forces set in motion by the market, counter- 
movements arose in order to protect the fabric o f society. Thus, two movements; the first 
being the creation of the self-regulating market and the social consequences of it, and the 
second (counter-movement) being the protectionist measures against it, forms the core of 
nineteenth century social history. Polanyi goes as far as to state that human society would 
have faced annihilation, had it not been for counter-moves to blunt the action of the 
destructive mechanisms of the market.^^
The protectionist measures eventually taken by the nation-states had consequences for the 
international economic order and institutional arrangements. The actual use of the gold 
standard, first applied by Germany, led to protectionism and another consequence was the 
new era of colonial expansion, which was the expression of economic competition between 
the states when the gold standard was actually a p p l i e d . P e a c e  in the international order
98 These were Uie processes to which Karl Marx wzs a contempoiaiy obsen-er, and the concerns of wliich he
wrote.
^  Polanyi, K (1944/1957): 76
The Gold Standard w as a British imrention to regulate international uade, according to w hich a National Bank
bought or sold gold at a fixed price. The Gold Standard was controlled by the Bank of England since the UK w as 
the leading economic pow'er. As a measure to ensure equilibrium in international transactions, the ’̂eIy measures 
to upliold the Gold Standard (and equilibrium) became proteaionist and counter-producti\ e to the international 
free-trade ideal. The argument made by Polanj i was that protectionism and colonial exploitation were direct 







could linger on as long as the balance o f power system functioned, which was especially in 
Germany’s interest as a war would be a revenge on that newly created state, but by the 1890s 
- following the collapse of free trade - Germany forged an alliance with Austria-Hungary and 
Italy. For a period Britain took over as leader of the peace interest but in the first decade o f 
the twentieth century peace was made first with France, then with Russia and the ‘Concert o f 
Europe’ now ceased to function and was replaced by two hostile blocks. As the symptoms o f 
the collapsing world economy became clearer, including colonial rivalry and competition, the 
two blocks were destined for war.
The old order broke down in the First World War, but after the war came a series o f attempts 
to restore the order and the gold standard (which was a cause for protectionism as soon as it 
was applied in practice). The gold standard had, however, rested on British hegemony, which 
no longer existed. The United States had taken over as the leading capitalist power and 
moreover, the attempt to eliminate the defeated states from the system made it impossible to 
restore, since this introduced an imbalance into the system. In this way, the League o f  Nations 
was doomed to failure from the start and especially so since the United States was not a 
member.^®*
Since there was no solution to the problem with the international economy, the crisis moved 
on and accelerated, which marks the beginning of the second phase in the above périodisation. 
This led to a series o f monetary crises within various states through the 1920s. The gold 
standard finally broke down due to accumulated imbalances in the forced stabilisation o f 
currencies towards the standard. A partial recovery was possible only after the final ' 
abolishment of the gold standard along with the institutions of the old order. By the 1930s 
three different types of protectionist measures against the market took shape. These are
Gennany, the economic structure was divided by the agrarian east, dominated by large land-holdings in Eastern 
Pnissia, and an increasingly industrialising west. Tlie eastern land-holders had favoured free trade for their 
exports, but when the prices on agricultural products fell after competition from the new' areas opening up in 
America and Russia, these Prussian land-holders opted for protectionism Since the emerging industry in western 
Germany' also opted for protection, Bismarck embarked on the rKW strategy. Hence, Germany needed protection 
as soon as it adopted the Gold Standard necessary' for free trade.
Althougli Woodrow Wilson had been elected on a ‘no-w ar’ ticket in 1916. the U.S. entered the war the 
following year and Wilson’s more global ^ision w as clearly expressed in the Paris Peace Conference. He himself 
favoured the League o f Nations, but there was strong political opposition in the US coming from fear tlrat the US 
would need to maintain standing troops on European soil. The conserv ative republicans rejected U.S. 
interv ention in Europe (and especially feared potential European involvement in the Americas). The Versailles 
Treaty (and the League o f Nations) w as defeated in the Senate in 1920, and instead the Monroe doctrine from 
1823, according to which the US alone e.xcicised influence over the Americas, w liile it w ould keep out o f Europe 
(’isolationism’), continued in effect for the nexl tw o decades.
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various expressions o f the necessary coimter-movemeni to the forces of the free market (or the 
second phase in a double-movement, where the creation of the free market and its effects 
constitute the first phase). Those three versions were:
the ‘New D eaf in the United States, and the various poverty reduction measures in the 
liberal states, which signalled the development of the welfare state project in the 
European west;
the socialist / communist state with developed central planning and rejection of the 
market principles altogether.
The fascist and national-socialist (Nazi) projects in Germany, Italy, Spain.
With the development of these three competing forms, the international order had changed 
shape considerably. Moreover, the final destruction of empires in Europe, and the principle of 
creating nation-states in their place completely reshaped the political and economic geography 
of Europe. The three ideologies, and political projects (fascism, communism, liberalism), 
were quite mutually exclusive and in global competition with each other. As such they were 
destined for collision and it took the alliance of two of them (communism and liberalism) to 
defeat the third (fascism).
Polanyi foresaw the welfare state as a necessary development in order to come to terms with 
the problems created by the self-regulating market, and although he was right in relation to 
the western European trend his hopes for the United States proved wrong. For Polanyi the 
New Deal comprised the essence o f a ‘social democratic’-style welfare protection project in a 
revolutionary age, where the fear of union power and communist revolution spurred measures 
against the effects of the free market. To Polanyi’s great disappointment the U.S. did not 
continue much further in the direction of social welfare provision. After the Second World 
War, the position of the United States was so strong that it could become hegemonic, and 
pursue a policy of opening the globe for an American capitalist expansion and economic 
lebemraum.
Neil Smith has suggested that the most important change following the Great War of 1914- 
1918 was not the shift from a European to a U.S.-based capitalism, but a shift to a different




connection between economics and geography. Following his thesis the change was from  a
system where capital accumulation and economic relations included geographical expansion 
to an integrated world system where there was no longer a completely territorial solution to 
the economy. In other words the strategy was to move from the geopolitics o f territorial 
power and control to a geo-economics of control through markets and politics, or from 
geopolitical to geo-economic imperialism. In Smith’s argument this is the rise of 
globalism, in which geography was rendered elastic in the process of capitalist expansion, and 
underdevelopment became an integrated part o f that of development. The liberal idealism in 
US foreign policy should, according to Smith, be seen in this context, as it becomes a tool for 
economic expansion. Although the American vision was that of a global economic space in 
which to expand freely, the borders had to be placed somewhere and the ideal o f national self- 
determination in the place of former empires provided the political-geographic matrix for a 
global economic space. Namely, in order for the U.S. global economic power to work, there 
had to be territorial stability and a fixing o f new states, and by breaking up the old European 
political geography into nation-states, economic expansion was possible. National self- 
determination and the creation of new nation states was the formula o f the time to break down 
‘old-style’ European colonial-based capitalism, and from quite different standpoints than 
those of W oodrow Wilson, the ideal o f national self-determination was shared by Vladimir 
Lenin and the communists.
However, this ‘fixing o f space for capitalism’ covering the European continent was stunted by 
the Russian Revolution, and by Nazism and fascism in several states. It was also defeated at 
home in the United States as the Versailles Treaty was voted down in the Senate, and 
Wilson’s liberal internationalism had to give way to the Monroe doctrine.
The political ‘isolationism’ inherited from the Monroe doctrine persisted in the inter-war 
years while at the same time the dominance o f  the United States in the global economy was 
consolidated. The U.S. upheld a trade surplus with Europe, which was brought to balance by a 
triangular trading system. In this system the U.S, purchased primary goods in European 
colonies and paid with dollars, which European countries then acquired by trading
Smith, N (2003) Neil Smith outlined the main points in his arguments on U.S, policy' following the two 
World Wars in tw o seminars at the Institute for Cultural and Economic Geography, University o f Lund, on 28 
and 30 April 2000.
Smith, N (2003); Smith, N (2005) “The Endgame of Globalization” Routledge, New York; most explicitly on 
pp. 70-71
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manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials and foodstuffs and through repatriation o f 
profits from colonial investments.
But as we have seen the temporary revival o f the economies and the welfare arrangements in 
the victorious countries could not be sustained in the fragile international order / disorder 
following the First World War and it may be said that a meltdown o f the global economy and 
political order was built into the post-war arrangements. With the failure to come to a 
settlement with the political economy of the defeated states, as well as the international 
economic system, the European powers entered another great war o f mutual destruction. 
Indeed the two world wars may be described as one single global crisis, with a pause, in the 
struggle for succession to British hegemony.
The American vision of a global economic space was made possible only after the Second 
World War (which constitutes our third phase) although in practice it was restricted to half o f 
the globe given the binary geopolitics of the Cold War.'°’ The Marshall Plan was a necessary 
step in this strategy, since the restoration of the major European economies was vital for a US 
led international capitalism, both in order to constitute markets for US goods and to avoid that 
these European states falling to socialist revolution. The reconstruction of industrial 
production capacity in Europe (centred on Germany) and in Japan was essential in order to 
overcome the lack of dollars for buying American products. If industrial capacity could be 
restored in Europe and Japan, the pre-war triangular trading pattern would provide for the 
dollar-gap to be filled and create the markets for U.S. companies. In order for the European 
states to find markets for their products there had to be a certain level o f development in the 
former colonies, or Third World, and so the Marshall Plan and the so-called point four 
programme of Development Aid (to underdeveloped countries) announced by Harry S. 
Truman in 1949 were integral components in the strategy for the new U.S.-led global 
economy.^®* The ‘freeing’ o f the colonies and the state- and nation building in colonial areas 
was essential to the new American order, and it was framed in the same ideological language 
as that of Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference some decades earlier. The ‘rights’
Reifer, T & J. Sudler (1998): 15
Derlugian, G. M (1998) in Hopkins, T & I. Wallcrstein (1998) “The Age of Transition -  Trajector>^ of the
World System 1945-2025” Zed Books, London & New Jersc>̂  : 153
Smith, N (2003): 455-456. In other wo ids a geo-economic strategj' within the ’free world’ coupled with a 
the Soviet Union and the communist bloc.
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weapon (the right to national self-determination, and so on.) was a powerful tool in this realist 
geopolitical / geo-economic consideration.
The whole institutional framework, which was to  uphold the New International Order, 
including the Bretton Woods institutions, and the United Nations, was designed under 
American leadership. Some institutions, such as the financial ones of the IMF and the 
W orld Bank, were to be dominated by the U.S. and its closest allies, while the U.N. was 
designed according to the idea of one-nation / one-vote in the Assembly, but with the Security 
Council composed o f a smaller circle o f veto-right states. The IMF and the World Bank were 
to operate as a kind o f currency police (IMF) and development credit institution (WB) to 
facilitate the governing and promotion of the global economy. The US dollar was to serve as 
the new standard (connected with a fixed price to gold) while the economic order ultimately 
was secured by the military power (and nuclear arsenal) o f the U.S.
Much o f the literature in political economy and economic history emphasises the U.S. basis 
and the dollar basis o f the post-war international institutional order in which the 'golden age’ 
of capitalism and unprecedented economic growth took place. It also emphasises the role of 
the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Programme, for the post-war reconstruction o f 
Western Europe. By contrast, Alan Milward has argued that initial U.S. ambitions for the 
post-war order were actually halted and had to give way considerably to European 
initiatives. Milward also claims that the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program was 
less significant than is usually suggested. The U.S. ambition was to break-up the nation states 
and create a united Europe and to move quickly towards equilibrium in international trade and 
finance. The Europeans were very much against this, especially the concept of a ‘united 
Europe’, and their main overall priority was not just reconstruction, but considerable 
development o f  the national economies and their potentials. The U.S. then shifted towards the 
softer goal o f trade liberalisation within the western European space. This was only possible 
in a gradual manner. The European states pursued the goal o f reconstructing their national 
economies, rather than seeking to recreate international equilibrium in trade and payments. 
The European Recovery Programme helped them do this, and especially the imports from the
Cf: Smith, N (2003), especially chapter 13
The UN Charter, for e.xample, was drafted in the U.S. Slate Department partly by copying elements from the 
U.S. Constitution. For the discussions and negotiations in relation to the new imemational institutional famcwork 
see Neil Smith (2003)
MUwardL A(1984)
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U S. enabled a high level o f capital accumulation. This destroyed the ideas of Bretton-Woods 
in its birth, but for the U.S. it was politically essential to keep Europe within its interest sphere 
and the concessions would be worth the price. For the Europeans the Marshall aid was not 
sufficiently important to allow the U.S. to pursue its initial goals. Instead, Milward argues, it 
was the European Payments Union that provided the institutional framework for European 
recovery and interdependence. The European Payments Union was a multilateral instrument 
through which a particular country could clear a trade deficit against another country with any 
other country in the union. Eventually the foundations were laid for further economic 
cooperation, which not only secured the peace but also provided for a European integration of 
a soft form (as opposed to the initial U.S. ambition). Thus, while the Bretton-Woods was 
rejected, the Europeans laid the foundations of a framework for interdependence which the 
Americans had to accept. In Milwards analysis the foundation for international trade was not 
only the U.S. dollar but the coexistence of a sterling area, that o f Western Europe and the 
dollar trading zone. Within this framework trade liberalisation was gradually possible, but its 
basis was a European integration project and the regulated market where nation-states pursued 
Keynesian economic policies and protectionism o f many sectors, while allowing the 
liberalisation of, or common economic policies in, a few sectors.“ ^
In minimising the role of aid flow Milwards analysis does not improve the case for a parallel 
between Marshall aid and current aid policy in the Balkans. In fact if  we follow Milward, as I 
would suggest, the contrast between the reconstruction of Western Europe and current aid 
policy is equally strong if  not amplified, because in Milward’s analysis it was Keynesian 
policies and strongly regulated economies which provided for reconstruction and economic 
development. The economic integration was gradual and negotiated by sector. This is 
essentially different from the trade and market liberalisation allied to privatisation pursued in 
current post-war reconstruction and transition policies towards the Balkans. Moreover, the 
European states were not only essential to the global economy, but they were industrialised 
and developed economies. Hence, aid was to a large extent a matter of the rich helping the 
rich.
The post-war trend in the international political economy was one of continuous liberalisation 
under the auspices o f an institutional framework, which was safeguarded by the United States.
112 Milward, A (1984): especially Ch.l and ‘Conclusions’.
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The successive liberalisation and the ‘rules of the game’ were designed to favour U.S. 
enterprise and economic expansion, but they had to be acceptable to other states in the core 
zone. In the shaping of this order governmental interventions and agreements between the 
major states in the core have played the lead role. In Europe and in Japan enterprise and 
industry were based on strong state support and the protectionist elements in many sectors 
played an important role in rebuilding domestic economic and industrial capacity for global 
competition.
The creation o f an American global economic space was however considerably impeded by 
the Cold War. The configuration of a bipolar structure of a ‘free world’ under US hegemony, 
and an anti-capitalist development alternative locked the political space into spheres of 
influence and created opportunities for a mid-way balance of non-aligned countries like 
Yugoslavia. Further, it created negotiation leverage for trade unions and social democrats in 
the west.
Thus, the shaping o f  international economic liberalism was matched by (and preconditioned  
by) protective national economic development projects throughout Europe. The state 
encapsulated, and organised, the governing o f the political economy within a mobilised 
nation. State, nation, and capital converged, but within a global capitalist (liberal) framework 
regulated by a new set of institutions ultimately safeguarded by the (hegemonic) United 
States. ‘F ree’ trade was strongly negotiated and regulated both in terms of products and in 
terms o f partners for the trade. If this seems paradoxical, they were in fact mutually 
conditioned: the Keynesian welfare state project was the foundation for the legitimacy o f the 
international liberal order.
Even if  the post-war European liberal (welfare) state was shaped in the inter-war period 
(especially the 1930s), through measures against poverty and measures o f inclusion and broad 
political participation (universal suffrage, working-class incorporation), it was in the post-war 
period that the role o f the state was expanded to unprecedented levels. Social engineering, 
interventionism in social life, and political steering in the polity constituted the matrix in
113 Ikeda, S (1998); 64
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which the global economic expansion operated. The welfare state project in the centre states 
was paralleled with the statist development model in the peripheiy, or third world.
State bureaucracies and hierarchical forms of government were exported, either from the west 
or from its communist competitors, to the ‘third world countries’ consisting o f former 
colonies and newly created states. In many such states, of course, this implied the creation o f 
more effective means o f repression."^
Under this new order the first decades of the post-war period saw a golden age. Georgi 
Derlugian has discussed how American labour relations became the pattern in Europe and 
Japan and how the project of global economic expansion was based on the recreation of 
markets and growing productivity and required the institution of increased wages, social 
security benefits, expanded leasure time, and so forth. This secured relative class peace 
within states and legitimacy for the whole order.
As outlined by Satoshi Ikeda, global economic integration was led by trade in the 1950s, by 
foreign direct investment in the 1960s -  along with continuing trade by bank lending in the 
1970s, and by international security flows in the 1980s. In the same manner liberalisation 
moved on gradually, with merchandise trade in the 1950s and 1960s, foreign direct 
investment in the 1960s, international financial activities in the 1970s and 1980s, and then 
continuously negotiated liberalisation of trade in services, information, and agriculture in the 
1980s and 1990s."*
The domination of the United States within production capitalism decreased in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Japan and Germany (and Europe in general) gained ground and the very 
foundations for the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony (which was the condition under which the 
other states could advance their economies) eventually seemed to undermine that hegemony. 
Here the Vietnam War played a crucial role. The war’s expenses seriously reversed the US 
balance of payments and when more dollars were printed to cover the costs, its value deflated,
Tlie term ‘the Third World’ was first used in 1949 by the French demographer Alfred Sourver, wlio intended 
it in a political sense for countries outside the Washington-Moscow axis, and only later it became the main term
for all underdeveloped countries. 
Derlugian, G (1998); 150 
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in turn eroding other states’ acceptance o f  it as a cornerstone for international trade, and they 
switched their preference to gold holdings. Thus, by the 1970s U.S. hegemony showed a 
tendency to decline, but it came in fact to be reaffirmed and consolidated through a strategy of 
changing the rules o f the international monetary system. W ithin international relations (and 
international economics) the 1970s has often been construed as a decline in US hegemony, 
and an increased regionalism where Germany and Japan rose as economic powers, due to 
their increased shares in the finance and control o f production. In contrast to this, Peter 
Gowan has analysed the shift as a US strategy to restore domination by first abandoning the 
US dollar’s link to gold (in 1971), then abandoning the Keynesian system (in international 
finance), which regulated private financial operators from moving freely around the world, 
and opening up for a free capital market and free movement o f capital globally. The other 
capitalist states (in Western Europe, Japan) were of course reluctant to accept a pure dollar 
standard, since it would give too much power to the United States and a step in the US 
strategy was to promote an oil crisis in 1973, by which oil prices quadrupled, and which was 
mainly directed against the potential competitors of Western Europe and Japan. Although 
the oil crisis has conventionally been seen as a Saudi-Arabian response in reaction to the Yom 
Kippur war, and the US support for it, Gowan has shown that it was promoted by the United 
States administration, which realised that the sudden inflow of petrodollars to the oil-rich 
Arab states could not be absorbed through reinvestment domestically in these countries and 
would therefore have to be placed primarily in the largest and most secure financial system, 
namely the American financial system (American banks and Wall Street), thus providing a 
considerable boost to the l a t t e r . I n  1974 a strategy followed to release capital control and to 
allow private banks to move to the centre of international finance. This shift would eventually 
have great consequences for a number o f third world countries and newly industrialising 
countries, including Yugoslavia, through the building up o f the international debt trap, to 
which we shall return in Chapter 5, The shift forced an eventual replacement everywhere of 
regulated exchange rates towards a floating exchange rate system, and it constituted a core 
pillar behind the move towards neo-liberalism by the late 1970s and the 1980s. Since the price 
in oil, and many other goods that are traded internationally, is set in dollars, and the US freely 
can move the exchange price of dollars against other currencies without suffering the
Reifer, T & J, Sudler (1998): 26; Gilpin, R (1987) “The Political Economy of International Relations’ 
Princeton University Press; 135
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economic consequences that other states would do if they attempted the same, the dollar has a 
considerable advantage or seigniorage in the international monetary system.
There was, of course, resistance in many countries to the abandoning of the exchange rate 
system, but while national banks guaranteed the value of national currencies, heavy 
speculation against many of them finally forced the free floating o f currencies, a process 
largely completed by the end of the 1980s. The switch from fixed to floating exchange rate 
systems left the price o f money itself to be set on the self-regulating market and signalled an 
increase in the financial strength o f capitalist enterprise, and in particular finance capital, vis- 
à-vis states and after this no single state could pursue macro-economic policies without taking 
into consideration the standing in the international economy; debt accumulation had direct 
consequences for the attraction and strength of the national currency.'^'* No other country but 
the United States would be able to run such a sizeable budget deficit, as it currently does, 
without risking interference from the International Monetary Fund and considerable financial 
punishment.
The post-war golden years of global economic expansion and increased welfare lasted up until 
the 1970s, and they rested on industrial mass production and the accompanying organisational 
and institutional arrangements known as Fordism. The Fordist production (sometimes Fordist- 
Taylorist) is successful because it achieves economies of scale (the product becomes cheaper 
in proportion to the quantity produced), but this requires mass consumption and the 
continuous expansion o f markets. In this manner the elements of success for Fordism also 
represents its limits. Like capitalism itself, it has to expand, and the social institutions 
accompanying it -  the Keynesian welfare state -  required continuous growth and increase in 
welfare provisions and salaries for the workers. By the 1970s limits were reached through 
the saturation of markets and through over-crowding and increased competition within 
enterprise itself As the system lacked flexibility to adapt to these circumstances a period o f 
contraction and stagflation (stagnation accompanied by inflation) followed. Initially the 
response was to export manufacturing to countries where the production costs were cheaper, 
thus providing an industrial impetus to the so-called Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) -
Gowan. P (1999): 20, and for the significance of dollar seigniorage see pp. 25-26.
Ikcda, S (1998): 64-65
The necessity to expand is o f course central to capitalism itself, but Fordism / Taylorism speeded up the 
process considerably. On the internal logic o f capitalism, and its expansionist logic -  geographically or by sector 
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a sphere within which Yugoslavia was competing through license-production and so forth. 
but by the 1970s the downturn in the global economy was exacerbated by the oil-crisis 
following the shock increase in the price of raw oil induced by OPEC countries.
In a number of underdeveloped countries the development project as such showed marginal 
results only and the uneven development within the global economy was increasingly 
politically challenged. Now figuring as a united group the Third World countries raised 
demands for more equal terms, culminating in the demand in the UN for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974-75.
By the 1970s new flexible forms o f production, fuelled by micro-electronics, and the 
revolutionary impact o f information technology, paved the way for a new e c o n o m y . T h e  
tertiary sector (service) gained ground at the expense of the primary (agriculture) and 
secondary (industry) in the core countries. Flexibility now became the prevalent catch-word to 
cope with a post-Fordist era, not only in production, but in management and organisation as 
well as government.
As we have seen above, the challenges to the Keynesian welfare-state model were not merely 
structurally-economically determined but part of a political strategy and indeed a new 
conceptualisation of government. Arienne Heritier has located the evolution of the concept of 
‘governance’ on the one hand in relation to the planning failures observed in implementation 
studies following the grand ambitions of the Kennedy administrations war on poverty in the 
1960s, and on the other hand in relation to systems theory research claiming that society is so 
functionally differentiated and complex that the political system cannot fully control other 
‘spheres’ in society ( ‘economic’, ‘culture’, for example.).*^* In reassessing the market 
mechanism, as another form of (self-) governing, the ideas that political steering needed to 
rely partly on private actors for policy success were then developed, with deregulation as a 
logical consequence.
For e.\ample Castells, M (1996) “The Rise of the Network Society”, Voi 1 of “The Information Age:
Econo Society and Culture”, Blackwell, O.xford
For a study of the changes in language and conception see Strath, Bo (2003) “Hie State and its critics: is there 
a post-modern challenge?” in Skinner, Q & B. Strath (Eds) (2003) “States and Citizens: Histoiy, T heoy, 
Prospects”, Cambridge University Press: 167-190
Heritier, A (Research seminar presentation at the European University Institute, 3 March 2003).
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Propelled by Chicago-style economic thinking, in which the self-regulating market was 
idealised, and by the ultra market-liberal oriented governments that came in power in the U.S 
(Reagan) and the U.K (Thatcher), by the 1980s a new revolution in the governing of the 
political economy paved the way for new policies in the international financial institutions 
(the World Bank and IMF). The pillars upon which the global economic order rested moved 
in a neo-liberal direction.
The relationship between centre and periphery now changed. The IMF and World Bank 
pursued neo-liberal policies and strict demands in relation to credits and loans to Third World 
countries as well as some socialist states. By the 1980s accumulated debts from loans 
obtained in the 1970s (and earlier) fuelled a crisis, since many of the products produced by 
these countries lost value relative to products they imported from the core states, including 
components needed to maintain their export capacity as such. The debt crisis of the 1980s 
which hit many developing countries rebounded on international banks in the west as some 
large countries announced their inability to repay their debts.
A most important change in the relationship between the rich countries and Third World 
countries following the restructuring o f global capitalism is the bifurcation of the world 
system. From the 1970s onwards the expansion o f global capitalism was replaced by a 
contraction spatially and, as already mentioned above, the dynamic aspects o f the global 
economy now increasingly takes place within and between three emerging blocks, while the 
periphery has become less relevant to the global economy. Ankie Hoogvelt prefers to 
reserve the term ‘globalisation’ for this deepening -  but no longer w idening- o f global 
capitalism. She also notes that the periphery is no longer needed for the capitalist system
and that developmentalism has given way to exclusion and containment.*^* This process has 
moved on gradually, starting in the 1970s and articulated in the 1990s.
W hile the restructuring of capitalism since the 1970s has brought strictures to the political 
economy of all states, it has constituted a particular problem for socialist states and to the 
Third World. Generally, it has brought about the death of development as a political project in
Due to the logic of capitalism, its expansion and deepening moves in c>'cles. Most recently a new expansion 
opportunit)' has opened up in Cliina. For the logic of capitalism, aside from Karl Marx’s classical accounts, see 
Harv'ey, D (1982/1999) ‘'Limits to Capital", Verso, London & New York,
H oog\d t, A (1997): 115-116 
Hoogvelt, A (1997): part2
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many Third World countries, and it has typically been identified as the macro-process with 
which the rigidity o f central planning, and other real-socialist, systems could not cope. The 
collapse o f the Soviet Union and the entire communist bloc in Eastern Europe marks a grand 
shift in the global order because o f the end o f bi-polarism and the end of the anti-capital ist 
development model. However, the order must be distinguished from global capitalism, since 
the latter has merely reaffirmed itself in the presence of a new political space into which 
expansion is relevant. Many of the countries in the European East had a relatively high level 
of development, especially when compared to conventional Third World countries, and 
several o f the East European states have now become integrated into the European Union, 
while other states are candidates for further EU-enlargement. Although states with a certain 
level of development are relevant for incorporation, global capitalism in the age of 
globalisation is largely exclusive.
Robert Cox has noted that ‘neoliberalism is transforming states from being buffers between 
external economic forces and the domestic economy into agencies for adapting domestic 
economies to the exigencies of the global economy’. Karl Polanyi’s methodological dictum 
requires us on the one hand to look for counter-movements to the market forces, and on the 
other hand to pursue an analysis o f a society in the wider context o f the global economic and 
political order. Following Polanyi, Robert Cox is expecting some counter-movement to the 
new liberal order, and authors like Björn Hettne and Stephen Gill follow a similar line.*^^ In 
the global periphery such counter-movement may be identified in the parallel economies 
clustered around clientelist structures, or in war-lord politics as studied for example by Mark 
Duffield or William Reno.*^'^ Although connected to formal economic decline and social 
exclusion these represent new forms of political projects, with new forms of legitimacy, rather 
than mere social breakdown. Supported by empirical evidence this perspective is in stark 
contrast to transitional logic for Eastern Europe or the neo-liberal development 
conceptualisation for Africa.
The character of political economy and the efforts to create a stable polity, or indeed the 
creation and destmction of the Yugoslav states, must be placed within this global context. 
Carved out o f two former empires in Europe, the multi-national Yugoslavia experienced two
Cox, R (1995); p. 39
See the articles by those authors in Hettne, B (Ed) (1995) “International Political Economy -  Understanding 
Global Disorder” Zed Books, London & New Jersey.
13-< See above; Duffield, M (1997) (1999) (2001); Reno, W (1998)
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internal wars with ethnic delineation, but it also produced the most successful real-socialist 
economy in Europe (or in the world), a high level of legitimacy for the multi-national socialist 
state, and achieved a high degree o f global economic integration before moving to a new 
peripheral (global) position towards and after the end of the Cold War order.
Yugoslavia from periphery I to periphery l l
The first Yugoslavia was created according to Woodrow Wilson’s vision of national self- 
determination following World War I. It was carved out of the defeated Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empires in the reshaping o f the European space, and found its internal legitimacy in 
the ‘Yugoslav’ and ‘Illyrian’ movement that advocated all south Slavic peoples in one state 
(developed in chapter 3). It did however also come to incorporate non-Slavic people, 
including a considerable Albanian population, which found itself outside the Albanian state 
in-the-making. Within Europe only France supported the newly created Yugoslav state and 
from the beginning it was surrounded by states with claims upon its borders (Italy, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary). Politically its external relations therefore focused upon securing 
support for the state borders, especially within the League o f Nations. Yugoslavia’s 
diplomatic relations were however out of tune with the strong economic dependence it had 
first on Italy and then (in the 1930s) increasingly on Germany. Yugoslavia was a small 
peripheral country dominated by agriculture. The agricultural sector had been exposed to 
capitalist principles only in the nineteenth century, and then primarily in the northwest and 
along the railroads and rivers, whereas much o f the hinterland still remained pastoral. Land 
reforms undertaken in the inter-war period had mixed results. In some areas it resulted in 
more effective agriculture, in others it had the opposite effect, and in some areas -  such as 
Kosovo and Bosnia -  it provoked ethnic tension. Industry and mining had primarily been 
developed by foreign companies and Yugoslavia was highly dependent on foreign capital and 
on economic centres in the west. Industrialisation was limited, but growing, primarily with 
light manufacturing in Slovenia and Croatia and in mining and metallurgy in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia. This was stimulated by foreign (first French and British, then increasingly 
German) capital. The depression hit Yugoslavia hard as grain markets and agricultural prices 
fell. Struggling with external and internal problems Yugoslavia remained a weak peripheral 
state with a foreign policy hopelessly incompatible with its economic dependence, as it was 





Yugoslavia suffered heavily from the Second World War and most of the casualties were due 
to internal conflicts. Only the socialist ideology could provide the necessary elements to unify 
the Yugoslav peoples following the bloody Second World War. The initial steps to rebuild the 
economy were disastrous. The first successful attempts at modernisation came only in the 
1950s. It had required the break with Stalin in 1948 and a peace made between peasants and 
the communist party. With the initial isolation in the communist camp Yugoslavia became 
oriented to western capital and markets in its development strategy. In the 1950s state-led 
development o f heavy industry and infrastructure provided considerable economic growth, 
but this was still not translated into increased living standards, and the 1960s saw an increased 
focus on consumer goods. In order to secure its trade and its credibility in the West, 
Yugoslavia had to pursue a policy o f external (import-export) stabilisation, which made 
domestic policy highly sensitive to international conditions. From the 1960s onwards 
Yugoslavia moved to increasing liberalisation in political and economic terms.
Although Yugoslavia achieved impressive economic growth, modernisation, and increased 
living standards, this was highly dependent on the position it had in the bi-polar order and on 
the expansionist western economies, o f which licence-production and technological 
components from the west coupled with labour exportation played a crucial role. Political and 
economic decentralisation in the 1960s and 1970s was initially successful, and necessary to 
manage internal regional and national divisions as well as being an integral part in self- 
management, but it also came to provide traditional forms o f loyalty with a new institutional 
framework. The economy relied heavily on traditional and informal ties and eventually these 
provided for blockages and strictures within the economy firstly and then the polity. 
Decentralisation eventually made the macro-economic policies -  which were so necessary for 
external stabilisation -  impossible, and at the same time decentralisation was necessary for 
internal political legitimacy. Yugoslavia was heavily hit by the debt crisis in the 1980s and the 
new policies pursued by the IMF and World Bank -  based on export-led development - were 
highly inappropriate for Yugoslav conditions. At the same time -  when decentralisation had 
reached a peak and when the global as well as national economic crisis started to become felt 
socially -  Yugoslavia’s most important political leaders died (Josip Broz Tito, Vladimir 
Bakaric and Edvard Kardelj all died within the span of a few years). The new political 
leadership in the 1980s was weak, while regional and local power was affirmed. As the whole 
socialist bloc in Eastern Europe crumbled, real-socialism itself lost its legitimacy, and the
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geopolitical rationale for Yugoslavia was crushed. In this manner, several of the foundation 
blocks for the Yugoslav idea of the state ceased to exist. Yugoslavia’s short, but successful, 
integration into the global political economy and international division of labour was replaced 
by increasing global peripheralisation, economic and social crisis, followed by political crisis, 
and finally state-disintegration and civil war (all discussed in chapters 4-5).
The new political projects in the Yugoslav space were articulated in strong ethnic exclusivist 
terms, and shaped along the clientelist and traditionalist ties that took shape at local and 
regional levels. Through violent conflict, such networks were reaffirmed and came to replace 
any other institutional or political arrangements for social security. As the formal economy 
declined and was marginalized, the informal economy expanded along the traditional 
networks, and showed a capacity for alternative forms of integration into the global economy 
(studied in chapter 6 and 7). Following the war and state-breakdown in the 1990s, the 
Yugoslav space became incorporated into western aid policies of démocratisation, social 
reconstruction, as well as direct humanitarian assistance and physical reconstruction. By then, 
however, western aid policy itself had become heavily permeated by neo-liberal theory in 
which market forces, private agents, and subcontracting, were dominant features. Indeed the 
changes in international political economy governed both logics,
Development debates, trends and theories
As is evident from the sketch of the changes in the global order and political economy 
outlined above, the logic o f development and development aid was firmly embedded in the 
logic o f bi-polarism. The commitment to development was a post-World War II occurrence, 
and connected to the whole restmcturing of the global economy and the new world order. In 
this way it constitutes a departure from colonial civilising missions, in which the periphery 
essentially played the role o f exploitation area for the colonial empires. Although economic 
development theories in relation to Latin America, which was already free, were formulated 
prior to the Second World War (notably in the 1930s), we can conveniently place the birth of 
development in the 1940s. It can be seen, first, in the Marshall Plan in relation to the 
reconstruction o f Western Europe, then in Harry S Truman’s 1949 speech where a 
development commitment was made to the former colonies. The production of theories and 
concepts, which were formulated in relation to the underdeveloped countries, must be placed 
within this historical context and particular global order, to be approached meaningfully. This
I k
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theoretical area is very wide and here we must sacrifice its complexity for the sake of a brief 
sketch providing an overview of the trends.
The economic theories o f development, which were formulated in the late 1940s and in the 
1950s focused on internal conditions in the countries concerned and were oriented towards an 
expansion o f the national economy. Few external factors were relevant, except o f course 
capital investment, aid flow and technological transfers. True to the Keynesian climate the 
state (and government) was given an important role as agent in the development process, 
which included state /  government interventionism, investment and planning, fiscal policies, 
and so on. in order to achieve economic growth. A particular focus of interest was GNP per 
capita. Arthur Lewis and W.W Rostow were important theorists for this tradition, and these 
economic grovrth theories laid the foundations for modernisation theory as it became 
formulated from the 1950s onwards.
In the late 1940s the critique towards economic growth theory came from the early 
structuralists and was formulated by authors like Raul Prebisch (in Latin America) and Hans 
Singer (in Europe). In the 1950s Raul Prebisch came to lead the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which largely adopted the structuralist programme.
A key feature o f early structuralist theory was an external orientation and a critique of 
classical trade theory. The so called Prebisch-Singer thesis advocated a long-term decline in 
trade between primary goods and manufactured goods due to advances of technology. Trade 
between developed and underdeveloped countries was therefore on unequal terms and 
essentially unfavourable to the underdeveloped country. This challenged conventional trade 
theory, which claimed the mutual benefits o f trade. The structuralists introduced the terms 
centre and periphery, where the centre countries were rich and benefited from trade, whereas 
peripheral (poor) countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America did not. The policy prescription 
of early structuralism was protectionist, and to replace imports with local goods, formulated in 
the so called Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy (ISI). The ISI strategy was applied 
in a number o f countries in East Asia (quite successfully), Latin America, and India.
In the 1950s and 1960s the main debate in development studies was between modernisation 
theories and dependency theory. Modernisation theory was widely encouraged by the US 
government, which sponsored research within a number o f disciplines. Within modernisation 
theory. Western European countries, and their successful path to industrialisation and
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modernisation, were seen as models which could be imitated. Whereas growth theory had 
been preoccupied with economics, there now emerged a concern about the entire social and 
cultural climate in which development efforts were to take place. Traditional institutions and 
values were seen as an obstacle to the absorption of technological transfers or elements from 
the western model and, in order to achieve development, social and cultural change was 
required. Modernisation theory thus differed from the economic development theories in that 
it did not consider development as restricted to economics and growth, but considered 
‘development’ as a process through which entire societies were transformed. The mode 
through which social / cultural change was to be achieved was through focusing on 
entrepreneurial agents (for example certain groups of educated individuals) in the developing 
countries. In this manner, modernisation theory was elite-oriented, where some layers within 
the population was seen as modem. There was however no class-analysis, and consequently 
no conflict between different wealth-groups in society, but rather an assumption of mutuality 
between different groups. The relationship with the rich western countries was seen as 
beneficial (as opposed to in early structuralism) and in fact necessary through the 
technological transfers and know-how it brought, and in the same way the urban areas within 
the concerned country were seen as beneficial to the rural areas.
Dependency theory rose in Latin America as a critique of Modernisation theory. Although 
structuralism was a starting point -  especially the focus on external relations -, dependency 
theory was also critical o f the ISI. Dependency theory was much more radical than early 
structuralism in its attack on the global economy. Whereas structuralism was reformist in the 
sense that it wished to introduce reforms due to the obstacles with the external factors, it was 
not anti-capitalist as such. Even Vladimir Lenin and imperialist theory, which was critical o f 
capitalism, had essentially considered colonialism as progressive. Dependency theory, by 
contrast, did not see any progressive line for the underdeveloped countries in relation to the 
west. In the classical understanding, as formulated by Dos Santos, the economy in the 
dependent country was conditioned by the development and expansion of another country, to 
which it was subjected. For Dos Santos development was however still possible, although it 
was externally dependent. Andre Gunder Frank provided a much more radical critique. He 
introduced the terms ‘metropolis’ and ‘satellite’ (both in a global sense and within states). 
Between the ‘metropolis’ and ‘satellite’ there is an exploitative relationship, first on the local 
scale, then on the regional, and finally on the global. In the early 1970s peace researcher 
Johan Galtung forwarded similar propositions.
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Where modernisation theories discussed the ‘developmental state’, Frank -  and other 
dependency theorists - discussed the '‘underdeveloped' state. In dependency theory 
‘underdevelopment’ was a process going on for centuries due to exploitation from the colonial 
powers. Development was therefore impossible as long as the exploitative relationship was 
maintained and the policy prescription following from Frank, and others, was a complete 
break with the west and de-linking from global capitalism. This o f course did not mean that 
trade was excluded, but it was to be undertaken on a regional basis between countries with 
similar levels o f development and with similar conditions in the global economy. Frank’s 
focus was mainly on trade and foreign exchange. In the 1970s Samir Amin applied the centre- 
periphery model in the study of production. Samir Amin became the first influential 
economist from a Third World country to contribute to the development debate. The thesis of 
asymmetric trade (which had been presented by Prebisch and Singer) was further elaborated 
in the late 1960s by Arghiri Emmanuel. Geoffrey Kay worked on similar lines, but placed an 
emphasis on the market position. Theories o f unequal exchange, some of them severely 
criticised, had an important role in elevating dependency theory among the countries in the 
Third World. Whereas modernisation theory was promoted by the aid agencies o f  the west, 
dependency theory had great influence in Third World countries, which presented a united 
front in the demands in the United Nations for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
in 1974-75.
By the 1970s it became increasingly emphasised that the ‘Third W orld’ was so heterogeneous 
that the theoretical frameworks developed so far, by the different opposing stands, were 
insufficient to capture the complexity and differentiation between various states and regions. 
Especially it was evident that development was possible in some places, such as the NICs.
The traditional international division o f labour, in which the underdeveloped countries were 
mere producers of raw material for the industries in the West, had been a relationship upon 
which dependency theoiy and critique o f the capitalist exploitation was founded. When, in the 
1960s, large companies in the west started to allocate some o f their production to peripheral 
countries to cut its production costs, a more heterodox interpretation was needed. The changes 
which became apparent in the 1970s gave impetus to a flourishing theoretical development. 
The relocation o f production and the increasingly complex relationship between states was 
addressed in studies of the New International Division o f  Labour. The fierce polarisation 
between modernisation theorists and dependency theorists also loosened up.
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A number of authors, such as Fernando Cardoso, accepted the premises of dependency, but 
claimed that development still was possible. The so called ‘dependent development’ they 
introduced was less radical than dependency theory in that they suggested that there was room 
for manoeuvre and negotiation with the multi-national corporations and with financial capital 
in the core countries.
The nature and character of capitalism was heavily debated among Marxist historians and 
social scientists. The issue was central both in studies of western European history, especially 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, as well as within development studies. The cross­
fertilization of social theory applied within different areas has always been considerable, but it 
is perhaps especially visible within development studies, as it is such an inter-disciplinary 
field.
In the 1970s Immanuel Wallerstein started to develop his world-system analysis which 
claimed that the whole globe had already become incorporated into a single capitalist system 
around the sixteenth century. One o f the sources of inspiration was Fernand Braudel and the 
Annales school which had emphasised the ‘long-term’, ‘deep’ structures in history aiming at 
writing a ‘total history’ instead of focusing on events. Thus, world-system analysis aims at 
studying long- term structures and it also rejects the separation of social life into ‘economics’, 
‘politics’, and other spheres, and the artificial disciplinary borders created within academia. 
An important contribution of world-system analysis was that it incorporated politics and 
economics into a single framework and studied global power relations as an integral part of 
the capitalist economy. In addition world-system analysis partly drew on the dependency 
school and incorporated many dependency concepts, such as ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ into the 
analysis, but it found the binary relationship insufficient and instead operated with a tri-modal 
model o f ‘centre’, ‘periphery’, and ‘semi-periphery’. World-system analysis is dynamic and 
there are possibilities for countries to move away from or towards the core (or semi­
periphery) under certain conditions, thus making development possible.
Although world-system analysis has been criticised for its focus on macro features -  it takes 
the whole world as the unit of analysis -  and for tendencies to macro-determinism, there is, as 
discussed in the introduction, no reason why it should not be possible to use the approach as a 
point o f departure and then pursue the analysis in a specific country or region. In fact world-
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system analysis lies close to both historical sociology and critical international political 
economy, and to the approach applied in this thesis. A difference is that world-system 
analysis really only typically operate with macro-'systems’ and with their change or 
continuity over long periods and tends to have limited methodological or theoretical value for 
analysing what is going on within states and the changing social relations within communities. 
Although it is a useful framework it therefore needs to be complemented with analytical tools 
and concepts from other traditions.
By the 1980s the neo-liberal trend took over (from modernisation) in all policy areas 
including aid policy. Neo-Iiberalism has been described as the counter-revolution in 
development economics. Since Keynesianism declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, neo­
liberalism has remained dominant in economic theory and in development thinking. The key 
feature is that primacy is given to the market forces because markets are believed to provide 
for better allocation o f resources than the state. Trade is seen as mutually benefiting and must 
be free. Although the neo-liberal version at the turn of the millennium is less extreme than it 
was a decade ago, its premises permeate all policy thinking within aid policy, whether for 
Eastern Europe or elsewhere, as discussed in the introduction and earlier in this chapter. The 
policy prescriptions are liberalisation, privatisation and structural adjustment.
In these divergent perspectives we can identify continuity between, on the one hand economic 
growth theory, modernisation theory, and neo-liberalism, and on the other hand between early 
structuralism, dependency, dependent development, and eventually world-system analysis. 
Although considerable refinements are visible, the former group all internalise the problems 
to the country concerned and share the neglect of a global capitalist structure. Further, they 
are based on abstract models derived from western experience and they are all policy-oriented 
in their perspective. In this way, this entire body of knowledge expresses a will to govern the 
periphery and have clear prescriptions for how the societies are best transformed. In the latter 
group critical perspectives on capitalism are collected. They have generally had less influence 
over policy among western donors, given their critical stance on macro-scope issues, but have 
had, on the other hand, a greater reception within the aid-receiving countries.
In the aid policy debate other critical perspectives have been forwarded. Thus for example 
advocates o f ‘participatory development’ have argued that the macro-economic focus has 
neglected local capacities, and that local population and communities must be involved in the
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aid process. This has been a view particularly popular among NGOs. Again critique of 
‘participatory development’ has included that local communities cannot affect large-scale 
structures and they have little power to criticise external aid programmes, and so 
‘participation’ just becomes an instrument for external agencies to implement their 
programmes. Further, critiques have been raised that local communities are not homogeneous 
and that internal power relations among the local community must be acknowledged before 
empowering them. The latter has been a particularly popular critique among feminists. 
Eventually ideas of participatory development have become effectively incorporated into the 
neo-liberal paradigm, since it enables a focus on local ‘private’ agents in the aid process, 
rather than on the state. A biopolitical ambition inherent in liberalism has, in this way, 
achieved support from both advocates of market-liberal privatisation and from the radical left 
including feminist organisations. They all share a concern to work on local ‘civil society’ 
whereas the role of the state in the receiving country has generally become reduced to that o f 
regulating and creating laws and law enforcement for the ‘civil’ and ‘liberal’ remoulding o f 
society. This merge is symptomatic of transition thinking and social reconstruction as 
discussed in the introduction.
The overall thrust of rolling back the state and unleashing market forces had disastrous social 
consequences, which were criticised by the United Nations and eventually recognised by the 
World Bank itself in the second half of the 1990s. The fact that the state indeed had a role
to play in the development process was gradually accepted, but it was to be highly 
instrumental for the market, in terms of providing the necessities for the market to operate 
smoothly, and in mitigating the social consequences for the most vulnerable part o f the 
population. Therefore the World Bank, during the late 1990s, moved from its strict focus on 
conditionality and coercive structural adjustment programmes towards a focus on reducing 
poverty, which was formulated in the so-called ‘comprehensive development framework’ 
(CDF).'^^ The framework opens up to extensive regulatory interventions across many sectors
Joseph Stiglitz, the Chief Economist of the Worid Bank from 1997-2000, and fonner Chairman in the 
CUnton-administrations ‘Council of Economic Advisors’ (1993-1997) has himself criticised the polic>̂  in articles
and books, for e.xample Stiglitz, J (2002) “Globalization and its Discontents”, W. W. Norton & Company, New 
York & London; Stiglitz, J (2003) “The Roaring Nineties: Why we’re paying the price for the greediest decade 
in histoty”, Penguin Books, London.
Pender, J (2002) “Empowering the Poorest? The World Bank and the Voices o f the Poor” in Chandler, D (Ed) 
(2002) “Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Relations”, Palgrave Macmillan. New 
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in society, which were previously ignored by structural adjustment.’ ’̂ A theme within the 
new approach is that governments in aid-receiving countries shall formulate a ‘poverty 
reduction strategy’ (PRSP), which shall provide a basis for loans. The new language 
emphasised ‘country ownership’ and ‘partnership’ rather than conditionality. Coupled with 
the new strategy the World Bank launched a project entitled ‘the voices of the poor’. The 
whole approach has been extensively criticised for reformulating the concept o f poverty, for 
deemphasising the material aspects o f underdevelopment and poverty by shifting focus to 
poor peoples’ need for social and psychological support, and for its extensive interventionist 
ambitions at the level of the household (especially in the name o f ‘gender relations’).’ *̂ 
Poverty is increasingly seen as a psychological and existential experience and not as a 
structural disadvantaged material position. A crucial trend through the 1990s, regardless of 
whether the applicable term is ‘transition’, ‘development’, or ‘post-war reconstruction’ has 
been an increased focus on human beings rather than on material growth, and an increased 
ambition to intervene directly on the level o f populations and transform societies as well as 
peoples attitudes: that is bio-politics.
That the problem of security and war became incorporated into aid discourse in the 1990s has 
already been discussed in the introduction.’^̂  Prior to the 1990s issues of security were 
typically located in the Cold War logic of inter-state conflict, but following the withdrawal of 
bi-polar patronage links and the what we may call ‘completion’ o f  the reconfiguration of the 
relationship between centre and periphery, the problem o f internal conflict was given 
increased attention. As Mark Duffield has analysed, conflict now essentially became 
interpreted as stemming from internal development causes and this underpinned the 
radicalisation of aid policy which now became committed to transforming societies as a 
whole, including the attitudes and beliefs o f its m e m b e r s . T h i s  (global) bio-political 
ambition gave an extended role to NGOs, which have become the tools through which to 
penetrate into the aid-receiving societies. Projects to educate individuals in the aid receiving 
society and to change their attitudes on various issues reflect this ambition. This is evident in 
for example, ‘reconciliation projects’, where conflict is treated as a mental problem and a 
question of attitude; ‘gender awareness training’, various ‘rights awareness’ programmes and
Rcn’i Kanbur and David Vines, chapter 6 by Francisco H. G. Ferreira and Louise C. Keely, and chapter II  by 
Raul Hopkins et al.
138
Cf. Pender, J (2002) 
Pender, J (2002); 103
Cf. DufTield M (2001) en block. 
Duffield. M (2001): 17 and Ch. 2
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so on, where individuals are treated as in need of liberal education in order to become more 
prone to liberal values and less to ‘particularistic’ values among other areas of interest.
The organisational and institutional structure of aid has thereby changed considerably. While 
the expansion of development NGOs, for example, has been gradual starting from the 1960s 
in donor countries and a little later in most aid receiving countries, there has been a 
considerable proliferation and consolidation o f their role in the aid process in the 1990s. Terje 
Tvedt has analysed the expansion o f the NGO sector in a number o f countries and argued that 
this was a result o f deliberate state policies from the donors. They now form an integrated 
part o f what Duffield calls ‘strategic complexes’ of global governance.*'*^ Such ‘strategic 
complexes’ involve donor governments, international organisations, military and security 
units, private agencies and NGOs.
These networks of authority and governance, as opposed to hierarchical structures of 
government, allow for considerable flexibility in the aid process. On the one hand the sub­
contracting and privatisation of aid implementation, which it reflects, allows for short-term 
engagement and for cutting the link with an undesired implementing agency (something 
which is not allowed within a hierarchical bureaucracy), and at the same time it allows for 
penetration into areas of society without directly involving the governmental body. While it 
raises fundamental problems for (democratic) representation and accountability, it is typically 
cheaper than any long-term engagement of investing in building state institutions. In this way 
aid policy has come to rely more on public-private networks, become more privatised and less 
accountable, and more radical and bio-political.
The underlying rationale o f biopolitics is that all states, or societies, move towards a common 
goal o f market liberalism and allow for global market liberalism to operate or at the very least 
that no obstacles exist for this global vision (exclusion of people is not a problem as long as 
they do not present themselves in the form of refugees, crime networks, terrorists). As such
T vedt T (1998) “Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? -  NGOs and Foreign Aid*’: especially ch. 2. 
NGOs certainl)' e.xisted prior to the 1960s, such as for e.\ample missionary' and ecumenical organisations, but 
e.\pandcd in the period 1963-1993 through deliberate state policies. Initially many development NGOs 
functioned as service providers as a complement to the state. Following the neoliberal trend in the 1980’s they 
were promoted internationally by the ‘right’ as part of the new political agenda, but were also supported by the 




biopolitics is embedded in the wider logic o f geoeconomics. The opportunity for a truly 
global ambition - geoeconomic and biopolitical - has opened up only after the fall o f the 
Soviet Union, real-socialism and bi-polarism. Consequently, the term ‘globalisation’ has often 
been criticised for obscuring the political agency driving it, and for obscuring the power 
relations within it, and many authors have preferred the terms ‘imperialism’ or ‘Empire’ as 
more accurate analytical and descriptive concepts. '̂*'*
Concluding remarks
Social reconstruction in Kosovo constitutes a  major European, and international, aid and 
security project and has also been taken as a point of departure for constmcting a more joint 
and pro-active European policy than the previous decade o f Balkan crisis had allowed. As 
such the aim o f regional integration and co-operation allied to reconstruction, as envisioned in 
the ‘Stability Pact’, has often been emphasised as a kind o f Marshall Plan for the Balkans.
The analogy calls to mind a metaphor evoking a grand effort, demanding long-term 
involvement, regional co-operation and considerable investment. In this way the analogy is a 
call for mobilisation. However, it can also help us to highlight the crucial differences, and 
essentially emphasise the problem o f current social reconstruction precisely because it has so 
little in common with the Marshall Plan. Not only are the ideas that inform current social 
reconstruction radically different from the Keynesian premises o f reconstmction in Western 
Europe, but also the post-Yugoslav social configuration at the turn o f this century is in 
considerable contrast to that o f Western Europe following the Second World War; the whole 
macro-system has changed. Historical parallels do not come without reservations because 
never in history are two configurations the same and analogies can therefore always be 
criticised. Nevertheless it is from history that we must learn. By way of analogies it would 
therefore be more relevant to draw upon the social and political effects arising from previous 
historical experiences o f creating a free market. The parallel with the protectionist counter­
movements o f  the 1930s is a good case in point, since the forms of redefining community.
As opposed to geopolitics, in the sense it was formulated by Neil Smith, discussed above, and Smith, N 
(2003) and (2005). Obviously, tlicre was a mission to civilise ‘savages’ also in the highly geopolitical colonial 
projects o f the nineteenth centur>% but it was largely a Cliristian-bascd moral imperative and never for the direct 
concern of the empire’s economy and political power, which at am’ rate was controlled territorially.
For e.\ample; Hardt, M & A. Negri (2000); Petras, I & H. Veltmeyer (2001) “Globalization Unmasked: 
Imperialism in the 21*’ Centurv'” Femwood Publishing, Zed Books, New’ York; Smith, N (2003); and especially 
after the US invasion of Iraq, which has been analysed as a resort to geopolitics and classic colonialism: Har\’ey, 
D (2003) “Tlie New Imperialism”, Oxford University Press, O.xford; Smitli, N (2005); Gregoi>', D (2004) “The 
Colonial Present” , Blackwell Publishing.
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identity, authority and legitimacy, in the Balkans during and after the break-up o f Yugoslavia 
may be seen as a response to similar social and economic crisis conditions. A framework of 
macro-global trends helps us identify the context of which Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav 
societies are a part, in which certain opportunities and limitations are given, and within which 
it has to create and negotiate policy choices as well as define itself
The global framework including the changes which have occurred in it does not inform us, 
however, about hcfw local society has changed or about its character. It merely provides a 
framework in which we can interpret the direction of change, and it provides the wider 
context in which it takes place. We need to know how Yugoslavia moved towards 
modernisation, which concrete problems it was confronted with and how they were 
negotiated, which policy choices it took, how the governing of the political economy was 
framed and how it was legitimised, how the national question was managed and articulated, 
how social relations changed, and how it came to be an aid-receiver in the first place. This is 
necessary in order to understand current social configurations and the character of the society 
and economy, in which social reconstruction operates. We also need now to know how this 
type of aid policy is operating in a concrete context like Kosovo and which problems it is 
confronted with in that particular society. That will be the issue discussed in chapters 8 and 9. 
But before that we must look at the particular trajectory of Kosovo, and Serbia and 
Yugoslavia of which it has been a part, in order to understand what kind of institutions and 
political economy it has developed, how the character of social relations have changed, and 




SMALL NATIONS IN ONE STATE? - The Legacy of the First Yugoslavia and the 
Partisan Revolution
The first Yugoslav state, created after the First World War, was a multiethnic state with great 
regional economic and cultural differences, carved out of the disintegrating Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires, under the auspices of the Versailles Treaty and its conception of national 
self-determination. Although ethno-plural in composition, the state was to a large extent an 
attempt to incorporate the Southern Slavs (with the exception of the Bulgarians) in one 
independent nation-state. However, it also came to incorporate large non-Slavic minorities, 
such as Albanians, which were particularly concentrated in the province of Kosovo (as well as 
in parts of Macedonia, Montenegro and Southern Serbia), which was also populated by a 
Serbian minority, contained a rich heritage of medieval orthodox monasteries and Churches, 
and was considered by the Serbs as the medieval cradle of their nation. The First Yugoslavia 
was in a vulnerable international position throughout the inter-war years, both diplomatically 
and economically, and the state was subjected to domestic as well as international challenges. 
This chapter outlines in broad strokes the history of the first Yugoslav state, sketches the 
political and economic tension points, and then moves on to briefly discuss the conception o f 
the national question, especially as it was perceived among the communists, within the 
partisan movement and the Yugoslav communist party, which eventually came to power after 
the Second World War.
Experiences with Imperial Rule, and the National Question before and in the First 
Yugoslav state
Until the First World War the Yugoslav region and most o f the Balkan Peninsula, was divided 
between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. What today is Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina 
(northern Serbia), was part of the Habsburg Empire, while Macedonia and Kosovo were part 
of the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia-Hercegovina was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878 and 
then annexed by Habsburg Austria (and formally incorporated in 1908), while Serbia proper 
(core Serbia) was part of the Ottoman state until 1878, but had achieved some autonomy in 
the nineteenth century. Montenegro was under the Ottomans before 1799. Over long periods,
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until the Napoleonic wars, much o f the Croatian coast, such as Istria, the islands, and towns 
like Zadar, Split, and Dubrovnik were under Venetian domination. Moreover, the Habsburg 
part was, from the second half o f the nineteenth century, divided into different regions, with 
Austrian influence in Slovenia and parts o f Croatia (Istria and Dalmatia), and the rest of 
Croatia under Hungarian influence. The Croatian coast was crucial for the Habsburgs in 
providing access to the Mediterranean Sea and its trade routes. The Habsburg military border- 
region (Krajina) stretching around Bosnia in a boomerang-shape and into northern Serbia was 
a region with separate treatment. Between 1809 and 1813 the whole coast and large sections 
of the hinterland up to the Dinaric mountains, as well as Slovenia, were incorporated into 
Napoleon’s French Empire as an Illyrian province (the name taken from the ancient Roman 
province ‘Illyria’). All in all this provides for a highly complex geographical pattern o f 
heritage from imperial rule in the Yugoslav region.
The areas under Habsburg control were generally subjected to capitalist economic relations to 
a much higher degree than the areas under Ottoman rule. For this reason there was a higher 
development of infrastructure and communications (roads, rail-roads, transports on rivers) in 
the northern areas and along certain pockets with natural resources. The development of 
infrastructure and communications paved the way for a higher level o f capitalist penetration 
during the second ha lf o f the nineteenth century, whereas in other less accessible areas, the 
market and money economy remained of minor importance. In the northern and north-western 
areas, under Habsburg control, and the areas along the communication routes, for example 
along the Rivers Sava and Danube towards Belgrade in Serbia, agriculture underwent a 
profound transformation through the exposure to  capitalism and market principles, as well as 
to a money-based economy and moved from a pastoral live-stock base to crop cultivation, 
while other areas, especially in the south, east, and in the mountain areas, remained under 
subsistence farming. Generally, all the areas still under Ottoman domination were left 
underdeveloped and with subsistence farming, while in the Habsburg areas only some 
accessible regions had market-exposed farming. The Habsburg area was further governed by 
different principles in the Military March (Vojna Krajina), the border region towards the 
Ottoman state, allowing the peasants to cultivate land more freely in exchange for providing
Dubrovnik was an independent cit5'-republic but under Venetian domination, whereas much of the coast was 
directly under Venetian mle.
For a classical and in many respects still unchallenged account o f the economic histoty of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century' Yugoslavia see: Tomase\ ich. J (1955) “Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in 
Yugoslavia” Stanford Uni\'ersity Press. On the specific issue here, see pp. 160-202.
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soldiers to the Empire. This area was under direct military administration from Vienna, 
Generally, there were different types of feudalism in the Habsburg area, with a rough division 
between the three areas o f ‘civil Croatia’, ‘civil Slavonia’, and the Military March. In the 
latter, there were no serfs, but almost all of the male population were drafted as soldiers, and 
here the preservation o f the extended families, the Zadmga (with several nucleus families 
sharing the same budget and usually the same house), which was promoted in order to more 
easily support the loss or temporary absence o f male family members persisted longer when 
other areas of Croatia were subjected to capitalist principles.
In the non-Ottoman areas, foreign capita! and economic exploitation was dominant in 
infrastructure, mining, as well as industrial development and from the 1850s onwards there 
was a break away from feudalism in much o f the region and thereby a change in social 
structure. The institution o f the Zadruga, which was a dominant feature throughout the region, 
Ottoman as well as Habsburg, started to disappear gradually, although it continued to exist 
along with feudal-like relations in some backward areas well into the twentieth century. 
Private ownership of land now became dominant, and was regulated through the introduction 
o f new laws, and agriculture became increasingly vulnerable to market relations and foreign 
competition. The gradual exposure to the market, the introduction of a money-economy, 
and the adjustment to cultivating one or two crops to be sold on the market as a supplement to 
subsistence-farming, increased the need for peasants to obtain credits in order to buy tools, to 
survive between harvests, or to make some form of investment in the farm.^^^ The depression 
in agriculture from 1873 to 1890/95 had a heavy impact on the Yugoslav lands and in many
In the Knijina, there was no landed aristocrac}' and tlie peasants were lefi to cultivate their land plots in 
exchange for providing one soldier from a family witli three male children, two soldiers if the family had five 
children, and so on. Tlie family then provided for the soldier, w ho ser^’cd actively for three years and then 
became part of the rescr\’e.
Tomasevich, J (1955): Ch. 3
The history here is complex. Even ‘civil Croatia’ had different characteristics of feudalism, and all areas did 
not liave serfs. There was a division berv̂  cen ‘uiharial land’, which had serfs, and ‘alod land', \\ hich was not 
settled with serfs. Slavonia in turn, had a completely separate land-tenure s> stcm and was mlcd directly by 
Hungary', before 1745 by a dual military-civilian administration and with the land distribution after 1745 the 
medieval system of latifundiawas re-established. Serfdom in Croatia was generally abolished in 1785, and there 
was a gradual weakening of the feudal system, but the serfs did not come to ow n anj' land. With the introduction 
o f capitalist principles, trade, and money-economy, the Zadruga u as generally weakened in most areas, but there 
were also laws regulating its abohshment, in 1889 and 1902, and in some areas it persisted much longer. The 
Military' March lost most o f its rationale in the 1870s, especially after the Berlin Congress, when the Ottoman 
state lost territory' in the Balkans. There arc several theories for the gradual dissolution of the Zadruga, e\'en 
diflerent definitions. See further Tomasevich, J (1955); Ch. 3 and 9; Cf. Byrnes, R. F (Ed) (1976) “Communal 
Families in the Balkans: The Zadruga, m n v s by Philip E. Mosely and Essays in His Honor", University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame-London: various chapters.
Tomaserich, J (1955): Part 1, in passim
Tomaevicli, J (1955): Ch. 27 en bloc
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areas poverty was severe. The wider background to the agrarian crisis was colonisation of 
new areas in America and Russia, which created greater competition for cash-crops in the 
Balkans, and in Europe in general, through the export of cheap grain (barley). Generally, the 
nature o f imperial rule in the Habsburg Empire was more economically exploitative in the 
capitalist sense, opening up new areas for mining and industrial production and thereby 
bringing infrastructure, while the Ottoman state retained a more feudal character in its 
exploitation and exercised tax collection but brought little industrial or infrastructural 
development. The whole region was economically backward however, dominated by 
agriculture with very weak industrial development and a low level o f urbanisation.
The Ottoman state allowed for a fairly tolerant position towards religious pluralism and was, 
since mediaeval times, organised along the millet-system, where groups, divided on the basis 
of religion, were allowed a certain level o f autonomy. The level o f toleration diminished 
considerably after the Tcoizimat reforms from 1839 onwards though, when greater pressure as 
well as taxation was levied upon the Christian m i l l e t s . S u c h  increases in taxation were, 
apart from the taxation of merchant traders, the only avenue for the feudal-style, non­
capitalist, Ottoman state to collect revenues for the military in a century of growing nationalist 
ideas, but in effect it just increased resistance to the state in a vicious circle, especially in 
Christian millets. The Albanian clans, or tribes, were divided between different millets. The 
Ottoman state never had much penetration into the Albanian lands, especially not in the 
highlands, and the particular indigenous life-style and customs were preserved. The Ottoman 
system o f governing demanded a levy of taxes and that the local population provided soldiers, 
but otherwise interfered little in local affairs. Muslims had privileges and many Albanian 
clans converted on occasions, sometimes switching back and forth between Christianity and 
Islam. The Porte utilised local clan leaders, and elders, as mediators between the Porte and the 
clans (a person elected by the clan for this purpose was a boulim-bashi).
The reform period starting in 1839 and continuing until 1880 is often jointly labelled the ‘Tanzimat’; for a 
classical account see Sta\TÌanos, L. S (1958) “The Balkans since 1453”, Hurst & Company, London: especially 
pp. 315-316 and generally chapter 16 and 18. The background to the reforms was comple.v, but includes 
competition from new producers of cotton and increasing pressure on the Ottoman Empire from w estem powers, 
both economically and politically.
(Ibmpare Vickers. M (1995) “The Albanians: A Modem History”, I.B Tauris, London & New- York: Ch. 1; 
and generally on Ottoman rale and national movements: Karpat, K (1973) “An Inquiry' Into the Social 
Foundations o f  Nationalism in tire Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations”, 
Research Monograph No. 39, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School o f Public and 
International Affairs. Princeton University.
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Some specific characteristics of Albanian society have already been described in the 
introduction. The traditional Albanian village consisted of the, often fortified, houses (kulle) 
of the extended families, but had no public spaces. There were no cafés or inns, or public 
buildings of any kind.^^" All matters relating to society, or social life, were discussed inside 
the family houses, and the house was thereby of particular importance in Albanian cultural 
life.*^  ̂Although there were towns and an urban population, Albanian society was 
overwhelmingly rural, with the traditional structure and customs permeating all social life. In 
contrast to the pattern in north-western Europe for example, there were no intermediary 
associations or public spheres between the individual, or family, and the state, and hence 
nothing resembling what has been called ‘civil society’ in the usage o f eighteenth or 
nineteenth century thinkers. Indeed there was neither the social structure nor social 
infrastructure or type of economy for such an analytical term as ‘civil society’ to be applied; 
social life was shaped by the extended family (with its house), the clan and the village, and 
there was no social organisation beyond the extended family apart from the clan. All legal 
matters were strictly regulated in customary law (the Lek) and applied by the clans, or 
mediated in meetings by the elders (kuvend).
The development of the national question and the struggle for statehood among the South 
Slav peoples (as well as the Albanians) were formed from the different experiences within the 
two empires. The struggles for independence and autonomy, within the Habsburg Empire or 
from the Porte (Ottoman State), had lead in the nineteenth centuiy to various unifying ideas o f 
statehood. Such ideas had largely been fostered among certain literate and educated elite 
groups within the new urban centres of Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, as these towns 
gradually grew more ’modem’ against the context of a fragmented and rural hinterland of 
isolated and illiterate peasants. The very idea of creating a state among these nations had 
received an impetus from abroad. During the French Napoleonic thrust into Venice and the 
Habsburg Empire, the coastal regions of Dalmatia and Istria, as well as a Croatian and 
Slovenian hinterland had come under French rule for a few years between 1806 and 1813.
Andersen. A (2002) ‘Transforming Ethnic Nationalism: the politics o f ethno-nationaJistic sentiments among 
the elite in Kosovo”, thesis for the Cand. Polit. Degree in Social Anthropolog}', Uni\ ersit>' of Oslo. A\'ailablc at: 
w^-^v.aasmundandcrscn.net (entered 2 March 2005): 60 
Ibid
As the term was used by for example Hegel, F (1991) “Elements of the Philosophy of Right” (Edited by Allen 
W. Wood), Cambridge Te.xts in the History o f Political Thought Cambridge University Press; Ferguson, J 
(1995) “An Essay on the History of Civil Society” (Edited by Pania Oz-Salzberger). Cambridge Texts in the 
History' of Political Thought Cambridge University Press. See.further ihc discussion in chapter 9.
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The French brought with them an idea o f creating an Illyrian administrative region. The 
idea was eventually revived in the 1830s and 1840s among Croatian intellectuals. One of 
them was the Serbo-Croatian / Croato-Serbian language reformer Ljudevit Gaj, who made 
attempts to test the idea on the disposed Serbian king Milos Obrenovic after the repression of 
a Hungarian revolt in the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848, which had resulted in equal repression 
of both Hungarians and Croats. Thus, the Illyrian idea was the first idea of unifying 
Southern Slavs (possibly including Bulgarians), who were perceived to share linguistic and 
ethnic characteristics, into one state and thereby achieve independence from the great 
E m p i r e s . T h e r e  were however also other ideas of more narrow state building among the 
Croats and the Serbs. The Serbs had been more successful, first achieving autonomy within 
the Ottoman state in 1838 and then independence for a Kingdom o f their own in 1878.
In Serbia the linguistic reformer Vuk Karadzic (Gaj’s Serbian counterpart), who reformed the 
stokavian language based upon Hercegovina-Serbian dialects, suggested that all Stokavian- 
speakers were really Serbs, regardless their religion. With the Serbs largely content with 
building a Serbian state, and attempting to include other Serb-inhabited territories into it, the 
Illyrian or Yugoslav ideas were mainly fostered in Croatia. In the 1860s and 1870s it had been 
taken up by the Catholic Bishop Josef Strossmayer who was a cofounder of the Academy o f 
Sciences and Arts in Zagreb and who sought to bring Serbs and Slovenes together with Croats 
through linguistic unification and who aspired to a federal state creation similar to that o f the 
Habsburg Double Monarchy. Those ideas competed with more narrow nationalist ideas in 
Croatia.
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire attempts were made to come to terms with the arising 
nationalism after the introduction o f the Double Monarchy. In 1868 some first steps were 
taken for national rights for the peoples o f Croatia, but it was the socialists or Austro- 
Marxists, such as Otto Bauer, who first tried to develop a framework to deal with the issue. 
Various programmes during the last fifty years o f the Double Monarchy, such as the idea of 
creating a federal state on Swiss principles along the Danube including TIlyria’ (South Slavia) 
or to overcome national aspirations through social reforms, all failed. In the industrialisation 




Cf: Lampe, John (1996) “Yugoslavia as Histor>” Cambridge University Press 
Lampe, J (1996): 46
See also Rusinow, D (2003) “The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia’’, in Djokié, D (Ed) (2003) 
Yugoslavism; Histories o f a Failed Idea, 1918-1992” Hurst & Company, London; 11-26.
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similar national trend prevailed. As outlined in the Introduction, the Croat and Slovene 
‘markers’ for national identity within the Austro-Hungarian Empire were based on language. 
The Illyrian idea had been fairly abstract at first, but won supporters among the Serbs in 
Croatia during the second half o f the nineteenth century and eventually also among Croats.
In Serbia itself the enthusiasm was overshadowed by dreams of annexing parts of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina into the creation of a Greater Serbia.
The Albanians, on the other hand, had no aspirations to an Albanian state before the twentieth 
century, but were quite content with remaining inside the Ottoman state. Although there 
may have been a growing Albanian identity, beyond the fis^ especially in the nineteenth 
century, there was not really any expression o f Albanian nationalism. Several factors made 
expressions of nationhood unlikely. There were disputes between clans, and the Albanians did 
not share a single religion, but were divided between Islam, Orthodox Christianity and 
Catholicism. The life-style between, for example, the Task in the south or in the coastal 
trading ports, and the Gheg o f the highlands was quite different. The focus here is on the 
Gheg and the Ghegarian lands, since the vast majority of Albanians who eventually became 
part of Yugoslavia were Ghegs. The Albanians did however demand autonomy within the 
Ottoman state and wished to be unified in a single Vilayet, and on several occasions they 
revolted against the Porte. Most o f these revolts were fairly unorganised, but by the 1870s 
there came increased demands for gathering all the Albanian lands into a single Vilayet and 
millet. The Porte had in fact utilised the divisions, and the millet system, according to the 
principle ‘divide and rule’.
Great Power rivalry contributed to Albanian-Serbian tensions in the region during the second 
half o f the nineteenth century. Austria was fiercely opposed to the creation of a Serbian state, 
and to any Russian influence in the region, and it considered the promotion of an Albanian 
national consciousness to be an important counter-weight to Slavic nationalism.*^^ A series of 
clashes between the Porte and rebelling Christian millets in the mid 1870s, including the 
Serbian-Montenegrin rebellion in 1976, provided the pretext for Russia to declare war on the 
Porte in 1877. Serbia and Montenegro soon joined in and Serbia managed to expand 
southwards and drive Albanians deep into Kosovo, which aggravated relations between Serbs
For the Albanian aspirations and state creation see further: Jelavich, C and B (1977/1993) “The Establishment 
of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920” Universiy of Washington Press, Seattle and London; Cliapter 14;
Vickers, M (1995); Stavrianos, L. S (1958/2000): Ch. 27 










and Albanians. Russia defeated the Porte and forced an agreement that would grant Serbia, 
Montenegro and Romania independence, while creating a large Bulgarian puppet state. Some 
Romanian provinces were annexed directly by Russia, but Montenegro was allowed to extend 
its territories. However, this entire reshaping o f  the Balkan Peninsula concerned all the major 
powers in Europe leading to the convention o f the Berlin Conference of June-July 1878 in 
order to modify the treaty and lay the foundations for the new map o f Europe. Here, the 
independence o f Serbia was confirmed (as well that of Romania and Montenegro), but Austria 
was permitted to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to block any aspirations for a greater 
Serbian state. Ethnically mixed territories with large Albanian populations, some 
predominantly Albanian, were now incorporated into the Montenegrin and Serbian states.
In response to these changes a series o f protests arose among the Albanians, who objected to 
Slavic annexation o f Albanian-inhabited lands. In Kosovo, which remained under Ottoman 
rule, several hundred Albanian clan leaders (including some from present-day Macedonia and 
South Serbia) gathered in Prizren on 10 June 1878 to form the Prizren League. The League 
organised an opposition movement to the Slavic territorial annexations and demanded that the 
Albanian lands be united into a single administrative unit within the Ottoman state. The 
Prizren League was not an all-Albanian nor even an all-Gheg movement though, since it did 
not receive more than marginal support from central Albania. However, a form of national 
movement had nevertheless started and regional branches o f  the League were formed in 
various areas. The Porte rejected the demands for a single administrative unit and the League 
was effectively defeated, but its ideological heritage survived among intellectuals.
By the early twentieth century the Yugoslav idea was most widespread among the 
Habsburgian South Slavs and small parties increasingly challenged the existing political- 
territorial borders. Hereby the tension between Serbia and Austria grew. With Austria’s 
occupation o f Bosnia in 1878 and especially after the formal annexation in 1908, Serbian 
resistance grew in Bosnia along with ambitions to join the Serbian Kingdom. The Serbian- 
Austrian conflict, which included a tariff conflict between 1906 and 1911, should of course be 
considered in the wider context of great power rivalry in Europe at the time, especially the 
Austro-Russian rivalry.
Vickers, M (1995); 29
Serbia and Montenegro \^'ere geographically separated by a slice o f Ottoman land, the Kosovo Vilaj'et, \̂  hich 
covered much of present-day Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sand2ak up to Bosnia.
Montenegro, for example, receh ed the town of Pec / Peja as well as northern Albanian territories.
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Meanwhile Italy had its own claims upon Ottoman territory, such as present-day Albania, and 
in 1911 a war broke out, starting with an Italian attack on the Ottoman state in Libya. In 
Albania a rising rebellion against the Porte was initially aided by Serbia and Montenegro, but 
then, in 1912, Montenegro suddenly attacked Albanian territory, which was soon followed by 
a Serbian expansion southwards into Kosovo and Macedonia. In the Balkan wars of 1912- 
1913 the Albanians, although they had disputes of their own with the Porte, sided with the 
Ottomans against the attacks from the Slavic neighbours and the coalition of Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece. In an attempt to settle Balkan territorial issues a 
conference of ambassadors in London in 1912 drew out the borders for the creation of a future 
Albanian state. In the new state, created in 1913, more than half of the Albanians ended up 
outside its borders as Albanian-inhabited but ethnically mixed land, was granted to Serbia.
The Serbian expansion southwards into Kosovo and Macedonia in the Balkan Wars o f 1912- 
13 only furthered the Austrian claim to put an end to the Serbian obstacle. The spark for the 
First World War came when a young Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the 
Austrian Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. Austria designed an ultimatum, to 
which it would be impossible for Seibia to concede, and then used the rejection of it as an 
excuse for military intervention. The Balkans was of course just a single theatre in the context 
of a much wider drama o f great-power rivalry that now came to its violent conclusion with the 
First World War.
The First Yugoslav state: general problems of primarily domestic character
The first Yugoslavia was created on 1 December 1918 with the name ‘The Kingdom of the 
Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes’ in an official proclamation by the Serbian crown prince 
in Belgrade. It was carved out of the South Slavic parts of the crumbling Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires after these had been defeated in the Great War and a new order created. The 
new state was a materialisation of the idea o f ’self-determination’ and ’democracy’ forali 
nations, which in line with the discussion in chapter 2 was fostered by the American President 
Woodrow Wilson and, as such, under the patronage of the Versailles Treaty.
The state was to a large extent created in reaction to external pressure and the international 
conditions at the time. The Slovenes and Croats were pushed to ally themselves closely to 
Serbia after the Habsburg monarchy had collapsed. Serbia, in its turn, was pressured by the
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Allies to agree to the creation of a Yugoslav state as soon as the war was over. In the 
Yugoslav case, the founding principles of self-determination and freedom meant for the 
peasants to freely own their land. Following this there were land reforms, which provided for 
the redistribution of land. While in many areas this meant securing support from the peasants, 
for example in the case o f land from the aristocracy within the Habsburg empire being 
delivered to local farmers, as in 1918, in other areas (such as Kosovo) it meant Serb 
colonisation o f Albanian land (although it especially aimed at breaking up feudal-style share- 
cropping and to create more effective agriculture). Hence, land reforms, as such, became one 
of the reasons for inter-ethnic tensions. The national dynamics were widely shaped by the 
different regional historical experiences, not least in terms of economic structure and level of 
development, which included agriculture, and which, as we shall return to below, created 
different conceptions o f the political economy and for economic policy. Throughout its short 
lifespan, the state thereby became contested domestically, at the same time as it was 
challenged internationally.
The first Yugoslavia was in many respects both an extension of the Serbian state and 
effectively ruled by a small Belgrade-centred bourgeois elite. It w as ravished by national 
conflicts in the shape o f constitutional and political conflicts, and from 1921 was pseudo- 
parliamentary and autocratic, and from 1929 a royal dictatorship. Its political and economic 
life was enmeshed in nepotism and clientelism, corruption, and use or misuse of power for 
personal enrichment and gain.^^^ Until 1934-1936 it pursued a political balancing act in the 
post-Versailles European diplomatic order, but then, primarily for economic reasons, ended 
up with a non-aggression pact with Germany, until the until the coup d’etat of 1941
In the creation of the new state there existed a fairly widespread idea that all southern Slavs 
were o f the same nationality. This idea was rejected by the Government but eventually it was 
recognised that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were three ‘tribes’ of the same nationality, which 
was reflected in the name of the state, which until 1929 was ‘the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes’, The Belgrade-centralised state was soon threatened by fragmentation among 
the rival national groups however, and in an attempt to save it, the monarchical dictatorship, 
installed in 1929, renamed it Yugoslavia with the official policy that only one nationality
Details of the level of control by a small Seibian elite is given in; Tomasc% ich, J (1955); 240-249; Stavrianos. 
L. S. (1958/2000); 624-625.
166 For example: Tomasevich, J (1955): 240-49.
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‘Yugoslav’ existed. This idea was quite unsuccessful and was officially abandoned in 1939, 
when the Croats were granted a large degree of autonomy. It was at this time after the re­
organisation o f the state framework, that Serbian-Croatian relations were at their best and it 
was largely a result of a threatening and hostile external environment.
The Muslim Slavs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by contrast, were not considered a separate nation 
at all. They were perceived as either Serbs or Croats, who had become Islamised during 
Ottoman domination, or by others they were perceived as ’Turks’ depending on political 
viewpoint. Among the Muslims themselves there were strong feelings that they should be 
considered and treated as a separate nation rather than as a religious community. Similarly, 
the Macedonians were either considered as Serbs (in Serbia) or as Western Bulgarians (in 
Bulgaria). The Macedonians themselves were divided, but there were strong segments within 
the population with Bulgarian national sentiments, and relations towards the Serbs were 
aggravated after Serb persecutions among inhabitants in Macedonia. The International 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), which had aspired to autonomy for 
Macedonia, lost its cause after the division of the territory between Serbia, Greece, and 
Bulgaria following the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Among the Montenegrins, the smallest 
nation in Yugoslavia, there was also a distinct national identity, but here the connection with 
the Serbs was the strongest.
The national conflicts in Yugoslavia were deeply intertwined with the different regional 
economic conditions, structures, and experiences, inherited from the Imperial period. The 
establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918 meant the creation of a completely new economic unit.
which had never before existed. The shaping of new borders brought customs and tolls where 
there had previously been none, at the same time as they disappeared between areas where 
they had previously existed. As has been analysed by Rudolf Bicanic, the creation of the new 
economic unit meant that a number of tensions and imbalances, which were never really 
solved, even in the second Yugoslavia, were bred into the new state from its birth. The 
regional differences implied different interests and conceptions for the economy. For those 
areas for which the new creation meant an actual increase o f the market (such as Serbia), the
Tlic argument here Iargcl>’ follo\^ s the Croatian Latvyer and Economist Rudolf Bicanic, who was a member 
of the Croatian Peasant Party during the inter-\\ ar period and opposed to King Aleksander’s rule, tlicn deputy 
director of the National Bank in Uie Yugosla\- govemment-in-exile during the Second World War, w hen he 
eventually declared support for Uie Partisans in 1942. and then took up a position as Professor of Economy in the 
Law' Faculrt' at Zagreb Universitj' after the war: Bidanic, R (1973) “Economic Policy in Yugoslavia" Cambridge 
Universiw Press: Ch. 1
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tendency was towards centralist autocratic policies for safeguarding the new state, while for 
those who found themselves in a much smaller market (such as Slovenia and parts of Croatia, 
especially the north-west), the tendency was to advocate a federalist and liberal policy. The 
most developed areas, and economic branches, had an interest in a more open economy, in 
order to develop a niche, and to trade and compete on a wider international market, whereas 
the underdeveloped areas were more interested in protectionist economic development. Such 
interests were not just confined to manufacture and industry, which were poorly developed 
anyway even in the northwest, but also applied directly to agriculture, because the dominance 
of the latter sector meant that there was no industrial sector in the new domestic market to 
absorb any agricultural surplus. The problem with uneven domestic regional economic 
development and structure was further complicated by its connection to national demographic 
divisions. The new state-market creation thereby incorporated two different conceptions o f 
economic development and moreover brought a division between a political power centre 
(Belgrade) and an economic power centre (especially the Zagreb-area), where the former 
employed non-economic means to counter-balance the most developed areas. As we shall 
se in chapter 4, these competing conceptions continued to exist in the second (socialist) 
Yugoslavia created after the Second World War.
The agricultural-based economy changed structure in much of the new region during the war 
years and the inter-war period. During the war years, women had taken over in cultivating 
the fields as the men were fighting in the war, and along with the development of industry in 
the new state there followed an early wave o f countryside prolétarisation. The great shortage 
of agricultural products after the war in much o f Europe increased the prices, which in turn 
led to a corresponding rise in the price of land. This had an effect on the quality of production, 
which fell, as well as on its character. The creation o f new borders and customs reduced the 
export of some products, such as Croatian wine, and the increasing pressure on domestic 
agriculture in the new state contributed to the radical fall in income for agricultural workers. 
Wages went down for other groups as well, both in industry and bureaucracy, but not to an 
equal extent. At the same time the tax burden in the new state increased, one of the objectives 
being to mobilise domestic capital. Under such economic pressure on both land and wages in 
industry, people compensated incomes from one sector with those from another, thus 
introducing the phenomenon of the peasant-worker; that is, a person taking an income both
’®Bicanic,R(1973); 20-21
Following: Biéanié, R  (1973) and, Tomasevich, J (1955).
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from industrial work and from cultivating land in order to survive or increase living standards. 
Under these conditions, and as an effect of the land reform in 1918 when land from the 
Habsburg aristocracy was distributed to the local agricultural workers, there followed an 
increase in subsistence farming even in those agricultural areas that had been exposed to 
market forces. The practice o f subsistence farming was accompanied by the sale of one or two 
products, such as wine or tobacco, on the market. Various land reforms were undertaken in 
the 1920s and 1930s, with different effects. They resulted in increased productivity in most 
areas, but reduced it in some (Dalmatia), and while they generally broke up sharecropping and 
feudal structures, they contributed to inter-ethnic tensions in some areas, especially between 
Serbs and Albanians and between Croats and Serbs. The reforms were however not 
accompanied by any agricultural policy, or support, to back them up.
The peasants, who in many areas were dissatisfied, had become considerably mobilised in the 
war years, and during the 1920s *^*and 1930s they became organised from earlier protest 
movements into political parties. The organisation of the peasants was however dependant on 
small groups of intellectuals in the urban areas, who took on the ‘peasant cause’. The peasants 
were particularly well organised in Croatia with the Croatian Peasants Party {Hrvaiska 
Seljacka Stranka, or ’HSS’), which was founded by Stjepan Radió and his brother; it moved 
in a nationalist and nationalist-romantic direction, and became the most important political 
party in Croatia during the inter-war period.
The incorporation of peasants into political parties and mass-based politics did not mean 
however that they generally achieved much influence in politics. Instead, the peasants could 
be controlled by the state through coercive means and economic credits, with Serbia being the 
region where the farmer’s dependence on credits from the state, or other lenders, was 
particularly abused. Fanners’ debts, and dependence on credits, meant that they could be 
directly manipulated for political purposes and credit could be traded for political loyalty. 
Nicos Mouzelis has argued that two different forms of popular incorporation into political 
participation prevailed in the Balkans, with a so-called ‘peasant populism’ in the north, and 
with the transformation of clientelist networks, from traditional to bureaucratic clientelism, in
Tomasevich, J (1955); cf. Lampe, J (1996): 184-187 for economic development and for the Seib-Croat 
tensions in relation to land reform.
^Tom asevich, J (1955): p. 248 and chapter 27 en bloc.
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the south (Greece). Peasant populism prevailed in Croatia, while Mouzeli’s argument for 
Greece concerning clientelist incorporation can be partly extended to the southern parts of 
Yugoslavia such as Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, where there was a mixture rather of 
the two forms; the peasants were incorporated into party politics, but the actual parties were 
either weak or represented other interests while controlling and manipulating groups of 
peasants. In the whole region, the strong state and low level of industrialisation, and the lack 
of any developed workers or trade union movement, which could develop an independent 
power base, coupled with weak urban-rural links and a strong hostility of the village towards 
the city (which represented political authority, creditors, and military conscription), 
effectively prevented any counter-balance to political-bureaucratic elites. Further, the degree 
of urbanisation was low and the urban middle class very small. Authoritarian and clientelist 
tendencies could thereby be preserved, albeit transformed, and these general conditions 
prevented the development of a ‘civil society’, as the term conventionally is conceptualised in 
contemporary li te ra tu re .T ra ia n  Stoianovich has suggested that a ‘civil society’, understood 
as a community with a ‘shared city’, as opposed to ancestry, and with networks of group 
associations that are independent from, but try to affect, institutional power, did not develop 
in this region; this is so because the city was so weak, the urbanisation level so low, and 
because state power developed and was extended before capitalist relations and 
industrialisation, as opposed to the case in western Europe.*^''
The Belgrade-centred Yugoslav state pursued a policy o f protectionist state-capitalism, which 
favoured industry, but the domestic entrepreneurs and dealers were often acting as middlemen 
for foreign companies and economic interests. All production in the first Yugoslavia was 
linked to the world market and the economy was highly sensitive to external conditions. Most 
of the export, around three quarters, consisted o f agricultural products, while the bulk of 
industrial products, up to 85 %, were imported. In the 1930s there was a general decrease in 
agricultural prices and shrinking grain markets. With a growing gap in the prices between 
agricultural and industrial products Yugoslavia started to experience a problem that it would
*’“ Mouzelis, N (1985) “Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the 
Balkans and Latin America”, MacMillan: Ch. 1-2
' ’Mn the sense that Hegel made a distinction between family and state, and in the sense most com cntionally 
used by contemporaiy writers, where ‘civil society’ is supposed to consist o f independent organizations 
counterbalancing the state and mediating, articulating or filtering \ ’arious group interests (for example trade 
unions, sport associations, non-profit interest groups etc).
Stoianovich, T (1994) “Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe”, M. E  Sharpe: pp. 291-292 
Cf. Lampe, J.R (1996): 179. Lampe discusses the Yugoslav strategy for overcoming the depression including 
the promotion of Germany as a principal trading partner.
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have even in the second (socialist) Yugoslavia, namely how to pay for imports with exports. 
This problem continued throughout the second Yugoslavia, but after the 1960s the import- 
export character changed and was no longer centred on agricultural versus industrial products. 
In the 1930s the crisis arising from the import-export relationship, and the imbalance betw een 
agricultural products and industrial products, developed into a banking crisis, which led 
Yugoslavia into a debt crisis. The exposed position to foreign economic powers will be 
elaborated further below.
Among the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in the essentially Slavic state, were the 
Albanians. The Albanian minority (concentrated in Kosovo and Macedonia) lived under 
Serb domination throughout the period of the first Yugoslavia, and had no specifically 
guaranteed minority or community rights. A Serbian view was that the Albanians, 
especially since they sided with the Ottomans against Serbia in the Balkan wars, were national 
competitors for the territory of Kosovo. The Serbian policy was deliberately targeted at either 
assimilation of the Albanians into the Slavic state or expulsion. The attempts at assimilation 
primarily included the incorporation of Albanian children into Serbian schools (with all 
instruction through Serbian) and for this purpose Bosnian Muslim teachers were brought to 
the province, but fearing that the only result might be to educate a potential resistance group, 
the policy was changed.*^* Albanians were then allowed to attend Muslim, or so-called 
‘Turkish’ schools, which were considered of lower quality, but the Albanians ended up 
utilising them to run their own parallel education system, and turned them into opposition 
centres of what was considered nationalist or communist activity.'^’ It should be noted that 
schooling among the Albanians was far from general: only 2 % of the state high school 
population were Albanians, while the level of illiteracy was around 90
' I here refrain from discussing marginalized groups that may have been c\ cn more disach antaged, such as ll)c 
Romani (Gypsic).
On Seibian-AIbanian relations during this period, as outlined here, see further Janjid, D (1994) “Nalioail 
Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Seibs and Albanians", in Janjic. D &. S. Maliqi (Eds) ( 1994) "Conflict or 
Dialogue”, Open University, Subotica: 117-176; and; Shoup. P (1968) "Communism and the YugosLiv National 
(Question”, Columbia Univ ersity Press.
Banac, I (1984) "The National (^estion in Yugosla\ ia; Origins, History. Politics" Cornell University Press: 
299; cf. Poultoa H (2003) "Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs" in Djokii. D (Ed) (2iX).t) "Yugoslav ism; 
Histories o f a Failed Idea 1918-1992” Hunt & Company, London: 115-135 (Poulion refers to Banac on this 
particular issue).
’'^Following: Banac. I (1984): 299 
'"^Banac,I(1984): 299
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The entire territory o f Kosovo was subjected to a policy of colonisation, which included 
attempts to alter the demographic composition o f the area, such as for example during the 
land reforms o f 1922-29, and again o f  1933-38. The reforms were aimed both against the 
inherited feudal and tribal social relations in Kosovo and against the Albanian population in 
itself, systematically and effectively favouring Serbs and Montenegrins and allocating them 
better quality land. Encouraged in such ways a large number o f Albanians left for Turkey 
during this period. The Albanian population thereby came to live under a state o f repression in 
the Slavic state, and the period started with violent raids and counter-raids between 1918 and 
1920. An Albanian rebellion movement, the so called Kaèak-movement, opted for the 
unification o f Kosovo with Albania, which was supported by Italy, and posed particular 
problems for the Serb-dominated state in the 1920s. Many Albanians considered the 
movement to be an anned rebellion against the Kingdom, the State, and its colonisation 
attempts, while for the Serbs it represented bands o f robbers and criminals.^** The movement 
was persecuted by the Yugoslav police, but its development was primarily prevented by 
disputes over the future of Albanians among the Albanians themselves. The Albanian 
Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Zogu, w as an opponent of the Ka£ak-movement and in 1922 
he started to disarm the Albanian tribes in the northern highlands o f Albania and the border 
area with Yugoslavia. When he later became Prime Minister, he entered into a secret 
agreement with the government in Belgrade to get rid o f the KaCaks. After a short interruption 
during the June revolution in Albania, he was reinstated in power in a new regime, which was 
sponsored by Belgrade and he then set out to suppress the Albanian leaders in Kosovo, which 
involved the assassination of the two leaders Zia Dibra and Bajram C u r r i . The newly 
created Albanian state was itself subjected to foreign interference, with Yugoslavia, on the 
one hand, and Italy, on the other, supporting various clans considered suitable for their 
respective state-interests. Apart from incidents with Albanian rebels in the south, the various 
conflicts within the new Yugoslav state were primarily filtered politically through the 
parliament, and often articulated as constitutional conflicts.
An outline of the state framework and its tensions
Formally, the state was a parliamentary democracy introduced in 1919 with universal suffrage 
and parliamentary government. The Croatian hopes for a joint state were however almost
Cf. Janjic, D (1994): see footnote 216
Miranda Vickers (1998) “Benveen Serb and Albanian: A Histoiy of Kosovo”: 99-102; Cf. Janjk, D (1994)
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immediately overshadowed. The Croatian aspiration to the federal idea, derived from the 
Habsburg experience, was not equally backed up by the Slovenes, or even Dalmatians, who 
found immediate protection within the new state from Italian and Austrian claims upon their 
territories. The Slovenes were geographically disconnected from Serbia and therefore had less 
fear of Serbian domination. From the beginning the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)’®"̂, 
which had strong rural support in Croatia, became marginalised from the alliance between the 
Serbian Radical Party and the more broadly popularly based Democratic Party (which had its 
supporters among all ethnic groups). The Radical-Democratic alliance passed the 
Constitution with a single majority in 1921, and the Croatian cause was weakened from the 
start as the Croatian Peasant Party boycotted the parliament rather than trying to negotiate 
some form of autonomy, which might have been possible.*^^ Eventually the HSS ended their 
boycott in 1924, but the parliamentary system operated under dismal conditions from the 
beginning and soon collapsed. Apart from the state being dominated by a small fraction of the 
Serbian elite, the parliament was heavily manipulated by the Crown (King Aleksander and 
later Prince Paul), After a shoot-out in the parliament in 1928, the leader of the Croatian 
Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, died, and in 1929 King Aleksander abolished the parliament and 
installed a royal dictatorship. In 1931 a new Constitution was passed which legalised the royal 
powers, although some retreats from the authoritarian rule followed.
In Croatia this spurred on the development o f the UstaSa movement, which aspired to an 
independent Croatian state, and eventually moved in a terrorist direction. Throughout the 
1930s the Ustasa largely operated from outside Yugoslavia, in the Croatian diaspora, and 
plotted against the royal dictatorship, but it was a Macedonian, with support from Italy and 
Hungary as well as Ustasa, who assassinated King Aleksander, together with the French 
Foreign Minister, in Marseilles on 9 October 1934. After his death, the regency continued to 
rule under his cousin Prince Paul, since the successor King Peter II was still a child. In order 
to counter the Ustasa’s claim for secession, the Croatian Peasants Party, now led by Vladko 
Madek, managed to negotiate with Belgrade and achieve autonomy for Croatia in 1939. In the
Cf. Hoptncr, J.B (1962) “Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941” Columbia Universi^ Press: Ch 1 
H n atska Seijaòka Stnmka (Croatian Peasants Part) ), led by Stjepan Radic until his deatli in 1928, tlicn by 
Vladko Maóek
Pavlowich. S. K (1988) ”The improbable Sur\ iv o r-  Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988 ” Hurst & 
Company, London: Ch 1
Hoptncr, J. B (1962): p. 7; Pavlowich op.cit: p. 3
See further Pavlowiclu S. K (1988): Ch 1; Pawlowicli, S (1999)“AHistoi>- of the Balkans 1804-1945”, 
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re-structured state, Croatia, which now included large parts of Bosnia as well as Dalmatia and  
Dubrovnik, was guaranteed a large degree of self-rule including control o f budgetary and 
internal affairs, while the central government maintained foreign affairs and defence, foreign 
trade, and communications. The 1939 agreement {Sporazum) was contested by many parties, 
including the Communists and Democrats, and particularly the Serbian parties who 
disapproved o f  the absence o f guarantees given to the Serbian minority in Croatia. The 
Muslims who came under Croatian administration were simply ignored in the formula. The 
Sporazum  was primarily an attempt to secure Serbian-Croatian relations, bring internal unity 
and avoid potential Croatian agreements with fascist Italy or even Germany. While 
Yugoslavia had opted for a neutral position in 1936 it was increasingly and reluctantly drawn 
into a German sphere of influence. Yugoslavia’s position internationally, both in terms of 
geopolitics and political economy were at least as problematic as any domestic disputes, and 
in fact a prime reason for keeping the country together in the first place.
A Place in the Balkans and in the W ord
If the domestic situation was poor right from the start with the main Croatian party initially 
boycotting the parliament, the international position was no more ideal. The new state had 
inherited a number o f external troubles from the Habsburgs and at its borders it had Bulgarian 
claims on Macedonia, shifting Albanian positions between Rome and Belgrade, a fascist Italy 
with claims to Yugoslav territories, and an irredentist Hungary (with a large minority in 
Vojvodina in Serbia. Its Slavic ‘brother’ Russia offered no support, as it was Communist 
ruled and the Cominform considered the Yugoslav state to be the (bourgeois) result of 
territorial expansion of one state on behalf of the crushed Empires. Yugoslavia was, as a 
popular saying goes, ’encircled by troubles’.̂ ** Moreover there was a growing German 
challenge after 1933, with Hitler in power, and a Great Britain whose interests were 
elsewhere. The only power supporting the Versailles-state borders was France. Yugoslavia 
therefore relied to a great extent upon France in its foreign policy, as well as forming alliances 
first in 1920-21 with Czechoslovakia and Romania (both with their own Habsburg legacy and 
interest in preventing an irredentist Hungary from sabotaging the peace treaty), and eventually 
from 1934 in a Balkan alliance with Greece and Turkey (and Romania) to fend off Bulgarian
A word game which schoolchildren could use to learn the names of Yugoslavia’s geographical neighbours; 
(Yugoslavia)ye okruiena brigamo” (Yugoslavia is encircled by troubles) with: B=Bulgaria, R=Rumania, I=Italy, 
G=Greece, A=Albania, M=Magyarska (Hungaty), and A=Austria.
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claims. Foreign policy therefore was mainly concerned with securing Yugoslavia’s borders 
and finding the alliances to support it. With the small nations (Czechoslovakia, Romania) it 
was a strong advocate of the League of Nations, but could not rely exclusively on any 
’’collective security” principle and therefore needed the ties with France as well as the Balkan 
alliance.
The Economically Dependent Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia’s diplomatic relations were however in poor compatibility with its foreign 
economic relations and foreign t r a d e . M o s t  of its trade was with Germany, Austria and 
Italy, and it grew increasingly dependent on Germany in the 1930s after the Great Depression. 
The Depression hit Yugoslavia hard as a small agriculturally dominated country. The 
agricultural crisis in the 1930s, the increasing gap between agricultural and industrial 
products, and the export-import asymmetry it created has already been discussed above. With 
the drop in prices in international trade, Yugoslavia also suffered a banking crisis, followed 
by indebtedness at home and abroad. With three quarters of the Yugoslav population still in 
agriculture and its exports being primarily agricultural and livestock products, its most 
important supplements were timber, minerals, and the export o f cement to the Italian market; 
however, in the nineteenth century, industry and mining had been largely developed and 
exploited directly by foreign companies and Yugoslavia was still heavily dependent on 
foreign economic centres.
Some industrial development took place in the inter-war period and, although the sector 
remained small, it was growing especially in the 1930s. The expansion was mainly in light 
manufacturing in the northwest (Croatia, Slovenia) and mining and metallurgy in the south 
(Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia) and it was stimulated, or exploited, with foreign 
capital, especially French, British and increasingly German. In spite of the nationalisation o f 
some industries and an import-substituted industrialisation strategy after 1929, foreign 
companies retained control over the bulk o f industry. The extent o f this in 1939 was that more 
than half of the metalworking industry, some 75-90 % of the mining, metal extracting and
Cf. fore.xample Pavlowich 1988. 
*^Hoptncr,J.B(1962): 94
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chemical industries, and 25-50 % of the other industries were under the control of foreign 
companies.*^*
The state did experience domestic growth, especially in the second half of the period, placing 
Yugoslavia in the top section o f economies in Eastern Europe, but the economy was 
externally dependent and the incompatibility o f Yugoslavia’s need for diplomatic friends and 
her need for trading partners could not be bridged. W hile in the period 1926-30 Italy took 
more than 25 % o f Yugoslav exports, Austria around 19 % and Germany just above 10 %
(and Czechoslovakia just below 10 %). this changed in the period 1936-39 to Germany taking 
close to 30 %, Austria just above 11 % and Italy just above 7 %. The loss of the Italian
market came after the League o f Nations decided on a selective boycott of Italy following the 
Italian occupation of Ethiopia. The League o f Nations decision had a considerable effect on 
Yugoslavia. The increasing dependence on Germany was also notable in relation to imports, 
which were in the same proportional range as for exports. Furthermore, the Germans bought 
out French and American interests in Yugoslavia, such as mine-holdings and electricity 
companies. By the second half o f the 1930s, the Yugoslav economy was almost completely 
dependent on Germany. It was not without reason that the Yugoslav communists considered 
the Monarchy to have exposed Yugoslavia to a subordinate position and invited domination 
and exploitation by foreign economic capital.
The reliance on Germany did bring some short-term gains, but it would increasingly become 
an awkward partner in foreign policy. When Yugoslavia joined the tripartite-satellites in 1941 
there followed a coup d ’etat by the discontented Serbian officer corps who tried to save 
Yugoslavia from internal unrest, but they had no time to develop their policies before the 
German attack on 6 April.
Figures taken from: Schicmp, C-U (1990) “Migration, Socialism and the International Dh ision of Labour: 
The Yugoslavian experience” Aldershot, Avebun-: 38
192 All figures taken from table II in Hoptner, J.B (1962): 95
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Occupation and Revolution: the development of state and nation conceptions among the 
Yugoslav Communists, their learning process in the Second World War and competing
state claims 193
The most significant political forces in the inter-war period were the fairly nationally oriented 
Serbian Radical Party, (with connections to the Orthodox Church), the equally national 
Croatian Peasant Party, and the less regionally attached Democratic Party, which advocated a 
centralist parliamentary system and land reforms. These forces operated under an 
authoritarian monarch.
The main contesters were eventually the fascist Ustasa (which grew out of the Croatian Party 
of the Right, and which had strong relations to the Catholic Church) and the Communists. In 
addition there were a number of liberals oriented to the Wilsonian ideal, but these could 
mainly be found among intellectuals (especially at Belgrade university) and had little popular 
connections. Since it was the Communist Party which eventually formed the core of the 
partisan movement and re-created the state in the second Yugoslavia the rest o f this chapter 
will be devoted to them and especially to their conceptions of state and nation.
The Yugoslav Communist Party, which was founded in 1919 and outlawed two years later, 
was deeply divided over the national question for long periods during its activities in the first 
Yugoslavia.*^"* The influences on their position came from the two sources o f Bolshevism and 
Austro-Marxism, eventually moving from the former towards the latter.
Like the Austro-Marxists, the early Bolsheviks conceptualised ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ as 
typical historical constructions, with the nation perceived as a historically constituted 
community of people. The emphasis here was against any racial or tribal conception o f 
nation. The Marxists emphasised the modem element o f ‘nation’ and connected it particularly 
to the rise of capitalism, although in the case of Stalinist Russia this practice changed
This section owes much to the following woiks (in more or less the same chronological order): Shoup, P 
(1968) “Communism and the Yugoslav National Question” Columbia UniversiW Press; Tomase^ ich, J (1975) 
“War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-45 -  Tlic Chetniks” Stanford University Press; and Denitch, B (1976) 
“The Legitimation of a Revolution” Yale University Press.
Shoup, P (1968): Ch. 1
See: Stalin, J (1913/1936) “Maodsm and the Nationalities (Question” Second Edition, London, Lawrence & 
Wishhart Ltd, London & Lh crpool.
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fundamentally in the 1930s.^^^ But, while AustroMancist ideas were more practically 
oriented towards solving the national question within the declining Austro-Hungarian empire, 
the Bolshevik theory of nationalism, as formulated by Stalin upon Lenin’s request, was 
developed partly in opposition to the Austro-Marxists and aspired to develop Russia’s 
potential with the various national groups by promising self-determination. It was only in 
the multi-national empires that the Socialists were concerned with the problem of national 
self-determination. The Balkans, however, were of little concern as the region was considered 
backward and as lacking suitable conditions for a revolution anyway (revolution was to be 
expected in and to be concentrated on the capitalist strongholds).
The central problem provoking disagreement within the Yugoslav Communist Party revolved 
around the issue o f how revolutionary aims should be achieved, but the constant tension in the 
country over the national question also added to disputes. The various movements within 
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia had taken different positions on the formation of Yugoslavia. In 
Croatia and Slovenia the socialists had opted for federation and autonomy within the Austrian 
state, and were suspicious of a Balkan federation. In Serbia, the socialists had wanted a 
Balkan federation, but there was also strong support for the idea of firstly uniting Serb- 
inhabited lands as a necessary step towards a coming revolution. When the first Yugoslavia 
was formed the Serbian socialists quickly recognised it, since it incorporated all the Serb- 
inhabited lands. The Serbian socialists gave little attention to the problem o f  how to regulate 
the nation’s self-determination within the federation to which they aspired. This was in stark 
contrast to the Austro-Marxists who had devoted much concern to this particular issue, but 
also in contrast to the Bolsheviks. The main focus for the Serbian socialists was instead the 
economic advantages which a federation would bring about. The party would eventually come 
to take a centralist position rejecting federalism as splitting loyalties among the workers along 
national lines. The Comintern held a different position; Stalin wanted a Soviet federal 
model in the Balkans, and made attempts to strike deals with the nationalist movement IMRO 
in Macedonia, as well as with the Croatian Peasants Party under Stjepan Radic. The position 
o f the Comintern was that, in a backward peasant-dominated region such as the Balkans, 
national movements should be exploited in a revolution against the Colonialists, and that
In the 1930s there was a dramatic turn in the Soviet view of nations and a growing emphasis on tlie 
“primordial” origins o f a “itation”. See: Martin, T  (1999) “Modernization or Nco-Stalinism? -  Ascribed 
nationality and Soviet Primordialism” in Fitzpatrick, S (Ed) (1999) “Stalinism -  New Directions” Routledge: 
348-367
’®'Cf. Shoup,P(1968): 14-15
Tlie part>' was during its first decade also dominated by Serbian socialists.
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national support could be secured through the idea of a common revolution in which self- 
determination could be promised to the various national groups (moreover, they saw the 
Yugoslav state as a territorial extension o f Serbia, created in the wake of the defeated Austria- 
Hungary). These efforts proved to be a great failure for the Comintern however, and it was 
evident that it had misinterpreted the interest of self-determination and over-estimated the 
possibility of creating interest in a communist revolution among the peasants. At the end of 
the 1920s a deep split over the national question developed between the Yugoslav Communist 
Party and the Comintern. This created problems for the Yugoslav communists, and after the 
dictatorship installed by King Alexander in 1929, their situation became acute. Communists 
were persecuted throughout Yugoslavia, many fled the country, and the party collapsed.
In the first half of the 1930s the party was slowly revived with a new leadership more in 
harmony with Moscow. In pursuing the idea of provoking an armed rebellion among the 
peasants in Yugoslavia, and to break up the country, the Comintern made some attempts at 
‘unholy alliances’ with the extreme national movements in Yugoslavia. Nothing came out of 
these efforts though and after Hitler’s rise in Germany the Comintern abandoned its hostility 
towards a Yugoslav state. In 1934 the Comintern had taken initiatives to create national 
communist parties in Slovenia and Croatia. These efforts were re-enacted and fulfilled in 
1937, but this time not as a step towards breaking up the state but rather to help ensure a more 
national image and support for the Communist Party. Meanwhile in Croatia the national 
movement had gained momentum, largely as a response to the repression of the dictatorship 
under King Alexander and the murder of Stjepan Radic. But at the same time the Communist 
Party started to become tmly Yugoslav. After the installment o f Josip Broz Tito as the leader 
of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1937, the new party leadership included Slovenes,
Croats, as well as Serbs and cultivated a pro-Yugoslav line supported by the Comintern.
Susan Woodward has argued that this Slovene-Croat infusion in the leadership made the party 
more committed to the idea of multi-nationalism and federalism from this early stage on.^*^ 
The heritage o f Austro-Marxism was now also more emphasised.
His real name was Josip Broz, while ‘Tito’ was the nickname always used.
^  Woodward. S (1995) “Socialist Unemployment” Princeton Uni% ersity Press: See heranaysis of early party' 
developments in Introduction (partly) and especially Ch. 2; Compare also Wachtel, A. Bamch (1998) “Making a 
Nation, Breaking a Nation -  Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia” Stanford Uni\ crsit>' Press: 130. 
Wachtel argues tliat Tito and his followers were decided not to repeat Uie mistakes of tlie Monarchy with its 
attempts to “Serbianizc” Yugoslavia and thciefore opted for some form of federalism (p. 130).
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After the German-Soviet agreement o f  1939, the party initially opted for a neutral position 
between the Western democracies and the Nazi-fascist alliance. The government in Belgrade 
tried to occupy a position of balance to keep the country out o f war, but its weak position 
became ever clearer, first after the German blitzkrieg and occupation of France, then with 
Mussolini’s intervention in Greece from 28 October 1940. The Italian setbacks in the southern 
Balkans against the Greeks, and in northern Africa against the British, pushed Hitler into the 
Balkans, with the aim o f aiding his ally and preventing the British from advancing in Greece. 
Yugoslavia occupied a precarious strategic position, both as supply route to the M editerranean 
and Africa, and for its proximity to the southern Russian front. The Yugoslav Government’s 
determination to  stay out o f the war forced it to sign an agreement with the Germans. But th is 
was seen as treason by the Serbian officer corps (who still considered Germany their enemy 
since the First World War) and also by a large part o f the Serbian population. The putsch  tha t 
followed seemed to receive considerable popular support, but also brought the immediate 
intervention by Hitler on 6 April 1941. The superior German military swept out the local 
army in a few months. It divided the country roughly between German military administration 
in Serbia and the eastern parts, Italian rule over Montenegro, Dalmatia, Istria, parts of 
Slovenia, Kosovo and western Macedonia to the Italian-controlled Albanian state, while 
Bulgaria took the remaining parts o f Macedonia and Hungary parts of Vojvodina and northern 
Serbia. The Ustasas received an enlarged Croatian state, the NDH-state {Nezavism  D rzava 
Hn^atskaf^^ ̂  which they set about ethnically purifying. In Serbia hundreds of thousands o f 
Serbs, including most of the army, were deported by the Germans to prisoner of war camps, A  
very small number of Serbian soldiers (a few dozen) escaped with Colonel Draza Mihailovic 
to the mountain Ravna Gora and would eventually form the core of the Serbian Cetniks.^®^
The number o f those killed in the inter-ethnic struggle that eventually unfolded, between the 
Ustasa and Cetniks, is disputed. Most accounts agree on a range of several hundred thousand 
Serbs killed by the Ustasa (some accounts give the figure as close to one m illion), and at least 
tens o f thousands o f  Croats killed in the later years o f the war by revenging Cetniks (some 
accounts claim one hundred thousand or more). In addition, there were certainly victims from 
other ethnic groups. In any case a large part, perhaps the majority, of the victims of the war 
were due to inter-ethnic violence within Yugoslavia itself
‘Independent State o f Croatia’
Compare for example John Lampe (1996): 200-201
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After Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia, the partisan movement that developed under the 
Communists would gather increasing support as a liberation platform from foreign 
occupation. Factions continued, but increasingly the communist partisan movement was able 
to provide a “Yugoslav” ideology promising both the liberation from foreign domination and 
a formula for resolving the national question; here, the struggle against foreign domination 
was a common cause. The objective was not easily achieved though. Initially the partisan 
movement, formed in the second half of 1941, had a poor recruitment base between the 
royalist Cetniks in Serbia and the UstaSi in Croatia. These two movements attracted large 
portions of the peasantry among their own national groups. Among the Muslim Slavs in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, many peasants sided with the Ustasi. The partisans sought an initial 
operation base in Serbia proper, but were forced out by the Cetniks and had to move towards 
the Sanzak area in the border region between Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro,
In Croatia it was equally difficult to attract Croatian peasants, and initially a large part o f the 
recruited forces were Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia (largely Krajina Serbs who sought 
protection from the the U s t a s i ) . T h e  Partisans developed strategies for trust and 
reconciliation between Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian M u s l i m s . T h e y  sought to ensure that 
villages which they entered were not looted, and avoided entering hostile villages unless it 
was strategically necessary. Sometimes this failed, and there are several descriptions of 
unscrupulous looting and, for example, partisan Serb harassment o f Croats or Muslims, but 
eventually, and especially after 1943, this gave way to a more consolidated 'multi-ethnic' 
partisan force united against the occupation powers and bound together with an ideology of 
brotherhood and unity'. The communists ability to attract such support for the partisan 
movement, in a situation so bitterly fragmented, ethnically-divided and so characterised by 
mutual distrust as Yugoslavia had become during the first years o f the war, owes a good deal 
to the ideology that could be offered, together with the self-confidence of victory. Moreover, 
the Yugoslav communists now had to take the question of peasant nationalism seriously, and 
to build into their ideology a method for how to deal with the national question. In December 
1942 the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation o f Yugoslavia) was founded
The Krajina (boiderland) was the mililan' border and buffer-zone behveen tlie Ottoman state and the 
Habsburg lands and gcograpliically largely follows the border between Croatia and Bosnia (the Krajina being on 
tlie Croatian side), as well as continuing into Scibia. Krajina liad a large population of Serbs before theŷ  w ere 
e.xpelled from Croatia in the ethnic cleansing during and after Operation “Storm” in August 1995 (and “Flash” in 
May 1995).
^  A systematic study of these strategies w ould be a \ eiy interesting study and pro% ide useful analysis both for 
tlie successes o f Yugoslav state-building, as well as the strategies for reconciliation as such.
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and during its second council in November 1943, it issued a statement that Yugoslavia w as to  
be organised along federal p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s  decision was confirmed by meetings in the 
national councils. Up until 1942 the partisan movement had been scattered, with little and 
ineffective control under the Communist Party, and the party had been primarily concerned 
with consolidating ranks. After the foundation o f the Councils the national question was m ore  
seriously tackled. It was largely due to the anti-fascist councils that the Communist Party and  
the partisans could win serious recognition among the people as a national liberation force. 
Certainly the chaos o f the war brought many supporters to the ranks of the partisans, but m an y  
were also attracted to the alternative movements, such as the Cetnik forces under M ihaijlovic, 
or to the Ustasi.
The anti-fascist councils however came to provide a new political instmment for the partisans. 
Through this structure the partisans managed to establish local ties with many regions and
ônsecure considerable support among the local peasantry. The strategy was different only 
where the minority problem was particularly difficult and where the hostility to the idea o f  
Yugoslavia was the strongest. There were also strong national sentiments within the various 
partisan ranks. It should be remembered that there were in fact several wars occurring in 
parallel (general resistance against the foreign occupiers, civil inter-ethnic struggles, and Serb  
partisans against Serb Cetniks) and that the partisan movement during these first years 
predominantly consisted of Serbs and was only joined by large numbers o f Croats in 1943. T o  
this extent there was a good deal of nationalist sentiment and provincial patriotism within the  
partisan ranks. But at the same time the partisans could plead with Muslims to join them in 
defense of the more nationalist Serbian Cetniks.
Eventually the Communist Party managed to create a new leadership cadre by recruiting and 
training local peasants who became strongly loyal to Tito and the unitary idea and thus 
created a new locally rooted leadership in addition the older (and more national-regionalist) 
one.^^^ The ideology of the communists provided “secured” equality by promising the 
elimination o f “bourgeois” national exploitation of one nation by the other. As Paul Shoup 
emphasises, in his by now classical work on the Yugoslav national question until 1966, the
Tlic decision is translated into English and reprinted in Trifunovska, S (Ed) (1994) “Yugosla\ ia Tlirough 
Documents From its creation to its dissolution" Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht / Boston / London; 206- 
207. This important decision was taken as the formal creation of the new state.
Shoup, P (1968) Ch. 3 
^'^'Ibid
^  Shoup, P (1968): 91-92
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partisans did not so much offer a solution to the national question as offered a form of 
cooperation.^®^ Rather than insisting on a Yugoslav identity they asked people to accept, 
tolerate and work together with Slavs o f other nationalities. From 1943 onwards they gained 
more and more supporters and also started to attract many Cetniks. The Cetniks engaged in 
alliances and collaboration here and there, while the partisans fought relentlessly against 
foreign invaders, and war-weary and disillusioned Cetniks laid down arms or went over in 
greater numbers to join the partisans in the last two years of the war.^*® There has perhaps 
never been a fully satisfactory interpretation of why the partisans were so succesful in 
attracting support from local peasants with strong national affiliations. The peasants were 
fighting for liberation from foreign powers and the partisans possessed strong credibility in 
this cause. But exactly why and how they were able to provide this among the various 
competitive groups remain partly unclear. In many places the peasants simply fought for their 
locality. The element o f the foreign occupation appears cmcial in addition to the country-wide 
organisational development anchored in local communities.^" For the partisan question the 
war was equally important in that it destroyed elements of competing forces, such as the 
Cetnik bands, as it was in bringing the peasantry under partisan ranks.
In the partisan years the Communist Party clearly went through a learning process, 
moderating the pre-war policy, and would come to promise a new Yugoslavia in which all the 
national groups (with some exceptions) would be constituent components.^" The Cetnik 
movement had a much narrower base for their idea of reviving the Serbian Kingdom. The 
strength of the Cetniks was that they had a large component o f professional officers, but this 
was also partly a disadvantage in that they were less adaptable to guerilla warfare and, 
moreover, the Cetniks failed to develop any political organisation to embrace the population 
that supported them; until January 1944 they only had a small national committee,^" The 
partisans on the other hand were learning fast and in addition had professional soldiers, many 
of the leaders having combat-experience from the Spanish Civil W ar.^" They developed a
Shoup, P (1968): Ch. 3
Milazzo, M (1975) “Tlic Chetnik Movement & Yugoslav Resistance" Jolins Hopkins University Press: 137- 
39
Skoepol, T  (1979) "Slates and Social Revolutions: A Comparath c Analysis o f France, Russia and Cliina” 
Cambridge University Press; Skoepol. T (1994) “Social Re^•olutions in the Modem World" has argued the 
general importance of the "foreign" powers for other revolutions (France, Russia, China). 
‘'"MUazzo,M(1979): 184-187
E.xceptions were for e.xample Albanians and Hungarians. The Bosnjaks or. Muslim Slavs, n  ere initially not 
acknowledged as a constituting nation, but uould become so successively.
Tomasevich. J (1975): 192-93 
“’̂ Ibid
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Strong organisational and material base in addition to being armed with a powerful ideology. 
In the terror o f inter-ethnic violence that followed under the Ustasja regime of Ante Pavelic, 
as well as the revenge acts o f the royalist Cetniks towards the end of the war, this ideology 
would provide the only source of legitimacy for a new Yugoslavia. Because considerable 
autonomy was exercised by the various party-branches and their partisan organisation, the 
partisan movement had an enormous flexibility at the same time as being locally rooted. It 
had a dual fighting force o f local-regional anchored guerilla bands, and the centrally 
controlled brigades (the proletarian brigades) to engage enemy forces in strategic battles. T h e  
Communist Party employed different ideologies in different regions. Susan Woodward has 
shown how the Slovenian and Croatian party branches played strongly on nationalist 
sentiments and how in Croatia it also adopted more liberal programmes or in the case o f 
Slovenia revived the self-governing traditions from the Theresian reforms of the Austrian 
E m p i r e . H e r e ,  political self-government and local initiative was based on regional 
economic self-sufficiency and thus autonomy in economic policy. Moreover, not dissimilar to  
the regional conceptions for the economy as suggested by Rudolf Bicanic, and as discussed 
above, Susan Woodward convincingly distinguishes two different concepts or economic 
models, rooted in the different experiences and conditions that prevailed in Slovenia and the 
Bosnia / Montenegro area respectively, that existed within the partisan leadership from the 
b e g i n n i n g . T h e s e ,  she argues, were brought into the Yugoslav state and fostered future 
internal disputes of governance and political economy.
It must be emphasized that the partisan struggle, and the Communist Party's ideology, was 
characterised by the combination o f revolution and national liberation. The South Slav lands 
were both predominantly rural and peripheral in a European context, and its subordination to 
foreign capital prompted the Communist Party to combine revolution with liberation from 
foreign capitalist domination and subordination. Because o f this, the international position 
was always important, and the Communists had a nationalist dimension. The capitalist enemy 
was pinpointed as the Royal dictatorship, which allowed, and cooperated with, foreign 
exploitation. In this manner, national self-rule and national liberation were necessary partners 
to, and prerequisites for, the class struggle, and the only means by which small nations in a 
global capitalist (and European) periphery could achieve this was by uniting against the 
common enemy. Dividing the small nations into nationalistic movements was an example of
Woodward, S (1995): Ch. 2
*’■ Woodward, S (1995). We sliall return to this in the next chapter.
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how foreign capitalists divide and rule in the market-making process of creating subordinated 
spheres of influence and exploitation. The concept and slogan o f ‘brotherhood and unity’ 
should be seen in this context.
As Bogdan Denitch has pointed out, another cnicial feature of the Yugoslav revolution is that 
the Communist Party managed to build up its own army.^** When the new state was formed 
the party and the army was one. In this sense the Yugoslav revolution shares an important 
element with the Chinese revolution, where the Party also had their own army, but differs 
considerably from, for example, the Russian revolution where the Bolsheviks first had to 
build up a strong base among other organisations within Russia, with the peasants, with 
factory councils and so forth, and then so to speak capture the state (which in Marxist theory 
at the time was seen as the only vehicle for power) before they could build their own army.^*^
Moreover, Denitch suggests, because the Yugoslav communists, the partisans, had managed 
to liberate the country from foreign domination and had the experience of guerilla warfare 
based on support from the local peasantry they emerged out from the Second World W ar with 
considerable confidence. Unlike the communist parties in Eastern Europe they did not need to 
rely on a dominant Soviet Union.^^® Such confidence was coupled with the specific 
experience o f relying on decentralised decision-making, which was a necessity in the guerilla 
war, and the party was in this sense more nationally anchored than its counterparts in Eastern 
Europe. From the outset the Yugoslav form of real-socialism differed from that in Eastern 
Europe. The communist parties elsewhere typically came into conflict with the peasantry over 
nationalisation reforms and the organisation of society and economy. Because these countries 
were predominantly agricultural and the majority of the population were peasants this meant 
that they actually came into conflict with a large part o f their own populations and their policy 
therefore also came to adopt more repressive f e a t u r e s . I n  Yugoslavia this was not the case. 
The partisans had built a support base among the peasantry, and the Yugoslav communist 
party came out o f the Second World W ar with strong local support, which created another 
source o f self-confidence as well as different starting conditions for the party. Except for
Denitch, B (1976); Ch. 3 
Ibid
Certainly we should itot underestimate the role of the Red Army, although the Yugoslav version has always 
been that tliey liberated thcmsch'es. Wliat is imponant though is that the Red Army was not present in 
Yugoslavia after the Second World War, as it was in the rest of Eastern Europe.
Denitch, B (1976) “The Legitimation of a Revolution”, Yale Universitj' Press: Ch. 3 
Ibid
some unsuccessful attempts until 1951, which were soon abandoned, there was no wide-scale 
confiscation or nationalisation o f  land. In fact 85 per cent o f the land remained in private 
ownership by small- scale individual farmers (state-owned, and later self-managed, farms 
were developed though and became highly product!ve).
The self-sufficiency o f the party, as well as the local support base, are two initial aspects in 
which Yugoslav communism differs from the Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc. The idea o f 
socialism was also framed differently. As we shall see below, these differences would become 
increasingly accentuated after the development of the Yugoslav form of real-socialism under 
worker’s self-management. Bogdan Denitch has further pointed out that the war and 
revolution in Yugoslavia, occurring in tandem, propelled a social transformation o f Yugoslav 
society. Because o f the mobile nature o f the partisan war much of the village communities 
came to be irreversibly transformed. Social mobility had come about by the war, and a new 
group o f  very young leaders emerged from the partisan ranks. The young officers and political 
leaders o f the partisans, as well as the partisan women, came to challenge the patriarchal 
nature o f society in the countryside and mountain villages. The war thus brought about a 
transformation o f society by uprooting the villages and countryside, which paved the way for 
the social mobility eventually necessary for industrial society. After the war the institutions o f 
the first Yugoslavia were destroyed. The Army was new and belonged to the party. In many 
respects, namely in institutional and ideological terms, the second Yugoslavia was a state 
moulded from scratch, from the party and the army. Further, the second Yugoslavia was 
created, and existed, in a profoundly reorganized geopolitical and global economic order.
Coupled with these noted elements of discontinuity between the second and the first 
Yugoslavia, it should be emphasised that the institutions themselves, and the inherited 
problems, also contained strong continuities. Apart from the obvious heritage of the national 
question, the second Yugoslavia would find itself initially with its very existence as a state 
questioned by foreign powers. Then, eventually accepted and externally legitimised it would 
again come to balance itself between foreign powers and, in its attempts to industrialise and 
modernise the country, become heavily dependent on global economic conditions and on 
foreign capital in the development of its political economy. These were conditions that the 
new regime, under the Communists, not only had to take account of, but actively would come
223
224
See further chapter 4 
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to incorporate as an integral component in its policy for developing and transforming the 
country, as will be discussed in the next two chapters.
It has been argued by George Schopflin, that Communism-Socialism was the only ideology 
available for Yugoslavia after the Second World War, and that it would be either a 
Communist Yugoslavia or no Yugoslavia at all. The contention was that only the 
Communist-led partisans could reconstruct the state (after the devastation and trauma of the 
Second World War) because they could offer an ideology with a solution to the national 
question and development independent from foreign domination. They offered a program of 
development and an egalitarian future and a dynamic system with prestige linked to such 
successes as those of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Communist partisans had led the 
struggle against and liberation from foreign occupiers. These were all elements that no other 
ideology or project could offer. This argument is quite powerful and the idea o f the new state 
was indeed heavily linked with the “revolution” and the Socialist project. It offered a promise 
of a “brotherhood and unity” between nations that had combated against each other during the 
war. To this I would propose adding that, given the political circumstances and constellations 
after the Second World War, Yugoslavia also had to be o f a particular kind o f socialism, 
independent from the Soviet Union, that it had to be non-aligned, and that it had to be federal. 
This does not imply historical determinism but is simply a consideration of the options, or 
opportunity-structure that was available at the time. It had to have its own form of socialism 
because of the ‘socialist interpreters’ or leadership that existed in the Communist Party, 
because of the strong commitment to independence (which was bound to conflict with the 
objectives of Stalin), and because of the local popular alliances the communist leadership 
build. These alliances were with the peasants, who had their own views on what kind of 
society they wished to have.^^^ Gaining local support had been in competition with strong 
opponents, such as the Croatian Peasants Party and nationalist ideologies. This multi-national 
leadership cultivated ideas of socialism other than the “Stalinist form”, and it was the 
leadership necessary to build support among the various nations. Certainly, this was at first
Tliis was presented in a sv'nopsis at a conference o f the “Europe and the Balkans”-netw ork in Bologna, Italy, 
Fcbruaiy' 1996.
Melissa Bokot’o}' has shown how' the peasants brought in their own claims and negotiated witli the 
Communist partisans during the war, as well as after, and how the Communists thereby went through a learning 
process during the w ar. See Bokovoy, M (1998) “Peasants and Communists -  Politics and Ideologj’ in the 
Yugoslav Countiyside 1941-53” Universit>' of Pittsburgh Press: en bloc, but for Uic partisan years see Ch. 1. The 
peasants, of course, wanted to maintain tlicir land and were \ eiy hostile to an>' confiscation o f propert)* and 




restricted to Slavic nations, and the Germans living in Yugoslavia were largely expelled, 
while the Albanians in Kosovo were incorporated into Serbia as an autonomous region, and 
initially subdued, but it was nevertheless a qualitative move forward from the experience o f 
the first Yugoslavia.
Because o f  this, the ideas of multi-national federalism were brought into the new state from 
its b i r t h . M o r e o v e r ,  the state probably had to be non-aligned due to the strong element o f 
national liberation, and national and economic independence, which was the objective and 
emphasis o f  the Communists. The global order that emerged after the war, a capitalist bloc in 
confrontation with a socialist bloc, and the Soviet Union under Stalin, made frictions with 
both sides likely and non-alignment the most viable option.
The Yugoslav model o f socialism and workers self-management was written into all the 
Constitutions since 1953, and thereby the political idea of the second Yugoslavia expressed 
discontinuity from the first Yu g os l av i a . Anchor i ng  self-management in the Constitution is 
a cmcial element since it links the state to a particular kind o f political economy and political 
project.
Another fundamental element bom  with the new state was that o f multi-national federalism. 
The second Yugoslavia was from the beginning defined as a federal state with six republics 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia), five state-bearing nations: 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians (Bosnian Muslims were recognised 
as a separate nation only in 1961), and a number of national minorities (such as the 
A l b a n i a n s ) . I t  was modelled after the USSR (largely copying the Soviet Constitution of 
1936) and the various republics were seen as constituting 'nation-states’ although this created 
some paradoxes (for example in relation to people of one nationality within a republic other 
than that encompassing its nation). The federa l and the multi-national character o f the
See: Woodward. S (1995)
TIic state was initially named the ‘Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia’ (Federativna Narodna Republika 
Jugoslavija), but changed name in 1953 to the ‘Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla\'ia’ (SocialistiCka 
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija).
Eventually the terms favoured were ‘nations’ (state-constituent) and ‘nationalities’ (i.e, minorities). The term 
‘nationalities’, was preferred as being less diminishing than the term ‘national minority’.
In tliis sense a Croat living in Serbia was part of tlie Croatian nation and represented by the Croatian nation, 
although he w as also a part of the Serbian republic. It is noteworthy that the Serbs in Croatia received no 
recognition as a minority'. Generally little concern was given to the minority groups, such as the Albanians 
(discussed further on in this chapter), but Kosovo and Vojvodina were constituted as autonomous within Serbia 
(Kosovo was first an autonomous ’oblast’ or region, and later.a ’province’). There w ere negotiations on how the
no
Yugoslav state was an important part of its identity. The problem of legitimacy is in this 
manner connected to the economy as well as to the political organisation of the ethno-plural 
state. The heritage of national liberation, and thereby the independence and sovereignty of 
these nations was a third dimension within the idea of the new state. Finally, but developed 
later than the other, we have added the non-alignment doctrine and the specific position 
Yugoslavia would come to hold between the two emerging blocs, making the foreign policy 
an important element in the state’s identity.
Armed with such an arsenal of ideological artillery the Yugoslav Communists could divert 
attention away from the national animosities towards a grand new project. Within the party 
there was a division between the leaders truly believing in a Yugoslav nation and those who 
emphasised the federal and multi-national framework, but this did not matter initially. 
Moreover, with the leaders of the national parties being scattered and repressed thereby 
leaving the national forces without ties to the people, the Communist leadership could embark 
on the task o f creating the multi-nationally constituted second Yugoslavia.^^’
borders should be drawn between the republics and several villages were transferred or swapped well into the 
1950s. The Bosnian Muslims recci\ ed no status as a state-bearing nation, but ncitlicr did make they make am- 
particular claims for this in 1945. There were discussions within the pait>’ on how to deal with Sand¿ak and 
eventually it was decided that it slwuld be div ided betw cen Montenegro and Serbia, apparently w ithout any 
serious disputes. Tlic formula of dividing ‘nations’ and ‘republics’ carried some inherent parado.xes in relation to 
representation.
Witli the scattering and repression o f the leaders of the various national parties the possibility for national 
mobilisation was neutralised, see further Shoup, P (1968) “Communism and tlie Yugoslav National Question”: p. 
101 and entire chapter 3. For the dispersion of tlte Croatian Ustaáa fascist movement and the build up of a 
terrorist organisation see for example; Clissold. Stephen (1979) “Croat separatism: Nationalism. Dissidence and 
Terrorism” Conflict Studies No 3. Januaiy 1979, Institute for the study of conflict London. It should be noted 
lliat tlicre were continuous guerilla bands operating in sc\ eral mountain areas after the war liad finished. The 
Albanian rebels in Kosovo were eventually only neutralised with direct help from Albania proper, and in areas in 




STATEHOOD BEYOND ETHNICITY? SOCIALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
NATIONAL QUESTION IN A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
The Developmental State: Political Economy and Social Change in a peripheral Country
(1945-74)
Yugoslavia experienced two extremes of Socialist Economy during a period o f less than fifty 
years, with a gradual transition from one to the other. In the early years of its existence, it 
experimented with a central planning system, with depressive economic results. During the 
first five-year plan, which was introduced in 1947, industrial production, wages, living 
standards, and personal consumption all declined and even fell below pre-war figures.^^^ The 
planning bureaucracy was so overfilled with incomprehensible masses of reports that it was 
unmanageable to interpret even by the sizeable administration that was build up when the new 
state was created. There were insufficient statistics about the state of the economy or the 
companies (the basic units in the economy), and the reports from enterprises were imprecise, 
both of which would have been essential information for economic planning. In addition, the 
orders from the planners were, while very rigid, equally obscure and eventually the whole 
industry produced goods without any relationship to economic criteria. Boris Kidric, one of 
the fathers of the impending self-management system, is noted to have said that the best 
weapon Yugoslavia could use against the United States would be to send them two Yugoslav 
planners who would ruin their e c o n o m y . B u t  the central planning system was developed 
under the extreme conditions of post-war reconstruction. It was the necessary approach to 
reconstruct the war-tom country (where great success was reached during the first eighteen
This is not simply attributed to war-damages, because reconstmetion was successful to tlie degree of 
reconstructing tlircc quarters of war-damaged infrastructure by 1946, but the decline w as recorded from the post­
war years. after 1947 up until 1952 (that is. during the Fi\ e-ycar plan). Some have attributed tlic decline 
primarily to lite post-1948 loss of trade with, and aid from, the So% iet Union and Eastern bloc, but among the 
Yugoslav Icadcrsliip there was a grow ing concern that central-planning itself was largely responsible. For the 
details and figures sec: Sire, L (1979) “The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Managcmcnf’ MacMillan; Ch. 1 & 2; 
Compare; Schrenk. M, C. Atdalan& N. A El-Tatawy (1979) “Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and tire 
Cliallenges of Development" World Bank Report, Johns Hopkins University Press; Ch. 1. It may be interesting 
to note that tlie Worid Bank team report attributed greater lesponsibiliw to e.xtcmal factors, rather than simply 
central planning, for tlie decline.
Boris Kidric’s comment is taken from Sire, L (1979); p, 9. w ho refers to the memoirs of Vukmanovics- 
Tempo (“Revolueija koja tecc" vol 2, Beograd 1971; p. 150)
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months), free resources to bring it towards the socialist project, and thereby achieve economic 
and national independence. Yugoslavia had suffered enormous structural damage during the 
war and the foreign assistance it sought in the initial reconstruction efforts came only very 
slowly. Initially the very external legitimacy of the new state was contested and viewed with 
suspicion both in East and West. Real foreign aid only came after the autumn of 1949, and 
instead Yugoslavia had to sign trade agreements with a number of European states in order to 
import the goods needed for post-war recovery and industrialisation. The central drive was 
therefore a forced attempt to revive the war-tom Yugoslavia, mobilise resources, and to 
achieve national as well as economic independence.
Immediately after the war, all the banks - and finance caipital - were nationalised, soon 
followed by the heavy industry (in 1946) and eventually by small industry (in 1948).^^"  ̂The 
railroads were already owned by the state and many o f the commercial firms had been 
incorporated during the war-time economy, but a major problem was the collectivization of 
peasant land. Although the Soviet Union was the only existing socialist model, the partisan 
communists were well aware that there were specific conditions in Yugoslavia, which might 
render the Soviet model less than perfect for implementation on Yugoslav soil. There were at 
the outset disputes within the party leadership over economic strategy and particularly over 
the issue o f collectivization o f the peasant land. Moreover, local, provincial, and peasant 
resistance to the collectivization plans was considerable.^^^ The problem was that the 
communists had forged an intimate alliance with the peasantry during the partisan war, had 
indeed incorporated peasants into their ranks and the peasantry was a base o f their legitimacy, 
while the revolution, however, needed to draw resources from the peasantry into industry in 
order to aid Yugoslav recovery after the war and transform it to a socialist society. The 
agrarian policy therefore favoured a gradual transformation o f the countryside. Rather than 
the capitalist prolétarisation o f the country-side, or the Stalinist way of eliminating the kulaks,
For the details o f this process see Bicanid, R (1973): Ch. 2
Melissa K. Bokovoy has provided an illuminating study of peasant resistance to collectivization in 
Yugoslavia during tlie years immediately after the war. She treats the heterogeneous peasant groups as active 
partners and agents putting pressure on the Communist part}’ and actively influencing their policies. Sometimes 
tlie resistance took violent form. This study has opened up a new window in the resistance to and dynamics of 
polic>'-making and it counter-balances the empliasis on urban class and/or “civil society”. However Boko\ oy 
also tends to the suggestion that this resistance undermined the legitimacy of the state-regime from the outset. If 
this is indeed her contention I am unconvinced o f the latter proposition. The modernisation process, and the liigh 
degree o f popular participation and decentralisation that the Yugoslav system came to materialise, suggest a high 
degree o f legitimacy, re-negotiated in many phases, but highly capable o f irmo\ation and reform. Melissa K. 
Bokovoy (1998) “Peasants and Communists -  Politics and Ideolog>' in the Yugoslav Countryside 1941-1953” 
University of Pittsburgh Press
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the Yugoslav Communist Party embarked on their own specific path. Now, as Rudolf Bicanic 
has stated, some property, including land, could simply be transferred from enemy 
collaborators or from foreigners as retaliation, and some of it had already been expropriated 
by the enemy (for example Jewish property), but the problem was the large number of small 
peasant land-holdings throughout the country.^^^ Much of the large scale land-holdings were 
expropriated and private property on land was limited to 10 hectares (25 acres) with some 
exceptions for mountain regions (at any rate this was what the majority of the peasants held). 
About 80 % o f the appropriated arable land was then distributed to some 70 000 peasants and 
war v e t e r an s . P r i va t e  agriculture was thereby mamtained'whWQ a parallel structure of 
agricultural co-operatives were developed (including butcheries and the whole production 
process around agriculture -  farming and livestock). The dual strategy was to develop 
cooperatives, as a middle way to collectivisation, which could be managed along industrial 
principles with higher efficiency (such co-operatives, along with larger agricultural estates, 
were maintained well into the 1960s and proved quite productive). The primary purpose was 
to free labour for industry and voluntary brigades. Collectivisation attempts were also 
undertaken, especially in 1949 when agricultural output was lower than industry and there 
were concerns over food-supply, but they were met with strong resistance and eventually 
abandoned after 1951. The strategy towards rich peasants, or kulaks, was to legally block free 
trade and to force the whole sector into using state-social networks only. Basically all other 
private property was nationalised around 1946 (with certain exceptions). It would remain 
under central state control only for a few years though since the statist model o f governing 
was soon abandoned in favour of wide-range decentralisation.
The other extreme which Yugoslavia experienced was the pursuit o f a self-management 
system in a highly decentralised federation, which eventually made macro-economic policy 
reforms quite impossible. Part of the difficulties with the Yugoslav economy, which seemed 
to perform so well for more than a decade, lay in the inherent contradiction between the need, 
on the one hand, for central authority to ensure macro-economic co-ordination (or planning) 
and economic reform in order to integrate and adapt to global economic conditions, and, on 
the other hand, the political decentralisation needed for regulating the national question. 
Another problem was the great regional differences in economic structure and development
^®Bicani6,R(1973):23
Schrcnk, M, C. Ardalan & N. A. EI-Tatawy (1979): 16
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level, which also happened to extensively overlap with ethnic-national demographic 
distribution.
The particular sensitivity to global economic conditions was a consequence of the strive for 
national independence and the position Yugoslavia took in the uncertain bi-polar Cold War 
that emerged between the Stalinist USSR and the capitalist West. From the 1950s onwards 
this meant that Yugoslavia fostered a position as a non-aligned state between the emerging 
blocks and favoured trade with both blocks. The non-alignment strategy of peaceful co­
existence eventually became its mission in international relations as new states emerged in 
Africa and Asia in the wake of colonialism. As a part of its security policy it had to maintain 
an independent military structure with the “one third” principle (1/3 o f militaiy imports from 
the west, another from the east, and a third which had to be domestically produced). It also 
had to keep national reserves of food and fuel supply in case o f isolation. Since the strategy 
from early on was to integrate into, and compete within, the world economy, the political 
economy was constantly challenged to reform and adapt to those external conditions. The 
Yugoslav conditions were, however, internally very asymmetrical, and this asymmetry was 
build into the representation in the political structure of the federation, which also greatly 
corresponded to national divisions. The question of the political economy, economic and 
political organisation, and the national question (and with it the constitutional federal 
organisation) are therefore intimately connected. Over time the limitations o f federal public 
policy, as a mediator between global capital and local (sub-republican) and regional 
development, and the needs and interests for development at the local level created political 
strictures, which eventually fed back into economic conflicts over federal economic policy. 
This development was gradual and before discussing it we should first look at the ideas, 
strategy and achievements of the Yugoslav modernisation project.
With Self-Management to Economic Liberalisation
The conception o f  the national question -  and the necessity of having a federal structure - had 
clearly matured within the Yugoslav communists during the war, but the idea of a socialist 
society and its means to modernisation and development were still heavily dominated by the 
impact o f the Soviet ex p er i en c e . Th i s  was the only actually existing model for the
And outside the Soviet Union the reality of life under Stalin was little known, which enabled admiration to 
also be expressed for the regime in America.
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'developmental state' that referred to the idea of modernising a rural and backward society 
along socialist premises. The “market syndicalism” that eventually developed was only a 
gradual adaptation to Yugoslavia's particular conditions. The state was the only agent that 
could provide the necessary conditions for forced development. At the same time the state 
was seen as an important vehicle for governing the political economy in the west also. The 
Keynesian approach was dominant in all the liberal democracies (even the U.S had had their 
New Deal under Roosevelt), and it was generally understood that active involvement and 
planning was a standard feature o f a modem state.
The change that eventually came may be attributed to an internal and external double-crisis 
which evolved over a few years. The main external crisis marking the period is typically in 
the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict over the Informbureau (Cominform) and Tito’s break with Stalin 
in 1948. Tito pursued his own foreign policy and opted for a Balkan federation with Bulgaria 
and possibly Albania, and therefore from the outset there had been cleavages between Tito 
and Stalin, but the Yugoslav leadership had still hoped for friendly relations and support 
between “socialist” as well as “Slavic” friends. But Stalin could not accept any deviation from 
Moscow’s and his personal authority, and the break was inevitable. In Albania, Enver Hoxha 
decided to support Stalin, which also caused Yugo-Albanian relations to deteriorate. The 
break has conventionally been understood as pushing the Yugoslav leadership towards a 
political economic formula of their own, driving them away from Stalinist interpretations and 
towards a re-interpretation of basic Marxist texts. Susan Woodward has instead suggested that 
the emphasis on this break has hidden the Yugoslav communists’ commitment from the 
beginning to avoid the Stalinist m o d e l . S h e  has argued that rather than developing the 
governance and political economy of self-management in response to this crisis, the isolated 
position of Yugoslavia in the period 1947-50 forced the party leadership to the labour 
mobilisation needed to increase the production necessary for export and defence.^“*® In effect, 
that the initial strategy, more similar to the Russian situation o f the 1920s (and the ‘New 
Economic Policy’) than to Stalinism, rather delayed the introduction of self-management 
instead of accelerating it. This interpretation views the early years o f central planning as a 
short-term necessity to provide the means for an export-import programme needed for 
industrialisation, rather than a Stalinist drive which eventually was abandoned.
Woodwanl. S (1995); Ch. 4 
=^"lbid
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The traditional interpretation is, by contrast, that the architects o f self-management, such as 
Boris Kidric and Edvard Kardelj (but also of course Milovan Djilas, and Josip Broz-Tito), 
began to reinterpret basic Marxist texts during the early crisis after 1948. It posits, in 
particular, that they now started more literally to embrace the idea o f ‘‘factories to the 
workers” and that the immediate producers themselves through associations should decide 
upon production.^"** The economic warfare between Yugoslavia and Soviet-controlled Eastern 
Europe (resulting in cancellation o f trade loans and interruptions in trade) that followed in the 
wake o f the Cominform-conflict thereby gave Yugoslav socialism a push in its own 
d i r ec t i on . An o t he r  suggestion has been that the whole “model” started through autonomous 
local practice.
Regardless of the exact origins o f the programme, the Yugoslav state was already during its 
early consolidation phase in a sensitive international position, to which it had to adjust in 
order to ensure its political, territorial, and economic independence. For a few years after the 
break with Stalin, it found itself in a kind of communist “interdict” .̂ "*̂  The shaping o f the 
political economy, socialist but not in the socialist bloc, and its system of governance, 
democratic socialism and federalism in a multi-national state, were in this manner extremely 
sensitive to  the global capitalist political economy and to western markets.
The Yugoslavs developed their own socialist model, which deviated from the Soviet-style.
The latter, with its unrestricted state ownership and control, was rejected as a form o f “state 
capitalism” . The idea of workers’ self-management, as “the true workers democracy”, was 
introduced during the first five-year plan in spring 1950, and would become a unique form of 
real-socialism. There was no real historical precedent for this. The conception of giving the
According to Milovan Djilas it was he who first suggested the idea to Kardelj and Kidrié, who were in favour, 
but thought it should wail a few years until workers would be ready for such a reform. A few days later they 
changed their mind and agreed it should be introduced rnuncdiately. See: Djilas, M (1969) ’’The Imperfect 
Society” London: p.l37, also mentioned in Sire, L (1979): 1-2
How e\ er, it is reasonable to claim that the Yugoslav political leaders had already developed an understanding 
of the problems w ith the economy during initial central planning as being a property of the central-planning 
model itself, even before the Stalin-Tito break in 1948. In any case there was at the time an idealisation of the 
So\'iet U nioa This ideal had to be destroyed, and the occasion was provided by Stalin himself in 1948.
The Yugoslav (Croatian) Economics professor, Branko Horv at, has suggested that the self-management idea 
developed \'cty soon after the war and that it actually developed from below as an autonomous practice in the 
Solin (Tommune outside Split in Dalmatia (personal communication).
Tire relations w ith the communist block eventually improved in the 1950s, especially after Nikita 
Krushchev’’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955.
This is indeed the case for all states, but particularly so for small weak states. Yugoslavia w as also 
increasingly open to the global economy, and had a detemiincd strategy to integrate in the global economv’, and 
its socialist economy w'as for this reason more sensitive to the ’capitalist’ enviroimient than for example those in 
the Soviet bloc were.
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“factories to the workers” existed here and there in Marxist texts, but with no developed 
political formula.^"^ In Yugoslavia there were experiments with informal consultations with 
workers in 1949 before it moved to formality and was written into law. It did not have much 
practical meaning in the beginning though. The disastrous performance in the first five-year 
plan continued into the first years o f the 1950s (the 1947-plan was extended for a year to 
cover also 1952). It was only from 1953 onwards that a rapid economic growth could be 
recorded, but this growth was primarily measured in the heavy industry and had no immediate 
effects on living standards. Internally this threatened to produce social unrest and eventually a 
legitimacy crisis. The initial response to the problems had been to seek to keep a firm central 
state control over the situation. In this manner the authoritarian form was preserved within 
Yugoslavia even after the break with the Soviet Union and the criticism of state centralism 
there. There was however the need to come up with a formula for economic revival, as well as 
filling the theory with practice, and an internal pressure for change developed in tandem with 
the external pressure.
The post-1948 criticism of the Soviet Union continued to intensify until Stalin's death in 
1953. After 1953 there were attempts to re-establish Yugo-Soviet relations. Neither party 
wished for the schism to continue and in 1955 Nikita Khrushchev made a formal apology 
before Tito in Belgrade and acknowledged Soviet responsibility for the crisis. The détente 
between the two parties would be further complicated by events in Hungary though. 
Throughout eastern Europe Khrushchev’s wooing of Tito was met with optimism. If it was 
possible for Yugoslavia to have a separate road to socialism then it might be possible also for 
others. The Budapest rising in 1956 signalled this new optimism. Soviet interventions in 
Hungary in 1956 made it impossible for Tito to normalise relations with the USSR. Popular 
support in Yugoslavia was clearly on the Hungarian side. Khrushchev and Tito may have 
underestimated each other, and without any party really wanting it, the schism had to continue 
at least on a formal scale. '̂*’ Yugoslav critique was continuously directed at the idea of central 
party control which was perceived as a form o f ‘state capitalism’. At the same time the 
“Budapest-effect” cut both ways. If it was possible to start a ‘counter-revolution’ in Hungary 
then the same problem could appear in Yugoslavia. This period saw increased repression and
There liad of course been e.xpcrimenls with factor>' councils and the like, such as for example the Turin 
woikers in 1920 (and elsew here), but this w as only a sectoral experiment and far from the socially more w ide- 
ranging concept of self-management.
Cf: Dennison Rusinow, The Yugosla\> Experiment 1948-1974, Hurst & Company, London 1977; pp. 87-94; 





arrests in Y u g o s l a v ! a . T h e  Yugoslav rethoric o f “workers management” and criticism of 
the Soviet Union w as however in clear assymetry with the ‘etatism’ still existing in 
Yugoslavia itself. There was also internal critique of what had become of the Yugoslav 
Communist elite after the revolution. This was particularly voiced by Milovan Djilas, Avithin 
the very core of the party, from 1953 onwards. The Djilas-crisis developed during the second 
half of 1953 and ended with his isolation from the party in early 1954, after he had openly 
started to publish his criticism of the party policy.
If the idea o f self-management had beeen formulated initially in ideological terms, there was 
increased pressure to develop it in practice. The need for economic revival coupled with the 
imbalance between the critique o f Stalin and the centralism in Yugoslavia itself, created an 
internal-external double pressure to  reform the system and in order to consolidate the 
legitimacy o f the revolution there was a need for concrete results. Rudolf Bicanic has 
suggested a division o f Yugoslav socialism into three periods, the first being one of 
‘centralised planning’ from 1947-51, followed by ‘decentralised planning’ from 1952-64, and 
then by ‘polycentric planning’ after 1965. "̂*  ̂Others have added a period of “agreement 
socialism” after 1974.^^° In his model Bicanic suggests that there was internal reform pressure 
to further decentralise, as a solution to problems with the planning in the preceding period. 
Thus, for example, the problems with centralised planning were solved by decentralised and 
indirect planning, which eventually proved to be just a disguised form of central planning, and 
this, in turn, was removed through further decentralisation and liberalisation. According to 
Bicanic, these periods have their respective forms of foreign trade policy, with a state- 
monopoly during the first phase, a commercialisation during the second, and finally a direct 
aim to integrate into the international division o f labour and the global economy, in the third 
phase.^^^ The initial purpose (1945-51) was protectionist, to create a barrier between the 
domestic economy and the foreign markets, and to import the products necessary for 
industrialisation. However, since Yugoslavia had to rely on the west, it needed hard currency, 
which could only be obtained either through exports or credits, and therefore it had to produce 
some exports. Yugoslavia ran a continuous trade deficit from 1945, for which it had to
For the most severe state or class “enemies” Yugoslavia had its own Gulag (or Sibiria) on the island Goli 
Otok (The Naked Island) off the Croatian coast outside Senj.
Bicanic, R (1973) “Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia” Cambridge University Press.
For example Likic-Brboric. B (2003) “Democratic Governance in the Transition from Yugoslav Self- 
Management to a Market Economy; The Case of the Slovenian Privatization Debates 1990-1992”, Uppsala 
Studies in Economic History' 69, Uppala. Note that Bicanic wrote in 1973 and thus prior to this last period. 
This follows Bicanic, R (1973): (^h. 8
120
produce exports in order to balance, and, according to Bicanic, this problem was addressed by 
introducing trade liberalisation, which in turn required currency liberalisation, both of which 
would come in the 1960’s.^^  ̂Moreover, in order to industrialise the country and eventually 
replace imports with domestic produced goods, a great number of foreign licences were 
bought. Here the crucial problem is the same (of combining a socialist economy in a 
developmental state with openness to global capitalism) regardless if one claims that the 
actual reform direction was a deliberate strategy from the outset or that it was an adaptation to 
new conditions. Woodward, as noted above, claims the former, while Bicanic maintained the 
latter. Nevertheless, the import-led industrialisation, growth, and development strategy as 
such, was common in many developing countries until the end of the 1970s.
Initially the reforms progressed carefully. In the 1950s planning was decentralised in both 
functional and spatial terms to the enterprises, municipalities and districts, with political 
decisions and legal regulations on the republican as well as federal level. Prices were set by 
administrative decisions, but were not centrally planned. A general investment fund (GIF), 
which was to be managed by the republics, replaced the federal central planning in order to 
invest in areas of strategic importance and transfer resources to underdeveloped regions. In 
1956 a new system of planning with increased consultation and participation was introduced. 
The Economic Plan o f 1957-61 was successful, and all objectives were already fulfilled after 
four years. The plan included a stronger emphasis on the consumer goods industry, which had 
been lagging behind in the 1950s in favour of heavy industry and infrastructure. Although 
there had been economic growth since 1953 (and in the second half o f the 1950s it was 
considerable) this had largely been created by heavy industry and therefore did not generate 
results in terms of increased living standards. This was now tackled as a serious problem and 
it was further assumed that investment in the consumer-goods industry would provide more 
immediate results, which in turn could be taxed and re-channelled into heavy industry. There 
were a number o f growing concerns. It was not only the delay in translating growth into 
increased living standards, which posed problems, because there had also developed 
distortions within the economy. Particularly there was an imbalance between different sectors 
in the economy, which prioritised the building up of a heavy industry and infrastructure. As a 
result o f this there followed increased inflation pressure.^^^ Moreover, the balance of trade i I
Ibid
253 Tlic lesser priority on the consumer goods industi>' resulted in under-supply. Economists have emphasized for 
e.xample tlic manner in n  hich industty' was built up and connected to their localities, \\ ith non-competiti\ c
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deficit had grown consistently and in 1961 showed an alarming trend. Foreign aid 
increasingly came in the form o f credits and loans, which eventually had to be repaid (rather 
than pure aid), and adding to the above, the agricultural sector experienced bad harvests in 
1960 and 1961.
A further drive to liberalise the system came in 1961 when three reforms were introduced: the 
opening o f the economy to world markets; a reorganisation of the financial system; and a 
relaxed control o f how wages were determined. These measures aimed at increasing the role 
of the market but they also resulted in economic oscillations and ad hoc policy measures to 
control inflation. A debate opened up over whether the best policy measures in the 
circumstances would be further liberalisation or a return to increased control.
One o f the consequences of the political and economic decentralisation was increased power 
to local poll deal-bureaucratic elites as well as managers. In this way regional differences and 
interests had received another channel of articulation. The problem o f internal uneven 
development had not been altered despite a stronger emphasis on investment in the southern 
more backward republics and regions. The geographical economic problem o f uneven 
development had the additional problem of being connected, for pure demographic reasons, to 
the national question.^^"^ In Slovenia and Croatia, which were the most developed regions, the 
tendency was to advocate liberal-reformist policies, with the claim that a central planning 
which pulled resources from the rich to the poor was in fact punishing efficiency. There were 
arguments that central planning may well be the best strategy in a “ take-off’ period, but that it 
was increasingly ineffective as the economy developed. On the other hand, this “take-off’ had 
not yet occurred in the south. The dilemma was that the solutions o f decentralisation provided 
further impetus for political articulation o f the existing problems, as well as new interest
industry placed in \ arious districts being subsidized by the state in order to expand, whereas the heal districts 
levied tax on consumer goods industry', which could not yet satisfy domestic demand. There w as also w age- 
pushed inflation in the wake of the relaxed state regulations in the 1950s. Low productivity in agriculture was 
often a problem and, later, externally imported inflation emerged. On inflation in tlie 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
see: Bicanic, R (1973): 79-80,103-i07,112, and in passim; Woodward, S (1995); 228,275-76, 330, and in 
passim; Schrcck. M, C. Ardalan & N. A El-Tataw'y (1979) in passim.
The accelerated decentralisation from 1963 omvards and the increasing inter-republican / national cleavages 
within the LCY and at Federal le '̂eI have been analysed by Sabrina Ramcl on the lines of an international 
balance of pow er system of republican struggle within the federal framework. While the application of such a 
model is done in an ingenious way, and it has increasing relevance after 1974 and especially after 1980,1 find 
the analysis too static (the model is a static framework of solid units in shifting alliances). Extending the 
temporal scope adds a dimension to how the national problem, altliough it certainly always existed, has been 
configured in different w'ays and been articulated by different groups w'ith different objectives. Ramet’s analysis 
can be found in Ramet, S (1992/1984) “Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1%2-1991” Indiana 
Unri’ersity Press
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groups who were pushing for further decentralisation. The strongest basis for this became the 
newly empowered political-bureaucratic elite at the republican and local levels. In opposition 
to the reform were the officials in the central planning system, as well as enterprise managers 
who saw a threat to their personal fiefdoms. In the less developed regions the question was 
raised, whether they could affordih^ liberalisation and the accompanying lack of central 
investment it would bring for their regions.
Throughout the 1960s there was a continuous debate and political struggle over the political 
economy and connected organisational matters. Conventionally the various stands have been 
called reformers -  or liberals - and conservatives, but Susan Woodward suggests that the 
conflict is better portrayed as that between opposing economic institutions and policies 
intended to facilitate micro-economic adjustments to a change in international conditions.^^^ 
She operates with two models of political economy, which were represented by different 
interest groups since the very foundation of Yugoslavia, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
These models, called the “Slovenia model” and the “Foca” model, from their origin in the 
partisan war, are according to her a better binary couple for understanding the struggle, rather 
than “ liberal” and “conservative”, which have the burden of heavy connotations from western 
political thought. Following Woodward the “Slovenia model” constituted a more “liberal” 
approach to economic growth within a socialist economy, focusing on manufacturing and 
processing firms for export markets, emphasising price competition and commercial 
orientation with its pressures for technological m o d e rn isa tio n .T h is  included a more 
flexible employment policy in response to market demand. The “Foca” model, in Woodward's 
analysis, represented a more developmental approach focusing on production of raw material, 
energy, infrastructure, producers goods, food for domestic consumption as well as export, and 
emphasised quantity increases that depended more on steady work, labour discipline and 
skills adapted to p ro d u c t!o n .I t  should be noted that both models are versions of socialist 
self-management, deriving from and adapted to different local/regional conditions within the 
unevenly developed Yugoslavia. As such they serve as analytical ideal types for the opposing 
political and regional interests, which to a great extent can be derived from economic
Woodward. S (1995): 237-238 
Woodward. S (1995): 264-265 and in passim
Woodward. S (1995). This is by necessit>’ a rather crude summary  ̂of Woodward's analysis on socialist 
unemployment in Yugoslavia. Woodward has a solid case based on many years of research and her incorporation 
o f the international political economj- in the analysis of Yugoslav development provides fora better 
understanding tlian most other studies. She also works along different chronological parameters than the typical 
ones (that is, the Reform of 1965 and the Constitution of 1974). In looking at the dynamics betw een nationliood 
and statehood I have nevertheless chosen to use the breaking points of the 1960s and 1970s.
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structure and level o f development.^^* However, the dividing lines did not just concern forms 
of political economy, but went to the very core of the Yugo-style interpretation of the Marxist 
theory of the state, which in turn was directly connected to the national question.^^^ Here, for 
one faction, the specificity of socialist Yugoslavia was defined in contrast to the centralism of 
the first Yugoslavia, as well as to the Soviet Union, which meant that Yugoslavia had to be 
decentralised, properly federalised, and essentially move towards a withering away of the 
state as such, which allowed only for a federal umbrella framework for the constituent 
nations, whereas another faction saw the state -- and 'brotherhood and unity* - as a framework 
for a universal South Slavism.^^^ W e shall, in the coming two sections, return to these 
divisions and their implications for the political and national dynamics, but for the moment 
concentrate on the reforms in relation to, and their meaning within, political economy.
Tito’s own position was initially in favour o f the developmental model (“conservative” or 
Foca) and maintaining central control. The debate was not merely between so-called 
“reformers” and “conservatives” , as there were different advocates among the reformers as 
well. Some opted for increased liberalisation so that companies could make their own 
decision based upon the market, while others opted for decentralisation in the sense of 
keeping planning at the local or regional level, but just not on a central level. Such 
polarisation would continue throughout the 1960s and, in fact, came to be slowly built into the 
system for the coming decades.
The economic debate o f 1962-63 became the central political question in Yugoslavia at the 
time. In tandem with it, another debate followed over preparing a new Federal Constitution. 
As the various interest groups, still confined within the party, re-negotiated the development 
of the Yugoslav project, the trouble signs within the economy indicated that some type of 
measures had to be taken. Moving on to self-management in practice required a series of 
measures. The foundation for this was laid in the early 1960s, and the Constitution of 1963 
was to some extent a turning point for democratic development in Yugoslavia. The 
Constitution re-organised the Federal Assembly (formerly Federal People’s Assembly) so that
Certainly ‘economic structure’ and ‘level of development’ greatly coincided in Yugoslavia so the heavy 
industiy and mining regions were less developed. However such coalescence does not go without saying; an 
economic structure dominated by mining and heavy' industr>' could have a higher level of devxlopment than one 
based on for example license-produced tedmology or consumer goods industiy.
Jovid, D (2003) “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardclj” in Djokic, D (Ed) (2003) 
“Yugoslavism: Histories o f a Failed Idea, 1918-1992”, Hurst & Company, Londoa 
^ “Ibid
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it now had a Federal Chamber of 120 deputies from territorial constituencies. Within it there 
was still a Chamber o f Nationalities with 10 representatives from each republic and five 
representatives from the autonomous provinces. There were four other special chambers 
(economy, culture and education, welfare, and organisational policy), which were to co­
operate with the federal chamber. Moreover Yugoslavia received a Constitutional Court, 
which was given the authority to decide whether republican legislation was in compliance 
with the Constitution. With the re-organisation of Government came a new impetus for 
political life in Yugoslavia and a new openness towards the public in the debates.
Tito himself moved towards favouring more liberal reform in the period 1963-64, and in 1964 
a number of economic measures were taken to prepare the ground for them. In addition the 
general investment fund (GIF) was abolished and companies had to rely more on their own 
investment. In his speeches Tito also started to link opposition to reform with party discipline 
and with nationalism, the latter essentially being a bourgeois phenomenon according to 
Marxist d o c t r i n e . H e  also lectured on tendencies towards cultural nationalism and 
emphasized ‘historiography’ as a problem asserting that teaching in the subject o f history had 
been insufficiently developed to promote reconciliation between republican interests.
Further liberalisation reforms came during 1964-65 (usually referred to as the 1965 Reform or 
just “the Reform”). Now many of the Federal Government’s responsibilities were transferred 
to the republics. Resource allocation and mobilisation were transferred to enterprises and 
banks, and the banks especially would have great power to decide over investment henceforth. 
Enterprises received greater autonomy, including with regard to their role in price formation 
and finally, exchange rates were unified and imports were liberalised in order to integrate into 
the international division o f labour. In place o f the abolished general investment fund came a 
federal fund for accelerating the development of underdeveloped republics and the province 
o f Kosovo.
An e.xtcnsive account on these debates is Rusinow, D (1977): Ch. 4 
W ilsoaD(1979); 153
The “Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and the province of 
Koso^’o” was an inter-republic transfer system of resources towards under-dev eloped and poorer areas witliin 
Yugoslavia (that is, from the north to the south). It was created to counter the uneven development witliin 
Yugoslavia. Each federal unit was to allot 1.85 % of the Social Product to the Fund, which allocated resources 
for im'estmcnt in Bosnia, Kosov'o, Macedonia, and Montenegro. As such it was also always the target for 
complaints. Croats and Slovenes complained over pav'ing too much (and that it was ineffective, constituted 
charity rather than investment an so on) and Macedonians, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Kosovars, for receiving 
too little (v\ hile their national resources w ere pulled into the industiy in the north below market prices) and Serbs 
complained o\ er paying anything at all, since statistics indicated that thc>' actuall>' ought to receive.
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The incentive behind these measures was to decrease the role o f the state as well as to de­
centralise. The reforms were then amended to the Constitution during 1967-68. The 1963 
Constitution had itself moved Yugoslavia towards a new political balance. On the basis o f a 
theory o f double sovereignty o f working people and nations, the reforms introduced personal 
rotation for all effective functions except the Presidency.
The objective o f worker’s self-management was to decentralise decision making to the 
smallest possible units. Within the social sphere this unit was the commune and within the 
economic sector it was a working unit or production unit within a company or enterprise 
(originally it was just the enterprise, but eventually this was subdivided into the smallest 
accountable working unit). The decentralisation to the commune was an important 
constitutional airangement to break up the power of the republics so that the federal balance 
should not only consist of inter-republican power politics (although the latter eventually 
became a dominant feature). In this manner, decentralisation “by-passed” the republican level 
and the focus was on the “autonomous” local community. Moreover, the state could 
eventually be reduced to a minimum so that resources were not drawn from production and 
growth. If the state provided the macro-economic conditions, the general framework, and o f 
course central functions such as defence and foreign policy, then local institutions in society 
could be governed directly and democratically by those who were affected by them. This 
would be both effective and democratic. With this aim a new local administrative unit, the 
opstina, was introduced in various republics at various times during the late 1950s and the 
1960s (1959 in Kosovo), replacing the earlier existing d i s t r i c t s . T h e  ‘opstina’ was a 
municipality-type, which was larger than the earlier districts, and which incorporated 
agricultural surrounding land into various administrative urban centres, with the idea that they 
should be able to function as self-sufTicient socio-economic u n i t s . I t  is essential to 
acknowledge that self-management became a wholly developed conception o f socialism and 
not merely an organisational matter for decentralised economy. It contained its own ideas of 
the state, o f representation, of property, and consequently of justice (in many respects
Hardten, E (1997) “Administrative Units and Municipal Reforms in Kosovo 1959-92” in Duijangs, G et al 
(Ed) (1997) “Kosovo-Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence” Peace Research Centre, University of Nijmegen; 
158-170. The opStina replaced the earlier district srez, and was introduced in Montenegro in 1957, in Kosovo in 
1959, but not until 1966 in Serbia and maiw other parts o f Yugoslavia.
Hardten, E (1997): 159
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different from Roman-based conceptions o f law).^^ From this perspective both capitalism 
and central-planned communism (etatism) were class-producing orders (bourgeois class 
relations in the capitalist order, etatist and bureaucratised ‘apparatchik’-class relations in the 
central-planning order), while self-management was based on egalitarianism.^^’ A brief 
description of self-management as a system must capture it at some instance in space and 
time, since it developed gradually and its explicit policy also claimed that it had to be in a 
process of constant change and development. Before 1971 the workers elected a working 
council to represent them in the enterprise. As it was practiced after 1971 the companies were 
divided into sub-units, and members of the working units, so called “basic organisation o f 
associated labour” (OOUR)’ *̂, elected representatives for the company level. The company 
thus, in turn, would have a council of representatives. Thus, the decision-makers would come 
from relatively small and supposedly homogenous units. From 1971 onwards, came a further 
development creating conglomerates of companies or enterprises within the same branch or 
similar branches, so-called “composed organisations of associated labour” (SOUR).^^^ There 
would be a delegation elected for each level up in the whole system all the way to the federal 
government. The ideal was that those who represented the people should come from a similar 
socio-economic background and environment, providing a system o f bottom-up 
representation, hence of equality. The system came to be developed most fully within the 
economic sphere but the same principle applied to the communes and to the social sector 
including institutions such as schools and universities.
W ithin self-management, the workers of a particular company had a limited influence on the 
organisation of work. Originally the space was limited within the directives that came 
centrally from Belgrade, but after the market reforms in 1965 it gained some momentum. The 
market reforms of 1965 made companies self-financing, where they formally had been 
completely on state budgets, and each company had to cover its own costs from its own 
economic performance (including salaries and investments). This gave a lot of power to the 
managers, but also created a wider space for the workers. The workers had influence through 
a “workers council” elected by the workers, which decided on various matters in relation to 
the workplace and production (the director reported on a 3-month basis to the workers council
^  Horvat, B (1982). Howat is perhaps the best e.\ample for providing a dev eloped system of Yugoslav socialist 
political philosophv.
Hor\'aLB(1982)
^  OOUR = Osnovna Organizaeija Udiu2enog Rada. In addition there would be a Radna Zajednica (Workers 
Community), ^\'he^e some functions like administration (not belonging to actual production) would be gathered. 
SOUR = Slozena Organizaeija Udnizenog Rada
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on how the company was performing and how the plans were fulfilled). After 1971 each 
company was divided into sub-units, so called working units or production units (OOUR). 
These units in turn became, in principle, responsible for their own budgets and they received 
their separate “workers councils”. Within many companies this created conflicts. More 
profitable units wished to remain together, while unprofitable units wished to be united with, 
and thus covered by, a more productive one (the particular organisation of a unit was decided 
by the companies’ general “working council”). After 1971, there came to be an increasing 
fusion o f companies within similar or interconnected branches into conglomerates (SOUR). 
Many such SOURs are still existing companies today (for example the Croatian oil-company 
INA). While the idea behind the SOUR was to create more profitable organisations, it was 
further considered that within a SOUR, the more productive companies would cover the loss 
of the unproductive ones. In some cases the SOUR was successful, but in others the lesser 
productive companies would pull down the whole conglomerate. The reform also created 
conflicts, in that productive companies resisted fusion with unproductive ones.^^“ Rather than 
producing more effective organisation, the reform created additional bureaucracy, new 
workers’ councils, and new buildings that had to be built for the new bureaucracy. Within the 
workers’ self-management system, however, just as in other socialist countries, the individual 
worker, once he was employed, had a high level o f security. In this manner a social pact with 
the workers was maintained. Regardless o f the performance o f the company, or the worker, it 
was difficult to get dismissed from one’s job (theoretically the worker owned the company, 
and could therefore not be fired).
Self-management gradually became a central feature o f Yugoslav society. The system was not 
only an instrument for the economic sector. In order to function in practice it would also have 
to penetrate all spheres o f social life and it eventually became a part of the very fabric of 
Yugoslav society upon which much of the legitimacy of the system was premised. It also 
fostered political participation and shaped political culture in Yugoslavia in a fashion quite
In some cases tliere was political pressure to create a SOUR but resistance from an indwidual company. This 
was for example the case with the Croatian firm “Nikola Tesla” (telecommunications), which resisted the merge 
with “KonCar” in the early 1980s (among other attempts). The power to avoid the merge came from tlie workers, 
who threatened a widespread strike bringing all tlic workers to the square in front of the Republican government. 
Since strikes, in theory, should not exist in a socialist country* these were often covered up, and since it would be 
problematic to cover up a strike of larger dimensions, this actually functioned as a pressure by the firm (and the 
workers) against the pressure from the government. Tesla w as later (after 1995) bought by Ericsson.
In practice possibilities did exist to fire indi\ iduals, but it was difficult and unusual. The method of reducing 
workforce in case of structural adaptation or “slimming” was primarily through retirements, re-education, and a 
stop on employment.
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different from the other real-socialist countries, thus continuing the Yugoslav deviation from 
the path of the rest o f Eastern Europe. Even if actual influence was often perhaps just 
nominal, it came, from the point of view of participation, to involve hundreds of thousands of 
people in some form of self-managing body, participating in the working council, communal 
assembly or the like.
After 1965 the Yugoslav economy moved in cycles. The role of the market increased, but at 
the same time there was a lack of instruments for macro-economic policy in order to promote 
development. The system of self-management increasingly became tv//t*r/v/.ve-managemcnt. 
The ambitions towards an egalitarian system were still there but the egalitarian model was 
transformed into a technocratic system and power structure.T here was an increased 
tendency towards monopolistic business-practices, where safeguarding an enterprise’s 
exclusive position in a district or region, through political means, became a priority, and 
further, the management in enterprises could increase their own salaries as well as workers’ 
salaries in exchange for loyalty. Thus, there was a collusion of management and workers in 
sharing the monopoly rents of enterprises. This threatened the solidarity and equality values 
within the system. Successively, the solutions to the economic problems would give rise to 
the future problems. Strictures were built into the system from the very way the self­
management system was organised and one of the overall effects of how self-management 
came to be materialised under the reforms was a fragmentation of the Yugoslav economy (to 
which we shall return below). The role of the market was increased, but the market signals 
within this system had severe imperfections, and could be misleading in an economy 
undergoing rapid structural change.
With the increased régionalisation of policy-making the federal state lost some of the 
instruments for macro-economic policy, such as fiscal policy, resource allocation and the 
control of co-ordination and implementation of plans. As already noted, many of the prices 
were freed after 1965 and investment decisions were left to the enterprises and more 
particularly to the managing bodies within the banks. The growing power of the latter came to 
be considered in conflict with Marxist premises and attempts to solve this problem were 
undertaken in the constitutional amendments of 1971 and in the new constitution of 1974.
It should be noted however that the idea of 'egalitarianism' (using the Russian w ord ‘ura\mloka' ) w as 
officially criticised in the late 1960s in fa\our of a more diversified salary system according to performance. 
There were different positions in different regions, and to some extent the student protests in i k  Laic 19f>Os were 
a critique of the official critique. Income inequality increased from 1%5 onwards.
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Another problem that started to appear in the context o f the market reforms was increased 
inflation. This came about partly as a result o f the freeing up o f prices and partly from 
difficulties in balancing the resources between investment and consumption. The monetary 
policy, which was left for the state in fighting inflation, had severe shortcomings and could 
not translate into effect in the Yugoslav society. One o f several reasons for this was that some 
inflation was imported through foreign borrowing and bilateral trade with periodic increases 
in money supply. While the sources o f inflation prior to 1973 had been primarily domestic 
they were soon to be fuelled by external conditions and especially so after the oil crises in 
1973. The recession in Western Europe and elsewhere had severe effects on the Yugoslav 
balance o f payments. A price for Yugoslavia’s integration into the world economy, and its 
whole development strategy, was the increased sensitivity to external fluctuations.
Within Yugoslavia, the particular form o f  socialism produced a social stratification, or class 
structure, with some particular characteristics, since it was neither directly shaped by 
conditions on the market -  private ownership -  as in western liberal societies, nor as 
hierarchically cemented and politically centralised as in the communist bloc g e n e r a l l y . A  
simple division can be among a top category of political elite and functionaries, a middle class 
of professionals, bureaucrats, managers, and higher white-collar positions, a lower stratum of 
workers and with peasants at the b o t t o m . G r e g o r  Tome has noted how the old (pre-war) 
middle class of entrepreneurs, professionals, merchants, and artisans, was heavily 
marginalized in the second Yugoslavia, but that some o f it -  those in the service sector -  
remained. Moreover, he notes the considerable expansion o f the working class and o f a 
white-collar class, while the peasants were significantly de-ruralised and incorporated into 
(primarily) the working class. Finally, there was a high degree o f social mobility, albeit a 
considerable class formation and reproduction, and there was the paradoxical fact that because 
party politics determined recruitment to elite positions, the class structure was most open at 
the top.^^^ Mladen Lazic and Slobodan Cvejic note some peculiarities in the Yugoslav case
On inflation see for example Woodward, S (1995): 227-228; Cf. generally: M. Schrenk, C. Aidalan, & N.A 
El-Tata\Ay (1979)
Tlie concept of class may be used in different ways, and although Marx connected it to positions and relations 
within the capitalist market economy (to ownership and relation to the means of production), it as used b}' Max 
Weber to denote position within societ}' as such Classes, in the sense of levels in a social stratification, thereby 
also exist in communist or socialist societies, although tliey here are shaped by the political part\'-state rather 
than by the market economy.
275 Tonic. G (1988) “Classes. Party- Elites, and Etlinic Groups” in Rusinow, D (Ed) (1988) “Yugoslavia; A 
Fracmred Federalism” . The Wilson Center Press, Washington; 58-77 
Tome, G (1998): 60-61 
Tome, G (1998): 63-65
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due to the liberal form of socialism and quasi-market intervention * * Thus, for instance, the 
relative autonomy of enterprises enabled managers to increase their ov\ti salaries as w ell as to 
pay higher wages to professionals, which was in contrast to societies in the communist bloc. 
Lazic & Cvejic review some sociological surv'eys from 1970s and 1980s and remark that they 
produced different results, which in some aspects were considerable, but with the common 
conclusion that income inequalities did exist and were connected to the hierarchical 
distribution o f positions with a nomenklatura at the top, professionals in the middle, and 
manual workers and (especially) peasants at the bot tom.However,  Gregor Tome suggests 
that class identification was low and that for a variety of reasons, there was a high level of 
class disintegrating factors. These include the fact that the non-owning class did not have any 
counterpart (that is, no class of owners), that there were no institutions for autonomous class 
representation, that political factors (rather than direct economic) determined life-chances, 
that there was a high rate of class change due to the rapid industrialisation and modernisation, 
and, not least, that the working class was very heterogeneous with great variations related to 
skill, sector of production, and region.^*® Consequently, national (and ethnic) identification, 
rather than class identification, came to prevail, which was exacerbated by political and 
economic decentralisation.
The most enduring and potentially dangerous problem that the reforms accelerated was that o f 
uneven regional development. The development gap between the richer republics in the 
northwest (Slovenia and Croatia) and the underdeveloped southeast (Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina) steadily grew wider. With regard to Kosovo, this 
region was exceptionally underdeveloped after the war. It completely lacked paved roads and 
the industry, mainly mining, which had been exploited by the Germans during the war, was 
largely destroyed. Because of Kosovo’s rich natural resources (the Trepia mining complex is 
one o f the richest mineral reserves in Eastern Europe), development efforts in Kosovo were 
focussed on mining, extraction, and heavy industry connected to it, including electricity, 
which in turn meant that the local economy remained quite one-dimensional and little 
diversified. In spite of actual development and growth taking place in Kosovo, it lagged 
behind the more rapid achievements in the northern republics. The reforms with actual
Lazié, M & S. C\xjic (2005) “Stratification Changes in Serbian Society: A Case of Blocked Post-Socialist 
Transformation” in Milic, A (Ed) (2005) “Transformation and Strategics: E\ cr> day Life in Serbia at llic 
Beginning of the 3̂ “̂ Millennium. InsUmte for Social Research, Faculty of Pliilosophy. Belgrade: 35-59 
Lazià, M & S. C\’cjic (2005): 37
Tome, G (1998): 62-66 and in passim.
131
liberalisation and decentralisation, which were necessary for economic flexibility, directly 
gave birth to, and empowered agents for, the inter-regional disputes. Namely, they further 
increased the role o f the large self-managed enterprises in the political economy and how it 
was governed. This spurred the regional (republic-based) leaderships into conflicts over the 
political economy, which in turn drew them into conflict over the organisation and function of 
the political institutions.^^^ We shall look at a number o f  concrete cases of this later.
There were two direct external key components in the Yugoslav modernisation project. First, 
foreign loans were still easy to obtain as long as the world market expanded and in the west 
there was interest in supporting Yugoslavia so that it would not fall back into the Communist 
bloc. Hard currency was needed for imports o f technology as well as raw materials for the 
Yugoslav manufacturing firms and industry. A problem was that as the Yugoslav economy 
became more differentiated the structural dependence (on imports) for production increased. 
By the 1980s some 99% or more o f imports were essential to production.^^^ Moreover, with 
time the cost of imports was increasing, while the price o f the products for export remained 
low, thereby diminishing the value of much o f  the export. Where western industry used less
energy per production unit, Yugoslav energy intensity increased. Between 1968 and 1982 
there was an increasing trend from public towards private sources o f international credit.
Over time the federal state lost all control over credit policy. Increasingly foreign creditors, 
especially the World Bank, filled the space o f federal investment accompanied by an 
increasing influence over policies o f developmental investment. Susan Woodward has 
shown how immediate the effects were from the intimate connection between foreign markets 
and capital, and domestic development. Following Woodward, the government faced a deficit 
of trade in the convertible-currency area from 1952 and steady inflationary pressure from the 
1960s, which created a vicious circle between external stabilisation and domestic stabilisation, 
with each undermining the other:
All tills is well-known, but for a good account (there are several) see for example: Burgh. S (1983) ’’Conflict 
and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia -  Political Decision Making since 1966” Pnneeton University Press: p. 51 
and en block
Woodward, S (1995); 226
Cf. Chepulis, R (1984) “The Economic Crisis and E.xport-Led Development Strategy of SFR Yugoslavia; In 
between possibilities and limitations”. Paper for the Mediterranean Studies Seminar, Dubrovnik lUC, April 
1984. Indeed this was a problem for many' developing countries.
D\'ker, D (1990) ’’Yugoslavia -  Socialism, Development and Debt” p; 93
Dyker. D (1990): 120
Woodward, S (1995); 236
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The solution to the trade deficit was to seek new short-term credits and to resort 
periodically to IMF loans. Resort to the IMF reinforced restrictive monetarism 
(in effect) and fiscal conservatism of the demand-management side of the 
leaders policy: to reduce the trade deficit, repay debt, and reduce inflation by 
restricting domestic consumption (including imports) and promoting exports. 
The effect of tight monetary policy and cuts in imports was almost immediately 
felt in production;-^^’
External stabilisation was the priority. Woodward contends, but in order to achieve it a kind 
o f anti-Keynesian “stabilisation” policy was pursued domestically, which meant that 
expansion was only possible with a new influx of foreign credit whereas domestic restraint 
was pursued under recessions. Such domestic “stabilisation” (or monetary planning) was 
pursued at the microeconomic level where the self-management accounts had to be balanced. 
Moreover, the priority in investment policy was given to consideration of the trade balance, to 
access to foreign credit, and to restoring liquidity, regardless of the consequences for 
employment or for the sectoral balance of the economy, which was needed to create 
g r o w t h . T h u s ,  striving to balance the trade deficit had an immediate translation in both 
consumption and employment. Such adaptation to global capitalist and international political 
economic conditions was contingent on the non-alignment strategy Yugoslavia had chosen, 
and in this manner the country’s strategy of independence made it highly dependent.
Foreign debt accrued heavily and the debt boomerang that hit many developing countries 
from the late 1970s onwards also came to Yugoslavia. However, debt repayment was already 
a problem from the early 1960s, and the reform measures were in fact undertaken w ith this 
problem in mind.
A second important external component in the Yugoslav modernisation project was the 
exportation of a large part of the Yugoslav labour force. From the mid-1960s onwards a large 
part o f the Yugoslav working force was found in European countries and by 1973 more than
WoodwanL S (1995): 228-9
^  Woodward. S ( 1995): 223-224 and 225-228. Here the concept of stabili/alion-polic> takes a difTcicnt 
meaning than in the Keynesian understanding and tlic term 'moncLin planning' is pertups more appropriate.
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one million people had emigrated.^*^ This represented between a fifth and a quarter of all 
actively employed people in Yugoslavia. While there was a decrease in emigration after the 
recruitment stop that came to much of Western Europe in 1973 and the more restrictive 
Yugoslav law on emigration from 1973 there were still over a million Yugoslavs living in 
other European countries by the late 1980s. Remittances from the diaspora would eventually 
come to play a significant role in the Yugoslav economy, to which we shall return later on. 
Labour migration was of course directly contingent on western markets, especially the 
European one.
Despite the problems, or rather in a complex interplay with them, Yugoslavia generally 
achieved impressive results during this time. There was rapid economic growth accompanied 
by income equality, although income was increasingly differentiated again after 1965. The 
country was largely modernised with a transformation from an agrarian towards a more 
diversified economy. The agricultural sector, which comprised almost 70 % of the employed 
around 1950 was reduced to some 33% in 1975, and accompanying this the share in GMP of 
the agricultural sector decreased from 32% to 12 %.^^* This was the prolétarisation o f the 
Yugoslav countryside, where previous peasants were drawn into industry and manufacturing 
work. As in many other East European countries there was the phenomenon of the peasant- 
worker, with many workers holding on to their land and cultivating it during the week-end or 
holidays as a supplementary personal income, or helping family members who maintained a 
farm. The agricultural sector was also the ‘'private sector”, dominated by small individual 
farms. While this sector decreased the social sector absorbed the transfers. A gradual 
urbanisation took off from the 1950s.^^^ The overall effect was significant structural changes 
in the Yugoslav economy as well as in the social structure of society between 1950 and 1975. 
There was considerable development o f the education system, including the establishment of 
new universities, increased literacy, and increased bureaucratisation.
Finally, Yugoslavia was increasingly integrated into the world economy. The level of foreign 
trade in relation to Gross Material Product (GMP) increased and by 1975 export and import
Schicrup, C-U (1990): 101-102 and table p.l02. Compare: Baudic, I (1973) “Radnici U InozcmsWu Prema 
Popisi StanovniSKa Jugoslavije 1971” (Yugoslav workers abroad according to the 1971 Census). Migracije 
Radnika Knjiga 4, Radovi Instituía za Geografìju SveufiiliSta u Zagrebu.
^  On labour migration see Schienip, C-U (1990)
Schrenk, M, C. Ardalan, & N. A El-Tataw' (1979): 32
For a study of rural-urban mobility in Serbia see Sitnié. A (1973) “The Peasant Urbanites: A Study of Rural- 
Urban Mobility in Serbia”, Seminar Press, New Yoik/London,
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were in the range of 18% and 24 % respec t ive ly .Between 1954 and 1975 the average 
annual growth in real GMP was 7.2 % while population growth was low averaging 1.1 % and 
domestic saving rates averaged 30 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in earlier years.
The result was rapid economic growth and increased personal incomes, which in the modem 
social sector rose by more than 5 % a year on average.
Transform ations in the National Question 1945*1958/62: from the promotion of 
^Yugoslavism* to reliance on m odernisation
As mentioned earlier much of the thrust of the national problem was aborted after the war 
with the disappearance from the political and social scene o f the leaders of those national 
movements that had operated during the war. However, after the break with Stalin in 1948, 
when decentralisation transferred new responsibilities to the regional and local authorities, 
one effect was a reformulation of local and national interests within the party apparatus 
among the local authorities. The national problem thereby took a new form in being 
articulated from and shaped by the various economic responsibilities that were transferred to 
the republican level, but this was only a transitory phase since these responsibilities were soon 
partially distributed to local authorities and to enterprise managers. In this manner local 
economic interests came to the fore although they were moulded according to national and 
cultural sentiments, and this was further aided by the fact that the communist party chose to 
identify local or regional economic interests as national. There was certainly an awareness of 
the problem within the party but there was also a strong belief that these problems would 
become neutralised with the social forces developing under the new political economy and 
modernisation o f the c o u n t r y . T h i s  essentially meant that other social relations would 
outplay the importance of national ones, and the expectation of this was itself connected to the 
idea o f socialist self-management. To this extent it was expected that modernisation, as such, 
would solve the problem, rather than leaning on state-political indoctrination. In 1953 there 
were considerable amendments to the 1946 Constitution, which included a merging of the
Schrcnk, M, C. Ardalcn & N. A. El-Tatawy (1979); 33. Tlie Gross Material Product (GMP) was a concept 
for national accounts, w hich was used in all socialist countries to measure the output of goods and sers ices. It is 
equivalent to Uic GDP of so-called “productive activities” disregarding so-called “non-productivc acth ities” 
w hich according to the definition of classical economics does not generate “value”. Tlie “non-productive 
acti\ ities” include: health, education, administration, culture, defence, banking, and housing.
M. Schrenk, C. Aidalan, & N.A El-Tatawy (1979): 31 
Ibid
^  See for example Shoup. P (1968): 168 and Ch, 5 en bloc on the national question during this period. See also 
studies on ‘values’ referred to below' in this section.
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Chamber o f Nationalities with the National Assembly, and the creation of a second house 
with a ‘council o f producers’ to represent the workers. Although the actual abolishment of the 
Chamber o f Nationalities contained a certain de-emphasis on federalism, and reduced the 
significance of the autonomy for the autonomous regions, like Kosovo, this did not have any 
real effects, as centralisation was high any way.
In Kosovo there were specific problems, since the population was predominantly Albanian 
and not Slavic. At the end of the Second World War the partisans had repressed an Albanian 
rebellion, but out o f  the rebellion an underground network emerged called the ‘Albanian 
National Democratic Committee’, which sought unification with Albania. In the early post­
war years relations with Albania were quite good and the border to Albania allowed for a 
considerable amount o f border crossing. However, after Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, the 
relationship between Yugoslavia and Albania deteriorated rapidly, and Enver Hoxha became 
one of the strongest critics o f Yugoslavia in the communist camp. This had the effect that the 
Yugoslav security police, ‘UDB-a’, increased its pressure in K o s o v o . T h e  late 1940s and 
the entire 1950s were marked in Kosovo, on the one hand, by the development of cultural 
autonomy, and on the other hand by waves o f persecution and pressure. First, in order to 
reduce Albanian dissatisfaction and to embark on a socialist modernisation project also 
covering Kosovo, schools were opened up and cultural institutions promoted. At the end of 
the war the level o f illiteracy among Albanians, in Kosovo as well as in the Albanian state, 
was close to 80 The education system was initially organised according to language, 
and schools were opened in the Serbo-Croatian, Albanian and Turkish languages 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . I t  proved difficult to find enough teachers to staff the Albanian schools, and a 
two-track approach had to be applied, by first educating a cadre of teachers, but gradually a 
network of Albanian-1 anguage schools was built up. After the 1953 Constitution, the 
education system was reorganised along regional principles. From the late 1940s and through 
the 1950s, Albanians received, for the first time in history, a real possibility for education in 
their own language, saw the emergence and spread of cultural institutions, such as theatres, 
and the publication of a bi-weekly Albanian-1 anguage newspaper, xhtRilindja (Awakening).
A certain degree o f emancipation was thereby promoted, which included efforts to ‘liberate’
Compare Shoup, P (1968): Ch. 5; Vickers. M  (1998); Ch. 8
UDBa (Urcd Drzavne Bezbednosti = Office for State Security) was renamed to SDB (Sluzba Driavne 
Bezbcdnosli) in 1%4, but continuously called UDBa (the ‘a’ added only for a more convenient pronunciation). 
^  Reuter, J (1984) “Educational Policy in Kosova” in Pipa, A & S. Repishti (Eds)(1984) “Studies on Kosova”, 
East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia University Press, New York: 259 
On the education s>'Stem in Koso^•o I here partly follow Reuter, J (1984): 259-265
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Albanian women from wearing veils, which covered their eyes.^°^ Second, throughout the 
period, the UDB’a persecuted ‘Stalinists’, searched for arms, and attempted to uproot the 
‘Albanian National Democratic Committee’, an endeavour in which they succeeded in the late 
1950s. This made the chief of UDB’a, AJeksander Rankovic, who was a Serb, one of the most 
hated persons in the Albanian population. Further, during the 1950s the government pursued a 
policy of ‘Turkification’, in which it perceived Albanians to be Turkish, pushed people to 
declare themselves so, promoted the Turkish-language schools, and even promoted 
emigration to T u r k e y . I n  the mid-1950s, a large number o f Albanians from Kosovo thereby 
emigrated for Turkey.
Leaving the specific situation in Kosovo aside, the problem with nationalism at this time was 
mainly displayed within the party itself and among intellectuals and artists. From the party 
leadership there were complaints that historiography as dispersed in text-books (produced 
separately in different republics) was fostering national romanticism and in the mid-1950s the 
party started a campaign for the fostering o f the Yugoslav idea and for seeking a new 
consensus on the nationality p r o b l e m . O n e  of its outcomes was the meeting o f a number of 
philologists and academics in Novi-Sad in 1954 resulting in a statement that Serbo-Croatian 
was one language with two different versions and alphabets, with preparations taken for 
publishing a Serbo-Croatian dictionary (published in 1960).^*’̂
A program for merging minority schools was carried out through the 1950s, which was met 
with resistance in many areas. In 1956 the party took measures to review the history writing in 
Yugoslavia. The historians were a problematic group since they generally tended to support 
the Yugoslav idea at the same time as their historiography was seen as national-romantic, for 
example though emphasising the role of their own nation in the liberation or building of 
Yugoslavia.^®^ The party pursued the policy that Yugoslav historiography should place more 
emphasis on Yugoslav unity and deal with this matter more according to Marxist theory and
V ickeaM (1998): 152
^  Vickers, M (1998); 149.1 here follow Vickers, but the generalisation is potentially controversial, especially 
the question of why Albanians left for Tuike>- in laige numbers. There were agreements with Turkey enabling 
migration, but was it primarily a factor of push or pull?
According to Miranda Vickers some 195 000 Albanians left for Turkc>' in the years 1954-57: Vickers. M 
(1998): 157
^S houp ,P (1968): 190-193
Shoup, P (1968); Rusinow, D (1977): 225; Wilson, D (1979); 141 & 172 
^ C f :  Shoup. P (1968): 199-200
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tradition, and Edvard Kardeij embarked on his own interpretation and definition o f the 
concept o f ‘nation’, with the intention o f ideologically supporting the Yugoslav case.^^^
After 1958 a new program was adopted and the promotion of ‘ Yugoslavism’ was abandoned. 
The party now relied on ‘social forces’ and modernisation to foster a new culture. 
Nevertheless, some efforts were still made to promote cultural co-operation and exchange.
The change was not abrupt and since there were continued efforts in some fields until about 
1962, some authors prefer to see the early 1960s as a turning point in the promotion o f 
Y ugoslav ism .B etw een  1959, in a review by the Party Executive Committee, and the new 
Constitution of 1963, the reference to ethnic minorities was changed to ‘nationalities’ and a 
new attitude was adopted that the various minorities could function as bridge-builders for 
their respective fellow nationals in other countries. The Bosnian Muslims, for their part, had 
their status elevated to that of a separate constituent ‘nation’ gradually after 1961.^°^
The idea that ‘social forces’, such as urbanisation, socio-economic development, and general 
modernisation foster new political cultures and value-systems is a feature o f classical 
development and modernisation theories, as they were interpreted in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
While several of the theoretical propositions o f modernisation and development theory have 
been heavily contested, and will be re-contested further in this study, these assumptions are 
not unreasonable as such. On the contrary they are quite probable and indeed very plausible. It
Kardeij's definition included the wording communit>' of peoples arising on llie basis of the social division 
of labour in the epoch of capitalism,— See furtlier Slwup: op. cit: and p. 202-3. Shoup (p. 199-200) mentions 
the attempt of the Yugosla\’ historian Bogdanov, who embraced the task and offered an liislorical interpretation 
that Yugoslavia liad been in the process o f formation since the first half o f the nineteenth ccntiuy^ due to efforts 
of a rising bourgeois class of South Slavs n  ho struggled for liberation against the e.vploitation of a provincial 
feudal class, but tliat this group had become opportunistic, conservative and reactionar>- after they came to pow er 
(and following the reaction within the Habsburg Empire in 1848) and that therefore the natural process of llie 
entire development o f the South Slavs was lialted and replaced by reactionary, abnormal and separatist 
tendencies. But Bogdanov’s interpretation received mixed receptions and it could not be established n hat was 
desirable for analysing the birth of the Yugoslav state (Ibid). Another attempt, which ran contrary to official 
doctrine, was made by Franjo Tudjman.
^  There are several examples but most recently see; Wachtel, A. B (1998); Ch 3. Wachiel follows the attempts 
to sponsor more unity n ilhin education policy, culture and literary canons. I would suggest a soft transition but 
have placed the year 1958 along with Shoup (op. cit) at the time when the campaign was largely abandoned. The 
Party- made concessions to the Republics, and Party  ̂policy' also generally clumgcd towards the minorities in the 
late 1950s so that the status of minorities was upgraded to “nationalities” (in contrast to “nations”) after review 
by the Party' Executive Committee in spring 1959. In 1961 draft preparations for the 1963 Constitution it was 
e\en  suggested to ban ‘Yugoslav’ as a national designation, but this rigid position nas soon dropped.
^  The process was gradual: in the census of 1961 the catcgoiy ‘ethnic Muslim’ was provided, and further 
concessions to Muslims as a distinct ethnic group (rather than just religious) were made in the 1963 republican 
constitution for Bosnia-Hercegovina. whereas the party- committee in 1968-69 prepared die ground further so 
that in the census of 1971 and in tlie Federal Constitution of 1974 they were a "narod, a separate constituent 
nation (cf. Shoup 1968: 216).
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would be strange if rapid socio-economic and spatial changes and increased mobility did not 
have any effect on value-systems and political culture.^^^ In studies from the 1960s and 
1970s, taking the so called development approach to communist studies, several indications 
were established that there was such a ‘modernising’ of attitudes, values, and political culture 
among the Yugoslav population and the elite groups.^" Studies on so-called “social distance”, 
surveying people’s attitudes towards other ethnic groups have been quite common among 
social scientists studying inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia. While “modernisation” of 
attitudes was established in many surveys, some studies tended to the conclusion that ethnic 
identification equally may be strengthened and re-emphasised, as much as replaced by some 
universalism.^^^ The persistence o f Albanian clans in Kosovo following theKo/n/n, or 
customary law, and especially the reproached phenomenon of blood-revenge, were equally 
considered as elements that would disappear with modernisation and social development.^'^ 
Miienko Karan, a Serbian social-psychologist who worked in Prishtina and Belgrade, studied 
the latter phenomenon in the 1980s, and suggested that it was exceptionally resistant to 
modernisation, and that rather than abating it had taken on worse features, while being 
squeezed between a tradition that had not yet disappeared and a modernisation not yet 
achieved.^'"' Various attempts to eliminate the phenomenon of blood-revenge, which included 
reconciliation efforts through the Socialist Alliance (a party front-organisation in which 
membership was quite important and widespread) and the threat o f exclusion from the 
Socialist Alliance for those who followed the Kamm, had a very limited effect at best^'^
The critique lias also mainly been targeted at the engineering of such “cultural change” after a pre-set 
schedule of goals.
See for example Claik, C & K. Jolinson (1976) “Development’s Influences on YugosIa\’ Political Values” 
Sage Publications. Bc\ erly Hills / London. Clark and Jolmson used a national survey on socio-political \ alucs 
undertaken by Zaninovich in 1967-68. Clark and Jolmson's study is one of tlie most positivist I ha\ e e% cr seen in 
tlic subject and is higWy based on quantitati\e methods. It allows some space for criticism, but as such the 
findings arc still valuable and based on a national suwey undertaken at a specifically interesting period of time 
(late 1960s).
Another example, equally positivist, is Gaiy Bcrtsch's study on value changes. His conclusion is that 
although modernisation and some form of universalism apply they can c.xist in parallel with a strong re-emphasis 
on ethnicirt and nation. Both studies can be subjected to se\'cre criticism, but Uiat we cannot enter into here. 
Bertsch, G (1974) “Value-change and Political Communit)’; The Multinational Czechoslovak, Soviet, and 
Yugosla%' Cases.
Tire plicnomcnon was. and is. reproached among many Albanians as well, and in Iris no>el Setpents o f Blood 
from 1958, the Albanian writer Adcm Demaqi corxlemncd tlie tradition of blood-re^‘cnge.
Karaa M (1985) “K n iia Osseta” Partizanska Knjiga, Ljubljana / OOUR Izdavaiko Publicistiika DelatnosL 
Beograd.
'  Karan concluded that modernisation and social dc\ clopmcnt did not have any effect on reducing the 
phenomenon in the Yugoslav' (Koso\ o) case, and that the measures or means needed to reduce it remained 
unknow n. He did believe that ev entually it would disappear with modemitv', perliaps after thirtv' years or mote, 
but tltal it was essential to acknow ledge the problem and tiv' to w oik along elements within Albanian cuslomaty 
law, which regulated peace periods through besa (w ord of honour). It would be counter-productiv e, howcv cr, not 
to acknowledge the phenomenon, or to belittle it, just as it would be to try to eliminate it simplv' through the
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It has been argued by Andrew Baruch Wachtel that the Yugoslav idea lost cause once the 
partisan themes had played themselves out, which would be some time around the mid- 
1960s.^*^ Wachtel suggests that supranational Yugoslavism was unable to renew itself and 
that the authoritarian tradition left the government cold towards a ‘supranational culture’ built 
on individual western lines.^^^ Subsequently there was only the collectivist principle, which 
with the lack of a supranational project fell back on the particular national identity of the 
various groups. Wachtel further labels self-management as a part of the Yugoslav “myth” 
together with the partisan liberation struggle and “brotherhood and unity”. Wachtel’s 
contribution is important and provides good points on the role o f cultural politics in relation to 
nation building. His observation o f the collectivist principle is also valid. However, although 
self-management certainly became part o f Yugoslav ideology, the concept of “myth” has the 
connotation of an erroneous belief, which can be revealed in retrospect. This may (perhaps) 
not be Wachtel’s intention (or others who use it), but it should be emphasised that these core 
elements were not merely a ‘myth’, recreated by Yugoslav intellectuals and politicians, but 
rather there was clear materiality behind them (although perhaps not operating according to 
blueprint) and they gradually became a practice within the political theory itself of the 
Yugoslav state. Moreover, as outlined in the Introduction and above, the nationality 
dimension cannot be understood in isolation from the re-articulation of interests and 
formation of new interest groups related to  the political economy and governing structure, 
which in turn was negotiated within the context of the international political economy. While 
it would be a serious mistake (and to miss a fundamental point in Yugoslav society) to reduce 
the national question to a matter o f political economy, and in such manner allow a crowding- 
out of cultural dimensions essential to the national question, it would equally be a mistake to 
dislocate the question of national articulation from the matrix o f dynamics that connects the 
state, nation, class and political economy. But in order to interpret the political conflicts, as 
they were articulated in economic, cultural, or constitutional terms, alternately, we need to 
condense the abovementioned matrix into an explicit framework. Dejan Jovic has suggested 
that the fundamental dividing line within the Yugoslav political elite concerned two
fonmal penal sy stem, since it could just continue out of the public domain. See further: Karan, M (1985) “Kr\na 
Osveta”
Wachtel, A. B (1998); 9 cf. Ch. 4
For the whole argument see Ibid. My impression is that “culture”, and cultural nationalism, is treated too 
much as an independent variable in Wachtel’s analysis. Despite the criticism here, I find Wachtel’s study of 
cultural politics and literature in Yugoslavia an important contribution to understanding the continuous 
recreation o f nation-hood, and in relation to the slate. In addition he has an interesting commentary' on much of 
modem Yugoslav literature.
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competing and opposing conceptions of the Marxist theory of the state. In the first, so-
called ‘statist’ conception, Yugoslavia was considered a South Slavic state, where 
‘brotherhood and unity’ concerned the ethnic groups as well as social classes. In this view 
‘ Yugoslavism’ entailed the promotion o f a universal south Slavic identity, which transgressed 
the ethnic and national peculiarities of the constituent peoples. In this context the reliance on 
‘social forces’ to overcome cultural or ethnic differences makes sense as a kind of teleological 
process of modernity leading towards a universalism limited within the Yugoslav state. In the 
second, so-called ‘non-statist’, conception however, the emphasis is on the Marxist idea that 
the state will eventually “wither away”. Here, socialism rather than south Slavism is at the 
centre, and thus the ideological (socialist) dimension rather than the ethnic. In the second 
conception it would be fundamentally wrong to promote any form of ‘Yugoslavism’, because 
the state would eventually disappear and must only be allowed to form an umbrella over the 
constituent nations, which would enable them to be independent and to pursue their road 
towards socialist self-management democracy. Jovic places Aleksander Rankovic, the Serb 
and Chief of Security, as the strong advocate of the former, and Edvard Kardelj, the Slovene 
party ideologist and theoretician, as the advocate of the latter (further discussed below). Tito 
himself, tended towards the ‘statist’ and ‘ Yugoslavist’ stance, while emphasising that this did 
not equal ‘unitarism’ (a Yugoslav heresy), in the sense of one nations hegemony over another, 
as had been the case in the first Yugoslavia. Jovic contends that the essence o f Yugoslav 
political struggle revolved around these positions, and that it was the latter that eventually 
prevailed. Emphasis is thus on the ideological nature of conflicts, rather than economic, 
cultural or national. Still, as argued by Yael Tamir (and outlined in the Introduction), the 
question of self-determination, in whatever sense, does concern concrete issues in terms of 
political economy and cultural affirmation.^*’ Moreover, the rationalities are affected by the 
opportunity structures within a wider political economic context. With such considerations in 
mind we have an outline for intra-Yugoslav divisions along political and ideological interests, 
as well as for economic interests, both criss-crossing cultural and national interests. The latter, 
economic interests, overlapped considerably with national divisions, whereas the former did
Jovic, D (2003): 157-181
Tamir. Y (1993) "Liberal Nationalism”. Princeton Uim crsiW Press; The direct overlapping of the economic 
disputes with the issue o f centralism versus de-centralism (statism/de-statism) is clearly noted as late as 1988 in 
DeA'Ctak, S (1988) "The Equalit>- of Nations and Nationalities in Yugoslavia”, Ethnos 32, BraumUller, Wien. See 
especially pp. 102-103 where Dex etak argues against an>̂  re-centralisation as a solution to the economic crisis.
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so to a much lesser extent, but in the case of the Albanians they did so considerably, since 
they had no interest in a Slavic conception of the state (they are after all not Slavs).
On the one hand we have a direct regional and national configuration that largely overlapped 
with the divergence in economic structure and level o f  development. On the other hand, 
however, conflicts were sometimes explicitly articulated in cultural and nationalist terms, 
rather than over political economy. In the case of Albanian nationalist expressions, the 
concern over political economy appeared secondary, although aggravated by economic 
deprivation and unemployment. In the case of Macedonia, in strict political economic terms, 
there was reason to take side with Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, because the economic 
structure and level of development was more similar to  these republics than to that of 
Slovenia or Croatia, and Macedonia was favoured by the inter-republican transfer fund. On 
the other hand Macedonia had no interest in a ‘ statism ’ that might produce centralism. 
Therefore, in terms of liberal reform, decentralisation and federalist formula, it often shared 
interest with Slovenia and Croatia. Hence, the political conflicts must be understood in multi­
dimensional terms and not as a strict translation, or reduction, o f economy into politics. 
Nevertheless there was a constant pressure to adjust to shifting conditions in relation to 
western markets and in the global political economy, even to  the extent o f disputes fuelled 
directly in connection to foreign credits. Let us therefore, within the framework outlined here, 
take a closer look at the political and national dynamics in the 1960s and early 1970s, which 
eventually resulted in a re-formulation o f the Yugoslav state.
Political and National Dynamics in the 1960s: political economy debates and national 
articulations towards liberal socialism
Although the battleground to a large extent concerned political economy, it assumed other 
features as well. At the end of the 1960s they became so strongly articulated with regard to 
the organisation o f the state, that they produced a legitimacy crisis, which eventually led to a
The reason why the ideological ‘statist’ versus ‘non-statist’ disputes overlapped less with national divisions is 
for example evident in the case of the Macedonians. In Macedonia the economic lev'el of development, and 
economic stmeture, was such that the ‘de\’elopmental’ (FoCa) model would be favoured. For this reason the>' 
would end up on the side of Bosnia and Serbia against Slovenia and Croatia. However, in constitutional terms 
tliey were more interested in decentralization and would thereby have joint interest with the Slovene and 
Croatian positions. Thereby the dynamic of conflict was multi-dimensional.
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re-negotiation of the whole Yugoslav project. We must follow how this unfolded a bit further 
before we can formulate some considerations of why this was the case.
The Reforms of 1965 initially ran into resistance on the implementation level. Notably in 
Serbia there was resistance to the reforms and one of Tito’s closest party allies in the state 
apparatus, Aleksander Rankovic, strongly opposed them. Alexander Rankovic held the 
important position of Vice Presisent o f Yugoslavia, was responsible for party organisation and 
chief of the security service (UDBa). With Tito now on the side of the reformers he eventually 
took the step to sacrifice Rankovic as he had done with Milovan Djilas before. The ground 
had to be prepared on a territory other than on the reform-issue though, since this was too 
closely linked to various interest groups. The issue where Rankovic could be attacked so that 
popular support could be maintained was on his responsibility over the UDBa, and the official 
occasion was before the fourth plenum of the Party Central Committee, held at the Briuni 
islands in 1966. Official Yugoslav history claims that it was discovered that the security 
service UDBa, headed by Rankovic, had wire-tapped all the party officials including Tito 
himself The discoveries were made in a complex series of intrigues involving the mutual 
wire-tapping between the Army’s counter-intelligence service and UDBa.^^^ Rankovic’s hard 
style measures had won him many personal enemies, one of them being the party’s chief 
ideologist and theoretician Edvard Kardelj, who was on the reformist side.^^^
With an entire political block going after Rankovic in 1966 a fatal blow was given to a large 
Serbian group of representatives around him. The purge o f Rankovic marks a considerable 
change in the situation in Kosovo, because the plenum further emphasised the principles of 
decentralisation and granted extensive autonomy to the republics and provinces, especially 
with regard to economic decision-making. Moreover, in an attempt to eliminate ethnic 
differences and break up ethnically homogeneous areas, an administrative reform in 1966 
reorganised the twenty-eight municipalities that had existed in Kosovo since 1959, into 
twenty-two new municipalities o f which only three were ethnically h o mo g en eo u s . T h i s  was 
part o f a wider reform in the municipality {opStim) system, but in the predominantly Albanian 
province it eventually had the effect of making the Serbs complain o f discrimination by
See Rusinow, D (1977): 179-91 (especially p.185-86)
In 1959 there had been an attempt on Kardelj’s life, for which his wife had blamed Rankovic and his people, 




Albanians and that they had lost all power in local governing. Thus, the year 1966 can be 
taken as a turning point in Kosovo, after which Albanian dominion rapidly replaced Serbian.
The late 1960s further witnessed several serious political problems in Yugoslavia, some of 
which were formulated in national terms vis-à-vis the state. As has been discussed by 
Rusinow they were o f a number of different natures and causes.^^"* In 1966-67 the LCY 
(League of Communists) was reorganised in a more decentralised m a n n e r . T h i s  came as a 
result o f internal pressure and as a consequence of the decentralisation of the whole system. 
The reorganisation of the party was immediately met with criticism from Moscow. The 
international scene now accumulated tensions for Yugoslavia, with a coup d'état in Greece in 
1967, disputes with Italy over trade issues as well as some territorial squabbles over 
Trieste, and a reopening of the Macedonian question by Bulgaria. Moscow was again in
schism with Yugoslavia, and there was an upcoming world communist meeting in which 
Yugoslavia had no place. At the same time Yugoslavia was uneasy with US involvement in 
Vietnam, in the 1967 war in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere, which was all considered 
to indicate a more aggressive American stance towards socialist regimes and non-aligned 
states. Any perceived threats from America were hastily fading though in the wake of the 
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The relations between the new 
Dubcek-govemment there and Yugoslavia had been particularly good.^^^ The Soviet take­
over initially produced a security-paranoia, with fears that Yugoslavia itself might be 
threatened, and a series of steps were taken to prepare for a possible upcoming conflict, but 
after a few months of uncertainty the situation moved back towards normality in 1969.
3:4
3;s Rusinow, D (1977): 197-244, see also Ch. 7; Cf. Wilson, D (1979): Ch.l4The Partj' had changed its name in 1952 from the ‘Yugoslav Communist Part)’’ to ‘League of Communists’, 
and then embarked on a gradual decentralization.
Trieste and the Julian region (from the Julian Alps) was under dispute, as was Istria, between Italy and 
Yugoslavia after the Second World War. The region was ethnically mixed. Trieste was under Habsburg Austria 
until 1918. under Italy (liberal and then fascist) betw een 1918-43, Nazi German}' 1943-1945, under pro- 
Yugoslav Communists inMay-June 1945, then a British-American Military Administration 1945-54, and 
Republican Italy after 1954, Zone B comprised areas around the City, border disputes tow ards tlic Slovenian 
border and tlie coast carne up in 1967. For an account o f Trieste and the border area see: Sluga, G (2001) “The 
Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border” State University of New York Press
Rusinow, D (1977): 210
Under the Dubàck-regime Czechoslo^'akia -was searching for its own liberalisation and revitalisation of the 
economy, which was stagnating under the communist dogma of central planning. Czechoslovakia was 
particularly important, since it had been the only industrialised country to fall under the eastern bloc. For Tito 
there seemed to be an opportunity for the formation of a more liberal socialist bloc in central Europe with 
Yugoslavia as a role model. Títere w as further support from the Ccausescu government in Romania.
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The Reforms o f 1964-65 aimed at revitalising the economy had not produced any immediate 
results and the years up until 1967-68, for their part were marked by economic stagnation. At 
the same time, living costs had started to increase and would continue to do so. Moreover, 
there was an increase in unemployment. Paradoxically, the initial momentum towards 
industrialiation and modernisation, which had started to produce a significant change in 
Yugoslav society - including the prolétarisation of the countryside, restmcturing o f the 
economy, and a developed education system - now hit the limit o f its own expansion capacity. 
The growing number o f graduated students, as well as skilled workers, could not be 
significantly absorbed within the social and industrial sector. These sectors were now under 
rationalisation at the same time as a significant force of students and workers were available 
for employment. The largest group was however the peasants. The prolétarisation of the 
countryside had reduced the agricultural sector significantly, from two thirds to less than half 
of the population in twenty years, although with great regional variations (the rural population 
was pushed by the meagre opportunities in farming and, to a greater extent, pulled by the 
cities).^^^ While unemployment became a real threat for the first time, there was now a new 
opportunity for moving abroad. Expanding western labour markets could absorb some of 
these people, and provided relief for the Yugoslav economy for some time to come. Despite 
the poor image this might bring for real-socialism, labour export became a calculated solution 
within Yugoslav economic policy and in order to facilitate and control the work-migration a 
federal bureau was created.
Among advocates o f the developmental model (Woodward’s Fo6a model), or so-called 
“conservatives”, the meagre result of the liberalisation of 1965 provided good arguments for 
doubting the effect of the reforms. The timing was such that Yugoslavia was opening up its 
market at a time when the trend in Western Europe moved towards increased protectionism. 
The disputes between republican party representatives increased, connected to the issue o f 
reform and decentralization, and because of the uneven development within Yugoslavia the 
positions on economic and political reform tended to merge with republican-national 
divisions. It was not clear-cut though. While the more developed regions (Slovenia, Croatia) 
showed stronger support for decentralisation and market liberalisation, these were in fact 
supported by Macedonia, which was among the more underdeveloped regions (together with
Among other reasons, producti\ ity was low in agriculture and the social security benefits -  in this prh’atc 
sector -  were poor compared to those in the social sector.
On labour migration see Schicrup, C-U (1990); Magnusson. K (1989) “Jugoslavcr i Sverige; Invandrare och 
identitet i ett kultursociologiskt perspektiv^ Centre for Multiethnic Research. Uppsala Uni\'ersity.
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Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina).^^* This indicates the complexity o f the 
disputes and that they spanned from political economy to the federal organization o f the state. 
The political debate was not confined within the party. The liberal trend after 1965 opened up 
a debate within intellectual and student circles about the nature of Yugoslav socialism, the 
limits to reform and of Marxism in general. Self-management within the media sector started 
to produce a more party-independent journalism and the intellectual climate opened up.
In Ljubljana the political review Perspektive had started to attack LCY bureaucracy and 
moved on to the Djilas-heresy o f demands for a two party system. In Zagreb came the neo- 
Marxist philosophical review Praxis^ proudly dedicating itself to “criticism of everything that 
exists”, which started to attack Yugoslav and Soviet Marxism for dogmatic positivism and 
warrant the need for a more humanistic Marxism. The Praxis group was influenced by 
philosophical re-orientations in western academia and wished to break away from the 
cementation tendencies within Marxism generally, and especially within real-socialism. In 
Belgrade the Frar/i-group had its counter-parts in Gledista and Delo. These were met with 
vicious ideological counter-attacks from the party, but Praxis was allowed to survive and 
continued publishing until 1975. In this liberal climate Milovan Djilas was released from 
prison in early 1967, but another writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov, had instead been sent to prison in 
1966 after having published articles on concentration camps in Leninist Russia, and after 
having announced his intention to publish a review as a basis for the foundation o f a new 
political party.
The imprisoning of Mihajlov set the limit for what was considered possible in 1966. The 
political climate in Yugoslavia had started fermenting. The move towards liberalisation had 
institutionalised a centrifugal potential within the political as well as economic framework. 
The old national-oriented part o f the intelligentsia was reinforced by large numbers of new 
students and new mobile groups, which the state sector had difficulty to absorb. The 
decentralisation of the state and economy had its parallel in decentralisation within the party 
(LCY). This further provided an infrastructure, which could be exploited for regionalist and 
nationalist interests. Some critique was particularly targeted on the political economy, while
Indeed tlie Macedonian case was special for other reasons as Macedonia had quarrels with Serbia since the 
war. and there were probably durable memories of bad experiences with Serb domination tendencies in the first 
Yugoslavia,
Here I outline some aspects of the main trend, for a detailed account see Rusinow, D (1977); Ch. 6
146
r
others related to more general political liberalism, and increasingly criticism came to be 
framed in cultural and eventually purely nationalist grounds.
In 1966 the Rankovic-affair had partly been perceived from a national perspective. It was a 
defeat for a Serbian flank within the LCY and as such threatened to create reactions from 
humiliated Serbian groups as well as euphoric victorious Croatian strands. In connection with 
this came a kind of linguistic dispute between Serbian and Croatian intellectuals.^”  The Novi- 
Sad agreement from 1954 was now rejected by a number o f Croatian academics and literary 
figures, including the prominent Croatian writer Miroslav Krleza. In March 1967 a language- 
declaration was published in Zagreb, which called for a Constitutional recognition o f Croatian 
as a separate language to be exclusively used in Croatia as well as being formally on a par 
with Serbian in all federal instances. In Belgrade there was an immediate response calling for 
the right of 700 000 Serbs in Croatia to be educated in Serbian (and Cyrillic), while Belgrade 
television should use only Cyrillic, These calls were not welcomed by the Government, which 
reacted strongly against it. Language was far too sensitive a nationality marker. But the 
national question was clearly being reformulated into the Yugoslav agenda. This was 
especially the case in Croatia. Here the Croatian cultural organisation ‘Matica Hrvatska* was 
revived in 1967 (modelled after the Matica o f the Illyrian movement within the Austrian 
Empire in the 1840s) and started a campaign within its magazine Kritika over the 
unfavourable situation for Croatians living in other republics.
Debate and critique were thus opening up on cultural, political-constitutional and political- 
economic fronts. Two leading economists, Branko Horvat from Zagreb (at the time Director 
of the Federal Institute for Economic Planning) and the Slovenian university professor 
Aleksander Bajt, published a series of articles on the economic incompetence of the 
reformers. These articles were published in the Croatian (Zagreb) daily Vjesuik in Autumn 
1967, and the party leadership responded in the Belgrade daily Borba. This soon transformed
On language poliw and disputes see for example: Neòak Luk. A (1995) “The Linguistic Aspect of Ethnic 
Conflict in Yugoslavia" in Akhavan, P & R. Howse (Eds) (1995) “Yugosla\ ia -  the former and future; 
Reflections by Sclwlars from the Region", The Brookings Institution, Washington and UNRISD, Geneva; 112- 
120
The Maticas ((^ueen Bee) had existed in the 1840s in Croatia and in Serbia (Novi-Sad) as a part of the Illyrian 
moN'cnicnt for Sla%' independence. They were essentially cultural societies, since political acm itics of their kind 
were prohibited in tlie Habsburg Monarchy.
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into a squabble between the Borba and Vjesnik publishing houses, with nationalist
undertones. 335
From the Croatian branch of LCY there came complaints over the effects the reforms had had 
on the banking sector. The reforms had intended to give more direct responsibility to 
enterprises and to reduce the role of the Federal government. In addition, the banking sector 
had been reformed and numerous banks merged into larger units, which were to take over the 
investment role formerly held by the general investment fund. But one effect had been that a 
few of the major banks, centred in Belgrade, had received a larger role in investment 
decisions. Within the banking sector the enterprise stakeholders now received less influence 
in favour of expert commissions. The Croats complained that these banks were favouring 
investment decisions in Serbia or elsewhere, but not in Croatia. Moreover, the retention 
quotas (a large part o f the foreign currency earnings a company made was to be deposited in 
the banks and located to companies that needed them for imports) were unfavourable to 
Croatian enterprise, which was claimed to produce more foreign currency than it received in 
r e t u r n , W h i l e  the Croats and Slovenes had interests in a much weaker federal role in 
political economy, the southern republics and provinces had just the opposite. The 
representatives from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo claimed that the Chamber of 
Nationalities should have increased influence over the economic issues. The target was the 
Federal Fund for developm ent,C oncessions were made towards these claims and a 
reorganisation was made in 1967, with amendments to the 1963 Constitution, which increased 
the power of the Chamber o f Nationalities among other changes. The political-institutional 
and constitutional organisation o f Yugoslavia was now clearly moving towards wide-ranging 
fédéralisation.
Between 1968 and 1971 there were a number of student demonstrations throughout 
Yugoslavia. The political focus varied and they had a number o f different objectives and
For the whole affair see Rusinow, D (1977); 229-231
On Ihc banking issue sec Rusinow', D (1977); Cf. Wilson, D (1979): 176-177; Ramet, S (1984/1992): 98
The “Federal Fund for Accelerated De\’eIopment of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo" was an 
inter-republic transfer s>'stem of resources towards under-developed and poorer areas williin Yugoslavia 
(basically from tlie north to the south). It was created in 1965 to counter the uneven development within 
Yugoslavia. Each federal unit was to allot 1.85 %  of the Social Product to the Fund which allocated resources for 
irn’cstment in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. As such it was also alwa> s the target for 
complaints. Croats and Slovenes complained over paying too much (and that it \sas ineffective and equalled 
charity laUier tlian investment) and Macedonians, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Kosovars for receiving too little 
(while their national resources were pulled into the industry’ in the north below market prices) and Serbs 
complained over paying anything at all wliile statistics indicated that they ought to receive instead.
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daims. Generally they received little support from the workers and did not result in any wider 
social mobilisation, but they were important from another perspective though as they 
introduced a new group and a new generation into the political life of Yugoslavia. In Belgrade 
in May-June 1968 it started with a street-fight in which the police intervened with perhaps 
unnecessarily harsh methods. This provoked a larger student demonstration involving 
thousands of students, which soon spread also to other universities and Republics with 
demonstrations in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana. The Belgrade students showed no 
nationalist sympathies at all however. Rather they were expressing a ‘new left’ and displayed 
slogans as “There is no Socialism without Freedom, no Freedom without Socialism”, “work 
for eveiyone, bread for eveiyone”, “Down with the red Bourgeoisie”, “Bureaucrats, hands off 
workers”, “Workers -  we are with you!” and the like.^^* The students had reason to complain, 
and did so, over poor lodging conditions and poor material standard. The student mobilisation 
came at a time when the party had itself opened up to a more liberal climate, and in addition 
the international movement of 1968 could be followed through the news. As mentioned 
earlier the expansion of the number of students following the modernisation of Yugoslavia 
could not be absorbed by the state or enterprise sector. This was especially the case after the 
rationalisation introduced after the reforms. Unemployment was on the rise, as was inflation. 
Generally such conditions have been expected to create the environment for increased 
mobilisation and social conflict within society.^^^ If this is the case, the crucial question 
within a multi-ethnic state is if this crystallises along ethno-national lines or takes other 
features. In Belgrade it took the form of a kind of a New Left and anti-bureaucratic protest. 
The most dangerous element of this fact from the Party perspective was that the students were 
calling for unity with the workers, in fact claiming a common cause. The Party responded 
with a mixture of wooing of the students, and at the same time driving a wedge between the 
workers and the students as well as between what was considered moderate students and more 
extremist students (generally equivalent to the philosophy faculty) who were isolated.^"^ The 
student movement might have gathered further momentum in the autumn term, but was 
interrupted by events on the international scene with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
The perceived external threat temporarily halted the domestic fermentation and in that year
From Rusinovi’, D ( 1977); 234
For example within classical political development theory of the 1960s as mentioned above. Here, the 
increased social mobilisation, political awareness and change of values that follow modernisation may have 
increased social conflict as an initial effect. One does not have to be a follower of classical modernisation or 
de\ elopment theory to agree on such a connection. For the developmental approach see: C. Clark & F. Johnson 
(1976)
Rusinow, D (1977): 234-240; Cf. W ilsoa D (1979): 178-180
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the LCY received 100 000 new members under the age of 25, thus considerably increasing its 
base in the new generation.^"*'
In other places student protests took direct cultural or nationalist features. This was the case in 
Kosovo in October and November 1968, where students demanded that Kosovo should be 
elevated to the status of a seventh republic. The situation in Kosovo had improved 
considerably after 1966 and the removal o f Aleksander Rankovic, with his Belgrade-centralist 
and authoritarian approach to the region; yet, among the Albanians the change had rather 
awakened their cultural self-esteem and in 1967, for the first time, Tito visited Kosovo and 
received a warm welcome. Four university faculties were established in Prishtina in 1968, 
which became upgraded to a university in 1970, and higher education was now available in 
the Albanian language (previously it was a branch o f Belgrade university). In 1968 Albanians, 
everywhere, celebrated the 500-year anniversary of the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg, a 
commemoration which was accompanied with nationalist displays and constitutional 
demands. In several towns in Kosovo, and in the Albanian-concentrated town Tetovo in 
Macedonia, students demonstrated and expressed their demands, and here the demonstrations 
grew into wider popular unrest and had to be calmed by the use of force. The claim for a 
Kosovan republic was sensitive not only to the Serbs (the ‘Metohija’, in what was then called 
Kosovo-Metohija, refers to the land of the Orthodox church, which has a large concentration 
of mediaeval monasteries there), but also from an inter-republican perspective, for example 
with regard to Macedonia. While a more concessional policy was pursued towards Croatian 
nationalism, this was not extended to the Albanians. However, in January 1969, in response to 
the 1968 demonstrations, the Serbian Parliament adopted a constitution for Kosovo, and 
Kosovo received its own Supreme Court and Albanians were allowed to display their own
The liberal reforms that had been launched successively since the mid- 1960s were confirmed 
officially in the 9̂** Congress o f the LCY in 1969. At the Congress a number of changes were 
introduced and the lively debate that developed pre-signalled those highly complex 
procedures of the Federal, Republican, and communal elections that were held the same
^̂ ’ Rusino\v,D(1977): 239




year.^^^ Three important changes should be mentioned here. First there was the creation o f a 
Federal Executive Bureau directly under Tito, which was to ensure that some federal political 
direction would be maintained in the, by now highly federalised, Yugoslav state. Then, the 
party organisation o f the Yugoslav Peoples Army was given increased influence so that the 
party representatives in the Army would have their own Congress, and the Army was given its 
own representatives in the Party Presidency separate from those coming from the republics 
and provinces. This introduced the army onto the political level to a previously unparalleled 
degree and this became an important element for the political calculations on a federal level 
later on. Third, there was the implementation o f the (already existing) rules for rotation o f the 
representatives, which resulted in the old veterans of the revolution being circulated out o f 
office and the introduction of a whole new and younger cadre of representatives on party 
congresses, republican central committees and into other offices. '̂*'* This in effect completed a 
generation shift within Yugoslav political life.
Legitimacy crisis and the re-articulation of the national question 1969-71: towards 
(con) fédéralisation
The second half of the 1960s thus marked a new phase in Yugoslav history. The 
modernisation programme had started to produce effects in the country in the 1950s and 
1960s albeit with various effects in various regions and a strong internal uneven development 
stretching from northwest to southeast and from town to village. The aggravation of socio­
economic problems that came after the initial phase of this programme, coupled with disputes 
over the nature of the state organisation, led the LCY to opt for a reformulation o f the political 
economy and the state structure, a political struggle won by the so-called reformists. However 
the increased decentralisation within state and party had created new interests, a new 
infrastructure and empowered new agents operating in that infrastructure, to formulate their 
regional interests. Self-management had at the same time created and empowered new agents 
w ho fought for their own fiefdoms. In the sense that this was ‘nationalist’, as in many cases it 
was, it was a nationalism that had taken a new form in a changing political-economic and 
social climate. The agents were new, as were their objectives.
For an account of the lengthy and complex procedures of nominating representatives, filtering them, electing 
and re-elccling them see Rusinow, D (1977): 260-266
For more details see Rusinow, D (1977): 255-260. He pro\ides the figures that 90 % of the new delegates had 
ne>’cr before attended a Part>' Congress and some 2/3 of tlie delegates o f tlic Republican CCs were new.
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Yugoslavia’s sensitive position within the international political economy, and towards 
external economic agents, made its independence highly conditional. In its struggle for 
independence it had come to rely on securing access to  western capital and markets, obtain 
licences, as well as maintaining a position of balance between the Soviet and NATO camp. 
The development strategy Yugoslavia had chosen, and its strategic position, made it 
impossible for the federal government to pursue a macro-economic policy as it suited 
(Keynesian-style counter-cycle policy was for example not possible) and instead federal 
policy became a domestic translation o f the external conditions given. This condition made 
the federal government preoccupied with trade deficit, foreign debt, and conditions for access 
to foreign capital, which in turn undermined the federal macro-economic policies that were 
supposed to foster growth and e m p l o y m e n t . A s  analysed by Woodward, this vicious circle 
of foreign policy translated into political conflicts between so-called liberal and conservative 
policies, which were primarily defined by industrial policy and its organisation, but because 
policy was so sensitive and responsive to international (external) factors there could not be a 
total victory for either side and instead the internal conflicts came to focus on access to 
capital, thus translating political conflict back into economic conflict.^"^^ Conflicts over the 
political economy were normalised and institutionalised in western democracies as a part o f 
the very operational structure of democracy. In Yugoslavia the danger lay in the fact that 
economic interest spheres could be crystallised along national zones.
Notwithstanding those mainly economically configured conflicts, the 1960s had also brought 
the opening of a new climate of public expression. Intellectuals, artists, and finally students 
who started to voice claims in the new political and social space also articulated a new 
agenda. It was the voice of modernisation and a critique framed on socio-economic 
parameters in some instances, on cultural-linguistic concerns and against political domination 
in others. Finally, some of the protests had no nationalist features at all. There were strikes in 
many areas, but generally there was never a bridge between different social groups to include 
workers, peasants, students, and so create wider political mobilisation. To the extent that 
interests were locally anchored among the workers and peasants, they never explicitly 
challenged the core foundations of the legitimacy of the political project that was Yugoslavia. 
Some o f the core pillars (self-management and multi-national federalism, but not the non- 
alignment) of the Yugoslav idea were however in need of refurbishment. The crystallization
345
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of the Yugoslav framework had from the beginning been moulded republican- and province- 
wise to satisfy and accommodate, and so neutralise, national sentiments. The brotherhood 
between nations "'bratstvo i jedim tvd' (“brotherhood and unity”) was considered not just 
some communist rhetoric, but truly the only way forward for small nations with big 
neighbours during and after the war. Among some political forces within the party, it was 
calculated that modernisation would replace the national affiliations with a more “modem” 
and truly socialist spirit, whereas for others it was essential that ‘brotherhood and unity’ be 
understood as national co-existence without replacement by “unitarism”.̂ '*̂  Yugoslav national 
identity never occurred as a replacement for other national affiliations, but only as an 
umbrella accommodation over them (one was Croat nnc/Yugoslav, or Yugoslav and Serb, and 
so forth). In fact, by the time it eventually did occur as an alternative, it was debated as 
constituting a problem^ and this was only by the census in 1981, when some 6 % stated that 
their nationality simply was ‘Yugoslav’, although the number was much lower in some 
places, such as Kosovo (far below 1
In the course of seeking a formula for governing these nations the party had to meet 
concessions and eventually empower local interests instead of bridging them. From having 
been conceptualised as an agent for modernisation the state was increasingly becoming a 
framework for managing a nationality and Mnter-regionality’ problem that could only be 
worse without that state. The alternative had been inter-ethnic struggle and foreign 
domination. The state was slowly being transferred from an active agent of governing the 
political economy to becoming a shield and negotiator against foreign powers and an umbrella 
over the (mostly multi-ethnic) ‘nation-republics’, between which all political issues were 
increasingly voiced in national terms. The rise of the national problem in new forms at the end 
o f the 1960s signalled that the Yugoslav state such was not questioned, but that it could only 
be allowed to be a weak one.
A real challenge to its legitimacy came in 1969, and it came from Slovenia and it started over 
a motorway. In the summer of that year Yugoslavia applied to the World Bank for assistance
This was essentially the dividing line between Kardclj. and his followers, on tiK one liand. and Ranko\ id. 
with followers, and to some e.vlcnt Tito himself, on the other. Sec the discussion in Jo\ id. D (2(K).t): Tlic 
continuous presence of the debate between ‘centralist' versus ‘dcccntralisis* (or ‘siatism’ -  *dc-statism') can be 
noted as late as 1988 in, the previously mentioned. Devetak. S (1988) "The Equalih of Nations and Nationalities 
in Yugoslavia’*, Ethnos 32, Braumuller, Wien: especially pp. 102-103
For example: Jovid. D (2003). The percentage of declared ‘Yugoslavs’ as alnwst 6 % in 1981 can be 
compared to the less than 1.5 % in the 1971 census. Calculated from figures gi\ cn in; Jugoslox enski pregled 
1983/3, Savezni zavod za statistiku: Statistidki bilten 1295.
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for a motorway programme. The Bank had already agreed to infrastructure-development 
credits, and the federal agreement had concretised this to include three highways, one 
respectively in Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. After the loan had been signed the Federal 
Executive Council decided to postpone the Slovenian highway and first prioritise a number o f 
other constructions, including a strip between Serbia and Croatia. Eventually all the projects 
were undertaken and the road constructions were not affected. But the decision in 1969 was 
received with violent reactions in Slovenia. The Slovenian representatives traditionally had 
close ties with those of Croatia and Macedonia and they had constituted a kind of reformist 
block within the federation. Now this link was broken and the Slovenes felt betrayed by what 
they perceived to be a Serbian-Croatian deal on their account .Widespread  popular protest 
arose in Slovenia and the Slovenian representatives stated that this would bring consequences 
for inter-republican relations. The whole issue threatened to bring down the federal 
government and as a sign of how seriously upset the Slovenes had been by the affair the 
president of the League of Communists for Slovenia, France Popit, finally explained that 
Slovenia did not have any intention o f leaving the Yugoslav federation.^^®
The whole affair had stirred up Slovenian feelings, but the Slovenian position soon calmed 
and they were back supporting a federation, which took rapid steps towards increased 
fédéralisation. These steps were taken in parallel with an evolving crisis of nationalism in 
Croatia. It was here, in Croatia, that the most serious threat to the Yugoslav project was 
formulated. W hat made it specific was the fusion o f nationalist fervour in public and cultural 
organisations and media, on the one hand, and the republican leadership, on the other. 
Between 1969 and 1971 several additional steps were taken to decentralise the economy, 
reaffirm the sovereignty of the republics and move the federation to the limit of confederation. 
In 1970 Tito raised the issue o f organising a framework for his succession and the creation of 
a collegial Presidency respecting the ‘ethnic key’ o f Yugoslavia as it was constituted by 
republics (after his death in 1980 with the constant rotation according to this key) was created. 
A new cluster o f amendments to the 1963 Constitution was also being worked out. One of the 
laws passed in 1969 gave republican control over territorial defence units. Another aspect was 
the attempt to introduce a new phase in self-management. In order to escape inter-republican 
stalemates other institutions in society, such as the trade union federation and the council of
For alliance politics and this issue see Ramet, S (1984/1992); 94-96; cf; Wilsoa D (1979); Rusinow. D 
(1977)
35i> Ramet, S (1984/1992); 96
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self-managers, were brought in to elaborate proposals. It was at this point that the “OOURs*’ 
(basic organisation o f associated labour) and the “social compacts" were introduced The 
division of companies into working units (OOURs) and fusion into complexes (SOURs) has 
already been discussed above. The introduction of this element w as a way of seeking a 
formula for decentralisation, which did not directly boil down to national-republican, and to 
give new impetus to self-management. Instead it fragmented the economy and society.
The leadership in Croatia had now broken its alliance with Slovenia at the inter-republican 
bargaining level and, coupled with the increasing display of nationalism in Croatia, it had 
increasingly isolated itself Croatia wanted more decentralisation, especially on all economic 
matters in order to free the republic from any, as it saw it, discriminatory tendencies from 
import-export firms and banks in Belgrade.^^* Their claims to keep more of the foreign 
currency earned by Croatian enterprise within those enterprises, or within the republic, had a 
good basis (and their claims were also eventually met), but other republics had equally 
powerful claims. For example, if the Croatian tourist industry earned foreign currency, then 
why should other republics supply this industry with below-the-market-price food products if 
they could have no claim on the earnings from the end product?’^̂  The Yugoslav economy 
was inter-linked in such a way, from raw materials to end products, that it was not really 
possible to calculate what would constitute ‘just’ productivity or earnings on a republican 
basis. The inter-republican stalemate on a federal level could develop because of the veto- 
right o f each republic. As Croatia exercised this threat to push through any demands they 
increasingly alienated other republics and drove themselves into isolation. The Croatian 
leadership now embarked on a strategy underpinned by the belief that they themselves, in 
Croatia, could realise a better form of socialist self-management economy and socialist 
democracy, and thereby take the lead in the economic field. The idea was that, with Croatia 
already (after Slovenia) being the most developed economy, further reform measures and the 
promotion of a more modem economy, could take the lead in one republic even if the other 
republics did not want to follow immediately. Croatian party representatives sought a new 
strategy to achieve legitimacy for, and power behind, the Croatian push for confederalisation 
and further reform, A group within the Croatian leadership saw an opportunity in receiving
For the whole Croatian Spring discussed here, sec Rusionow, D (1977); Dcnitch B (1976); compare a partly 
different interpretation in Ramet, S (1984/1992) and another in Jovii. D (2tX)3). The inteipicumons do not differ 
in essentials, but Ramet tends to see more cause for the Croatian claims llian for example Dcniich docs, u  iKicas 
Jovic emphasizes Uie intra-Croatian elements of the conflict 
^^"Cf: Dcnitch,B(1976): 196
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support through the nationalist euphoric tendencies, which existed within the bulk o f the 
cultural, media, and academic circles in Croatia. Essentially it was a policy for reforming the 
political economy, but with the presence o f parallel nationalist tendencies, the strategy - to 
seek support for the former - was to fuse the two currents (not dissimilar to the events in 
Serbia in 1986-87 under Slobodan Milosevic, which will be discussed later). The most 
forceful vehicle o f Croatian nationalism was the cultural organisation, ‘Matica Hrvatska’ 
(Croatian Queen Bee). From these circles a homogenisation strategy was developed, in which 
popular mobilisation and propaganda were utilised, and where emphasis was placed on the 
conviction that Croatia was disfavoured and exploited within Yugoslavia by other 
nationalities (especially Serbs).^^^ The attempt to mobilise and homogenise along ethno- 
national lines created a split within the Croatian party leadership, but the wooing of nationalist 
forces had created a momentum, which the republican party leaders could not control. The 
public scene in Croatia had evolved into euphoria with nationalist outbidding. The 
“moderates” were driven out of office and the hard-line triumviate continued to utilise 
national feelings while at the same time becoming hostages to it.^^^ The interest in renewing 
the political economy and republican autonomy was merged with cultural and nationalist 
claims. It thus turned into the movement, which was later to be labelled the ‘Croatian spring’ 
(of 1971). It must be noted that the Croatian policy was still devoted to self-management 
socialism, at least in theoiy. In fact, the self-management argument against other forms of 
socialism (state capitalism), that is, that the workers would be alienated if  they did not 
dispense of their income and that it would be unfair to take the surpluses they created away 
from them without their consent, was merely extended to a republican l e v e l . T h a t  is, it 
would be unfair to take surplus from the republic for the federation without the consent of that 
particular republic. Nationalist euphoria culminated during that year with mass
Tlie Croatian claims spanned from the reasonable to the unintelligible. Among tlie claims were tliat tlie 
Croatian nation was threatened by a demograplüc plot from Belgrade, which encouraged Croatian workers to 
emigrate as gastarbeiters, while Serbs secretly took their place. It was claimed that the demographic indicators 
showed that the Croatian nation was endangered, that Serbs w ere trying to “Yugoslavify” them and eliminate 
them as a nation. Furtlier, some argued, there was the threat of “Se^ification” o f tire Croatian language, and a 
Croatian orthography was published introducing words that had not been in use since the nineteenth centui>'. 
Tlieie were claims Üiat SeÁia was trying to split off Dalmatia (w here a distinct regional identity and dialect 
e.xistcd) and by claiming that there did not exist any orthodox Croats, but these were Serbs in disguise seeking to 
infiltrate the nation (a Croat w as per defínition Catholic), et cetera. Tliose academics and politicians w ho 
distanced themselves from the nationalist euphoria were condemned with appropriate invecti\ es at the time as 
being ’Unitarists’, ‘Rankovicite’ (referring to AleksanderRankovió), ’Neo-(Zominformists’, and so on. See for 
example: Ramet (op.cit) pp. 100-106. An arsenal of appropriate offensive terms of the time from respective 
communist camps may include: “neo-Stalinists”, “Pseudo-liberals”, ”Anarcho-s>mdicalist deviation”, “Anaieho- 
liberal”, “Cominformist”, “Rankovicite”, “Counter-revolutionary”, “Nationalist linked to bourgeouis decadent 
emigré centers” and so forth, (used in rhetoric between the USSR and Yugoslavia or within Yugoslavia).
Under the leadership of Savka Dabée\ ik-Ku£ar and supported by Miko Tripalo and Pero Pirker
Denitsch, B (1976): 195
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demonstrations, the displaying of nationalist symbols, rallies, various inter-ethnic 
provocations, a wide-ranging student strike and student demonstrations, and various extremist 
claims. The numbers were many, the students who went on strike alone numbered 30 000, and 
the popular demonstrations could on occasion number up to 100 000.^^^ However, although 
attempts were made at homogenisation, and claims that “nation” and “class” were the same (a 
Marxist heresy), the trade union and the broader stratum o f industrial workers did not 
participate. Instead it was from this group that the strongest protests against the political 
strategy of the leadership were made. The nationalist mobilisation was comprised o f the 
cultural organisation Hrvatska Matica, which expanded its scope and generated numerous 
sub-branches to the extent that it started to look like a party-organisation, together with 
various intellectuals, students, and middle or lower party officials. The party leadership had 
moved itself into a stalemate p o s i t i o n . T h e  whole situation was brought under control with 
a small display of force (but little violence) and a threat o f using the army, the arrest of 
several hundred students as well as the leaders of the Matica, followed by the ’Voluntary” 
resignation of the republican party leadership.^^* In the culmination o f it all, one must further 
add Tito’s incontestable personal authority. His authority did not only come from the power 
o f his office, but equally in his person. He was the leader, the grandfather of Yugoslavia, 
master-man of the revolution, and the respected international statesman.
With some of the old, previously marginalised, moderates now reinstalled as the new 
republican leadership, the situation in Croatia slowly calmed down. The Matica and its 
various newspaper-publications were banned. The party was filtered and several thousand 
members were expelled from membership. In effect it was a clean sweep of the party branch 
in Croatia. The purge o f reformists, or so called liberals, was not limited to Croatia, but 
affected Serbia too. Here, the reform-oriented party officials could hardly be accused of 
nationalism. In a kind of “cultural revolution”, which affected several republics, Tito 
effectively regained control and did away with party officials, directors, and even university 
professors. In Croatia the process lingered on for another two years, but in parallel the 
Croatian republic was met with concessions to most of their initial economic claims and the 
re-negotiation of the new constitutional formula could begin. As if  the republic had been
Cf. Ramet. S (1992/1984): 127-129
A situation/position within chess in which the King cannot move, but still is not checkmate.
In the 1970s there were also demonstrations in other parts of Yugoslavia, including Montenegro and Slovenia. 
The response from the central federal authorities to these upheavals varied from compromises and s\ stem 
reforms to repression. There were political trials all over the countiy, and especially in Croatia the students 
received harsh treatment and prison sentences of up to four years.
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rescued from itself it was back as a partner in Yugoslavia. Three features stand out as 
important consequences. After the explicit threat to bring in the army, this very institution 
would slowly come to increase its position in Yugoslav politics, especially after Tito’s death 
in May 1980. A second feature is that the LCY now had clear evidence that the workers and 
trade union had not been brought to fervour in the nationalist crisis that had developed over 
more than a year (except in some areas in Slavonia). This strongly indicated a political 
legitimacy that went all the way down to  the factory floor. As a consequence the party was 
going to rely further on those institutions, which indeed materialised from the early 1970s and 
became constitutionalised in 1974. Thirdly, as the inter-republican framework inevitably 
moved to even further fédéralisation (or confederalisation), there was a need for some 
integrative structure, which was to become the LCY. Through an increased party discipline 
and through increased focus on self-management the republican centrifugation could be 
allowed, and fulfilled, with Yugoslavia still remaining one country. The emphasis on 
refurbishing self-management was a necessity. It was not only the Yugoslavs grand 
innovation within political theory it was also at the core o f the Yugoslav idea. Re­
emphasising self-management meant that the disputes within the political economy, that is, 
the economic concentration to banks, import-export firms, and various technocrats, could be 
attacked from a political economic and socialist position rather than from a republic-national 
position. With the more condensed LCY and with a revived self-management, one could 
afford a confederal isation, and indeed both have the cake and eat it. If  the 1950s had been the 
decade o f “statism”, the late 1960s of liberal and eventually inter-republican stalemate, then 
this formula was the logical extension o f the Yugoslav idea. It was upon this formula that new 
political alliances could be formed. ;
359 Or. rather one of their many innovations as \  aiious constitutional and political-representational obscurities 
and ait-woiks should not to be resented.
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CHAPTER 5
RE-FRAMING YUGOSLAVIA: FROM A RE-NEGOTIATED STATE TO ITS 
BREAKDOWN
The new federal Constitution o f 1974 was both the result o f extensive bargaining and 
compromises between various regional political and economic interests, and a logical 
extension of the reform process related to self-management. In the new Constitution 
Yugoslavia was formally and thoroughly federalised with full autonomy for the six republics 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia) and the two 
autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The new constitutional 
framework provided the domestic architecture in which political and economic processes 
were shaped during the 1970s and 1980s, both in terms o f how Yugoslavia’s interaction 
within the global political economy was mediated at the national and regional levels, and in 
terms of how the national question and regional relations were reorganised.
Bureaucratisation and fragmentation after 1974, global-local strictures, political 
economy, and the crisis of the 1980s
In various analyses o f the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, the 1974 Constitution has 
occasionally been identified as the organisational architecture for b reakdown.St i l l ,  this was 
only partly the case. We have also seen how there was a new impetus to self-management 
from the reforms of the early 1970s, of which the Constitution was only the formal 
culmination. At the same time, however, the new drive for self-management propelled an 
explosion in bureaucracy.
The bureaucratisation of the 1970s took place mainly at the level o f the republics and 
provinces, where all social relations in turn were bureaucratised on a local level. The 
economy became fragmented into separate feudalities, governed through a political- 
bureaucratic structure, which was pervaded by informal networks and clientelist relations.
^  For e.xample: Diniitrijevic, V (1995) “The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the 
(!)ollapse of Yugoslavia”, in Akhawan, P & R. Howsc (Eds) ( 1995) “Yugoslavia, the Former and the Future: 





Informal networks had presumably always played a considerable role in the operation and 
governing process through various segments of society, whether enterprise or commune, but it 
was the manner in which informal networks and formal institutions were combined, rather 
than the existence o f the former p erse , which provided for successes or failures. Initially the 
informal structures simply provided the necessary personal networks to operate the system. 
Such networks, often (but not only) of a traditional kind, based upon kin, ethnicity, and with 
regard to Albanians upon clan as well, translated into the formal institutions of self­
management and provided for clientelist relationships and separate track channels within and 
between those institutions. The Croatian sociologist Josip Zupanov has shown how various 
attempts to eliminate informal networks within particular enterprises, through the replacement 
of people, merely resulted in the enterprises becoming unstable or even dysfunctional, and 
able to operate fully again only when a whole new informal network had replaced the 
previous one.^^* Zupanov describes different strategies that a Director could use in order to 
control and exercise governing o f the enterprise in which he worked, and concludes that the 
only successful avenue would be to introduce or develop his own informal circle, which had 
to occupy key positions. In several cases o f the reorganisation o f enterprises, observed by 
Zupanov, the sole purpose of the reorganisation was to replace one informal network with 
another. Such strategies could require considerable time, and in one case it was necessary to 
undertake three consequent reorganisations before the old informal network had been 
eliminated and replaced with a new one. For this reason Zupanov concluded that the 
introduction in the early 1970s o f mobility o f directors (on a four-year basis), which aimed to 
overcome the problem of clientelism, created more problems than it solved. Although 
clientelism, and the offering o f favours, such as allocating flats and so forth in return for 
loyalty, might have been a disturbing element from a socialist ideological point of view, and a 
threat to  self-management rights as well as subversive to organisational goals, it was the 
connecting social tissue in the whole working organisation, Zupanov writes.^^^ Similarly, a 
study o f  Veljko Rus and Frane Adam on enterprise in Slovenia noted how a hidden coalition 
between different heads of units protected each other and their respective interests, as well as 
other ‘patrons’, and maintained a network within which favours were distributed, including 
irregularities in the allocation o f flats and the upholding of Active working positions for
361 Zupanov, J (1977) “Sociologija i samouprav Ijanje” Skoijska knjiga. Zagreb: 202-214; Zupanov’s studies were 
conducted in the 1970s.
Zupanov, J (1977): 211 (my summary).
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c l i e n t s . R u s  and Adam further describe how various units within the same enterprise 
communicated their problems via the municipality, rather than directly to the leadership o f 
their own enterprise, and they noted a peculiar case where an individual who had been 
formally removed simply remained in his working position, while all colleagues, including 
the lawyer of the firm, continued to accept his signatures on official documents.
The persistence of such traditional ties, informal networks and clientelism, permeated society 
and its institutions, and increasingly threatened the whole fabric o f society after the 
considerable decentralisation of the state and economy and the accompanying empowerment 
of the regional and local institutions.^®^
In order to maintain a social contract, support, and legitimacy at the local level, various 
particularistic interests were defended by the local elite, which guaranteed work and social 
security in return for loyalty, while there was no governing authority above to connect or co­
ordinate the economy. The overall effect came to be a highly inefficient economy, where 
small enterprise or regions were exposed to market forces, without taking measures to achieve 
economies of scale, efficient allocation, or coordination. Moreover, a considerable informal 
economic sector developed aside from the social and private ones.
As analysed by Carl-Ulrik Schierup, the intermarriage of the market reforms o f the 1960s and 
the constitutional reform of 1974 had an effect of fragmentation upon Yugoslav economy as 
well as society and in the economic decline that followed, there came about a 
retraditionalisation of society and an accentuation of clientelisi networks rooting themselves 
in the whole economy.^®® The combination o f the market reforms o f  the 1960s and the 
political compromises and constitutional reforms in 1974 was in fact going to create a climate 
unfavourable to development instead of promoting it.
Moreover, in the 1970s the federal political-administrative elite started to dissolve and after 
the 1974 Constitution, the further decentralisation of the federation resulted in political space 
effectively being split up according to republic and province borders, which was particularly
Rus, V & F. Adam (1986) “Moi i Nemoc samoupravijanja” Globus, Zagreb: 159-163; Rus’ and Adam’s 
studies are from the 1980’s.
Rus, V & F. Adam (1986); 159-163
This has also been discussed by for example Schierup, C-U (1990)
^  Schierup, C-U (1990) and (1999) “Memorandum for Modernity” in Scliierup, C-U (Ed)(1999) “Scramble for 
the Balkans” MacMillan: 32-61
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prevalent since the party itself had been divided into eight separate regional branches and an 
additional separate branch organisation for the army.
The combination o f the political and economic reforms created a Yugoslavia where the 
republics looked increasingly like separate national states (albeit very heterogeneous). The 
new republican bureaucratic elites were led by particularistic motives pursuing protectionist 
measures against the others, with similar features existing on a regional and sub-regional level 
as w e l l . T h e  long-term concepts o f development were lost in the process, and 
macroeconomic policy became increasingly difficult to manage. A major problem was the 
uneven regional development in Yugoslavia, where differences between the more developed 
republics and the underdeveloped republics, especially Kosovo, continued to grow.^^^ In 
Kosovo itself the high demographic growth was ‘eating up’ all developmental gains.^^^ 
Unemployment was unevenly distributed over the Yugoslav republics. By the turn o f the 
1980s official unemployment generally was towards 14 %, but it was much higher in Kosovo 
where up to 80% o f  the population, and an even larger proportion among ethnic Albanians, 
had to rely on the private sector or be registered as unemployed. Thus, there was a 
structural pressure to rely on traditional ties (clientelist, kin and family), which were 
operational outside the public sector. In effect the Albanians largely relied on a political and 
economic network in extended families and the villages, resembling a parallel society 
alongside the formal economy o f the Serbs.
As long as the economy grew, and as long as there were still credits, the crisis was not acute, 
which was the case until the early 1980s. The Yugoslav economy continued to grow up until 
1982, with an annual rate o f growth for national income around or above 5 per cent.^^^ 
Throughout most o f the 1970s living standards could generally be maintained at a high level. 
The early ’70s started with good indications o f economic recovery, there was a general 
expansion in employment during the 1970s, and urbanisation gained further pace with people
For example Scluenip, C-U (1999); Ooati. V (1997) “The Impact of parliamcntaiy democracy on ethnic 
relations in Yugoslavia 1989-1995” in Janjic, D (Ed)(1995) “Ethnic Conflict Management” Longo Editore, 
Ravenna: 53-93; Ram et S (1992/1984) in passim
^  This will be discussed below, but for some figures see for example Bogosavljevió, S (1994) “A Statistical 
Picture o f Seibian-Albanian Relations” in Janjió, D & S. Maliqi (Eds) (1994) “Conflict or Dialogue” Open 
University, Subotica: 17-29 
*^^Cf. Bogosavijevic, S (1994)
Woodward. S (1995); p. 347 and 342 




coming in from the countryside to the urban centres for job-opportunities or university 
education. But at the same time the structural problems within the Yugoslav economy (such 
as increasing energy use per production unit, the structural foreign dependence on production 
and the deteriorating value o f exports relative to the imports needed for export) coupled with 
slackening markets abroad, soon forced Yugoslav leaders to scale down domestic 
development goals and focus energy on coping with the problems in foreign trade balance.^^^ 
After 1979 employment stagnated. The second oil crisis had a direct impact on Yugoslavia’s 
terms o f trade and from 1980 onwards there may even have been a substantial amount of 
export at a loss.̂ "̂* Let us qualify the international circumstances for this.
Although there were considerable economic-structural problems inside Yugoslavia, the 
rapidly accumulating economic crisis was largely conditioned by a deteriorating opportunity 
structure following the restructuring in the international political economy. In fact 
Yugoslavia, just on its way to integration in the international division o f labour, opted for a 
reorganisation o f the state and political economy at the time when global economic conditions 
were redesigned. A fundamental change in the international monetary system came with the 
US strategy to restore its global dominance over capital by abandoning the US dollar’s 
linkage to gold and turning to a pure dollar-standard international regime (in 1971), and then 
by promoting the first oil crisis in autumn 1973.^’  ̂As shown by Peter Gowan, the first oil 
crisis was not an anti-American and anti-Israeli response by Saudi Arabia in reaction to the 
Yom Kippur war, but a US promoted oil price shock (with quadrupled prices in oil), directed 
against Japan and Western Europe.^^^ The rationale was that, since the oil price was fixed in 
dollars, there would be a sudden influx of dollars to the oil rich Arab states, which they could 
not reinvest domestically but had to place in (primarily) the American financial system 
(American banks and Wall Street), thus boosting the latter. This was followed, in 1974, by a 
strategy to release capital control and to allow private banks and capital to move to the centre 
o f international finance.^^ The inflow of petrodollars to the private banks had to be 
reinvested and a round o f extensive borrowing to less developed countries (and others) was 
promoted. The first oil shock had only a limited and indirect effect on countries like 
Yugoslavia, but it constituted the first phase in the coming debt trap. For Yugoslavia, and
D’Andrea Tyson, L (1980) “The Yugoslav Economic System and Its Performance in the 1970’s” Institute of 
International Studies, University of California at Berkelej-: 87
374 D> ker, D (1990); 125
Gowan, P (1999) : 20-22, Ch. 3 and in passim 
Gowan, P (1999); 21
Gowan, P (1999); 21-24 and, Ch. 3 and 4 ew bloc
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many countries in the periphery, it was, for several reasons, economically rational to borrow  
money for their industrialisation programmes: first, the new terms for international finance 
appeared to function reasonably well; second, the strategy o f indebted industrialisation 
provided a route for development as well as integration into the world economy; third, the 
loans and credits from banks were given with interest rates that were favourable in light of 
current and expected inflation.^^* The blow came with the second oil crisis (induced by the 
revolution in Iran in 1979). First, because the US switched strategy to a restrictive monetary 
policy, and from maintaining a low dollar currency (which had been favoured by the Carter- 
administration in order to stimulate industrial investment) to suddenly raising interest rates, 
and thereby changing the conditions for the loans, which led to  a direct debt crisis for many 
countnes. Second, because it created a global economic recession, which directly affected 
exports (and thereby trade balance and credit worthiness) for many peripheral countries, 
including Yugoslavia.
The deterioration in terms of trade and the increasing interest rates from foreign debts had to 
be financed at the cost of the w o r k e r s . T h e  drop in wages and living standards in the 1980s 
(particularly 1989-91) led to fear of poverty and to mass frustrations. The fall in living 
standards culminated to around 30 % by 1984.^^‘
Now unemployment came to change qualitatively. While unemployment was a problem for 
the new generation in the 1970s, it became in the 1980s an acute problem for the urban 
middle class and also for the industrial working class. For the latter group the countryside had 
usually offered a retreat, but with the modernisation o f the country the agricultural sector 
decreased and soon there was no possibility to absorb workers here either. Moreover, the 
possibility to migrate and work as gastarbeiier abroad decreased significantly after the second 
half o f the 1970s as Western European markets became more protective, while the industry 
there underwent restructuring. Unemployment, as well as social services and housing were 
generally a local responsibility. The rising unemployment pressure eventually strengthened an 
increasing closeness o f the localities towards people from the outside. As has been discussed 
by Woodward, unemployment was increasing, but made invisible through strategies o f relying
G ilpia R (1987); 318; and Gowaa P (1999): 48 
C f.G ip liaR  (1987); 318
C f Babic, M & E. Primorac (1986) “Some Causes of the Gro^\th of the Yugoslav E.\tcmal Debt” Soviet 
Studies, Voi XXXVIII, No 1, January 1986:69-88 (especially p. 70); and Woodward. S (1995) in passim: 
D\ker, D (1990)
38 i Dyker, D (1990): 125
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on the private sector and on traditional ties, such as the family and connections to land '** 
This meant than in terms of redundancy women who where married had to leave first (as ihev’ 
were expected to be supported by their husbands), and people who had private land were 
expected to be able to rely on it, and so on. Unemployment meant exclusion from some 
political rights connected to the production centres and the social sector, and thereby 
essentially a form of combined social and political exclusion.From the 1970s onwards the 
self-management units became more exclusive (instead of inclusive), and there followed an 
increasing reliance on the private and traditional sector to cover for the public sector, and 
consequently a segregation of the political world of the employed from the unemployed.'*'* 
What followed was in effect the increasing segmentation and atomisation of society along the 
very premises o f those local and functional units of self-management that the Yugoslav 
system had promoted. Consequently a large part of the Yugoslav working class was 
marginalised.
Yugoslavia was now confronted with a number of structural problems. On the one hand, in 
the various negotiations to liberalise its political economy, and to address national and 
regional issues, it had produced an internal feudal-like architecture for its whole economy, 
and on the other hand, it had for reasons of its independence, and very form of political 
economy, a heavy international dependence on the whole industrialisation project. It needed 
the global market, foreign credits, and technology imports and licences in order to integrate 
into a global division o f labour, which was the essence of its development project. liut with 
increased protectionism in the wake of a global recession and crisis, the world prices of their 
manufactured goods decreased. Now, the generally increasing prices of spare pans and 
components needed for the exporting industry (mainly light manufacture) resulted in 
increased production costs and less competitive Yugoslav exports on the world market. From
Woodward, S (1995): 320-22, and generally chapter 9 en bloc
Woodward, S (1995): 320-327, to be read in the conte.xt of Ch. 5. Woodward provides a detailed an.il> sis of 
this issue, which can only be briefly summarized here. Since the political s> stem was structured around lltc 
economic system, certain political rights (participation in economic and policy issues) were linked to 
employment in the social sector. It was collective units of property holders, such as republics and cnicrpnscs. 
wliich had bargaining power ov^r credit and money (with a division between such units railKr ilian bciw cen 
employers and workers). Social ownership tied the employed persons* interests in higlKr waces and secure jobs 
to the economic results of the employers. Political rights of participation in economic decisions and pohc> w ere 
connected to the v alue produced in the public sector. Tlic party' depended on tiK support from ilic nunagers. and 
the employed liad an influence in tlie election of managers (with some exceptions), w hich in turn created a 
patron-client relationship between, especially, those on election committees and tlic managers. Unemployed 
people or w orkers in the private sector were outside this s> stem and could be represented polmcalh only in local 
and neighbourhood assemblies of voters.
Woodward. S (1995): 320-327
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1974 - 80 the price for imported raw materials and components amounted to 8 billion US 
dollars. In 1980 the price paid for imported materials was 18 % higher than the total amount 
obtained for exports in that year.^^^ Moreover, interest on the loans was rising, while the price 
on exported products could not keep up. As a result Yugoslavia was trapped in a vicious 
circle.
Foreign debt had increased steadily from the mid-‘70s reaching some 20 billion US $ in 1981; 
it continued to remain at this high level, and accompanied with deteriorating terms of trade, 
the translation in the domestic economy was stagnation in the levels of aggregate 
production.
In order to overcome the problems and move further in developing its newly industrialized 
economy, Yugoslavia had to reschedule international loans and obtain new loans for 
investment. But, as discussed in chapter 2, the policy in the World Bank and the IMF was 
now directed by a new paradigm. The same paradigm that fuelled Yugoslavia’s debt crisis, 
with a consequent economic and social crisis, underpinned international aid from the 1980s 
onwards (albeit, as discussed in the Introduction, with some changing contours).
With the new neo-liberal, Reagan-Thatcher, policy in the World Bank, Yugoslavia was 
pressed to carry out structural adjustment/stabilization reforms and an export-led development 
strategy for which both the international economy and Yugoslavia’s economy were highly 
unsuitable, and which came to accentuate the foreign debt crisis further.^®^
The structural adjustment loans that Yugoslavia received from the World Bank in the early 
1980s were heavily conditioned for its exporting sector. For 1983 all the credits had to be 
used for importing material to the export industries and Yugoslavia was pushed to reform its 
policies as well as having direct foreign control in the development bank handling the 
l o a n s . W h i l e  Yugoslavia had deep internal regional differences, foreign capital had to be 
invested in the already industrial regions where they were expected to give the best results.^*^ 
The reforms Yugoslavia was pushed to pursue included massive direction o f resources away
Chcpulis.R(l984): 6.
Cf. further Dvker, D (1990): 124-125
387 Chepulis, R (1984); Compare Young, B (1999); for a good discussion on the role of foreign creditors and the 






from domestic capital investment, currency devaluation, removal of subsidies for salaries and
operating costs, freeing interest rates and similar reforms.Tighter  restrictions on
international credit forced the country to import less reproduction material, with the result o f
'̂ 01
stagnation and decline in productivity. Moreover, in the huge debt crisis the government 
was forced to pursue restrictive policies and reduce the import of technology, while the 
western world was in the midst of an information technology revolution. The policy of the 
international creditors forced a devaluation of the dinar, first in 1983 and then again in 1988, 
down to the black market value, at which the dinar had remained well below the official price 
for several y e a r s . T h i s  was accompanied by escalating inflation. The difference between 
production costs and export prices was compensated at the expense of workers income and by 
raising prices on the domestic market. Those who could manage best in this situation were the 
peasant-workers, who had land to fall back on, and who could supplement their living costs 
by trading directly and informally with the fruits of the land. The urban population, which had 
to rely only on wages, faced the hardest decline in living standards. By the 1990s the 
economic situation was even worse. All the major trading partners of Yugoslavia during the 
1980s -  Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Kuwait -  disappeared, while facing the 
prospect of a protectionist European U n i o n . T h e  sanctions imposed on Iraq left Yugoslavia 
uncompensated (while some other states received compensation).^’^
Hence, unemployment, social exclusion from protective clientelistic bureaucratically 
governed social-economic entities, and restrictions in consumption, created a social crisis in 
the 1980s, at which time national tensions also generated severe concerns over the future of 
Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo, as will be discussed below. The economic and social 
crisis was the result of the combination of the domestic fragmented governing structure that 
had been formed and the new global market and financial conditions to which Yugoslavia had 
to abide, as well as the direct development policy pressures forced upon it.
The 1980s further saw a change in the political leadership. Within a few years three of the 
most prominent leaders died. Tito died in 1980, Edvard Kardelj in 1979 and Vladimir Bakaric
Young. B (1999); 153
C f Babió. M & E. Primorac (1986); Dyker, D (1990)
Cf. D\ ker, D (1990); 128-131 and Ch. 7 in passim 
Young, B (1999); 153
The loss in trade mav have amounted to some 5 % of the GNP
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in 1983, which considerably eroded the inherited political authority of the c e n t r e . A f t e r  
Tito’s death the regional and local elites consolidated their power-base in their respective 
republics and party branches, Within the Yugoslav political elite strong divisions developed 
which, in the struggle for political constituencies, were transferred to other sectors, as the 
republican and political elites looked for allies among the emerging nationalist political 
opposition in their respective environments, and thereby transformed inter-party political 
conflicts into inter-ethnic ones.^^^ As the chief interpreters o f social and economic events, 
they could manipulate their power base by interpreting all social problems as national or 
ethnic issues. In this manner, the new type of alliances that were formed on the local level 
transformed, through the 1980s, into broader populist-nationalist movements.
The federal government was no longer able to offer much to the localities and at the same 
time the remains o f federal resources were questioned. On top o f this came a number of 
strategic concerns. In the mid 1980s, after the Reagan-drive towards an arms build-up of US 
forces, followed by high military spending in the NATO countries and increased NATO 
activity in the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia was forced to sustain resources for military and 
security purposes. In Europe the integration o f the EC, in the west, and Gorbachev’s 
perestroika^ in the east, meant that Yugoslavia’s strategic position and identity started to be 
questioned domestically. What relation could it have to an increasingly integrated EC and 
what middle-position if  Gorbachev could offer a closer relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Western Europe? As communist and socialist ideology was losing its credibility the most 
feasible ideology to replace it was nationalism.^^’ Thus the ideological legitimation was 
increasingly nationalist, as the socialist project crumbled and more basic economic survival 
links strengthened. By the late 1980s the Yugoslav economy had become so fragmented that
•  '»Q O
the republics traded less with each other than they respectively did with foreign countnes.
The various republics became increasingly dependent on economic power centres in the
Tito died on 4 May 1980, Edvard Kardelj on 10 February^ 1979, and Vladimir Balearic on 15 January 1983. 
Tito had an uncontestable personal authority attached to liis person, but Kardelj and Bakaric were also important
figures of the Yugoslav revolution with important political positions. Although Vladimir Bakaric, due to his 
illness from TBC, did not occupy any o f the most central positions, he nevertheless liad an important informal 
role in the party. The importance of the loss of such leadership should not be neglected, when looking at the 
power stmggle that followed between elite fractions in the 1980s.
For c.xample Coati, V ( 1997)
Compare: Puhovski, Z (1995) ) “Yugoslav Origins for the Post-Yugoslav Situation and the Bleak Prospects 
for Civil Sociew” in Akliavan. P & R. Howse (1995) “Yugoslavia the Former and Future” Brookings Institution 
&UNR1SD, Geneva: 121-138
For some figures on the deteriorating inter-republican relations see for example Tome, G (1988): 72
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west.^^^ Even on a regional level, competition took highly protectionist forms, which 
eliminated all benefits o f a larger domestic market or resource allocation. In 1989 the last 
Prime Minister o f Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, was elected on promises o f market reform 
measures to revitalise the economy. These were, however, not realisable due to political and 
structural problems, because it was impossible to pursue a macroeconomic policy in the 
decentralised environment, where local bureaucratic elites safeguarded their positions against 
federal threats, and earlier market reforms (imposed in the 1980s) had seemingly just created 
increased social sufferings.'*®^
Social changes in Kosovo, the development of a new Albanian elite, and Serbian- 
Albanian relations
Kosovo had gradually received extensive autonomy in constitutional amendments between 
1969-1971, but the 1974 Constitution enshrined it to the same level, de facto, as that of the 
republics in everything but name (except the right to secession).'*®* After the reduced Serbian 
influence in Kosovo and the promotion of Albanian institutions, including university faculties, 
an Albanian change in attitude towards the state can be noted, and an increasing acceptance 
that they could express their cultural specificities in terms o f participation in modem 
institutions."*®^ In obtaining control over the institutions in Kosovo, including courts, these 
could be coloured by specific Albanian informal institutions. In terms o f the legal system, 
elements of Albanian customary law {Kamni) could thereby be respected and in practice 
partly merged with Yugoslav law."*®̂  Hence, the new era that had started in Kosovo in the late
In addition to dependency on foreign loans and foreign influence over economic policies, licensed production 
and subcontracting was w idely spread.
Ma^ko^•ió 's prograinme w ould lia\ e required a degree of re-centralisation and federal control, w hich the 
republican leadcrsliips did not accept. Tliis w ent to tlie core of the conflict o> er different conceptions of tlic state 
(‘statist’ \  ersus ‘non-statist’, as discussed earlier) and the programme of Marko\ ic represented one of the 
centralisation attempts at the end of the 1980s. w hile another was tliat of Slobodan Mi!o5e% ic.
A difference w as that ‘statehood’ of the pro\ince was not recognised, and Albanians were not considered a 
‘constituent nation’ of Yugoslavia. Therefore the province did not formally have the riglit to secession, wliich the 
republics judicially lutd after agreement with the otlicr republics. Relevant e.xccipts of the Constitution of 1974 
are reprinted in Trifiinovska, S (Ed) (1994) “Yugoslavia Tlirough Documents From its creation to its 
dissolution”, Maitinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht; 224-233
Backer, B (2003); 136
Tliere was a considerable problem with ethnic discriminalioa and informal networks, in the whole legal 
sj stem in Kosovo, w hcrcas following Kanun often implied regulations outside the court s> slcm. With regard to 
problems in court practice compare; Magnusson, K ( 1981) “Nationalitctsproblcm i Jugoslavicn; Krisen i 
Kosovo”, Bidrag till Ostslalsforskningcn Voi 9. Nr 2,1981. Nordiska kommitten for Oststatsforskning; 110-112 
and in passim-, Cavoski, K (1986) ’’Why there is more free speech in Belgrade than in Zagreb” Index on 
Censorship, No 8, 1986; 22-23; Petrovic, R & M. Blagoje^’ic ( 1992) “The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins 
from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the surv c>' conducted in 1985-1986” Demographic Studies Voi III. 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Department of Social Sciences, Beograd: especially pp. 169-173. On the
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1960s was Consolidated, which for the Albanians was further facilitated by the normalisation 
in relations between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1971; a diplomatic move long overdue, but 
partly spurred on by a shared anxiety of a Soviet threat following the 1968 intervention in 
Czechoslovak! a.
The constitutional decentralisation ensured that all decisions could be taken on a republican or 
provincial level, leaving only foreign policy, defence and security, and some macro-economic 
elements to maintain the functioning o f a common market at the federal level. Hence, the 
influence from Belgrade in Kosovo was effectively abolished, although this had been the case 
de facto  already for several years. Kosovo was now governed by Albanians, and Belgrade had 
very little insight into the affairs of the province, and still less o f a say in them. At the sam 
time, the University o f Prishtina started to produce a new Albanian elite. Since the late 1960s, 
and especially after the normalisation o f relations with Albania in 1971, textbooks were 
imported from Tirana, and academic and cultural contacts fostered, which resulted in a 
growing Albanian influence in Kosovo. In the late 1960s the Albanian state adopted the Tosk 
version as the Albanian standard language, which consequently spread to the Gheg Albanians 
in Kosovo as well, gradually resulting in an increasing distance between the Slavic and the 
Albanian population.^^^ The cultural affirmation among the Albanians was fostered at the 
University of Prishtina, as well as outside it, and an Albanian movement in quest of a 
republican status within Yugoslavia took deep root. The ideological legitimacy within this 
movement was increasingly Marxist-Leninist with the Albanian variant ‘Enverism’ becoming 
prevalent.
role of Kanun see also Backer, B (2003) A translation of the Kanun ofLèk Dukagjini is Gjcqov, S (Ed) (1989) 
“The Code of Lekö Dukagjini” Gjonlekaj Publishing Company, New York.
After the gradual normalisation in diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, after 
Stalins death, the Albanian state (under En\ er Ho.xha) had been the hardest critic of Yugoslavia. Follow ing the 
Soviet intcr\ ention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania isolated itself from the Soviet Union. The eventual 
changes in the communist /  real-socialist world, in the triad between the Soviet Union. China, Yugoslavia, 
created a new dynamics enabling Yugo-Albanian relations to improve. The ground for improved relations 
betw een Yugoslavia and Albania had already been laid by Tito in the mid-1960s, w ith the attitude shift towards 
tlic minorities, that they could be bridge-builders with their fellow nations in other states, and tlie empowerment 
of local authorities on various levels in Kosovo.
Compare for example Vickers, M (1998); 176-177
^  Maliqi, S (1998) From the late 1960s “Enverism”, the Albanian variant o f  Marxist-Lcninism, became 
prevalent, such as for example in the ’’Revolutionaiy^ Movement for Albanian Unification” wiiich was founded 
by Adcm Demaqi. In the 1980s the Albanian Movement had two parallel courses, an underground (illegal) 
headed by Marxist-Leninist groups, and another semi-legal, semi-public, through the acti\ ity of intellccmal 
associations, management bodies in the administration subsequently also in the administration, parliament and so 
on. In the late 1980s there was a merge behveen lite so-called “Enverists” and “Titoists” into a single front 
against the Serbs. Tlic ideological commitment to communism did, howe\'er, become an obstacle for tire 
Albanian Movement to develop into a prominent force, since the ideology w'as increasingly losing prestige.
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The University of Prishtina had an over-representation within the social sciences and 
especially the humanities, and enrolment o f students was systematically used as a measure to 
hide unemployment in the province."^®  ̂By 1980 the university had 26 000 students and the 
number steadily grew. Although there was a mushrooming of higher education institutions in 
the whole of Yugoslavia during this period, and an increasing number of young people with 
academic degrees, the conditions in Kosovo were particular. On the one hand the University 
o f Prishtina was widely considered a second best alternative and rated below the academic 
institutions in Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana and elsewhere, and on the other hand many 
Albanian students in the generations from the 1980s onwards did not learn to write Serbo- 
Croatian, which would have been necessary for work mobility."*®* As the Yugoslav economy 
started to stagnate in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, it was unable to absorb the new stratum 
o f  young academics. In Kosovo, which was the poorest region, this problem became 
particularly accentuated, both because of the high proportion of humanities degrees and 
because of the language barrier that developed. In this context, the humanities over­
represented University of Prishtina increasingly became a breeding ground for Albanian 
nationalism. With the university, a new Albanian elite of academics and educated 
professionals developed alongside the traditional elite of clan leaders and elders, which had 
formulated and mediated interests among, and between, Albanians, since the Ottoman period, 
and it was the new elite which came to populate the formal stmctures of the state and the 
party in the now greatly empowered province."*®  ̂The new Albanian elite would during the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s, as representatives of the communist party in Kosovo, come to 
articulate the interests o f the autonomous province within the league of communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY), but there were also off-shoots of much more radical elements outside the 
party. In 1974 there were further demonstrations in Kosovo, calling for the unification o f the 
Albanian lands inside Yugoslavia, and in the mid 1970s two underground organisations were 
uncovered and several students arrested for subversive operations and propaganda calling for 
unification of all Albanian lands with A l b a n i a . A m o n g  the non-students being arrested 
w ere the novelist Adem Demaqi, who was charged for being the founder of the ‘National
Cf. Reuter, J (1984); 259-264 
On the Universitj’ of Prishtina cf. Reuter, J (1984)
Cf. Vickers, M (1998): 173-174. But the recruitment in the pait)  ̂in Kosovo seems largely to have been an 
adaptation to traditional clan stmctures, c f  Magnusson, K (1987) “The Serbian Reaction: Koso\ o and Ethnic 
Mobilization among the Serbs”, Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, Voi 4:3,1987: 3-30 (pp.
11-12 and footnote 38); Vukovic. I (1985) ”AutonomaStvo i separatizam na Kosomi” Nova Knjiga, Beograd; 10
Vickers, M (1998); 180-181
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Liberation Movement o f Kosovo’. A new wave o f nationalist demonstrations took place in 
1978, at the Albanian celebrations of the anniversary o f the League of Prizren, which was 
followed by more arrests to stifle elements o f Albanian irredentism.
Although there were no serious disturbances in inter-ethnic relations during most o f the 1970s 
in Yugoslavia generally, and especially not on an inter-republican level, the situation was 
slightly different in Kosovo. Where the Albanians previously had been discriminated in a 
Serbian-dominated and Slavic oriented state, it was now the Serbs who complained about 
discrimination from Albanians. Serbs and Montenegrins were systematically discriminated 
against in work-places, institutions, and courts, as well as experiencing discrimination or 
intimidation in social life as such."**̂  In a study from the early 1980s, Marina Blagojevic 
reported that such discrimination was experienced as particularly difficult among women and 
children, often for example in terms of intimidation, beatings in school or threats o f rape, but 
that it also concerned pressure on Serbs to sell their property below actual value within a 
generally corrupt system /'^ The pressure was especially high on agricultural land, as whole 
Zadnigas, within the growing Albanian population, sought to obtain new land.
From the 1960s until the 1980s such discrimination, and the direct competition for land and 
property, resulted in considerable emigration o f Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo in the 
range o f every third Serbian family, and almost half o f the Montenegrins, leaving for Serbia 
proper mainly.^^^ In 1977 a working group in the Serbian branch of the party compiled a list 
of concerns over the situation in Kosovo and argued for changes in its autonomy. It became 
known as the ‘Blue book’, but did not receive any support outside limited circles in Serbia. 
The whole issue o f the situation for the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, and their 
emigration from the province was, until the mid 1980s, largely taboo in Yugoslavia, and it
Cf. Magnusson, K (1981): 110-113; Petrovic, R &  M. Blagojevic (1992): 162-173; Janjié, D (1994): 117-176 
(especially p. 138)
Sec further: Blagoje\-ic, M (1997) “Tlic Other Side o f tlie Tmth: Migrations of Seihs from Kosovo” in 
Duij/.ings, G ct al (Eds) (1997) “Kosovo-Kosova: Confrontation or Coc.xistence”, Peace Research Centre, 
University of Nijmegen: 70-81. It should be noted that Blagoje\ ic’s study was conducted during the first half of 
tlie 1980s and consequently at a time before the ‘nationalist ferv or’ in Serbia, when tlie issue of the situation for 
Serbs in Kosovo was still a taboo in Yugoslavia. It was then published only in 1989, when it was instead 
received rather as an act of Serbian patriotism. See also Petro\ ic. R & M. Blagojevic (1992) “The Migration of 
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija”, Demogiapliic Studies. Vol III, Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, Beograd.
Blagojevic, M (1997); Bogosavijevic, S (1994). In actual figures the amount e.\ceeds 100 000 Serbs who left, 
contributing to further changes in demographic composition in Kosovo. Otlicr minorities experienced 
discrimination as well, but did not necessai^y have anywhere else to go to.
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was politically incorrect to voice it, but around 1986, as we shall see in the next chapter, it 
would move to the centre of political discourse in Serbia.
From a statistical point of view, Kosovo had periods of remarkably high economic growth, 
since the point of reference is an initial low level of development, but although the province 
had special treatment with inter*republican financial transfer systems through the ‘Special 
Fund for Development o f Underdeveloped Areas’ or the ‘Special Fund for Economic 
Development’, the asymmetric development in Yugoslavia was not reduced.'*’'̂  Instead the 
gap in economic development and in living standards continuously increased and high 
Albanian demographic growth considerably reduced the development gains which were 
a c h i e v e d . T h e  province never managed to accumulate any large resources for reinvestment 
o f its own and the vast majority of capital for regional development in Kosovo came from the 
other republics and was mainly invested in the mining (coal and minerals) and power 
(electricity) industry. In Yugoslavia it was widely assumed that the traditional social structure, 
and customs, among Albanians would be eroded in the process o f modernisation, and in the 
1970s it was believed that further industrialization and especially urbanization, would have a 
particular effect and even reduce irredentism."̂ *̂  However, this was not the case. With the 
social crisis and accompanying mobility in the 1980s a large number o f people moved from 
their agricultural base and settled in the towns, but in Kosovo the main trend was that whole 
Zadrugas simply moved into an urban neighbourhood and settled there, thus maintaining the 
traditional connections of the social structure although there was a visible change in 
demographic and working stmcture."^*’ The links to the rural base were typically preserved 
and in the cases where individuals or couples worked in town they would maintain the link to 
their Zadruga and use part of the generated income to send back to the relatives in the 
country. A similar form of urban-rural symbiosis existed throughout Yugoslavia, but among 
the Albanians in Kosovo, the traditional extended family structures were largely maintained in 
the urbanisation process, unlike what had been the case among the Slavs, when they had been
For example Bogosavljcvió, S (1994). In 1981 Kosovo had a 5.9 % real GNP rate, while Serbia had 0.1 %, in 
1986: Kosovo 8.1 %, Serbia 0.2 %. on the whole up through the 1980s Kosovo had m ice the growth of Serbia 
(Bogosavljevic 1994:24) noting the lower initial development level of Kosovo.
Cf. Bogosavljevic, S (1994); Islami, H (1994) “Demographic RealiW of Kosovo” in Janjic, D & S. Maliqi 
(1994) “Conflict or Dialogue”: 30-53. It should be noted that there are (partly nationally coloured) disputes over 
the reason for underdevelopment in Kosovo and an Albanian claim (here represented by Hizvi Islami) is that 
there was a deliberate stiateg}' to neglect Koso\ o in the dc\ elopment policy, where natural resources were 
extracted but the accompanying indusu>' that could produce capital accumulation lay elsew here.
The reliance on 'social forces’ lias been discussed above, cf. Vickers, M (1998): 173 
Cf. Vickers. M (1998): 223-224
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exposed to market-economy and capitalism a century or less earlier, or exposed to 
urbanisation and industrialisation processes in various periods during the twentieth century.“*** 
Certainly the increased mobility and social changes affected the clan-system in some manner, 
provided new forms o f economy, and new contacts, but the social networks, customary rules, 
and traditional loyalty structure never eroded, even though it may have been ‘renegotiated’, 
and a large part o f the Albanian population continued to live outside the formal economic 
system, with most people surviving either from subsistence farming or various jobs in the
private sector. 419
In seeking new economic opportunities some clans developed, or expanded previously 
existing, illegal activities, such as trade in heroin, gold, and weapons. Albanians living in 
Turkey could apparently obtain heroin at cheap prices, and then through networks in Kosovo 
and Albania proper, open up trade into Western Europe and the United S t a t e s . Accord i ng  to 
Miranda Vickers, heroin trade was established in some Albanian emigre communities in 
Western Europe and the United States, where narcotics were sold under the control of, or in 
collusion with, the Albanian intelligence service, with part of the revenues being used for 
buying land and property from Serbs in Kosovo."*^* The specialisation in such economic 
activities during the 1980s, and perhaps earlier, was linked to some of the Albanian separatist 
and terrorist organisations that existed in Europe, such as the ‘Red National Front’, the 
‘Kosovar Union’, and others."*^^
National tensions existed continuously in Kosovo, but a real crisis came in 1981 when large- 
scale rallies led to direct intervention by the federal government and the declaration o f a state 
of emergency. It started out as student protests in March 1981, initially with demands for 
better food in the canteens, but after two weeks it had evolved into political and nationalist 
demands for an elevated status o f Kosovo to a republic. The demonstrators attacked the police 
who tried to disperse them, and in April the demonstrations reached a peak in the whole
For the uiban-rural sv'mbiosis see Schienip, C-U (1990); in passim; Simió, A (1973) “The Peasant Uibanites: 
A Study of Rural-Urban Mobility in Serbia”, Seminar Press, New York & London. For Kosovo see: Vickers, M 
(1998); Ch. 9 in passim: St. Erlich, V (1976); 244-251. For transformations in family structures generally see; St. 
Erlich, V (1966) “Family in Transition: A Study o f 300 Yugoslav Villages”, Princeton University Press.
For example; Vickers. M (1998); 223-224 
Vickers, M (1998): 225 
Vickers, M (1998): 225
At least it seems safe to assume that there were considerable links between se\'cral of these networks, if they 
were not the same operating in different fields. There existed several different organisations, of which some were 
involved in assassinations and kidnappings of Yugoslav diplomats.
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province leaving at least nine people dead and 260 injured/*^^ The demonstrations were not 
confined to Kosovo, but spread among Albanians in other areas as well, primarily in western 
Macedonia. The federal government then introduced a state o f emergency, a ban on travel, 
and prohibited public meetings, and the demonstrations were condemned throughout 
Yugoslavia as being counter-revolutionary and nationalist. Special police and militia units 
were sent to the province to repress the mobilization and by July the situation was under the 
control o f the Yugoslav government, but at the cost of several people killed (estimates range 
from the official dozen to unofficial claims closer to a thousand) and many arrests.''^'^ The 
head of the Kosovo party branch of the League of Communists, Mahmud Bakalli, resigned as 
a consequence o f the demonstrations. In July the immediate state of emergency ended, but the 
ban on public meetings remained in force, and the province was in effect continuously treated 
with special measures. Trials against Albanian nationalists continued throughout 1982 and 
1983 and several party officials were expelled from the party (Mahmud Bakalli was expelled 
from the party in 1983). Albanians accused the federation of terrorising Albanians and in the 
Serbian republic the news media devoted increasing attention to Albanian attacks on Serbs 
and their property, to the burning of Yugoslav flags and desecrations of Serbian graves. In 
June 1983 the emergency measures from 1981 were abandoned, but tensions remained high, 
and among Albanian football supporters there were regular exclamations o f their allegiance to 
Enver Hoxha."*^  ̂ In the first half of 1984 some 1800 Serbs and Montenegrins emigrated from 
Kosovo, which was followed by a resolution from the Presidency of Kosovo to stop the Serbs 
from leaving.
In 1985 a conspicuous court case, the Martinovic-case, started, which eventually evolved into 
a symbol for the Serbs about their situation in Kosovo."*^  ̂The case concerned a Serbian 
farmer, Dorde Martinovic, who claimed that two Albanian men attacked him, while he was 
working on his land, and that he was tortured and had a bottle forced up his anus. The local 
court dismissed the case and ruled that he had inflicted the damages upon himself, but the 
case was then taken to Belgrade where court proceedings continued until 1990. In the same
Chronology of the Kosovo Crisis, in “Europe" No 4, Jan-Feb 1996, The European Movement in Seibia, 
Europe Press Ltd, Belgrade: 29
Cf: Cohen, L (2001) “Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan MiloSevió” WesWiew Press: Ch 1 
For tensions during this period see for example: Vickers, M (1998): Ch. 10 & 11; Clark, H (2000): 41-45 
Chronology of the Kosovo Crisis, in “Europe” No 4, Jan-Feb 1996, The European Movement in Seibia, 
Europe Press Ltd, Belgrade: 30
For details of this case see Menus, J (1999) “Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war”. University of 
California Press: Ch 2; Cf. Chronology of the Kosovo Crisis, in “Europe” No 4, Jan-Feb 1996, The European 
Movement in Serbia, Europe Press Ltd, Belgrade: 30-31
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year a media campaign started in Serbia, about the discrimination of Serbs in Kosovo/^* In 
the following year, 1986, a law was introduced in Kosovo, which prohibited Serbs from 
selling their p r o p e r t y T h e  purpose of the law was to stop the Serbian exodus from the 
province. The Albanian movement seemed to have calmed down by 1986, but it had by then 
given impetus to the much more explosive force o f Serbian nationalism.
Endgame: Serbian Nationalism and the loss o f autonomy for Kosovo
Serbian nationalism in the 1980s took different forms, with one stream seeing the future in a 
disintegrated Yugoslavia and a Serbia created along ethnic borders.'^^® In 1986 the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) produced a draft Memorandum, which has received 
considerable attention. The Memorandum as such is an inconsistent document, with one part 
of it being an analysis of the Yugoslav crisis, primarily in economic terms, and another part 
being more traditionalistic, elaborating on Serbia’s options in case Yugoslavia should 
disintegrate."*^^ The second part comprises some purely nationalist ideas, and when excerpts 
were ‘leaked’ and published in the newspaper Veóernje novi sii, they immediately stirred up 
reactions against it, eventually leading to a Croatian response."*^^ In Serbia the memorandum 
prepared the ideological ground for public manifestation o f the nationalist view, and served as 
a bridge between what has been called official and unofficial nationalism."*^^ The 
memorandum came at a time when the local communist Serbian and Montenegrin elite in
See for example Matié. J (1996) “Tlie Media and EUmic Mobilization: The formula for Kosovo”, in 
Biancliini, S & D. Janjic (Eds) (1996) “Ellmicity in Postcommunism”, Institute of Social Sciences, Fomm for 
Ethnic Relations, and International Network Europe and Uic Balkans, Belgrade: 231-236. Tlie matter will be 
discussed furtlier in cliaptcr 6.
Cluonolog)’ o f the Kosovo Crisis, in “Europe”, No 4, Jan-Feb 19%, The European Movement in Serbia, 
Europe Press Ltd, Belgrade: 31
Janjic. D (1997) “Serbia between an Identity Crisis and tlic Challenge o f Modernization (1987-1994) in 
Janjic, D (Ed) (1997) “Serbia between the past and the future” Institute o f Social Sciences & Forum for EUmic 
Relations. Belgrade: 19-54. It should be noted that at least a quarter o f tlie Serbian nation lived outside the 
territorx' of Serbia and that 34 % of the population in Serbia itself (Kosox o included) is etlmicitlly non-Serb.
Memorandum SANU (1989) “Memorandum SANU Grapa akademika Sipske akademije nauka i umetnosti o 
aktuclnim dmiwenim pitanjima u naSoj zemlji”, Na§e Teme, 33, 1-2: 128-163. The Memorandum is widely 
mentioned in the propaganda and literature on the Yugoslav crisis. A part o f the Memorandum was translated 
into English by the Belgrade magazine ’Vreme’ and it was later issued in English by the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, with a commentary to the criticism against it: Pantic, M (Ed) (1995) “Memorandum of tlie 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answer to Criticisms”, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
Belgrade. It was also issued in German and French.
The Memorandum was not an officially sanctioned document from the Serbian Academ>', but a draft \ ersion 
or ‘work-in-progress’. Selected parts were first published in Veèernje novosti in September 1986, which created 
a highly heated debate. A Croatian standpoint on the Memorandum was published in the United States in 1987. 
The full version o f the Memorandum was only published in 1989 in tlie journal NaSe Teme. In the heated debate 
the focus was on its aitionalist aspects.
Janjic. D (1997)
176
Kosovo increased their protests and pressure (over the situation in Kosovo) at the federal 
level. They did so by organizing political protests directly in Belgrade, where they would get 
the best attention.
This movement became a useful tool for Slobodan Milosevic, who discovered that he could 
use the Serbs outside Serbia, instrumentalise nationalism and manipulate the social crisis, to 
achieve power in Serbia itself^'* During the late 1980s a growing number of reports about 
Albanian discrimination and abuse of Serbs living in Kosovo came from various stances, 
including from independent scholars, from the Orthodox Church, as well as from some human 
rights organizations, such as Amnesty. Although the problem was very real and actual, and 
there was a steady flow of Serbs who left Kosovo after perceived or direct threats and 
pressure, the issue was now deliberately manipulated (and further exaggerated) in Belgrade. It 
was now presented in an image that it would be impossible for Serbs to continue to live in 
Kosovo, and that Albanians attempted to create an ethnically clean Albanian Kosovo. The 
emerging protests by the Kosovo Serbs coincided with the growth of the social crisis, which 
existed all over Yugoslavia.
The latter popular frustration, which grew with the economic and social crisis portrayed 
above, spurred demands for social reforms, but without as such being particularly 
nationalistic. At the same time, a third issue was increasingly politically mobilised in Serbia. 
The latter concerned the 1974 Constitution, which was considered to be unjust to the Serbs. It 
was unjust, they argued, because the Serbs were the only nation without full control over any 
republic, since Vojvodina and Kosovo had representation in the Serbian parliament in 
addition to having their respective provincial parliaments, and since all other republics and 
provinces did not have any such interference.The mobilisation in Serbia took more 
nationalistic forms because it merged with the protests from the Kosovo Serbs and in this 
manner the issue o f the position of Serbs in Yugoslavia was reactivated.
Hence, three parallel issues were emerging and being politically mobilised. Under Slobodan 
Milosevic’s leadership they were strategically merged into a wider popular mobilisation of the 
Serbian national issue, by wooing the working class through claims that a change in power 
was essential in order to achieve economic and social change, to restore confidence in self-
Cf. Cohca L. J (2001): Ch. 2
Which was also discussed in the SANU Memorandum of 1986.
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[ management and to de-bureaucratise Yugoslavia. The generai social unrest would thereby be 
' given a cause and be channeled into a nationalist mobilisation, rather than any other form o f 
social mobilisation. All matters could be dealt with in one package.
By proclaiming the need for reforms - including that of the bureaucracy - as well as 
proclaiming that the Serbian ‘national issue’ must be addressed, as well as the issue of the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo, Milosevic was in a way perceived as a Tito” (a new strong 
leader), for the Serbs."*̂  ̂Namely, part o f the message he offered could be perceived as quite 
modem; not only did he become the ‘great reformer’, but he was also addressing the sensitive 
issue of Kosovo.
The pressure of the movement from Kosovo came to contribute largely to Milosevics victory, 
by radicalising the political climate over the issue of how constitutional changes should be 
undertaken in order to protect Serbian interests. The movement of the Kosovo Serbs was in 
this manner instrumentalised by Milosevic, who at a speech in Kosovo in 1987 addressed the 
problem in Kosovo as one o f an ethnic nature. By this time favourable preconditions existed 
for political reactivation o f Serbian national-romantic myths about the Serbian defense of 
Christianity against Ottoman Muslims, and their consequent defeat by the Turks, in Kosovo 
Polje in 1389, and quite generally for the political mobilisation of nationalism. The issue o f  
the position o f Serbs in Kosovo was incorporated into protests o f ‘loyalty with the Serbs in 
Kosovo’ and so called ‘meetings of the truth’, throughout Serbia in 1988."^^  ̂The political 
conflicts between republican communist leaders were further transferred to the public through 
an inter-republican propaganda war in the republican-controlled media, which took on a larger 
scale during and after 1988."̂ ^*
In 1988 the Kosovo party branch o f the League o f  Communists was annexed by the Serbian 
party. In November the leadership o f the Albanian province organised large demonstrations in
4 Ì6 His attempt to position himself with the people (as their leader)^ but against the bureaucracy, was a 
replication of Tito’s tactic of placing burcaucracj' betw een himself and Uie people, and - with Kaidelj -  put the 
priority of the party in a struggle against bureaucracj' (during the 1960s), see Jovié, D (2003): 169, and footnote 
19.
In this euphoria demands were raised to remove all hindrances for the unification o f tlie Serbs, and to mark a 
break with the existing social order. This was later to receive the label “the anti-bureaucratic revolution”.
Matic, J (1996) “The Media and Ethnic Mobilization; The formula for Kosovo”, in Bianchini, S & D. Janjic 
(Eds) (1996) “Ethnicity in Postcommunism” Institute o f Social Sciences, Fomm for Ethnic Relations, and 
International Netw ork Europe and the Balkans, Belgrade: 231-236; In chapter 6 we sliall look closer at the 
discursive strategies in Serbia.
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reaction to the replacement o f the Kosovo communist leader Azem Vlassi. These protests 
continued through the winter and in February and March the federal government sent the 
army to repress the unrest in Kosovo. The confrontations that followed resulted in 24 dead 
and hundreds of arrested.'*^’ The distrust between the Serbs and Albanians increased further 
when several Albanian leaders, including Azem Vlassi, were sentenced for ‘counter­
revolutionary undermining o f the social order’."” ® Although they were released later, this had 
established a new practice in dealing with the Albanian issue, and from now on separate 
political organisation became the only form of political organisation.
Among the Serbian public the mobilisation around ‘loyalty with the Kosovo Serbs’, and the 
Kosovo myth, served to prepare the ground for introducing a series of legal and constitutional 
changes, which in effect would abolish the autonomy o f Kosovo (and Vojvodina). A peak was 
reached on St. Vitus Day on the 29 June 1989, when the Orthodox Church, with the support 
of the republican authorities, celebrated the Battle of Kosovo and Slobodan Milosevic 
addressed a rally, which was organised for that p u r p o s e . F r o m  this point, the regime of 
Milosevic treated the province with pure administrative-repressive measures and used 
tensions and insecurity in Kosovo as an instrument to keep Serbia out of federal control, and 
for nationalist activation of the Serbs in the other republics."'"’̂  Thus, for example, it supported 
the fear among the Serbs in Croatia of becoming a minority in a new independent Croatian 
state, which in turn had started engineering mono-ethnicity and engaged in systematic 
discrimination of its Serbian minority."*"*^
Through the political mobilisation of nationalism the MiloSevic-regime created a sort of 
proto-ideology, which sought to legitimise the regime on the assumption that ‘Serbia is the 
first in the socialist world to have carried out a revolution against the existing order’"*"̂"*, with 
so-called non-party pluralism. After certain pressures the regime had to renounce this 
ideology and instead opted for the legalisation of a multi-party political life. The League of
Cf. Clark, H (2000): Ch. 3; Vickers, M (1998): Ch. 11; Chronicle of the Kosov o Crisis, in “Europe” No 4, 
Jan-Fcb 1996, The European Movement in Serbia. Europe Press Ltd, Belgrade; 31-33
In fact Azem Vlassi was never sentenced but arrested and held in prison for quite some time.
Compare for example: Janjié, D (1994); Kostoviòova. D (1997) “Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo 
Albanians to loss of autonomy in Serbia 1986-1996“ Keele European Research Centre 
Janjié, D (1994)
The Kosovo myth was thus a tool for also reinforcirig the nationalist paranoia of Serbs in Croatia (or in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina), although there certainly was a real basis for fear of that minoritj' as the policy of HDZ and 
Franjo Tudman was ultra-nationalist and directly anti-Serbian.
Janjic, D (1994)
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Communists in Serbia attempted to build an image of itself as a party of national unity, and 
used nationalist interpretations in relation to Serbia’s position in Yugoslavia, as well as the 
status o f the two autonomous provinces in Serbia. In the constitutional revisions o f 1989 both 
Kosovo and Vojvodina lost attributes of their autonomy, such as the constitutional veto and 
parts o f the administrative and judicial functions. This was taken even further in July 1990 
when a decision was made to adopt a new constitution (in effect from 28 September 1990), in 
which Kosovo and Vojvodina finally lost their autonomy.'*^^ While this immediately 
provoked strong reactions among the Albanians it also affected other republics as it altered 
the existing constitutional balance o f Yugoslavia.'*'*^ In effect it was a confirmation that all the 
national (and republican) issues in Yugoslavia were interconnected, and that a disturbance at 
one level would affect the others.
As will be discussed further in chapter 7, unrest in Kosovo grew rapidly along with Albanian 
resistance and secession claims, and on 19 October 1991 the Kosovo Albanian parliament 
amended the Kacanik Constitution and formally declared Kosovo independent.'*'*^
As we have seen, there were a great number o f structural, constitutional, political, economic 
and social issues, which in combination provided for a particular explosive climate in 
Yugoslavia by the turn of the 1990s. In addition there were important geopolitical and 
international factors. In 1989 the Soviet client states throughout Eastern Europe regained their 
political independence, and soon after the entire Soviet Union collapsed (1991). The real- 
socialist project was thereby dead, and the whole geopolitical order of Europe, as well as of 
the world, was to be redrawn. No matter what political strategies were fostered in Yugoslavia,
DuSan Janjic lias characterized this Constitution as a normative expression of authoritarian-nationalist 
populism, and suggested that constitutional democracy merely was simulated, all sy mptomatic of a Serbian 
identity crisis in the context of the crisis; Janjió, D (1997)
By establisliing control ô ■ê  tlie rivo autonomous provinces as well as o f Serbia and Montenegro, Milosevic 
could control four out o f  eight votes at the Iiighest federal level (the other four being: BiH, Slovenia, Macedonia, 
Croatia). This disturbed the federal balance and created fear in the leadership o f the other republics, that Serbia 
would dominate the federation. Slovenia was the first rcpulic to protest opting already in September 1989 for 
independence.
Dr Bujar Bukoshi was named Prime Minister after having been Secretary' General in the LDK. which he was 
a co-fourxler of. On 23 December 1991 Kosovo applied to the European Union for recognition as an independent 
stale, but was rejected. Through German pressures the EU came to use the territorial republican borders as a 
basis for recognising states, thereby ignoring tlic minorities within those borders. Macedonia was not recognised 
due to pressure from Greece. Germany wished to have Slovenia and Croatia recognised as independent and 
pressured otlier EU-members consequently resulting in a deal made during the Maastricht discussions in 
December 1991. where there slwuld be EU-unity towards recognitions. Greece accepted to recognise Slovenia 
and Croatia under the conditions that Macedonia was rejected. The UK accepted the approach in exchange for 
exceptions from tire Social Charter, wliile southern EU-states received elements in the structural funds during the 
negotiations.
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in Serbia or elsewhere, this constituted a dramatic change o f incalculable consequences. It 
certainly also contributed to challenging the existing state framework of Yugoslavia. By June 
1991 Slovenia and Croatia opted for independence. In October the same year Germany 
pushed the EU to recognize them as independent states and, despite warnings over the 
consequences with regard to minority issues, Germany effectively moved ahead with 
unilateral de fa c to  recognitions. But if  any republic left the Yugoslav federation (such as 
Slovenia), then the whole structure would crumble. The federal framework provided for a 
careful balance in which several republics combined could counter-balance others, but 
without one of them Serbia would become too dominant. Moreover, inside several republics, 
those with large minorities, it would almost certainly lead to war. For Slovenia, which was 
more than 90 % ethnically homogeneous, it was fairly unproblematic, but for the 10-15 % 
Serbian minority in Croatia it was unthinkable to suddenly become a minority in a new 
Croatian state with a strong ethno-nationalist ideology, and the Serbs who lived in Krajina 
immediately declared secession for a state of their own. Blockades and fighting had already 
started over territories there. In Bosnia and Macedonia the situation was even more complex. 
Bosnia did not have any national majority but was comprised o f 44 % Muslims, 33 % Serbs, 
18 % Croats, and some smaller minorities. The elected president Alija Izetbegovic managed 
to balance Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian claims for nine months, but when the EU invited 
Bosnia to hold a referendum for a secession of their own, the republic was rapidly pushed 
towards the rift o f war.'*'’* The Serbs wanted to remain a part o f a Serbia-dominated 
Yugoslavia, or become part or Serbia, while the Croats wished to become a part of Croatia. 
For the Muslims it was a choice over whether they should have a war against the Serbs or 
against the Croats. When Bosnia was recognized on 6 April in 1992 (unintentionally, but 
symbolically, the 51 year anniversary o f Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia), the answer was given: 
they should have war with both. War spread rapidly in Bosnia immediately after the 
recognition, and in Croatia it was already ongoing since 1991. Here, at the bloody secession 
of these republics and the miraculously (initially) peaceful secession of Macedonia, we 
separate from their respective trajectories in order to focus our attention on Serbia proper and 
Kosovo. To a large extent the cornerstone of the Yugoslav crisis lay in Kosovo, although a 
much wider dynamic was set in motion. However, although we have all structural 
preconditions, including international factors, and various political advocates, for the crisis in
For example Sorensen, J. S (1996) “Bosnien-Hercegovina mcllan dcmokrati och etnokrati: pawingad 
majoritetsmodell som krigspiovocerande faktor” i Milivojevii, N et al (Eds) (1996) “Bortom Krigct” Carlssons.
Stockholm: 130-138
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Serbia, we cannot be completely satisfied with them in order to  understand the political 
mobilization of nationalism there, because other forms o f mobilization might have been 
possible. We need a complementary picture o f  which concrete discursive strategies were 
applied, and which type of economy was fostered, in order to understand the new political 
project, and to this we shall turn in the next chapter.
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C H A P T E R 6
HEGEMONY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULISM: The Emergence 
of the Milosevic Regime and the transformation of Serbian society
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his regime was based 
upon the merging o f three different political hot-issues where the objectives (although 
originally different in character, origin and expression) came to be articulated and discursively 
formulated into a single framework along ethno-nationalist principles. The fusion of these 
forces around Slobodan Milo§evic, together with his faction within the Serbian League of 
Communists, and the support he enjoyed within the Army, made up an ‘alliance of forces’ 
forming a ‘social bloc’ in a new hegemonic project."*^  ̂This alliance spanned both segments 
within the Party, supporters within the Army leadership, groups o f intellectuals, and the wider 
popular movements described earlier. Through its position within the Serbian state (and the 
Party), in addition to personal links, it further had control of the state media. The socialist 
hegemony was thereby replaced with a new ‘ethno-nationalist’ hegemonic formation. It was 
essentially populist and originally thrived on the widespread popular euphoria which was the 
base for the legitimation of the elite which had come to power in the 1980s.
While, according to state-organisational criteria, it makes sense to distinguish the final 
disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, as a major 
historical break, Slobodan Milosevic's hegemonic project took off a few years e a r l i e r . T h e  
earlier discussed protest movements co-inciding in the mid-1980s were a symptom of a 
legitimacy crisis for Yugoslav state ideology and of an identity crisis in society."^^* Its 
manifestation was seen in the social consequences of what was perceived as a result of both 
the constitutional and political-economic form of governing The idea o f real-socialism was 
well rooted and supported, but the manifest economic crisis strongly indicated that reform
The terms are from Antonio Gramsci.
By ‘project’ I simply mean the profound re-organisation of the political agenda.
Studies indicating tliis by: Golubovié, Zagorka (1988) “Kriza identiteta savrcmcnog Jugoslovenskog DruSha” 
Filip ViSnjió. Beograd. Compare: Matic, Jovanka (1996) “The Media and Ethnic Mobiliyation: The Formula for 
Kosovo" in Janjic, D & S. Bianchini ( 19%) “Ethnicity in Post-Communism” Institute of Social Sciences & 
Fomm For Ethnic Relations & Europe and the Balkans. Beograd: 231-236
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measures had gone wrong. The convergence o f ‘reactive nationalism’ in Serbia towards the 
mid-80s, following the Albanian crisis in Kosovo o f 1981, with the mobilisation of the 
Constitutional issue, and the wider general social protests, was coupled with the emerging 
cleavage within the elites of the League o f Communists. We have here the economic and 
structural raw material for the coming crisis, but although these are constituent parts it is not 
sufficient to analyse them separately and simply combine them in order to arrive at the 
trajectory of the 1990s. The global, political-economic, constitutional and social critical 
conditions merely provided for a particular narrowing opportunity structure within which 
several historical paths might have been open, and there is no immediate determination of 
agency inherent within them. The above-mentioned crisis issues were merged in a specific 
way, with certain strategies involved to create the new interpretative framework through 
which the new practices could make sense. This chapter therefore focuses on the analytical 
level o f political and discursive strategies, before moving on to the character of the political 
economy of the state transformation. The particular changes in Serbia proper are intermarried 
with, and are absolute preconditions in order to understand, the trajectory in Kosovo which is 
discussed in the coming chapters.
The concept o f ‘hegemony’ here places attention on the agency involved in social change, the 
discursive strategies o f a group in order to form alliances with other groups and involve them 
in a new interpretive scheme, new way o f looking at social problems and relations and 
thereby achieving support for a new political project working at multiple levels in society. 
While the term is associated primarily with analysis o f change in capitalist societies (with 
class divisions, and as a framework to avoid determinism) it is applicable to real-socialist 
societies as well, where conceptions o f ‘transition’ (to liberal market democracy) or ‘social 
breakdown’ otherwise dominate. The focus on agency does not preclude ‘structural 
conditions’ because, as discussed above, these set limits to the freedom of choice, but it does 
emphasises that structural conditions do not carry any strict limited given trajectories within 
them. Through the concept of hegemony we further emphasise that there is no single 
dictatorial agency involved (by a monolithic leadership relying on force, for example), but
Originally formulated among Russian intellectuals in the 1880s the term is associated with Antonio Gramsci, 
who developed it to analyse capitalist society and strategies for the working class. Tlie strong association w itli 
class has since been disconnected in order to include other groups (including ‘ethnic'). Tlic different applications 
and orientations cannot be discussed here, but generally hegemony theory is connected to analysis of capitalist 
societies, such as for e.xample Stuart Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism. Writers like Nicos Poulantzas and Bob 
Jessop have placed more emphasis on structuralist aspects, w hile Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe reject 
‘essences’ inscribed to concepts. Anna Maria Smith has applied Zizck and Lacanian ideas in her analysis of 
Thatcherism in Britain.
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that the redefinition o f the political agenda involves strategies for mobilising support among 
several groups so as to create an alliance. Furthermore, the strong nationalist fervour in 
Serbia, and other post-Yugoslav republics, was not a re-awakening o f ‘dorment’ nationalism 
repressed by the real-socialist order, although they -  and the new projects -  grew out of it. 
While conflicts which crystallise along ethnic lines fairly soon achieve an ‘inter-reactive’ 
dynamic o f their own, the idea of ethnic nation-states had to be formulated and implanted 
among the wider population, or among strategic groups, through the application of discursive 
strategies and instruments. As has been expressed by Anna Maria Smith, a hegemonic project 
does not need the support of the majority, but operates by transforming specific political 
demands into a broader social i m a g e r y . I t  redefines claims and incorporates them into a 
single framework, which - although it may seem inconsistent -  promotes itself as the sole 
alternative to a social order.
The political project of Slobodan Milosevic incorporated different group interests and 
protests, from the intellectuals in SANU (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts), whose 
Memorandum it drew upon, to the Kosovo Serbs and the marginalised workers in Serbia, and 
defined, (re)formulated and (re)articulated their different interests so as to create a single 
movement, which came to constitute the political power-base for the leadership. The idea o f 
reviving the nation-state ideal was the ‘ideology’ that connected the factions, and the socialist 
message was reinforced through the perspective shift from a ‘universalist’ Yugoslavia 
towards a Serbian framework.“*̂  ̂There need not be a ‘planned’ strategy behind this. It is even 
unlikely that there was any possibility at a given time to calculate in detail the consequences 
of a particular move. It is more probable that Slobodan Milosevic himself at some point in 
1987 realised the impact he had upon Kosovo Serbs as a speaker, that the crowd needed a 
leader, and that this opened new possibilities for a popular base in his own ambitions. By 
reformulating the Kosovo issue from that o f a constitutional conflict, to that of a national- 
ethnic conflict and that republican state measures were necessary in order to hamper it -  a 
process taking place in 1987 -  it could be directly linked to the constitutional issue and 
reorganisation of the state. All social problems were eventually incorporated into this scheme 
with the revival o f the idea of ‘nation-state’ as a new legitimising principle. This project
Smith, A. M (1994) “New Right Discourse on race and sexualiN” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge:
Ch 1 in passim
454 Ibid
Actually' the SANU Memorandum discussed different options and supported a ‘universalist’ Yugoslavia (as 
they saw it), but in case this was not possible it opted for a strong Serbian state.
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eventually implied war and ethnic clensing, generally having some homogenising effects on 
society, but it was more radically enhancing the identity crisis in Serbian society. This crisis 
was further perpetuated by the deep social and economic transformation o f Serbian society 
following the illiberal economic order (or disorder), which accompanyed the new project. The 
hegemony was therefore not long-lasting and other means were necessary to remain in power. 
In this chapter we shall further discuss the discursive practice at work in this process, the 
electoral legitimation of the regime following the introduction o f multi-party elections in 
1990, the subsequent erosion o f hegemony and the protracted legitimacy crisis, and finally the 
changes in political economy -  and economic base -  under this project. The form o f economy 
which emerged may be characterised as cleptocratic and illiberal, and it encompassed a 
transformation in ownership structure. Following the use of state institutions for cleptocratic 
purposes by certain networks in power -  and ‘subcontacted’ bands -, the economy developed 
a trajectory of informalisation, traditionalisation and criminalisation. The effect was a 
profound re-stratification of Serbian society. While, as discussed in the introduction chapter, 
the two concepts ‘transition’ and ‘breakdown’ have dominated in the literature of Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, the process may be better interpreted from the perspective o f ‘social 
transformation’. This avoids the linear assumptions o f developments towards liberal 
democracy, as implied in the term ‘transition’, and o f ‘straight-forward’ ‘reconstruction’ o f a 
‘broken down’ state and society which is implicit in the term ‘break-down’. The term 
‘transformation’ intends to conceptualise both state and society as having changed to a certain 
degree, and that this includes agents who have developed new relationships, strategies, and 
projects in the course of this procès.
This constitutes the two dimensions I wish to emphasise here; the ‘ideology’ and legitimation 
of the (new) state and its regime, and the governing o f the political economy within this new 
(political, governmental, territorial) framework. The next chapter will then turn to the 
‘resistance’, adaptation and opposition to this, which took place in Kosovo.
Nationalist Discourse strategies, Symbol Language, and the introduction of multi-party 
elections
The most important factor behind the nationalist wave in Serbia was the issue of Kosovo, 
because both the constitutional ‘movement’ and the protests o f the Kosovo Serbs could be 
expressed in it. The wider social and economic crisis, and accompanying frustration, could
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further be re-worked into it through the idea of a ‘common solution’ for all Serbs, Kosovo, 
and the crisis of 1981 concerning Albanian nationalism, was both the nodal point for 
‘reactive’ Serbian nationalism, as well as it ‘provided’ much o f the mythical material in the 
‘new-old’ (Serbian) nationalist discourse. In line with socialist dogma, the Kosovo crisis was 
initially defined in ideological terms, but from 1987 onwards it was reformulated as a conflict 
between two ethnic / national groups. Following this new position taken by the Serbian 
League of Communists -  and originally raised in the SANU Memorandum of 1986 -, the 
issue was now re-articulated in the Serbian press. Jovanka Matic has shown this by analysing 
the changes in reporting and articles in the important Serbian daily newspaper Po//7/Aur, which 
from 1988 increasingly portrayed events in Kosovo from a strongly nationalist and chauvinist 
perspective and supported Milosevic’s programme within the p a r t y . O n c e  the issue had 
been cast in these new terms the ground was prepared for the activation of the Kosovo myth 
and other folk-lore material in order to boost national identification. The mythical dimension 
is often, if  not always, central to nationalism, and the ‘common descent’ of a nation or the 
idea of its ‘collective destiny’ requires some form of bonding which draws upon mythical 
material. It is not important here whether the myths have some basis in real history or not 
(they may often have), but that myth is a central form for the social and cultural presentation 
of ideas and as such a powerful system for collective identity formation and for social 
integration.'*^^ As expressed by Jelena Duric, the myth o f the nation-state has, during the past 
centuries integrated all aspects of social life -  ethics, politics and culture -  as the collective 
participation in the common destiny of the nation.'*^* Further, modernity and colonial 
expansion has exported the ideal of the nation-state to the whole world.'*^^ The Yugoslav idea 
and communist-socialist ideology had also incorporated such mythical material. As discussed 
in previous chapters, the idea of self-determination and independence was a major driving 
force, and the idea o f the ‘liberation struggle’ and revolution by the Yugoslavs themselves 
was a powerful element in the legitimacy o f the regime as well as the state. The old slogans 
and ideas o f ‘brotherhood and unity’, ‘egalitarianism’, and so on, only needed a minor 
reworking into a narrower circle with the ethnic nation as the basis. Although the myths 
cultivated along the Yugoslav idea had carried the same folk-lore material as the latter ethno-
Matic, Jovanka (1996), To cover the whole media landscape, see also the references to other media analysis 
in the discussion below.457 Compare Doric, Jelena (2000) “The Use of Myths for Creating and Destroying a Socict>” in Skoplanac 
Bmnner, N et al (Eds) (2000) “Media and W ar’ Agenc>' Argument, Belgrade: 153-176.
Duric, Jelena (2000) “The Use of Myths for Creating and Destroying a Sociew” in Skoplanac Brunner, N et 
al (Eds) (2000) “Media and War” Agenev' Argument, Belgrade: 155 
^^ Îbid
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nationalist discourse replacing it, they were now stripped of the earlier universalistic and 
inclusivist (Yugoslav) framework, in which they had been embedded, and were reworked in 
an exclusivist ethnic-nationalist framework. As has been repeatedly noted the communist and 
nationalist ideologies had many elements in common, including the collectivist idea, the 
element o f ‘struggle’, a division o f ‘us’ and ‘other’ and of absolute ‘enemies’ (class 
substituted with nation)."*^ This closeness enabled core continuities within the discursive 
shift, with the replacement only o f some crucial elements in order to arrive at a completely 
different framework of ideas. The idea o f  the project o f  the socialist oriented political 
economy could be maintained, but (supposedly) ‘better’ realised within the new cultural 
homogenous frame, and through its mobilisation. In other words it was the idea of the ‘nation- 
state’, which was renewed, and as such a part of an essentially modem phenomenon.
Ivan Colovic has provided an extensive analysis of Serbian ethno-nationalistic myths, and the 
political symbolism, upon which the new nationalist discourse in Serbia drew."*̂ * The renewal 
of the ‘nation-state’ idea drew on folk-lore and mediaeval tales where the plots above all are 
concerned with the nation as the long-lost and re-found happy units of ethnos, blood, state, 
territory, faith, culture and language."^^^ The myth o f the Battle of Kosovo Polje on Vidovdan 
in 1389 where Prince Lazar dies in defending Christianity against the Turks places the 
Serbian nation in a connection to the distant past. But, following Colovic, events in the 
mythical are located outside the co-ordinates of time. The discourse of warlike ethnic 
nationalism offers a mythic, anti-historical perception o f time, with eternal presence and/or 
return to the same, and with temporality imagined this way the political and military leaders 
and the wars of today are the reincarnated forebears o f the past."*̂ ^
Symbolic language and expressions play an important role in communication in public life 
and in the way individuals identify and position themselves in public space. In socialist 
society public space was more directly regulated than in liberal societies, and the most 
important instrument through which symbol language and coded messages were transmitted
For example: Puhovski, Z (1995); Goati, V (1997); and Durid, J (2000)
Colovic, I (1997/2000) “Politika Simbola" Biblioteka, Beograd.
Following Colovic, I (1997/2000): Ch. 1
Following Colovic, I (1997/2000): Ch. 2. On the my ths of the battle of Kosovo Polje, see for e.xample the 
collection of translations by Locke, G. N. W (1997) “The Serbian Epic Ballads: An Antholog>”, N olit Belgrade; 
See also Jakupi, A (1999) “The Origin and Motives of Serbian Myths on Kosova”, Eurobalkans. No 34-35, 
Spring-Summer 1999, A^ens; 21-27
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was electronic media.'* '̂* Access to media was to become a major problem for the new 
political parties that were formed in Serbia with the introduction of the multi-party system and 
the call for free elections in 1990. These new parties had a double problem. First, given the 
social structure o f the socialist society -  a fairly large peasant worker and worker stratum, 
with a small middle class of professionals, managers, white-collar employees, and so forth, 
and an even smaller upper stratum o f the party elite and functionaries - the parties were not 
‘rooted’ in society in the sense that they had any particular connection to a social stratum, 
class or interest group. Therefore they were ‘socially unbonded’. Second, they were difficult 
to identify and position along the liberal european political spectmm. For many of them 
Western Europe appeared as a role model in liberal democracy, but the society out of which 
they came did not resemble that of Western Europe to the degree that the ideological division 
and party structure could be imitated."*^^ The regionally bonded party elite which struggled for 
control over the political entities managed to take over the symbolic language and as they 
alredy controlled the main instrument for disseminating it -  the mass media - the groups and 
parties which were without resources (including financial) or influence in the existing power 
apparatus had great difficulties in transmitting their message. Apart from being ‘socially 
unbonded’ they were essentially ‘crowded out’ in the public space, both in terms of symbol 
language and the instruments for disseminating it.
The role o f the media as an instrument in nationalist and war propaganda, has been 
extensively noted by both local analysts and external observers, and one of the early budget 
posts among western donor agencies in their support for démocratisation in the region was 
also allocated to support ‘independent medi a ’. The ‘propaganda war’ in the media started at 
least three years before the ‘real’ wars, and control over much of the Serbian media was 
secured by Slobodan Milosevic, as President of the Serbian League of Communists, already in
^  A small Seibian art and design magazine named “KVADART’ had an interesting discussion of political 
symbols in a special issue in 1996.1 would like to thank the author and editor, Radomir Vukovió- a graphic 
design artist from Belgrade -  for sliaring and discussing with me his insight into political party sy mbols in 
Seibia, on 3 November 2001.
Tlic problem was similar in other post-communist countries, but with the difference that they did not have a 
divided elite regionally anchored in separate 'national republics' (even in the federations like the Soviet U nioa 
the party was m t divided into separate branches and the conflict was rather between society' and the party instead 
of between separate branches of the party).
For example Sida (Swedish DcN clopment Co-Operation Agency) had special budgets since approximately 
1994; the private ‘Soros Foundation’ had large budgets for this in the early 1990s; tlic EU followed somewhat 
later.
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198?/^^ From then on the most important media supported “Slobo” and were, throughout the 
following decade, engaged in systematic propaganda campaigns, manipulation, false 
information, hate-speech, campaigns against ‘dissidents’ - individuals as well as groups -, and 
capitulation to political interests and nationalist fervour/^* In Serbia proper non co-operative 
editors and journalists were dismissed or resigned of their own accord, and in Kosovo there 
was a crackdown on the whole media landscape with an effective closing o f the Rilindja 
Publishing House.
While the most important media - such as ‘RTS’ (Radio-Television Serbia), ‘Radio Belgrade’, 
and daily newspapers like Politika, Vecenije Novosti, Sorba  - were instrumental in 
nationalist and war propaganda, the regime from time to time had a fairly liberal approach to 
so called ‘independent media’ in Belgrade and in some other urban centres as long as the 
circulation of transmission space was limited (although there were indeed many cases of 
intimidation, confiscation of equipment, and arrests especially in Kosovo). The reason for this 
was that the supporting base of Slobodan Milosevic was not reliant on Belgrade in any case. 
As a capital it had always been the locus o f opposition and as long as local radio stations or 
especially periodicals did not reach too far outside Belgrade they posed no real danger to the 
regime. Television was generally superior to newspapers as an instrument, both by its more 
direct impact through ‘images’ and because economic hardships were an obstacle to the 
purchasing of newspapers. In addition many private stations became instrumental in 
propaganda by following the ‘political correctness’ o f local/national discourse, and what may 
be called negative self-censorship.
Nationalist symbol language and iconography came to penetrate public space and popular 
culture through music also, with one of the most conspicuous examples found in the Serbian 
Uechnofolk* and ^turbofoik\ a local form o f intermarriage between folk and techno music.
Eric Gordy has analysed messages and scenes from this aspect of popular culture, which
Compare Lukovic, P “Media and War: Yugoslavia, the Minor o f Hatred” in Biserko, Sonja (1993) 
“Yugoslav ia Collapse War Crimes” Centarza Antiiatni Akcija, Beograd: pp. 73-78 
^  Lukovic, Petar (op. cit). Further studies of the role of the media can be found in: Tliompson. Mark (1994) 
“Forging W ar The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina” Article 19; and: Skopljanac Bmnncr. 
Nena et al al (Eds) (2000) “Media and W af ’ Agency Argument, Belgrade. Oppositional parties in Serbia 
regularly complained about lack of access to, and distortions in, the media (and this was further noted in the 
international communiri*, including for example the OSCE), for example: CeSID (2000) “Guide through 
Electoral Controversies in Serbia” CcSlD (Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju), Beograd.
For a non-region specific account of the topic for example: Cairuthers, S. L (20(X)) “The Media at W ar- 
Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century'” St. Martins Press, New York. A classic remains: 
Knightley, P (1975/2000) “The First Casualty” Prion Books, Londoa
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among the urban-oriented youth population was considered the ‘regimes’ battle against them 
and their values/*^^ Gordy describes the regime strategy as a ‘destruction of alternatives’, with 
one of the fields where this was played out being popular culture, and a ‘rural’ versus ‘urban’ 
values confrontation."̂ ’° This conflict between urban-rural, or in perhaps the better metaphors 
‘gemeinschaft’ and ‘gesellschaft’, remains a noted dimension within all the former Yugoslav 
Republics/^* Nationalist iconography spread throughout all spheres of society. Locally well 
known symbols like four S in a matrix (C in Cyrillic) on a shield or just painted on a wall 
expressed the message for Serbian unity (only unity can save the Serbs), just as a peace sign 
came to express opposition. The urban-oriented, democratic-oriented and anti-war oriented, 
were outflanked to small newspapers and periodicals, limited-reach radio stations (and some 
TV, like Studio B), underground movements or finding their expressions in rock music and 
blues. In this way musical preference simply became a symbol for individual political 
orientation.
The formation of new (nation-state) ideology expressed, as well as created, a deep identity 
crisis in Serbia and within the Serbian population through the 1990s. As has been discussed 
by Dusan Janjic, the question o f how the new state should be defined created contradictions; 
constitutionally it was defined as a ‘civil state’, but the development was towards a ‘national 
state’ along ethnic principles.'*^^ Moreover, aside from the fact that a third o f the population in 
Serbia are non-ethnic Serbs (apart from Kosovo there are minority concentrations in South 
Serbia, the Sandzak, and Vojvodina), the principle of historical rights was applied to Kosovo 
and the internal organisation of the state. Following Janjic’s discussion there were two 
‘programmes’ to the national question, one of them regarding the question as one of state 
territory and demanding the expansion o f the mother-state to the envisaged ethnic borders (i.e. 
‘unification of all Serbs in a single state’), while the other opposed this idea and instead opted 
for a ‘unity of people’ and a more universal a p p r o a c h . T h i s  ideological division was
Gordy, Eric D (1999) “The Culture of Power in Serbia -  Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives’ 
The Penns> l\ ania State Uni\ ersit>' Press: en bloc and Ch. 4
Ibid471 These concepts were introduced by Ferdinand Tdnnies and will be discussed funher in Chapter 8.
Janjic, DuSan (1998) “National identity Building Processes in Post-Communist Society': Serbian Case 1989-
1996” in Biancliini. S & G. Scltòpilin (Eds) (1998) “State-Building in the Balkans -  Dilemmas on the Eve of the 
21“ Centuiy” Europe and llie Balkans & Longo Editore, Ravenna: 339-362. See also: Janjic, D (1995) “Serbia 
Between tlie Past and the Future” in Bianchini, S & P. Shoup (Eds) (1995) “The Yugoslav War, Europe and the 
Balkans: How to Achieve Security” Europe and the Balkans & Longo Editore, Ravenna: 63-71. The term in the 
constitution is Driava Gradano, which should actually be translated citizens state.
This follows Janjic, D (1997) and (1998) “National identity Building Processes in Post-Communist Society’: 
Serbian Case 1989-1996” in Bianchini, S & G. Schtìpflin (Eds) (1998) “State-Building in the Balkans -
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complicated by the cultural and political differences between Serbs from different parts of 
former Yugoslavia - Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia proper and so on - and between rural 
(for example the Krajina area) and urban. Bosnian and Croatian Serbs who found themselves 
as a minority in the newly created Croatian (1991) and Bosnian (1992) state, for example, 
generally tended to opt for the former programme seeking protection in the ‘mother-state’, but 
the division was also present within the Serbian diaspora outside the territories o f the former 
Yugoslavia. Janjic uses the allegories ‘the two Serbias’ and ‘highlander Serbs’ to describe this 
difference in political culture and cultural orientation. While the ‘highlander Serbs’, Serbs in 
Krajinas (here the Croatian area bordering Bosnia), and in Bosnia tend to see the state as a 
protector or ‘mother-state’ with an organic conception o f the state (i.e. the state as a ‘body’ 
and part o f the nation), Serbs in Serbia proper see the state as a collector o f taxes and 
apparatus o f organised violence (army, police, conscription etc.) and something to be avoided 
by the individual as much as possible.'* '̂* The organic conception of the state is however a 
typical feature of the post-Yugoslav state, although this may be more emphasised in Croatia 
and Slovenia."^^^ The regime supported the first programme until summer 1994 and could, 
according to Janjic, thereby obtain a statist and authoritarian political o r d e r . T h e  idea was 
then abandoned, as became evident to the Bosnian and Croatian Krajina Serbs in 1995 when 
they had no support to count on. It had served its purpose in the late 1980s, when public 
rallies were organised in Kosovo, so called ‘meetings o f the truth’ in Belgrade, and politically 
orchestrated demonstrations, as well as in the early 1990s when populism reached a peak and 
the regime was firmly consolidated; for the newly secured regime in Belgrade it was not 
worth the cost of engaging in an even wider all-Yugoslav war.
Dilemmas on the Eve of the 2T‘ Centuty” Europe and the Balkans & Longo Editore, Ravenna; 339-362 
(especially 1998; 343-45).
Developed in Janjié. D (1998); 345. DuSan Janjió would ascribe this difference to liistorical variations where 
Scibia proper was under Ottoman mlc for cenmries, while the Serbs in Croatia -  and Bosnia after 1878 -  were 
under Habsburg rule, and that the different relations to the state under these conditions created variations in 
political culture (personal communication). While I believe there are elements of this, another interpretation 
could be tliat the ‘atomisation’ of Serbia and the perpetuated crisis in the 1990s has created a deep mistmst in the 
state and its institutions, which w ere not present during the Tito-period. Studies from Serbia showing the support 
for self-management socialism, and the egalitarian orientation, can be taken to suggest lliat the socialist period 
has created a strong belief in the state institutions -  although coupled n illi a clientelist system. However, the 
egalitarian aspect of this has a longer historical tradition from the Zadruga and village community, which was 
widespread until the second half of the nineteenth century and survived into the riventicth century' in some areas.
Due to the Serbian crisis in the 1990s the organic view' of the state may not be strong in Serbia proper (but 
among Serbs outside it). By ‘organic’ we here mean an understanding of the state as a protector -  and something 
to be loj'al to-, its territory being a part of its ‘body’ and the ‘nation’ connected to it. This lias been discussed by 
Stefano Biancliini (1998) “The Idea of State in Post-Communist Balkan Societies” in Bianchini. S & P. SIwup 
(Eds) (1998) "State Building in the Balkans -  Dilemmas on the Eve of the 2 Century” Europe and tlie Balkans 
and Longo Editore, Rai enna: 53-80.
Janjic. D (  1998); 344-45
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Elections
The discursive shift towards ethnic nationalist definitions of all problems prepared the way for 
a victory o f the nationalist parties at the first multi-party elections in most Yugoslav republics 
in 1990. In contrast to the rhetoric of the extreme nationalist parties which came to power in 
Croatia and Slovenia in spring 1990 opting for secession and rejecting the Yugoslav real- 
socialist ideology the nationalist parties in Serbia lost, in favour of the Socialist Party which 
was maintaining a socialist (as well as nationalist) orientation."*^ One reason for this was that 
there was a very strong support for, and legitimacy of, self-management socialism and 
egalitarianism, which this party could utilize. While in Croatia and Slovenia the road out of 
the economic and social crisis was interpreted as leading out o f Yugoslavia and towards 
further liberalisation (and privatisation) accompanied by national reaffirmation and 
homogenisation, the solution to the social crisis in Serbia was seen in fulfilment of the 
egalitarian and real-socialist development (and their national goals). The Bosnian, as well as 
Macedonian, position was here much closer to Serbia, but Bosnia was forced out of the 
Yugoslav federation once Croatia and Slovenia had opted for secession and definitely after 
the EU pushed a referendum upon them. The Bosnjak / Muslim population was squeezed 
between Serbian and Croatian nationalism and although the Government of Alija Izetbegovic, 
himself a Muslim nationalist, managed to balance between them for nine months, nationalist 
logic soon took on its own dynamic where they had to come along as well. In effect they 
could choose either a war with the Serbs or a war with the Croats, and eventually they were 
invited to have both. The Macedonian case was in a way similar, but internationally they were 
ignored after the stalemate with the Greek position (formally over the name Macedonia). But 
in Serbia there was neither the possibility to leave Yugoslavia nor did they reject socialism. 
The popular support for real-socialism is indicated by research conducted by the Institute for 
Political Studies in Belgrade in 1990, and by research at the Institute for Social Sciences."*^
The political message of Milosevic was therefore both nationalist and socialist and as such 
appealed to the populus. This explains why the nationalist parties did not win the first 
elections in Serbia despite the nationalist turmoil which had developed over a few years, and
The ‘Socialist Party’ was simply the renamed ‘Serbian League o f Communists'.




despite the fact that nationalist parties had already won in Croatia and Slovenia/^^ The 
nationalist parties in Serbia lost the elections because their political space was already 
occupied by the SPS (Socialist Party) and had a strong and charismatic leader in Milosevic, 
and the other parties therefore had to move in an even more extreme nationalist position in 
order to profile t h e m s e l v e s . T h e  same was the case with the Social Democratic opposition, 
since the SPS already had a socialist message as well as the socialist iconography in form of 
the red rose (an internationally known symbol for the Social Democrats). The early adoption 
of a nationalist programme incorporated to the socialist orientation made the SPS the most 
attractive parly on both these positions, since they (in addition) had a legitimacy inherited 
from the ancien regime, but added a ‘modernisation’ attitude of correcting all the mistakes 
derived from it (as epitomised in the term ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’). Following the work 
of Vladimir Goati, this merge is central, since the real-socialist project had strong support in 
all the ‘least developed’ republics of the former Yugoslavia, but socialist parties only won if 
they had adopted the national programme early enough as in Serbia and M o n t e n e g r o . I n  
Macedonia this adoption came too late and, just as in the more developed Slovenia and 
Croatia, it was instead the new opposition parties which came to be considered most credible 
in representing the ‘national interest’ (Bosnia was special since the party here was too ethno- 
plural). This development shows the switch between the socialist and nationalist orientation. 
Whereas the nationalist affiliation had been only secondary priority earlier (in Tito’s 
Yugoslavia) it was now first, and the socialist degraded to a good second position. Or rather, 
the idea o f recreating the nation-state promised new opportunities for self-determination and 
the realisation o f  a socialist egalitarianism, which had come o ff course in the Yugoslav 
framework. In this manner, Milosevic and his party had therefore at the same time 
incorporated nationalist and socialist sentiments in Serbia and blocked the political space for 
the two most important alternatives, leaving only liberal-oriented parties (mainly the 
Democratic Party) in a clear opposition. However, since liberalism had never become strongly 
rooted in Yugoslavia (hardly even before the communist-socialist revolution or inter-war 
period) such parties had weak chances even for purely ideological reasons."^^  ̂The position of 
the SPS was at the centre of a new hegemonic project building partly on ideological-political 
continuity with the past, but reformulated in populist-nationalist terms to cover several 
interests. This was a skilful opportunistic platform in itself, but it was still not enough to win a
‘'^®Goati,V (2000); 31-40 
Goati, V (2000): 33
481̂ Goati, V (2000): 38-40 
Generally liberalism does howev er seem to have wider spread in the 1990s.
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majority of the votes. First, it could gain power only if the Albanian population rejected and 
boycotted the elections, as they did, and second, it managed to get a majority in Parliament 
only through the fortune of the (majority vote) electoral system. The majority vote system 
ensured that they needed only 46 % of the total votes (first round) to achieve an impressive 
77.6 % o f the mandates in Parliament. At the presidential elections (for Serbia) Slobodan 
Milosevic also attracted the voters from the nationalist parties and gained an even stronger 
support than his party had done in the Presidency, with 65 % of the votes (although just 47% 
of the total electoral body)."**̂
Already in a central position within the state-party and with an early transgression of one of 
the ancien regimes core ideological foundations Slobodan Milosevic was able to use the 
legitimacy o f existing institutions (the Party, self-management, et cetera) to further his 
consolidation of power in the late 1980s and at the turn of the 1990s. As will be discussed 
below he - and his party - was however going to drain the legitimacy from those institutions 
and destroy them during the course of the 1990s. The political message was socialist- 
nationalist populist (the mobilisation of the Serbian cultural force for modernisation) and the 
discourse oriented to foster the idea of the nation-state drew on the most perverse forms of 
nationalist and folklore sources. This utilisation of folk-lore and mythical material, o f heroes 
defending the land, had earlier been incorporated into the communist framework and provided 
a rich source from which to reformulate symbolic language. Few areas in Europe (apart from 
the Scandinavian/Icelandic sagas) have as rich folklore material as this area of the Balkans. .
If we screen off the nationalist discourse for a while and focus on the socialist oriented 
platform and political message, this promised a reformation of the real-socialist form of 
society along the developmental angle which had been particular to the less developed 
republics.'*^ As such it also drew on the analysis (that had been made by various intellectuals 
throughout Yugoslavia) of the errors self-management socialism had contained or developed, 
especially since the 1970s (as for example identified in the first part of the SANU 
Memorandum). In their political programme the SPS put emphasis on completing the 
industrialisation process in the country, with renewal of obsolete technology, further
For the figures in the elections see Coati, V (2000): documenlai>’ appendi.x. 
Compare Susan Woodward's “Foia modeP as discussed in the pre\ ious chapter.
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automation and computerisation, as well as revitalising the rural areas."**̂  It opted for 
development programmes, job-security, reduced working hours and limited overtime, a 
minimum wage o f 100 Dinars, the stimulation of small-scale business, as well as 
transformation o f  funds to especially support agriculture.'*^® In its developmental and 
egalitarian orientation it opted for a more effective state, but with a clear regulatory role.
The emphasis on rural and agricultural areas was very important since rural voters were 
central to Milosevic, and they constituted a very large part o f the electorate. The political 
programme had egalitarian, socialist, and developmental aspirations, and although it may 
have been internally contradictory and incoherent, it could appeal to the wider population. It 
had the essentials to attract workers, farmers, socialists or nationalists, including socialist- 
nationalist oriented middle class intellectuals. From the vantage point of Milosevic’s later 
career it is difficult to estimate whether there ever were real intentions behind this (it is quite 
probable that his personal ideology was purely ‘Machiavellian’), but there is no reason to 
assume that the SPS leadership otherwise was less genuine in their ideological conviction than 
other parties.
The socialist dimension enabled both continuity with the ancien regime and an appeal to the 
wider population in Serbia, which was in favour of the egalitarianism and security provided 
by that order. I f  we now add back the actual nationalist rhetoric and propaganda to the picture 
we arrive at a bridge to other values and a truly populist orientation in vogue with the Zeitgeist 
that had developed in Serbia since the second half o f the 1980s.
After the elections, in early 1991, the ruling SPS party adopted an even stronger nationalist 
position and sharpened its attitude towards neighbouring republics with Serb minorities 
(Croatia, Bosnia). In doing so they forced the other extreme ‘ultra-nationalist’ opposition 
parties to support them and thereby incorporated them into their project so that these 
opposition parties gave legitimacy to the government’s policy.
Further elections were held to the Federal Assembly (the Federation now reduced to consist of 
Serbia and Montenegro) in May 1992 and again in December 1992, to the National Assembly
For a comparative analysis of Economic Party Programmes see: Miniò, Jelica (1997) “Economic Programmes 
of Political Parties in Serbia -  Possibilities of a European Option” in JanjiC, D (Ed) (1997) “Serbia between the 
past and the future" Institute for Social Sciences & Forum for Ethnic Relations, Beograd: 129-152.
Ibid
Coati, V (2000): 49
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of Serbia in 1993 and in 1997, and for the Presidency in 1992 and 1997. Municipal elections 
were held in 1992 and 1996. The established hegemony was however short-lived when it 
came to support for Slobodan Milosevic and SPS. Only the strong ‘nationalist' ‘ideology' 
lived on. A reason for this is that once established there was no return to Yugoslavia -  which 
had disintegrated under this ideology -, and ‘ethno-nationalism’ received a dynamic o f its own 
after hostile inter-ethnic and inter-republican relations had come between republics and 
national groups. Furthermore the démonisation of Serbs in the west, and the economic 
sanctions imposed on Serbia, created a feeling of being exposed to external hostility and a 
need for unity. However, the support for the regime was already in decline from the early 
1990s, and after the 1992 elections the SPS had to form a minority government with support 
from the extreme ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRP). In 1993 the SPS entered a 
coalition with smaller parties and after the 1997 elections it shared power with SRP, backed 
by other coalition partners ‘JUL’ (Left), created by Miijana Markovic (the wife of Slobodan 
Milosevic), and ‘ND’ (New Democracy). None of these coalitions prevented the SPS from 
maintaining a dominant position within the state apparatus, but it expressed the decline in its 
support, which eventually was only about a fifth of the population.
The SPS maintained its power through these elections by a number of manipulative means. 
The rules for elections were unilaterally changed in some instances, as was the number of 
electoral districts along with other manipulations of electoral geometry. Double-voting en 
masse occurred, voting ballots were planted into polling boxes, election results were altered 
for example.''**** The SPS was assisted by a weak and divided opposition, who at times only 
came together temporarily. In the May election 1992 the ‘democratic-oriented’ opposition 
boycotted the elections, but they were held anyway since other parties participated (Vuk 
Draskovic’s party SPO). These elections were held when war was ongoing or recently ended 
in Croatia and had just started in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and a day prior to them the UN 
Security Council decided to impose economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. In 
the municipal elections of 1996 the opposition gained a victory, which the SPS was eventually 
forced to recognise in February 1997. Resistance and opposition to the regime existed, 
although it was weak and disunited, and a notable feature to mention here is the rapid drop in 
electoral participation from around 70 % in the earlier elections to around 60 % in the
For example: CcSID (2000) “Guide through Electoral Controversies in Serbia” CeSID (Centar za Slobodne 
Izbore i Demokratiju) Beograd.
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l a t t e r . G en e ra l  erosion in the confidence of the ritual of elections and in politics developed 
within a wide section of the population in Serbia, especially after 1996. According to a 
number o f surveys the confidence in all institutions - with the exception of the Army, 
education, and the Church - decreased through the 1990s indicating an extended legitimacy 
crisis from early on and throughout the d e c a d e . I n  a study from 1999 Zoran Slavujevic 
characterised the whole political system o f Serbia as dysfunctional, and that its institutions 
acted as disintegrative factors.
The regime had successfully created a new outlook on all aspects of social and political life in 
the late 1980s, but while doing so it utilised the institutions o f  society and the state, eventually 
draining them o f legitimacy. While the regime embodied continuity with the ancien regime - 
the Party was the same (only renamed) and had the same leadership, and preserved elements 
of the earlier ideology - the discursive formation was indeed new, and a break with the 
Yugoslav past. This new discourse, or ideology, was necessary to legitimise the new political 
project -  the nation-state. In the span o f a few years this legitimacy was effectively eroded. 
The regime managed to stay in power partly relying on a submissive political culture, through 
the manipulation o f crises, external threats - including the sanctions imposed by the UN in
1992 which had a supporting effect for those in power - a general fear o f instability in the 
population, and a general atomisation o f society."*^ SreÒko Mihailovic suggests the term 
‘virtual legitimation’; when the ethnic principle o f ‘blood and soil’ had reached a peak in
1993 and started to  decline, there was a maneuvering to find new formulas o f legitimation.'*^^ 
They included that, in 1995, after Milosevic and SPS had abandoned the support to Serbs in 
neigbouring republics (Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina) and signed the Dayton Agreement, the 
ethnic nationalist principle was replaced with a message of ‘peace’, where Milosevic came
See documentary appendices by various elections in; Coati, V (2000). It should further be noted that llic 
Serb's confidence in their political system had deteriorated to such an extent that in several of the elections lield 
after 2000 less than 50 % of the electorate voted, forcing the redrafting o f the law so that a parliament could be 
constituted anyway and a president elected.
^  Sec a collection o f opinion studies in: Mihailovic, S (Ed) (1997) “Izmedu Ospoiavanja i PodrSke -  Javno 
mnenje o Icgitimitetu ticce Jugoslavije” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Institut DmStvenih Nauka, Beograd. Also: 
SlaMijevic, Zoran. D & S. Mihailovic (1999) “Dva Oglcda o Legitimitetu -  Javno mnenje o legitimitetu treée 
Jugoslavije" Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Institut DmStvenih Nauka, Beograd. Compare a study of despair and 
hope in: Mihailovic, S et al (2000) “Javno Mnenje Sibije" Centar za Prouòavanje Alternativa, UGS, Nezavisnost, 
and Udmzcnje za Unapredivanje Empirijskih Istrazivanja, Beograd.
Sla\'uje\'ic, Z ( 1999) “Delegitimizacija Sistema i NJegovih institueija” in Slavujevic, Z & S. Mihailovic 
(1999) “Dva Oglcda...”
For ‘political culture' there are a number of studies, see for example above-mentioned studies on attitudes and 
value orientations. For the effects of UN Sanctions see: Dimilrijevic, V & V. Pesic (1994) “The Effects of UN 
Sanctions on F. R Yugoslavia” Centre for Human Rights, Beograd.
Mihailovié, S (1999) “Virtuelna Legitimacija Trcce Jugoslavije” in SlaMijc\ ic, Z & S. Miliailo\ic (1999)
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back from Dayton as a peace-maker. In 1998 and 1999, and especially with the NATO 
aggression on Yugoslavia (spring 1999), nationalism was replaced by ‘patriotism’ and the 
defense of the country.
Political alternatives were de fa c to  very weak. Although the democratic oriented opposition 
received increasing support they were deeply divided and incapable of coming up with a long­
term response to the regime."*’"* They boycotted one election, in another they had the strategy 
to focus on winning in the municipalities, some of the parties shifted positions (for example 
the SPO) or were split in two, and, to borrow a term from Michael Mann, they were 
strategically ‘out-flanked’ on the political arena."*’  ̂The hegemonic project was thus not long 
lasting, but it resulted in a deep crisis of state-disintegration, international isolation, war, and 
dysfunctional institutions and political system. In this environment new techniques o f 
domination were applied including elements o f coercion. More repressive measures were 
applied after 1998 including a crack down on oppositional ‘independent media’ and activists. 
In order to understand this ‘chaotic’ and ‘fragmenting’ development we need to look at the 
political economy produced under, and which in turn was reproducing, this order. Due to the 
character of ‘governance’ and how the economy operated it is, however, more appropriate to 
use the term ‘illiberal’ economy. This term intends to capture the informalisation of the 
economy, an economy functioning without contractual relations, outside the normal operation 
o f institutions, and the criminalisation o f the economy. The term ‘parallel economy’ is here 
less apt for two reasons. First, the term ‘parallel’ may be misconceived as if there were no 
contacts with the formal economy, which would be misleading. Second, in the case of Serbia 
it may be confused with the ‘parallel economy’ and ‘parallel society’, which developed in 
Kosovo among the Albanians from 1990 when they boycotted all (Serbian) state institutions. 
Another term, ‘shadow economy’, would tend to give the impression of something operating 
in the shadows, at the margins o f a formal economy, whereas this was not really the case here.
Under this new ‘order’ (or disorder) Serbian society came to change profoundly. From the 
informal networks and structures in real-socialist Yugoslavia, and as an adaptation to
Fora study of the various political parties see for example Thomas, R (1999) ‘'Serbia under Milo§e\ic: 
Politics in the 1990s” Hurst & Compan>% London.
Mann has suggested that a reason w hy groups do not rebel is not because they consent, but because they arc 
strategically ‘outflanked’: Mann, M (1986) “The Sources of Social Power Voi 1 -  A History of power from the
beginning to A.D. 1760” Cambridge University Press.
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marginalisation and eventually complete isolation within the global economy, an illiberal 
economy was consolidated in Serbia. ■
The Political Economy of Populism: Illiberal economy and the re-stratification of 
Serbian society
Although there were no reforms, such as liberalisation or privatisation (with few specific or 
dubious exceptions), and although employment guarantees, which had always been important 
for political inclusion through the self-management system of representation, were formally 
preserved the nexus of the Serbian economy in the 1990s made it everything but socialist.'*^^ 
The nomenklatura transformed the state into an instrument for cleptocracy, through which a 
small percentage o f the population grew very rich. In reality most of the industry was 
bankrupt. Salaries were kept at a low level and were sometimes not paid for months. This 
condition could be attributed to economic sanctions and war, thereby materially strengthening 
the idea that Serbia and the whole nation was under threat from external enemies. Despite 
poor conditions employees would rather stay in their workplace than leave it for uncertain 
prospects. Self-management received critique, along with the messages o f the ‘anti- 
bureaucratic revolution’, ceased to function, and industrial relations collapsed.
The combination o f war, state disintegration and economic sanctions put severe strains on the 
economy. However, rather than mere social breakdown, and break down o f institutions, the 
process can be viewed from the perspective of social transformation. Economic sanctions, 
economic decline, and war provided opportunities as well as it created restrictions. The 
general picture o f  re-stratification of Serbian society is one o f pauperization o f the huge 
majority o f the population and the enrichment of a small group o f 1-2 per cent at the very top. 
There was a widening gap between the top and bottom, but decreased inequalities at all the 
lower levels. Rather than the elimination o f the old middle class however, it was a sinking of 
the hierarchies to lower levels, while the previously homogeneous peasant stratum at the 
bottom started to di f ferent ia te .Whereas  the old middle stratum, professionals and others.
Tliere were some reforms, but they were very specific. For example, already in 1989-90, se\'eral federal laws 
were initiated with the intention of making employees in former self-management organisations become 
shareholders, and by 1992 about one third of the social enterprises had undergone ownership transfonnation. See 
further Bolzi6, S (2005) “Blocked Transition and Post-Socialist Transformation: Serbia in the 1990s” Universiri' 
of Belgrade (unpublished manuscript).
Studies and suix eys by Mladcn Lazii and others during the 1990s suggest tliis picture: see Lazic, M (Ed) 
(1995) “Sociew in Crisis: Yugoslavia in the Early 1990s” Filip Vi§njic, Beograd: various chapters, especially
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moved downwards, there emerged a new middle stratum of private entrepreneurs. This new 
middle stratum of non-professionals was composed of people who managed to find 
themselves in a good economic position in the new economic climate under sanctions and 
war. While local researchers have conducted surveys and studies on social structure, during 
the 1990s and after, the empirical evidence for the economy is much poorer.'*^* Most further 
estimates could only be made on poor statistical evidence. Even the census o f 1991, which 
gives a picture for the period before the war, was only reliable for parts of Yugoslavia. While 
fairly reliable for Serbia proper, it is for example completely irrelevant for Kosovo (Albanians 
boycotted it and had already started the formation of the parallel society in response to the 
withdrawal o f Kosovo’s autonomy). Moreover, development in the grey or black economy 
escapes the researcher partly as much as it does the tax collector. The problem o f method 
should however not restrain us from acknowledging the importance of this part of the 
economy. Through the use o f ‘soft material’, including newspapers, and some studies and 
estimates by local researchers, it is possible to provide a discussion.
The political economy of war and sanctions: Illiberal economy
All macro-economic indicators show that the formal economy in Serbia in the 1990s was 
facing disaster The only exceptions may be agricultural production and production of 
electricity. The formal economic performance of Yugoslavia declined during the 1990’s. The 
GNP for the initial years, for example, show an index: 1990/89 = 92; 1991/90 = 92; 1992/91 = 
74; 1993/92 = 70 (in 1990 prices).“̂^̂  The GDP as well as GDP per capita show a similar 
decrease, as does industrial production, which fell continuously between 1987 and 2000. 
Consumption per capita declined (reaching its minimum in 1993), tourism was stalled, cattle- 
stock went down, mortality increased and birth-rate decreased, the total number of employed 
decreased and the ratio of number of employed per pensioner in the country went down, the 
ratio o f unemployment and number of unemployed increased (with official unemployment
Ch. 2 ,3,and 5; Lazic, M (Ed) (2000) “RaCji Hod”, Filip ViSnjic, Beograd: Lazic, M & S. Cvejic (2005) 
“Stratification Changes in Serbian Sociew: A C^se of Blocked Post-Socialist Transformation” in Milic. A (Ed) 
(2005) “Transformation and Strategies: Everyday Life in Serbia at the Beginning of the 3̂** Millennium, Institute 
for Sociological Research, Faculty of Pliilosophy, Belgrade: 35-59
^  On social stratification and ch^gc see Lazic, M (1995) “Transformation of the Economic Elite”: pp. 127- 
159; Vujovid, S (1995) “Changes in Living Standards and Way of Life among Social Strata” : 85-125, both in 
Lazi6, M (Ed) (1995); LaziC, M (Ed) (2000) “RaCji Hod”, Filip ViSnjic, Beograd; Lazic, M & S. C\eji6 (2005). 
Concerning the economy, especially the black and grey sectors, there ha\ e been some estimates by' local 
researchers, as referred to below.
^  MrkSic, D (1995) “The Dual Economy’ and Social Stratification” in Lazic, M (Ed) (1995): 23-84. This citation 
refers to p. 37
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figures around 22 % in 1992 and just below 28 % in 1999).^^° The transport on roads 
decreased, and the building o f flats decreased/®^ ’ '
The economic decline was accompanied by a drop in real wages and the spread o f poverty in 
the countiy. In the mid -1990s it was estimated that 50-70 % o f the population was below the 
poverty line.^®  ̂While the formal economy was in a state of collapse, and the country under 
sanctions, there were other means of providing resources however. Formal economic collapse 
therefore does not necessarily mean that there was a shortage of money (although its 
distribution changed). In fact the new Yugoslavia, and Serbia, to a large extent became a 
‘cash-economy’ in the 1990s. It has been estimated that some 9 billion Deutschmarks were 
traded in for Euros, in Serbia alone, when the Euro was formally introduced in 2002.^°^ For a 
country with just 8 million inhabitants, this estimation would indicate that there was no 
scarcity of money in circulation in Serbia. There are three dimensions of the economy that 
need to be discussed;
the economy of inflation
survival strategies through delayed payment of debts and the rural-urban symbiosis
m v and the crim inal econnm vthe grey econo y  t  ri i l o y
These dimensions or elements o f  the economy may be treated separately in order to 
understand the transformation o f Yugoslav society in the 1990s. As categories, they are 
however arbitrary, and there is no possibility of clearly singling out ‘criminal economy’. I 
would like to differentiate between small-scale activities or ‘survival strategies’ by ‘ordinary 
people’, and economic activities o f officials or organized groups (namely ‘Mafia-type’ 
activities). Traditionally a separation could be made between ‘grey economy’ and ‘black 
economy’. The ‘grey economy’ would then for example include all economic activities that 
evade the tax collector or the official statistics, while the ‘black economy’ typically involves 
production and trade of illegal goods or services (narcotics, trafficking and so on.). 
Traditional (statistical, legal and fiscal) criteria might also use distinctions between official- 
unofficial, legal-illegal, economic activities (thus there can be unofficial legal economic
Bela Knjiga, MiloSeviceve Vladavine, G-17 Plus, Beograd 2000.
Ibid
-'”‘ M riisic,D(1995):38
Estimations by the SMRI (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute), gh cnby Srdjan Bogosa\ Ici ic 
(Professor of Statistics and Chief Executive of SMRI), 26 July 2002.
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activities or unofficial illegal activities for example). Methodologically there are similar 
problems for the researcher as for the tax collector or law enforcer, when studying the grey or 
black economy. For the present purpose however, I am primarily interested in understanding 
the various forms o f illiberal economic activities, which expanded while the formal economy 
declined. This interest is directly in connection with understanding social transformation and 
the material base o f power in a ‘war economy’ or in the politics o f state breakdown. Activities 
such as trans-border trade in legal and illegal goods, for example the smuggling of petrol, 
pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, stolen vehicles, weapons, narcotics and human trafficking mostly 
belong to the black economy. But, under the pressure o f economic sanctions some activities 
are simply necessary to maintain the functioning of society, while others are of a more 
‘alternative’ economic nature. That is, they are ‘alternative’ in the sense that they seek 
specialization in purely illegal activities as a means of provision and as an alternative to 
formal economic development (where the collapsed industry can offer no competition 
anyway).
The definition of what is illegal and legal is not strictly delineated here. A clear definition 
would be needed if ‘data’ were to be assessed, but since there are no clear ‘data’, only 
estimations and educated guesses, we can settle here with a pragmatic and arbitrary 
separation. There have been some estimations o f ‘grey economy’ in Yugoslavia during the 
1990s, using different criteria, but with the common feature that all o f them exclude the illegal 
goods (narcotics, stolen vehicles, weapon smuggling, human trafficking, etc). For our analysis 
here we use these estimates as examples o f the changes in the economy. The ‘black economy’ 
is also important, and due to methodological problems I have had to settle for creating a 
picture from newspaper articles (in primarily Croatian, Serbian, and Montenegrin 
newspapers), some interviews, and a single study based on the work of teams of researchers in 
various republics.
The Econom y o f Inflation  -  or **The N utty R ide”
In the years o f 1993 and 1994 Yugoslavia (and Serbia) experienced hyperinflation of a 
magnitude competing for world record. In January 1994 inflation had reached above 313 
million per cent per month. Inflation was an effective instrument of redistribution within
^  Dinkii, M (2000) “Ekonomija Destnikcije” Stubovi Kulture. Beograd: 42-43. Cf. Doko Stojicic, in Radojko 
Mrljes & Milomir Kragovic “The History of Serbian Culture” Mrljcs Publishing, Beograd 1999:344.1
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the economy. Technically it would function so that a bank’s minimum reserve (as ordered by 
the National Bank) would be left uncontrolled for a period o f time, during which it could trade 
out some of the reserve to local dealers who would exchange Dinars for Deutschmarks (or 
other currencies), give some o f the cash return as payment to the dealers, and then later trade 
it back to Dinars after a period (a few weeks for example) when inflation would have eroded 
and balanced out the ‘rent’. The purely technical aspect is not at issue here. The question is 
where the money came from and where it went. In the Tito period there was a large inflow of 
foreign cash to Yugoslavia. During the breakdown of the country the pension funds were a 
key factor for cash inflow. This cash inflow was itself necessary for creating a demand in the 
grey and black market. The cash money came from particularly three sources:
- Gastarbeiters coming back to Serbia and remittances from the diaspora (especially 
pensions)
- Residents in Serbia working for foreign companies (especially pensions)
- Foreign based branch offices of Yugoslav companies registered as private companies or 
on individual persons
- Sale of private property
Due to the large proportion of the population who had been either in the diaspora, for example 
as gastarbeiters, or who had worked in other republics in the former Yugoslavia, pension 
funds were a key factor in the inflow o f money to Serbia. Many people in Serbia had either 
worked in Western Europe or in Russia (for example as gastarbeiters in Germany) or had 
worked for companies in other republics of the old Yugoslavia. Taking Slovenia alone as an 
example there were approximately 20 000 people in Belgrade who had worked for Slovenian 
enterprises in Belgrade. With an average pension in Slovenia amounting to 500 Euros, this 
created an influx o f  some 10 million Euros per month from Slovenia alone (to this one can 
add all the other republics and countries, such as for example G e r m a n y ) . T h i s  indicates that 
pensions were o f considerable importance as a source. Another source of cash flow would be 
foreign-based branches of Yugoslav companies, which were eithere registred as private 
companies in the foreign country or registred on an individual person, although in reality they 
were part o f a socially-owned enterprise. The cash accounts of these allegedly private
personally remendier exchanging money by the hour in summer 1993 when exchange rates mo^'cd rapidly, and a 
Coca Cola cost 250 million dinars (inflation was then still below 2000 per cent per month). The cultural 
magazine “Republika” had the price “equivalent of one egg” on one of its issues.
Estimates by SMRl, Sidjan BogosavIje^’ic (personal communication)
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companies, or of those registered on individuals, were not immobilised with the introduction 
of sanctions and therefore money from these companies abroad could be used inside 
Yugoslavia. There are no statistics or documented evidence for the existence o f the latter, but 
it can be assumed to have played a significant role in the economy during the 1990s.^^ Many 
import-export firms had branch offices, often as joint ventures with foreign companies, and 
the rent from these firms could be transferred (under-cover) into Serbia. In addition to these 
sources, there were the people in Serbia who had houses in other republics (for example 
summerhouses on the Croatian coast), and could not return there. Many tried to get the legal 
procedure for selling their houses (unless they were confiscated) and every week somebody 
would be successful and receive a sudden inflow of cash. Finally, a large diaspora, sending 
cash to relatives, or coming on visits in Serbia, exchanging foreign currency for Dinars or 
buying things in Serbia (including food during the stay) provided an important contribution.
These sources created a necessary level o f cash flow inside Serbia that could be either sucked 
into inflation and thereby transferred, or that could provide the necessary basis for a market in 
the grey and black sector of the economy.
Inflation was a chief instrument in the economy for extracting cash money from the 
population and transfering it, through the banks, to the state and government. From these 
resources payouts could be made to loyal associates as well as to finance activities (for 
example the police and special forces). This also meant that large amounts of cash money 
could circulate without documentation or written evidence (as was shown to be a problem 
with evidence for various activities in the Hague-tribunal against Slobodan Milosevic). Thus 
inflation came to work as a gigantic machine for transforming wealth in Serbia, and 
concentrating it in the hands of the few. The Grey economy, by contrast, was rather a survival 
strategy among the population. This is another point in distinguishing between the ‘grey’ and 
‘black’ economy, where the black economy is more typically illegal and also involved better 
organisation and links to the state. A distinction should be drawn between the purely 
‘illiberal’ forms of economy, the economic basis of the new power elite, and that o f ‘survival
^  All this would be operating illegally, violating sanctions as well as occasionally constituting ‘creative 
registration' and there is no c\ idcnce for it. Howc\ er, it seems highly plausible lltat such accounts played a 
considerable role in the payout of salaries during the MiloScvic-period and much cash would probably be 
transferred in suitcases over the borders, \̂  ithout any' documentation. It would help explain how companies that 
formally had no activities could still pay salaries. I w ould like to thank Silvano Bolzi6 for bringing m>' attention 
to the scope of this phenomenoa
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strategies’ for the population (while the latter may include illegal activities tolerated by the 
state for the functioning of the system).
Survival strategies through delayed payment o f debts and the rural-urban symbiosis
An important factor in pacifying the population was that the authorities never insisted on 
payment of bills. Thus, for example telephone bills and electricity could be delayed for 
several months without sanction. In the period of hyperinflation the actual cost o f a bill that 
was paid with a few months delay had been severely inflated. In this manner people could 
keep using resources and escape payment. While for the government this was a deliberate 
strategy in order to avoid serious social unrest, the ordinary man would have a feeling of 
‘getting off the hook’ or of deluding the authorities.
Another important survival strategy lies in the rural character o f Serbian society, with 
approximately a quarter of the population living in rural areas as farmers (depending on year 
and definition). Still more people had weekend houses, inherited land, or relatives on farms, 
and worked in temporary f a r m i n g . M a n y  families could therefore get immediate foodstuffs 
from relatives or trade foodstuff for other services. In addition many people had relatives in 
the diaspora who would send cash back to Serbia. These connections provided for a 
considerable amount of individual survival during the harshest economic periods.
About 40 % of the households in Serbia are mixed or purely agricultural households. The 
‘peasant-worker’ phenomenon in Serbia, with farmers taking extra work in industry or non- 
farmers occasionally cultivating land (on week-ends and seasonal farming), has remained 
fairly wide-spread. About a quarter of the urban house-holds own land, and just as many are 
additionally engaged in agriculture, half o f them working their own land and about a fifth 
helping relatives to do so.^^* The size o f the land-holdings (weekend houses, inherited land 
and so on) are predominantly fairly small, three quarters are less than 2 hectares, and most 
additional agricultural activity was for home needs and reducing high food c o s t s . T h e  
peasant-worker phenomenon was not typical for this period but existed widely in Yugoslavia, 
as in many other east European countries. However this element was additionally






strengthened through the 1990s and many households would revive their previously unused 
land.
The worst off section o f society in the period was those urban dwellers, especially pensioners, 
unskilled workers and the unemployed with little connections in the countryside or diaspora, 
as well as part of the rural population. The peasant stratum, which previously had been fairly 
homogeneous at the bottom of society, started to differentiate with approximately half o f the 
peasants remaining in the lowest income categories, whereas about one quarter rose to a 
relatively high income and were able to enrich themselves.’*® As a category the peasants' 
material position was generally improved, since the reduction o f  all needs to the elementary 
and most basic resulted in the increased value of resources for food production.” * For a small 
part o f the urban middle class especially, one of the few possibilities for good income came 
from working in, or creating, NGOs that could receive support from the Foreign Development 
Assistance Agencies and Donors.
Criminalisation o f the Economy
In a situation of economic sanctions (imposed on Yugoslavia by the U.N in 1992), alternative 
ways of provision have to be developed. The effects of economic sanctions have been 
discussed generally in several studies elsewhere and also particularly for Yugoslavia.’ *̂  The 
effects of the sanctions on Yugoslavia were to strengthen Milosevic politically and to produce 
a ‘criminalisation’ o f the economy. In effect it created a quite new opportunity structure for 
trans-border trade and monopoly goods. While the inflation can be treated as an instrument 
used by the regime to extract rent from the population (particularly pension funds and 
savings), there are two aspects or elements o f the economy that should be viewed separately: 
the so-called ‘grey economy’ and the ‘black economy’. While definitions may vary, the 
estimates from the sources used here typically classify untaxed and unregistered activities 
within the ‘grey economy’. They are with few exceptions legal goods and services, but illegal 
(and unofficial) as activities. In the category o f ‘black economy’ we would then count all 
illegal goods and services (narcotics, petrol smuggling, human trafficking, cigarette
MikSic, D (1995): 60-61; Lazic, M (1995): 262-264; Cf. Lazie, M  & S. (>  ejie (2005). Suncys have been 
piesented in Lazic, M (Ed) (1995); and Lazid, M (Ed) (2000) “RaCji Hod” Filip ViSnjié. Beograd 
Lazic, M (1995): 263
For e.xample: Wallenstecn, P (1971) “Ekonomiska sanktioncr” Prisma, Stockholm; Baldwin, D (1985) 
“Economic Statecraft” Princeton University Press; and Dimitrijcvic, V & V. Pejic (1994) “The Effects of UN 
Sanctions against Yugosla\ ia (Serbia and Montenegro)” Centre for Human Riglits, Belgrade
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smuggling and so forth). Here some o f the goods are legal, but the production or distribution 
systems are violating laws or licenses, and usually require and belong to the business of more 
organized groups and networks, and can be classified as organized crime.
Without making clear definitions, the grey economy - with smaller-scale black elements in it - 
would include the small-scale transfer o f  public goods to private (for example selling public 
goods from work places) in a less-organized manner, and all forms of services and 
transactions which evaded the tax system (that is trade within Serbia). In fact, under economic 
sanctions a very large portion o f the economy could be classified as such (perhaps with the 
exception of agriculture). The bulk o f this sector was pure trade (while some belonged to 
crafts). Due to the lack of instruments and problems in methodology there have been various 
estimates for the size of this sector. Some estimates indicate that its scope between 1991-95 
was approximately 5 billion Deutschmarks for the total period, or 1 billion per year.^^^ 
Estimates from the Economic Institute were that the grey economy in 1997 constituted 34 % 
of the GDP.^^"* Estimates from the G 17+ organisation of economists are that the grey 
economy increased from constituting 10 % of GDP in the early 1990s to some 80% of GDP 
towards the end o f the Milosevic-regime, and then decreasing again to some 30 %  of GDP in 
the post-Milosevic period.^^^ For a comparison the percentage o f the grey economy in the 
SFR Yugoslavia has been estimated at 4.4-6.6 % in 1961, 12.2-18.2 % in 1971, and 16.6-24.9 
% in 1981 Other estimates state that the share of the grey economy in registered GNP was 
20 % in 1981, 24.6 % in 1986, and 41.7 % in 1992.^^’ This is high compared to estimates 
from the late 1970s o f some western countries: USA, 5.8-13.5 %; Great Britain, 0,7-15 %; 
Sweden, 8-15 %; West Germany, 8-12 %; Italy, 10-30 %; Japan 3.9 %; Denmark 11.8 %; 
Switzerland 4.5 %; Belgium 11.5 %.̂ ^®
The grey economy typically has an inverse ratio to formal economic development and before 
the war it was most widespread in the least developed areas, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Estimates from a research project at the Economic Institute in Belrade, inter\’ie\v in Beograd with Gorana 
Krstic, Economic Institute, 6 November 2001.
Estimates from a research project at the Economic Institute in Belrade, interview in Beograd with Gorana 
Krstic, Economic Institute, 6 November 2001.
The G 17+ started as an organisation of 17 liberal economists, and then developed into also forming a 




Mrksic, D (1995) 33 (taken from Glas, 1991), and 33-35.
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Montenegro, Serbia, and least in Slovenia and Croatia. The expansion of this sector in the 
1990s further produced uneven regional development as a typical effect of the grey economy. 
The people forming the work force of the grey economy was very heterogeneous and were 
recruited from various strata, regions, and were of different sex and education. They included 
peasants, students, unemployed, unskilled workers, skilled workers, refugees, as well as both 
men and w o m e n . T h e  activities also varied: peasants were more represented in trade, 
unskilled workers in resale of cigarettes, petrol and alcohol, and smuggling foreign exchange, 
skilled workers were more represented in trade in food-stuffs, for example.
A small-scale example of personal entrepreneurship within what may be called a mixture 
between grey and black economy (illegally produced legal goods, but often officially ‘taxed’ 
for inside Serbia)^^^ was the big market in pirate copied CDs existing on the streets o f 
Belgrade. Some o f the CDs were produced on a small-scale inside Serbia, while an even 
larger portion was smuggled from the bigger pirate copy producers in Ukraine and Bulgaria 
and transported to Serbia by car or train. The sale of these goods took place openly, and the 
sellers paid tax for their kiosks (some also escaped this, but would then not be able to have a 
fixed place for their business). The financial police only controlled that the taxes for the 
kiosks were paid, but showed no interest in the goods. The exception was local musicians, 
whose CDs were more than double the price of those of the foreign musicians (or 
pornographic CDs).^^^ In 2002 there was some decrease, and a stricter control, in this market 
since negotiations started between foreign record companies and local distributors to sell CDs 
legally, but at much lower cost than in Western Europe (there would be no market if  the 
prices were not heavily reduced).
Apart from the manipulation o f currency and inflation, the large-scale trade in goods and 
services was the aspect of the parallel economy with closest links to the state and 
‘nomenklatura’. The smuggling o f petrol for example, which was necessary during the 
sanctions, had to rely on contacts with customs control, and paid tributes or ‘customs’ to the
519 MrkSic, D (1995): 52-55 
"=®Ibid
Sometimes the “taxation” was rather a matter o f bribing the right people as comiption is wide-spread in 
Serbia. For an analysis of corruption see: Boris Bregovic & Bosko Mijatovic (eds) “Corruption in Serbia” CLDS 
(Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies). Beograd 2002
This is quite w ell known in Belgrade and I base this information on informal talks with se\'eral individual 





Serbian state (that is, the structure around President Milosevic). The larger enterprises, such 
as the smuggling of cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, narcotics, and human trafficking relied on 
such links as well. While the typical socialist state structure never had a clear separation 
between the political and economic elite, there was a direct merge between the political elite 
and organised crime in the whole Yugoslav area during the 1990s. Again it should be noted 
that the most inaccessible activities from a methodological standpoint are the organized crime 
activities within the black sector of the economy. Pieces o f information can be put together 
from interviews with police investigators and criminals involved, witness statements, and 
from articles in local newspapers over the last several years. Needless to say that there is no 
direct evidence for the following picture of the ‘black market’ and its links to various state 
structures, only fragments here and there. For the purpose o f analysing the changes in the 
economy and social structure, this area can however not be ignored and research should not 
be daunted as long as these methodological difficulties are noted and transparent.
The control of the revenues from customs, or tributes from the trans-border goods, were under 
the control of the chief of the state security (before November 1998 Jovica Stani§ic, who was 
then replaced with Rado Markovic). The head o f customs control (Mihajl Kertes) kept the 
incomes from the revenues of these goods in his office, and was then instructed how the 
money should be spent. Thus, instead of transferring the incomes to the federal government 
the money would go directly to the head o f customs and then to the State Security Police. 
These resources could then be used for pay-outs, or for financing activities without any 
official record. The chain o f command in the state security organisation was from the 
President (Slobodan Milosevic) to the head of the security police (Jovica Stanisic) via a 
mediator (Franko Simatovic, alias "Frankie”) to the special units JSO or “Red Berets”
(headed by Milorad Ulemik-Lukovic, alias “Legija”). This was the direct security link for the 
power of the President, and they were the most reliable and best equipped forces. These units, 
formed by Franko Simatovic in the early 1990s, were to a large extent composed o f criminals, 
and were used for some of the more covert and unorthodox operations (including ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo and political assassinations in Belgrade). The incomes from trans-border
The infonriation for the command stmcture mentioned here and for the channelling of money comes from 
witness statements by Rado Markovic (in Haag in July 2002) and interviews with journalist Jovan Dulovic at the 
Belgrade magazine Vreme  ̂who lias done research on this topic (interviewed at Vreme, Beograd, 26 and 29 July 
2002). Sec also various new s reports covering the Haag-tribunal that week, for e.xample Radio Free Europe;
W WW, rfcii org/nca/fealures^2002/07/260720t)2164641.asp (entered 8 August 2002),
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trade tributes stayed within this structure o f  command, under the control of the President, 
without being officially recorded or transferred to the federal government.
According to a series of investigations by the Croatian newspaper A'^c/owii/ (involving dozens 
o f reporters), the tobacco industry or cigarette smuggling appears to have been one of the 
most profitable sectors, even exceeding oil-petrol smuggling. The market for smuggled 
cigarettes existed in the former Yugoslav republics, in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe 
(for example Italy, Germany, Scandinavia). Here the links went directly from the syndicates 
to the top officials of the post-Yugoslav states.
In 1996 and 1997 conflicts emerged among factions in Belgrade under Milosevic, possibly on 
the division of assets from smuggling and loot from areas in Croatia and Bosnia, Conflicts in 
Montenegro divided Bulatovic (President o f  Montenegro until 1997) and Dukanovic 
(President o f Montenegro after 1997), who also became political opponents between the so 
called “greens” - the Montenegrin separatist union, and the “whites” in favour o f a unified 
Serbian-Montenegrin nation.
With regard to the oil-petrol, cigarette, and other smuggling through the 1990s, the links 
between the parallel economy and the top officials in several former Yugoslav republics (such 
as Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro) appear to have been very strong, and sometimes under the 
direct control of the state.
During the years of direct war and ethnic cleansing large scale looting of property of other 
ethnic groups, and in some cases the own ethnic group, took place. Such looting was typically 
undertaken by paramilitary groups to supply themselves and their patrons with resources (in 
some cases these groups were simply paid off in this way, and occasionally operated 
autonomously). In Bosnia, for example, as has been noted by Hugh Griffiths, the ethno-
The information given here is collected from newspaper articles in nc^vspapc^s from Seihia and Croatia. 
Primarily from the Croatian newspaper A'ac/ona/, which in the period 2001-2 lias published dozens of articles on 
the subject (dozens of them retold in the Montenegrin newspaper £>.4 Y which published some 60 articles on the 
topic). Tlie director of Naciona! has received death threats from Montenegrin special police for the magazines 
im estigalion into this, and gave a lengthy topic-related intcr\ iew on Croatian TV in mid-November 2001. 
Articles used here liave been published in Nacional: Issue 287 17/5 2001; Issue 288 24/5 2001; Issue 289 31/5 
2001; Issue 290 7/6 2001; Issue 291 14/6 2001; Issue 292 21/6 2001; Issue 294 5/7 2001; Issue 297 26/7 2001; 
Issue 298 2/8 2001; Issue 299 9/8 2001; Issue 300 16/8 2001; Issue 302 30/8 2001; Issue 306 27/9 2001; Issue 
307 4/10 2001; Issue 318 20/12 2001; Issue 331 21/3 2002. There have also been articles in Bosnian and Serbian 
newspapers (for example DAKI, Nedeljni Telegraph and others).
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nationalist elite not only exploited and robbed the local population in their own area of 
control, but in addition used displaced persons and refugees as an instrument for maintaining 
the instability necessary for preserving and recreating patron-client relationships.^^® Since 
paramilitary units, bands o f criminals as well as regulars from Serbia sometimes operated in 
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia (just as Croatian troops operated in Bosnia), the entire former 
Yugoslav area has to be taken into consideration when discussing resources from looting.
The New Entrepreneurs
Serbian society in the 1990s, under hyperinflation, war and sanctions witnessed a large-scale 
breakdown o f the legal system. In the collapse of the legal system the state led the way, and 
the economy was severely criminalised. In a society where the rule of law has collapsed, 
individuals typically have to rely on alternative forms of protection.
As discussed in the previous chapter, existing patron-client relationships were recreated all 
over Yugoslavia during the 1970s and 1980s, and networks o f nepotism were rooted in 
enterprises as well as in the underground economy. This process was even further 
strengthened and fuelled by the disintegration of the “real-socialist” structure and the 
deterioration o f the self-management system. As there was no other structure replacing it, this 
left a vacuum in which masses o f working population inevitably looked for any type of
protection. 528
In this economic and social environment a considerable space was opened for private 
initiatives. During the Milosevic-period some 270 000 new private enterprises were registered 
(95 000 being shops), out o f which 60 000 were sucessful (in 2002 some 100 000 registered 
enterprises remained). Those who were developing business activities in this economic 
space slowly formed a new economic middle stratum (here I exclude criminals, who might 
also be included into this stratum). This new economic group, or stratum, which may
Hugh Griffitlis, “A Political Economy o f Ethnic Conflict Ethno-nationalism and Organised Crime” in 
Journal o f Civil Wars, Voi 2, No 2 (Summer 1999); 56-73. Frank Cass, London (pp. 67-70)
Looting was also undertaken on an individual basis. In the Knin area in Croatia, where I lived for a year in 
1996-97,1 regularly obser\^ed how Croats from Bosnia looted, and often confiscated, Serbian houses. Looting 
w'as also undertaken by Croatian soldiers.
Stanojevic. M (1992) “Regulation of Industrial Relations in Post-selfmanagement Society” in Kuzmanic, T & 
A. Tinger (1992) “Yugoslav ia War” Peace Institute Ljubljana: 53-59
Estimations from SMRI (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute) Belgrade, Interv iew w ith Srdjan 
Bogosavljevié, 26 July 2002.
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encompass some 700 000 people, was formed in parallel as the old middle class sunk as a 
hierarchy (although there was a small, but marginal, recovery in the latter group in the period 
2000-2). The ‘new entrepreneurs’ are not a homogeneous group. There were also different 
phases o f entering into the ‘private business’, some of which started in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, while others appeared during the period of the sanctions and war. Within this 
section there was also business ranging from the larger scale to the small private shop, as well 
as activities benefiting from sanctions to those of a more typical entrepreneurial nature (that 
would do good without sanctions). A study from the early 1990s shows that the group largely 
consists of individuals without university education, and they generally come from three 
different types of backgrounds:
- people coming from lower worker or clerical positions and then moving into the private 
sector
- from positions in the middle class moving to elite entrepreneurial positions
- or people from varied background who after having established command positions in 
public companies established their own firms
For the successful establishment o f a private firm o f some size it is important to have good 
connections, or links to some patron, for example in a public company or within the state- 
structure. In the group of new entrepreneurs some 10 % have spouses in command positions, 
either political or public managerial. The lower educational profile of the whole stratum of 
entrepreneurs, as has been pointed out by Mladen Lazic, probably means that the present 
private business elite is not the elite o f the future.^^^
It is important to note that the new middle stratum of business-oriented is almost completely 
absent from the NGO-scene in Serbia. The local NGOs by contrast are largely made up of 
individuals from the old middle class. The typical local NGO activist (there are 3,000 
registered NGOs in Serbia) is urban and university educated. Almost 60 % of the activists in 
NGOs are university graduates, while 5 %  have MA degrees, and almost 5 % Ph.D. 
d e g r e e s . T h e  NGOs, to a large extent, survive from foreign aid support. Foreign support is
Lazic, M ( 1995) 
Lazic. M (1995): 139
532 Lazic, M (1995); 136
Cf. NCjO Polic>' Group (2(X)1) “Third Sector in Serbia -  Status and Prospects” Center for the De\ elopment of 
Non-Profit Sector. Belgrade, 2001: 25-27
213
however uneven among the NGOs and there are typically a small number of NGOs receiving 
a large amount o f financial support. The primary effect o f this support has also been to 
preserve living conditions among this group, and to make a small number of them relatively 
well off.
The emergence of a new group of entrepreneurs does not necessarily constitute a 
transformation of the system to a market economy. Rather the entrepreneurs have occurred in 
the opportunities given in the new social, legal, and economic environment.
The Restratiilcation of Serbian society
In a period o f some fifteen years or so Serbian society transformed dramatically. The most 
forceful transformation took place under the conditions o f economic sanctions and war. The 
typical socialist structure gave way, aided by the sanctions and war, to a drastic class 
distinction and the formation of a narrow stratum of the very rich. As discussed above a large 
portion of Serbian society was re-traditionalised in the sense that they had to rely on land and 
traditional ties, impoverished (officially a large group even lived below the poverty line), 
and/or pushed into the grey or black sectors of the economy. A large number o f  people 
emigrated, probably several hundred thousand only in the 1990s. Serbia also received an 
influx o f between 600 000 and one million refugees from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, which 
due to their uncertain situation provided a further recmiting base for cheap labour in the 
black-market sector. The deterioration in social standard and material life for the wider 
sections o f society damaged all ethnic groups, including the third of the population which is 
non-ethnic Serb (Kosovo excluded, the larger minorities particularly include Albanians in 
south Serbia, Muslims orBosnjaks in Sandzak, Hungarians in Vojvodina, Croats in parts of 
Vojvodina, Roma throughout, and others).
The old professional elite partly vanished as a middle class during the 1990s (only with some 
marginal recovery after 2001). In their place a new economic elite of entrepreneurs appeared, 
probably comprising more than half a million people (700 000 estimated). The old 
(socialist/communist) political elite survived through the 1990s, mainly transformed to a 
“national elite”, and managed to consolidate its positions and hold on to command positions it 
had before also over different sectors o f the economy (for example through the nationalisation
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of firms). In this manner the collective owner hierarchy continued in the 1990s. This was 
therefore also the case for the managers o f public companies who remained in their positions. 
Another stratum of the elite may be categorised as those who had formed private firms and 
operated in the favourable conditions provided by UN sanctions and breakdown of the legal 
order. Within this group many acquired their wealth through illegal or semi-legal means.” ’ 
This latter group includes some of the “new entrepreneurs”, but not all since many o f the 
“new entrepreneurs” are simply small-scale firm or shop keepers. Finally a small group of 
people created their wealth through purely illegal activities, as discussed above, through 
looting in the war-zones or smuggling for instance. Here, as discussed above, there have been 
strong links between the Mafia and the state. Generally we can conclude that there has been a 
wide redistribution of wealth during the Milosevic-period, 1986/87-2000, and the period of 
war and sanctions. As the larger sections of society were impoverished, a small segment of 
the population (comprising perhaps 2 %) received great wealth, primarily through illiberal 
means, while other segments were “reshuffled” and survived more or less successfully.
W ar as Social Transformation: Concluding remarks
The concept of ‘transition’ has remained dominant in the literature and analyses of Eastern 
Europe as well as the Balkans. Although having undergone a number o f changes in the 1990s, 
from ‘shock therapy’ towards more ‘gradualist’ approaches, it nevertheless maintains an 
implicit, and often explicit, linear and evolutionist assumption of a trajectory towards ‘liberal 
democracy and market economy’. A similar tendency is accommodated within the concept of 
‘social breakdown’, which is more often applied to regions experiencing war and conflict 
(post-conflict areas). True, the latter is often connected to a macro-structural framework with 
a focus on the processes of ‘marginalisation’ and ‘exclusion’ inherent in the global political 
economy, where ‘marginalised’ areas within global capitalism experience ‘break-down’.’ ®̂ 
However, it nevertheless implies an understanding that ‘broken down’ states and societies can 
be ‘re-constmcted’ according to a pre-scheduled vision of liberal democratic market order. As 
such it fails to capture the actually existing political projects which may be in place as a form 
of adjustment or adaptation to marginalisation.
There has been some change in the post-Milo§e\ ic period (after 2000), but this will not concern us here. See 
continuous surv ey projects by Mladen Lazic and others, thus far for example: Lazii, M & S. Cvejid (2005); 
Bolzic. S (2(X)5)
^'^Lazid,M(1995): 131
For e.xample: Kaldor, M (1999)
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By conceptualising the Yugoslav - and Serbian - case as a process of social transformation we 
avoid expectations of a schematic evolution towards market economy and liberal democracy, 
and draw attention to actually existing trends, political projects and political economy in 
Serbia within which current political and socio-economic struggles are taking place. In this 
chapter I have discussed the formation o f such a new political project, its form o f economy 
and the accompanied reshaping of society during the 1990s. I have argued that it must be 
understood in connection with the global political economic marginalisation, as well as 
macro-scope systemic changes, and thereby essentially as an adaptive project. I have further 
argued that the character of such adaptation is never straightforwardly inferred from global or 
systemic change, but must be analysed in relation to specific local conditions, prerequisites, 
and agency at the local political and social level and  in terms o f concrete strategies. In this 
context I have argued that the political project o f Slobodan Milosevic originated as a 
hegemonic formation in the late 1980s, prior to the introduction of multi-party competition 
and elections, but that ‘hegemonic erosion’ followed after a few years and that other 
techniques of maintaining the domination of the regime were then utilised. The contention has 
been that the profound social and economic changes were undertaken under a specific 
political formation within the context o f a specific opportunity structure, and that opposition 
to the project was disunited and outflanked. Certainly there would be more to say about 
opposition and resistance in Serbia during the 1990s, as expressed through political parties, 
strikes and demonstrations, non-governmental organisations or independent media. However, 
such opposition and resistance in Serbia do not directly concern the main arguments of this 
thesis, which will now turn strictly to Kosovo. In the next chapter we shall look at resistance 
and opposition to this project with a focus on Kosovo only. Essentially ethnic nationalist in 
character, the wider context of Serbia provided the necessary frame of reference. The regime 
of Slobodan Milosevic was eventually overthrown in 2000, and we shall give a brief account 
of this early in the next chapter, but the little more than a decade of his regime had a profound 
impact in all spheres o f society and social life and the same fundamental problems which 
faced Serbia and Kosovo a little more than a decade ago, remain with a substantial number of 
issues added to the list.
216
CHAPTER 7
ADAPTATION AND RESISTANCE IN A NEW SOCIAL FORMATION - Aspects of 
cohesion and fragmentation in Serbia proper and in Kosovo
Introduction
We have discussed in chapter 6 how the political economy, or illiberal economy, in Serbia in 
the 1990s brought a rapid social transformation of Serbian society. The advantages inherent in 
the self-management system eroded and with the formal economic decline privileges 
previously enjoyed by workers became even more difficult to fulfil than they had been during 
the economic crisis of the 1980s. The social contract and the old order eroded, while the new 
alliances between ‘elite networks’ and the workers brought no social security. With the rule of 
law and the social security system breaking down, reliance on clientelist and traditionalist 
forms of social relations came to completely outplay the role of institutions. However, where 
such networks earlier had been embedded in a functioning institutional and political economic 
framework (which to a large extent had functioned through such networks) society was now 
effectively atomized. Individual survival strategies prevailed over any previously existing 
solidarity. This pattern was however mainly characteristic o f Serbia proper. Among the 
Albanian population in Kosovo (and among Albanians in South Serbia and Montenegro) the 
strategies of adaptation and resistance were expressed as a direct ethnic clash with Serbian 
society. The persistence of clan-based social solidarity, rather than the comparatively looser 
form of clientelism existing among the Slavic population (perhaps with the exception of 
Montenegro where clan-based loyalties may have survived), constituted the social institution 
through which security was provided. Although Albanian opposition to the Serbian state did 
not originate under the Milosevic-regime (but rather the other way around - it preceded it and 
provided the fuel for Serbian nationalism to be instrumentalised by the regime) it was 
consolidated during the clash with that regime. Throughout the 1990s the ethnic dynamics of 
the conflicts in Yugoslavia took on a life o f their own and this was particularly severe 
between Serbs and Albanians where the ethnic distance was the farthest (religion, language 
and social structure were all different). For the Albanians the struggle against the Serbs now 
became a homogenizing factor and Albanianess was partly defined in opposition to what was 
Serb. Although the process of institutional break-down, national chauvinism and socio-
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economic crisis was the same throughout the region, effecting Serbs and Albanians alike, it is 
useful to highlight a contrast between resistance and adaptation in Serbia proper on the one 
side and among the Albanians in Kosovo on the other. Such a contrast enables us to see local 
variations in adaptation and resistance due to specific cultural and historical heritage, social 
structure and ethno-regional concentration. It further provides the several layers o f reflections 
and adjustments to the political project and economy of marginalisation and isolation.
In Serbia proper, one expression of this is material survival strategies, new forms o f 
entrepreneurship and illiberal forms o f  economy. Another reflection and adjustment is the 
responses to the regime that were manifested (by those who were not advantaged in the new 
society) through workers protests, trade union resistance, political parties, and NGOs. Some 
of these ‘oppositional’ forces received financial and moral support from abroad. Foreign aid 
agencies sought leverage for ‘democracy assistance’ and so forth in the local NGOs, 
oppositional media, and the independent trade union confederation 'Nezavisnosf as support 
for so called ‘civil society’. In Serbia proper the emphasis was often on what was perceived as 
‘democratic-oriented’ and ‘non-nationalist’ (anti-war) opposition to Milosevic. In Kosovo, 
where the whole ethnic Albanian community was in opposition, not only to Milosevic but to 
the Serbian state, foreign aid came to support the very ethnic community in opposition to the 
state. The conception of ‘civil society’ (discussed further in chapter 9), which once in the 
Greek sense had indicated a peaceful order governed by law, has in the twentieth centurty aid 
conception become a ‘thing’ or realm o f life institutionally separated from state institutions 
with the expectation of promoting democracy. The experience of Serbia and Kosovo
provides a particularly clear picture o f a process where what was meant to be the (re)birth of 
civil society turned out to be the renaissance of the ethno-national community. The 
destruction of the basic socialist production models in the whole European east, post- 
Yugoslavia included, and the rapid social transformation in Serbia in the 1990s clearly 
indicate a dimension of discontinuity. However, this is coupled with elements of continuity o f 
the ancien regime^ including its social values, thus emphasising that while there is no return to 
the self-management political economy or political ideology o f Yugoslavia, there was also no 
rapid break with its social, instututional, and political heritage, but rather a new configuration
Compare: Keane, J (1999) “Old Images, New Visions” in Skenderovic Cuk, N & M. Podunavac (Eds) (1999) 
“Civil Society in tlie Countries in Transition” Open Universit>' and Agencj' of Local Democrac>' Subotica, 
Subotica: p. 13.
Puhovski, 1  (1995): 123. Puhovski refers to this generally as a problem with the concept of “Civil Societ> ” in 
a “post-socialist” order. I wish here to contrast the ‘degrees’ of ethno-nationalist organisation and its 
‘institutional’ formation in what has been perceived as ‘civil society’ within Serbia and Kosov o.
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with many of the old elements maintained. Nevertheless, this configuration of nationalist 
ideology and illiberal economy must be labelled a ‘new order’.
The social, political and economic climate of this new order and the crisis constitute a very 
complex situation with complex processes. New resistance and opposition to the regime was 
bred in it, and it itself constitutes a part of the new social formation, but social disintegration 
and economic depravation and transformation also provides an explanation as to why the 
regime could remain in power for so long despite the catasptrophic consequences o f its 
performance. In Serbia the opposition at the political level was fragmented, weak and 
organisationally outflanked although there were considerable social protests and unrest at 
times. Tendencies towards a more united opposition came in 1998, and the regime responded 
with increased pressure on independent media and NGOs, but efforts were interupted by the 
NATO bombings in spring 1999 (March-June), which had the initial effect of strengthening 
Milosevic politically and allying people in a patriotic unity against the common enemy 
(western aggression). Towards the end o f summer 1999 opposition efforts were again 
reactivated and a growing alliance o f opposition parties organised mass meetings (August- 
September) with the demand for free and fair elections. In January 2000 the majority of 
opposition parties signed a ‘Platform for Democratic Opposition in Serbia’. There were a 
number of domestic complex factors drawing these parties together, and in addition it was 
now clear that the west no longer supported Milosevic (as had been the perception with the 
introduction of sanctions, with the negotiations for the Dayton Agreement, and with the 
eventual revival o f diplomatic relations after 1995). Outside the political party scene there 
was a growing opposition as well, with the initially very small but rapidly growing student 
movement ‘OTPOR’ (Resistance), the increasingly influential independent trade union 
confederation ‘Nezavisnost’ (Independence), and the NGO think-tank of market-liberal 
economists G-17 and its offshoots.^^^ A parliamentary opportunity for the opposition came 
with elections to be held in autumn that year. The processes of uniting the opposition and the 
combined/?«/5c/i/revolution in October 2000 are complex and will not be dealt with further 
here, but it should be noted that the sole unifying aim in the whole opposition movement, 
party as well as non-party, was to oust Milosevic from office. The eventual voter turnout at 
the elections was over 70 %, which marked a break from earlier elections as well as elections
Eventually ‘G-17 Plus’ (the number of original members was se\ enteen).
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held subsequently to date.^^ The united opposition won the elections on 24 September 2000 
with just over 50 % for the Presidency (with Vojislav KoStunica as candidate) and 43 % for 
the Federal Assembly. The regime immediately contested the results. The united opposition 
(‘DOS’) moved on cautiously, and held secret meetings with the special units o f the police in 
order to  ensure that these would not intervene as the opposition planned to take over 
parliament. Moreover, General Peri sic, who had been dismissed after an open disagreement 
with Milosevic in 1998, secretly organised a military unit that could fight against any police 
or army units if  they intervened against the opposition. The climate had now considerably
changed and the mass gathering of people on the streets, and their readiness to fight for their 
parliamentary victory, was stronger than it had been ever before, bordering on the threat of 
civil war.
In Kosovo, resistance was instead ethnically based against the entire Yugoslav / Serbian 
(Slavic) state as such, and the Albanians developed a completely parallel society, social and 
political life, throughout the 1990s, as response to the withdrawal of autonomy for that 
province. Albanian interaction with political and social life in Serbia proper was virtually 
absent. The development of a parallel society and parallel economy among the Albanians in 
Kosovo was, however local in appearance, a project with intimate international and 
transnational connections. It expresses a local path, or trajectory, of'globalisation' both in 
terms o f the opportunity structure that it is embedded in, through (the neo-liberal) capitalisms 
break-down o f the (Yugoslav) socialist model, and  in terms o f  the alternative form of 
adjustment to this opportunity structure with regard to character o f the economy and society it 
cultivated and in the transnational links it rested upon. Within this social formation the local 
power-struggle among the Albanians was higly affected through, and continguent upon, 
several international factors. These are here analysed together with the changes in internal 
Kosovo Albanian politics.
After having discussed the local forms of adjustment and resistance, the chapter continues 
with a brief commentary on the Rambouillet meeting, the so-called 'interim agreement', and
TIic oppositions strateg>% the various activities of the ‘DOS’ pam  alliance as well as the trade union 
confederation ‘Nezavisnost’ and oppositional organisations and movements, such as ‘OTPOR’ and ‘G-I7’, and 
the entire prelude to the bringing clown of the government merit a separate anah'sis. For some good accounts see 
the collection of articles in: Spasic, I & M. Subotic (2001) “R/evolution and Older. Seibia after October 2000”, 
Institute for Philosoph>’ and Social Theorj, Belgrade. For a thrilling account o f the 5 October pufscA/revolution, 
see: BujoSevic, D & I. Radovanovió (2001) “October 5: A 24 -  Hour Coup”, Second Edition, Press Documents 
10, Media Center, Belgrade.
Cf. IWPR Tribunal Update No 396,4 March 2005, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Londoa
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the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. This process constitutes the immediate prelude to the 
establishment o f an international protectorate in Kosovo, and the international diplomatic 
steps that took place here have had, and continue to have, an essential impact on the entire 
post-conflict reconstruction and governance operation in Kosovo.
Towards Separate lives in Kosovo: Parallel Society and Economy
As new political parties were formed throughout socialist Yugoslavia in 1990 and the years 
after, there emerged a number of new parties and organisations in Kosovo. This apparent 
pluralism however, just as elsewhere in socialist Yugoslavia, came with a strong ethnic- 
national bent. "̂^  ̂As ethnic polarisation increased between Serbs and Albanians, and the 
Serbian state pursued a policy of repression and strong ethnic discrimination in Kosovo, the 
whole political scene in Kosovo was forged and merged under the leadership of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. Following Skelzhen Maliqi, 
the LDK was formed as a pan-Albanian party, on the ethnic model, to comprise under it all 
kinds of associations, such as youth and women groups.^"*  ̂It actually projected itself as a 
movement rather than as a party. Although the party originally was intended to have branches 
throughout Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of autonomy for Kosovo blocked this development 
and confined it to Kosovo (the Albanians in Macedonia, for example, soon organised their 
own party). In Kosovo the LDK became hegemonic and rejected suggestions from other 
groups in Kosovo to first opt for démocratisation and only later pursue the issue of status for 
Kosovo. The LDK became the political umbrella for the Albanian movement and emerging 
parallel society. Just as with most other political parties in Serbia and other post-Yugoslav 
republics, it cannot be considered a political party in the western liberal sense, but rather as an 
authoritarian pyramid of power. The LDK was, following Maliqi, modelled on the Socialist 
Alliance (the party front organisation o f the League o f Communists in Yugoslavia) and, in
LDK (Democratic League of Kosova), The Agrarian Pait>' o f Kosova, The Social Democratic Party of 
Kosova, The Youth Parliament of Kosova, The Parliamentarian Part>̂  of Kosova, Tlie Party of National Unit}', 
The Liberal Part}' of Kosova, The National Democratic Party of Kosova, The Independent Trade Union of 
Kosova, Tlie Albanian Christian-Democratic Part}', Fomm of Albanian Intellectuals, The Green Movement of 
Kosova.
Maliqi, S (1998): 28
^  The LDK (Democratic League o f Kosovo) led by Ibrahim Rugova was established on 23 December 1989. Its 
founders mainly came from a background in the communist party'. The formation of other parties in Kosovo 
came only after the LDK had established a dominant position. The majority' o f the opposition to LDK sprung 
from the Association of Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (AYDI or UJDI).
Maliqi. S (1998): 30-34 and in passim 
Cf. Maliqi, S (1998): 34,37, and 239
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Kosovo, filled the gap of the disintegrated LCY. The LDK tended to concentrate on fighting 
political rivalry in Kosovo rather than taking on Belgrade. In the rapid ethnic polarisation the 
parallel society that developed must be considered an ‘ethnic society’ rather than ‘civil 
society’. The vast support for the LDK was based on solidarity in opposition to the Serbs. In 
this way the ethnification of politics in Kosovo resembles that of the other republics of former 
Yugoslavia.
The Albanian movement gathered momentum at the end o f the 1980s and even more so in the 
1990s. The nationalist fervour in Serbia proper, and the campaigns under Milosevic, spurred 
increasing ethnic unity among Albanians and an opposition to the state rather than just to the 
regime. Dusan Janie has suggested that a ‘trigger’ which generated emotional-political 
mobilisation o f the Albanians and prepared them for the complete boycott of state institutions 
was the ‘poisoning incident’ in 1990. "̂^  ̂This strange incident was the apparent poisoning o f 
some 7000 schoolchildren in some 13 communities in Kosovo. No investigation was allowed 
by the Serbian authorities, who blamed it on a form of mass hysteria, but the Albanian 
perception was that Serbs were poisoning their children.*"^* Some observers, including the 
federal president of the time, Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic (who became president of Croatia 
following Tudmans death in 1999 and HDZ’s loss o f power), thought it might have been 
caused by the chemical agent Sarin, which has been used in chemical weapons.
While the first half of 1990 saw violent demonstrations and brutal police countermeasures 
with the situation threatening to  spiral out of control, in the course of that year the Albanian 
movement was to change its activity and embark on a new political strategy. In January 1990 
some 40 000 demonstrators demanded abolishment o f the state of emergency, the liberation o f  
prisoners, and free elections. These demonstrations grew increasingly violent, with an equally 
violent response by the Serbian police forces, In February 27 demonstrators and one 
policeman were killed and 54 demonstrators and 43 policemen were w o u n d e d , I n  March
Janjic, D (1994); 156, also cited in Claik, H (2000) “Ch il Resistance in Kosovo” Pluto Press; 58 
^  Fora good account of how this incident, and others, have been perceived see Mertus, J (1999) “Kosovo -  
how myths and trutlis started a war” University o f California Press.
Clark, H (2000); 58
For these events compare: KostoviCova, D (1997); Maliqi, S (1997) and (1998); Clark. H (2000): Ch. 3; 
“Chronology of the Kosovo Crisis”, in “Europe”, No 4, January-February 1996, The European Mo^'ement in 
Serbia, Belgrade; 34-35; Vickers, M  (1998); especially Ch. 12. Names o f the dead were listed in CDHRF 
Bulletin, October-December 1997, Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms in Prishtina, see also 
Clark, H (2000): Ch. 3, footnote 29.
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some 7000 people were arrested.^^* The situation was threatening to spiral out of control. 
However, in spring, the Albanians changed strategy and embarked on a practice of peaceful 
resistance in line with the philosophy o f the peaceful protests initiated by the Albanian 
miners. Slowly the Albanians came to identify themselves in opposition to the Serbs - while 
Serbs were using violent-repressive measures the Albanians would use the opposite (non­
violence). This change was not preceded by any public debate or decision, but imposed by 
circumstances, and was initially equally surprising both to Serbs and Albanians.’’  ̂The new 
strategy was in effect the result o f a series of pragmatic decisions through 1988-90. As the 
Albanians were not armed they could not engage in direct confrontation. The idea o f a 
common enemy and a common goal became instrumental in unifying the Albanian rises. The 
phenomenon of blood-feud, still existing in Kosovo, was adressed in a campaign which 
started in 1990. Under the prominent figure Anton Qetta and with the support of around 500 
students and intellectuals, this campaign included visits to villages where families were 
involved in blood feuds, in order to persuade families to reconcile, eventually resulting in 
reconciliation between some 2000 families and about 20 000 released from house 
confinement.^”  It involved the visit o f ‘elders’ who had to give their besa to the 
reconciliation.
With the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and the subsequent wars, the 
strategy was to keep Kosovo out o f the conflict. Nevertheless the inter-republican conflicts 
between mainly Serbia and Croatia had a radicalising effect on the Albanian leadership. Being 
an autonomous province in Serbia would assume an entirely different meaning if the 
Yugoslav federation dissolved. In response to the withdrawal o f autonomy a session was 
held in Kacanik in September 1990. With a two third majority the representatives from the 
provincial Assembly passed the so-called KaÒanik Constitution demanding an independent 
Republic o f Kosovo. This was followed by a referendum for independence in September 1991 
and elections for a parliament and president in May 1992.^^^ These elections were however no
Janjic,D(1994): 155
Maliqi, S (1998): 100; KostoviCova. D (1997). Note that Kostoviiova uses the same article by Maliqi as a 
source, but in an earlier published \ ersion.
553 Maliqi, S (1994): 242; Clark, H (2000): 60-64; Vickers, M (1998): 248 
This is also why the stance of the international community' of “returning the status of the 1974 Constitution to
Koso\ o” was so unrealistic. The status given in that constitution was from a completely different context than 
that of a Yugoslavia comprised of sbe republics and nvo autonomous provinces with internal political dynamics 
where the republics could balance each other out. In a disintegrated Yugosla\ ia it would obviously ha\'e a quite 
different meaning.
The independent Kosovo would according to the official Albanian interpretation remain outside other 
Albanian territories. The request for unification, howe\-er, was common to all Albanian parties and groups. In
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more democratic than any other electoral ritual that was performed in the Yugoslav successor 
states during the 1990s. Formally the Kosovo Albanian parliament amended the Kacanik 
Constitution and declared Kosovo independent on 19 October 1991.^’  ̂ In April that year 
(1991) the parliament elected a Presidency with seven members, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, 
The Serbian police immediately issued arrest orders for the initiators o f “Republic” and the 
Albanian leaders fled the country to form an exile Government. Ibrahim Rugova was able to  
remain in Kosovo since the charges on him were dropped. The alternative political structure 
and government completely outside o f the Serbian polity, was thereby build up. In December 
1991 a “state treasury” of the Republic o f Kosovo was established in Switzerland, which had 
an important Albanian Diaspora, and Albanians refused to pay any further taxes in Serbia.
ParaUei Society
Although many elements o f the parallel society and its operation, in Kosovo during the 1990s, 
remain obscure, with little or no documentation or data, there are a few good accounts either 
by local writers or studies based upon them in combination with f ie ld -w o rk .M o s t figures, 
however, have to be based on estimations and educated guesswork, since there are no reliable
statistics. 559
The parallel system that developed through the 1990s, by the Albanians in Kosovo was 
largely built on institutions existing prior to 1990. They were, however, refined and extended 
as separate Albanian institutions completely parallel (or underground) to the state institutions 
in the course o f the increased state-repressive measures and the Serbian clampdown on
1990 Uie activities of tlie Albanians in Western Macedonia and Kosovo were politically linked, and during 
demonstrations in Tetovo that year students demanded “Greater Albania” (further Janjic 1994).
Dr Bujar Bukoshi was named Prime Minister after having been Secretary Geiwral in the LDK, which he was 
a co-founder of. On 23 December 1991 Kosovo applied to the European Union for recognition as an independent 
state, but was rejected. Through German pressure the EU came to use the territorial republican borders as a basis 
for recognising states, thereby ignoring the minorities within those borders. Macedonia was not recognised due 
to pressure from Greece. Germany wished to have Slovenia and Croatia recognised as independent and pressured 
other EU-members consequently resulting in  a deal made during the Maastricht discussions in December 1991, 
w here there should be EU-unitv’ towards recognitions. Greece accepted to recognise Slovenia and Croatia w ith 
the conditions that Macedonia was rejected. The UK accepted the approach in exchange for exceptions from the 
Social Charter, w hile southern EU-states received elements in the structural funds during the negotiations.
Cf. Chronology of the Kosovo Crisis, in “Europe” No 4, Jan-Feb 1996, The European Movement in Serbia, 
Europe Press Ltd. Belgrade: 38
A most useful source coming from inside the Albanian community is the collection of essays, w r̂itten 
throughout the 1990s, by the Albanian philosopher and publicist Skelzhen Maliqi, and collected in Maliqi, S 
(1998) “Kosova: Separate Worlds”, Dukagjini Publishing House, Prishtina. Tluough these essays it is possible to 
trace the changes in perception and attitude within the Albanian community. The accounts gi\'en by e.xtemal 
w riters, even if ethnographic field-w oik has been conducted, often utilize these w orks, for example Kostoviòo\'a, 
D (1997), as ŵ ell as interviews, for e.\ample Clark, H (2000).
Statistical pictures have been elaborated by statisticians in Belgrade, such as Bogosavijevié, S ( 1994) and by 
Albanians such as Islami, H (1994) and they do not always agree.
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existing institutions. These state repressive measures included for example: the dismissal of 
journalists from the Rilindja Publishing House in Pristina / Prishtina in 1989 (following their 
reporting from the miners strike); the dismissal of 220 journalists and 170 staff in 1990, and 
the closing of the Rilindja in 1990; the mass dismissal of thousands of Albanians from various 
institutions (including the teachers in schools and in the university); the storming and take­
over of radio-television; a number of discriminatory laws such as the “Law on Trade in Real 
Estate”, and the dismissal of workers in social-owned enterprises, including those in the 
Trepca mining c o m p l e x . I n  effect some 115-140 000 workers in various public institutions 
or socially owned enterprises were made unemployed.
While the proclaimed independent Republic was symbolic (its territory was controlled by 
Serbian police) the Albanians in Kosovo in the early 1990s came to resemble an organised 
and independent society. Its development was a response to increased Serbian repression and 
discrimination in the period 1990-92 when the Serbian parliament passed several hundred 
laws that in effect ended the autonomy of Kosovo in all spheres o f l i f e . T h e  framework for 
the highly repressive and discriminatory policy was laid out in the “Programme for 
Attainment of Peace, Freedom, Equality and Prosperity of the SAP of Kosovo”, adopted by 
the Serbian Assembly in March 1990.^^^
From the academic year 1991/92 Albanian students were expelled from the University of 
Pristina/Prishtina, and a law was passed in Belgrade that all education would be pursued in 
Serbo-Croatian. In response the Albanians formed their parallel Albanian-language university, 
which was established in November 1991. They also build up a network of primary and 
secondary education. Some Albanian pupils stayed in the regular primary schools, because 
according to Serbian law attendance was obligatory, but various techniques for segregation, 
such as division into ethnic shifts, were appl i ed .Overa l l ,  the absolute majority of pupils
^  Compare Vickers, M (1998): 246, and Ch. 12 in passim
Estimates of these figures vary, Maliqi (1997): 279, suggests 115 000 constituting three quarters of the 
employed.
Cf.KostoviCova.D(1997)
This programme pledged that all means w ould be used to pre\'ent any expression of (particularly Albanian) 
nationalism and it intended to stimulate the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to the pro\ ince. This programme 
came to sen'e as an ideological-political framework for the following laws and the measures taken to dismiss 
Albanians from all public institutions. Cf. KostoviCova, D (1997); Judah, T (2000) “Kosovo: War and Revenge’ 
Yale Universit)' Press: 62
^  Cf. KostoviCova D (2000) “Kosovo’s Parallel Sociert': The Successes and Failures of Non-Violence” in 
Buckley, W. J (ed) (2000) “Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan lnter\ entions” Cambridge: 142-148. In fact
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and students were moved into the parallel education system. The education system would 
become the largest independent system (ranging from pre-school to university) in the parallel 
society. In addition to this, the Albanians developed complete or partial networks of social, 
political, union, health-care, sports, media and cultural associations. A kind of social welfare 
system of solidarity funds was established to aid the most endangered groups, such as jobless 
miners in Trepca / Mitrovica. These solidarity funds were established largely with diaspora 
money from Western Europe, the United States, as well as Albanians in Croatia and 
Macedonia, but they also received contributions from within Kosovo itself Albanian 
humanitarian organisations, such as the Mother Theresa Association, and the trade unions, 
distributed food and firewood as well as cash.
The parallel institutions were generally financed through a parallel tax-system. This was 
based on a three per cent income tax o f all Albanians in Kosovo and those working abroad 
and additional funds were collected in Western Europe. There were also contributions from 
Albanians in Macedonia. The revenues from these sources financed the political elite and its 
activities as well as the social institutions. Based on media sources (Serbian ‘AIM’) Howard 
Clarke suggests that the bulk of the revenues were actually raised inside Kosovo and that only 
about a third o f the contributions came from the diaspora in Western Europe. The 
institutions o f the parallel system also required great acts o f  solidarity including reduced 
salaries or unpaid services. For the first couple o f years the teachers in the education system 
worked without payment, ju st receiving some union support but after 1993 they started to 
receive wages, which were then increased in 1997.^^^ The education system was a comer 
stone in the parallel society and it took the greatest part of the entire budget. Shkelzen Maliqi 
made the estimation that the annual budget must have been at least 50 million US dollars, but 
that probably less than half o f that money actually was collected.^^*
A number of problems existed within the education system. Maliqi has described how semi- 
professional teachers or professors could use the extreme situation to their own advantage and 
that conflicts between different groups resulted in among other things the publication of
the division into ethnic shifts had been applied in some areas during the socialist YugosIa\' period due to 
shortage of school space and due to that p i^ils were taught in different languages (Albanian or Seibian).
Maliqi, S (1998): 110 
^  Clark, H (2000): 103 
Clark, H (2000): 102 
^  Maliqi, S (1998): 115
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parallel Albanian literature and history textbooks.^® The quality of education certainly went 
down under these extreme conditions, but generally it was possible to maintain some form of 
education for Albanian youth and children, which constituted a considerable portion of the 
population.^™
The parallel structures in Kosovo were also partly financed from aid-money coming from 
Western donor governments and NGOs, although these sources must have been marginal. 
Through budget posts for so called ‘civil society’, financial support was given to local media 
(for example Koha Ditore), as well as to local NGOs, Service providing NGOs could also 
obtain support from other budget posts in the western aid industry.
Because o f the mass-dismissal of Albanians from various socially owned enterprises, the 
whole supply of goods and services became transferred to the informal sector (or alternatively 
the ‘private sector’). The traditional structure of Albanian society facilitated everyday 
survival, which relied heavily on extended family and village community solidarity. The role 
of diaspora remittances played a crucial role. Several hundred thousand Albanians living in 
Western Europe and the United States sent money to relatives. The income they could receive 
in the West from any type of work or even social welfare was considerable compared to the 
opportunities available in Kosovo and at least 30 % of the Kosovo Albanians depended on 
direct support from their relatives a b r o a d . M a n y  Albanians also worked seasonally in 
Eastern European countries including other ex-Yugoslav republics. Some Albanians worked 
in Croatia, for example in ice cream or pastry stands, during the season and then moved on 
elsewhere.^™ Even these remittances were a problematic source of income because after 1992 
and the imposition o f UN sanctions on Serbia, it was not possible to transfer any money via 
the banking systems. Money had to be brought, smuggled, or collected somehow. Travelling 
from Western Europe to Kosovo directly was not a good option, both for practical and 
political reasons (travellers had to avoid Serbia proper, and in case the individuals were 
asylum seekers in Western Europe they could hardly travel back where they fled from). 
Although diaspora remittances certainly provided an essential income for many families, they
^^Maliqi, S(1998): 116
The number of pupils and students -  from primai>' school to university -  was close to half a million. An 
estimation o f the number of pupils in 1994 suggested around 274 000 in elcmcntan’ school and 63 000 in 
secondari' school (uni\ crsity not included): Ahmcti, S (1994) “Forms of Apartheid in Kosovo” in Janjic, D & S. 
MaJiqi (eds) (1994) “Conflict or Dialogue” Subotica: 108-114
Maliqi. S (1998): 109 and 241
An Albanian friend o f mine supported his family primarily from the incomes of selling ice cream at a seaside 
resort in Croatia during the Iwliday season and there were man>' Albanians w ho did similar \\ orlc in Croatia.
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were by no means regular or easy to count on and the longer the individual asylum seeker or 
illegal immigrant stayed abroad the larger became the probability that he had to put priority 
on supporting a family of his own in the West.
The parallel structures provided a lifeline for Albanians in Kosovo in a period o f mass- 
dismissals, unemployment and general Serbian repression and discrimination and 
paradoxically there was even some apparent economic improvement in the first year. Fairly 
rapidly, however, the extreme conditions Kosovo Albanians were living underwent from bad 
to worse. At least 20 % of the population needed humanitarian aid and probably another 20 % 
left Kosovo. Most of the newborn children in Kosovo were delivered without professional 
medical assistance and there was a scarcity of medical and pharmaceutical supplies.^^'* For 
every year that passed the social and economic disarray increased and with it, so was also the 
frustration.
The three per cent tax rate was applied to all kinds o f business activity and even if  the tax was 
voluntary there was considerable social loyalty and pressure to contribute by those who could. 
The social structure o f Kosovo is one reason for this, but the external threat (from the Serbian 
state) and the common cause (independence) as well as the fact that tax collection was 
undertaken through a personal visit, all ensured a high or complete level o f solidarity (//oi 
contributing would cause embarrassment).^’  ̂Additional contributions above the three per 
cent were of course also welcome. Among the most lucrative business activity were the 
various forms o f smuggling and organised crime. According to estimates by the ‘Southeast 
European Legal Development Initiative’ (SELDI) the income from smuggling o f  drugs was, 
together with remittances from the diaspora, the most important pillar for financing the 
parallel institutions in Kosovo through the 1990s.^’  ̂Diaspora remittances as such provided a 
good opportunity for laundering money from criminal activity. We must therefore take a look
 ̂̂  These figures are estimates, and no figures in Kosovo for this period are certain. Compare Maliqi, S (1998): 
241 and in passim
Until 1990 over one third of the deliveries took place without medical assistance, but after 1990 the figure 
increased: see also Islami, H (1994) “Demographic Reality of Kosovo”, in Janjic, D & S. Maliqi (Eds) (1994) 
“Conflict or Dialogue” Open University, Subotica: 30-53 (p. 38).
Howard Clark has suggested that there were probably no direct threats or pressures involved, or at least that 
he did not find an>' evidence for it, but that there was considerable "social pressure', see Clark, H (2000): 241, 
footnote 36.
Southeast European Legal Development Initiatwe (2002) “Anti Corruption in Southeast Europe: First Steps 
and Policies” Center for the Study of Democrac)', Sofia; p. 13. The SELDI brings together various government 
organisations and e.xperts from tlie different countries of Southeast Europe. Reports can be obtained through 
www.csd.bg.
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at the nature of organised crime, black market and smuggling activity. However widespread 
this became in the whole post-Yugoslav (and South-East European) region there are some 
local variations in its characteristics.
Biack market and Albanian Mafia
Organised crime and black market activity expanded considerably through the 1990s and 
further after 2000. A condition that should be made transparent from the outset is that the 
nature of this sector provides particular methodological problems for anyone who wishes to 
study it.^^  ̂The sources used for the activities discussed here are primarily various European 
and international criminal intelligence services, NATO reports, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, as well as a number of ‘soft sources’. Taken together these sources 
probably provide a fairly reliable picture, or at least a plausible outline, of Kosovo Albanian 
and Albanian mafia, black market activity and organised crime.
The heroin trade established in the 1980s expanded considerably through the 1990s and 
further after 2000. The heroin primarily originates in Central Asia. After the US invasion of 
Afghanistan, the opium/heroin production in this country was revived and it is estimated that 
it stands for three quarters of world production.’^  The main transit route to Europe is via 
Turkey and then either through the northern route (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine,
Anthropological work is U pically not possible as access to the networks is highly restricted. Neither is it 
possible to conduct inter\ iews (these methods may c\ cn be dangerous). Witness statements arc \ cr> rare with 
regard to Ure Albanian mafia since the ncrivorks are tightly knit and based on kinship and follow certain codes of 
silence. In addition to various criminal intelligence reports (often based on police work which included 
confiscations, surv eillance, raids) I bclie\c that "soft sources' such as local media can be used. Local journalists 
have a continuous contact w ith, and insight into, the socict)- in w hich llicy w ork. Occasionally I liavc also 
referred to articles in international newspapers, but w hcievcr it lias been possible I Invc tracked the original 
source or oUienvise checked other sources for tlic same infonnalion. Used w ith care (and complementing 
different sources) it is possible to arrive at a fairly plausible picture of tlic sector. In am- case tlic value o f tlicsc 
sources may not be of any poorer quality’ than documents for an early historical m ent w here some sources may 
ha% e been destroyed on purpose, evidence distorted ct cetera: Compare the argument on similar t> pc of sources 
by Walston, J (1988) “The Mafia and Clientelism: Roads to Rome in Post-War Cabbria" Routlcdgc, London & 
New York.
Especially reports from: DIA (The Italian Anti-Mafia Directorate), from Bundcskriminalamt (the German 
Criminal Intelligence Agency), Kriminalundcrdttelsctjdnstcn (Sw edish Criminal Intelligence Sen ice). Interpol 
and Europol. A number of annual situation reports, activity reports and spccbl reports on Organised Crime or on 
Drug trade are public. See also South-East European Legal Development Initiative “Anti-Corruption in South- 
East Europe: First Steps and Policies”; NATO Parliamcntan Assembly - Sub-Conunittcc on Democratic 
Governance: Organised Crime, Dmg and Human Trafficking in Europe (report 2(X)3). By ‘soft sources’ I mean 
numerous articles in newspapers and magazines. Some UNMIK reports also mention the phenomenon. See also 
Vickers. M & J. Pettifer (1997) “Albanb -  From Anarchy to Balkan Identity" Hurst & Company; and Vickers M 
(1998). I ha^'e listed various websites in the reference list.
Cf, Boutin, C (2003) “Organised Crime. Drug and Human Trafficking in Europe. Report to the Sub­
committee on Democratic Governance for the NATO Parliamcntaa Asscmblv"
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Poland, the Baltics), the southern route (Iran, Pakistan, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, to 
European ports), or the Balkan route. The Balkan route is divided, either through Romania, 
Hungary and Slovakia or through Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania, through Croatia or across 
the Adriatic to Italy. The Albanian mafia controls a large part o f the heroin trade in Western 
Europe. By the late 1990s it was estimated that they controlled some 70 % o f the markets in 
Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Switzerland and Belgium and about 80 %  
of the Scandinavian market. A large Albanian diaspora was settled in Turkey in the 1950s. 
Heroin trade from Turkey through Albanian networks was established in the 1980s, with 
process laboratories existing also in Prishtina and with part of the Albanian intelligence 
service being involved in the trade for Western E u r o p e . A c c o r d i n g  to  reports by the Italian 
DIA the Albanian mafia initially operated in places were the Italian mafia had no business - in 
a kind of geographical division o f labour - but then increasingly took over branches to run 
whole businesses by themselves or worked in partnership with the Italian mafia. They have 
been tolerated and worked together with both the Cosa Nostra (Sicily), the ‘Ndrangheta 
(Campagnia), the ‘Sacra Corona Unita’ (Puglia), and the Camorra (Calabria), and they have 
continuously expanded their b u s i n e s s . S i n c e  the 1990s they provide drugs on a vast scale to  
the Italian mafia. In addition to the strengthening of the traditional heroin trade, the 
Balkans also became a main transit area for South American cocaine during the 1990s. The 
Albanian mafia operates in all fields o f smuggling, which include: arms trade, human 
trafficking, cigarette smuggling, and narcotics (heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs, cannabis).
C Q f
Some estimates suggest that the value o f  this is about 2 billion US dollars per year.
It is estimated that 20 % of the world trade in small arms takes place through criminal 
networks, with a value o f 1 billion US dollar / year.^^^ The fall o f the communist dictatorship
Ibid: estimates by Interpol; compare: bi-annual activity reports by DIA (Italian Ministry o f Interior); Ciluflb, 
F & G.Salmoiraghi (1999) “And tire Winner is .. .the Albanian Mafia” Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Massachussets Institute o f Technologj'. Many different reports must be based upon the same original 
sources, such as Interpol estimates and studies by various national criminal intelligence agencies.
Cf. Vickers, M (1998): 225 (with sources from Interpol)
For the following see tlie various DIA bi-annual reports on activity and results: “Ministero Dell’ Interno -  
Direzione Investigativa AntiMafia: Attività Svolta e Risultati Conseguiti” from 1999 onwards (available in 
English).
See DIA report on activity and results for first half 2002; cf. for example: Galeotti. M (1995) “The drug threat 
from Eastern Europe”, Jane’s Intelligence Review”, Nov 1995,
See especially the DIA report on activity' and results for the second half 1999:29.
For example: United States Senate Republican Policy Committee (31 March 1999) “Report onKLA Dmg and 
Criminal L iras’’ at: wu u- .koso\ o .confmc2.html (entered 22 Febnian' 2005); Jerry' Seper, “KLA finances war 




in Albania and the anarchy that followed in the years 1991-92 and then again after the fall of 
the pyramid games in 1997 gave rise to the movement of considerable quantities of arms. The 
Albanian mafia provided its Italian counterparts (the Cosa Nostra, the Camorra, the 
'Ndrangheta, and others) with relatively cheap amis and explosives.’^̂  The Albanian mafia 
has further been heavily involved in human trafficking, both in terms of illegal immigration 
and for forced begging or prostitution, and possibly also in human organs. Of an estimated 
500 000 women being trafficked every year up to 200 000 travel through the Balkans.^** The 
Albanian mafia holds the bulk (about 65 %) of this trade. In London alone it is estimated that 
some 18 million Euro per year was send back to Albania from the income of prostitution. 
Similarly the DIA estimates that the bulk o f the income from criminal activity in Italy is 
reinvested in the Albanian homeland and that very little is used for reinvestment in Italy, 
except some for purchasing real estate to be used as operation b a s e s . S o m e  estimates 
suggest that the value of the drug-trade alone could be in the range o f US$ 1 billion 
annually. Taken together this provides for a considerable flow o f resources back to Albania 
proper, and Kosovo and Macedonia’s Albanian part. Albanians from Kosovo started to play 
an important role in the Albanian economy in the 1990s, when many of them left the difficult 
situation in Kosovo for the new opportunities made available in Tirana after the fall o f the 
communist dictatorship there. Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer describe how Kosovo 
Albanians and returning American-Albanian émigrés became ‘big fish in a little pond’ as 
Albania was opened up, and how they made use of their large extended family-networks and 
international connections to develop their economic interests.^^^ This included buying up state 
owned companies when they were privatised and then, in many cases, using them for money 
laundering and as front companies for organised crime. Albania was underdeveloped and 
backward, even compared to Kosovo, and when it became more open the Kosovo Albanians 
sought out opportunities for commerce there. The increased contact between Albanians in 
Kosovo and in Albania revealed the differences that had been created after living in different
For example DIA report on activity and results second half 1999: 29
The source for the following statements on prostitution is the NATO report by Boudin. C (2003).
DIA report on activity and results second lialf 1999: 30
Compare Galeotti, M (1995) “The dmg threat from Eastern Europe”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Nov 1995; 
Hislopc, R (2001) “The Calm Before the Storm” Paper presented for tlie Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, San Fransisco. California. Hislopc provides estimated figures for how much tlic 
KLA collected through heroin trade. He further suggests the figure of USS 400 billion annually for tlie total 
global trade of the whole business.
Vickers,M&J.Pettifer(1997): 159
Xhudo. G (1996) “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity” in “Transnational Organised 
Crime” Voi 2, No 1, Spring 1996: 1-20, Frank Cass, London.
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States during most of the twentieth century and contributed to intra-Albani an tensions. The
net^^'orks o f smuggling and of organised crime, which exploited the markets in Western 
Europe, were thus established and operating throughout the Albanian lands (Albania proper, 
Kosovo, Macedonia), and revenues flowed back to them for ‘reinvestmentVcirculation in all 
these areas, rather than just to any particular country or region. It is in the nature of this form 
of economy that it operates around trans-national networks that defy the territorial limits o f 
the state and even utilise the existence o f state-borders as an additional source for (overhead) 
earning.
Several factors contributed to the expansion of smuggling and of the black economy during 
the 1990s. War and sanctions constitute an important base for this economy. New state 
borders, international sanctions, and political instability formed a new structure of opportunity 
for the expansion of smuggling networks and routes. Here, the integration of criminal 
networks and state apparatus became essential, since smuggling was necessary in, for 
example, providing society as well as the military with oil and petrol. The break-down of the 
Soviet Union, and the whole communist East, created new borders, unemployment, a 
withering security service and so on, which became essential building material for a new form 
of economy based on trans-border trade, trade in illegal goods and services, and illegal trade 
in legal goods and services throughout the area o f central Asia to Europe. While much of 
arms-trade, oil-petrol smuggling, and cigarette smuggling expanded in Yugoslavia during the 
war, some other sectors, such as the ‘heroin-trade’ were ‘re-routed’ towards the south, where 
the Albanian mafia could take over and simply utilise the earlier trading routes it had 
established for human trafficking (which in the early days was refugees, rather than 
prostitutes). The collapse o f  the Albanian state, first in the early 1990s, then after 1997, 
created new ground for especially the trade in arms. During the 1990s the Albanian mafia 
established itself as one o f  the most powerful crime syndicates in the world, through 
expansion and consolidation in the region, in Europe and the United States, and with links to 
certain segments of political (or opposition) power in Albania, Kosovo and the Albanian part 
of Macedonia.
The Albanian mafia differs from Serbian or other South-Slav organised crime networks in 
social structure. Whereas other criminal networks in the Balkans are based on clientelism and
593 Compare Vickers, M & J. Petlifer (1997): Ch. 8
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throughout the 1990s have been developed with strong links to the state and security 
apparatus as well as the political elite (and often operated directly from them), the Albanian 
mafia is even more tightly knit through extended family and clan relations. This makes it 
particularly difficult to infiltrate and to obtain witness statements against it. Like the code of 
silence in the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Albanians have their code for how to solve disputes 
between families or clans. In this sense the term ‘mafia’ (as with the Sicilian origin) is 
particularly appropriate as opposed to elsewhere in the Balkans where the term ‘organised 
criminal networks’ would be more accurate. Recruitment into the Albanian mafia is however 
not restricted to family members when it comes to the lower levels and outer circles o f the 
network; but the ethnic basis remains important. Non-family or clan member Albanians, who 
share the same culture and the respect for besa (word o f honour / oath) are recruited, but 
never into the inner circle. In the cooperation with other networks, the ethnic dimension 
provides no obstacle and the Albanian mafia has a well-established business with Kurdish, 
Italian, Croatian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and other criminal networks.
Albanian smuggling and organised crime operations have been developed with members of 
the Sigurimi, the former Albanian security service, but is strictly controlled by fifteen 
families. The Mafia should be distinguished here from all the numerous criminal gangs that 
flourished during the crime wave in Albania in 1991-92.^’̂'̂  They typically have no connection 
with each other and the interests of the Mafia are not necessarily compatible with the criminal 
gangs. The latter may rather be a nuisance to the Mafia.
In contrast to most of the Yugoslav successor states, were criminal organisations were linked 
to the state apparatus, in Kosovo they were a part of the political opposition to the state. 
Nevertheless, just as in all the former Yugoslav republics, they were linked to a political 
project with ambitions to mono-ethnic state building, and they expanded into areas where 
opportunities were available when the formal economies and industries were on the verge of 
ruin and removed from any possibility to compete in the global economy. The result o f this 
kind of economy, just as in Serbia, has been a considerable concentration o f resources in some 
groups and networks, whereas the largest part of the population have faced poverty or even 
extreme poverty. At the same time it has been exactly this kind of economic opportunity,
For a good account see Vickers, M & J. Pettifer (1997): 128-130; Cf. Xhudo. G (1996)
On poverty see further cliapter 8 and ihe reference to the initial (2000) poverty assessments by the WB and
UNDP.
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which has been able to provide resources and security for some people, albeit on the basis o f  
new and strict criteria for exclusion and inclusion: notably on the principles o f first kin and 
clan, and then on ethnicity. Moreover, it has provided certain Albanian clans and networks 
with resources and power, which they have been able to utilise in an internal political power- 
struggle against other networks in Kosovo. This will be discussed further below in relation to  
the rise o f the Kosovo Liberation Army and its power struggle with the LDK leadership.
Further characteristics o f the parallel society
In practice, the system of ‘parallel life’ was facilitated by the character of the ethnic structure 
in Kosovo, While all (at the time) 22 municipalities in Kosovo were ethnically mixed 
according to the 1981 census (only two had a Serb majority and all others had an Albanian 
majority) the settlements inside them became increasingly ethnically h o m o g e n o u s . T h e r e  
was an increasing physical separation, with certain exception o f the larger towns. The v e ry  
physical and geographical segregation between the ethnic groups therefore facilitated the 
practical functioning of the system since daily contact to some extent could be avoided.
Serbian authorities tolerated the self-organisation o f Albanian society, but halted all attem pts 
to build para-state or state institutions. To this end they obstructed the constitution in 1992, 
broke up the union of Albanian policemen, prevented the foundation o f a Kosovo Chamber o f  
Commerce, and prosecuted a group that attempted to organise a defence ministry.’’^
Ironically the status quo could be preserved in Kosovo for years due to the separation of the  
state and society. Serbian authority rested upon force, with a small privileged group in state 
institutions, while the Albanian ethnic majority had established all its own structures. D uring 
the 1990s the situation can be described as a complete conflict between the state and the ev e r 
better organised Albanian national community.
While it is tempting to describe the development in Kosovo as a system of Apartheid, it is 
worth noting that it was different from the South African experience. In South Africa separate 
official institutions were built up, by the state, for different groups to segregate the black and 
the white population. There were also strict rules for how, and in which areas, the whites
Statistics from Bogosavljevic, S (1994)
Tliis was also reflected in even day life, such as in which cafés the>' used and in public transport (for example
Serbs travelled in trains and Albanians in buses). 
^^M aliqi,S(1998); 184-185
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could co-operate with the blacks. In Kosovo there were no such rules but rather a chaotic and 
repressive policy, which eventually produced two parallel societies.
The policy of Milosevoc and the Government in Serbia never aimed at creating separate 
institutions but at taking over, maintaining and controlling existing institutions from which 
the Albanians were marginalised and excluded; it aimed at domination through the existing 
structures without creating seperate ones. This resulted in an Apartheid-like situation, but 
where the Albanians themselves developed a completely independent society from below in 
protest to, and out of the control of, and thereby in conflict with, the state. In this respect 
resembles the Palestinian situation more.^^^ There was in fact strong pressure from the 
dominant LDK party upon all Albanians not to have any contact with the Serbs. Strong social 
control was exercised so that Albanians who had contact with the local Serbs, or made any 
moves resembling dialogue, received warnings from the LDK. Serbian policy in Kosovo was 
much less elaborated, and much more arbitrary, than it was in the South-African case. The 
strategy o f ethnic cleansing as an instrument for building territory was not initially developed 
by Milosevic, but rather something that was accepted in due course in order to maintain 
power. The repressive measures were however not only a means to control the province, but 
probably included aspirations to encourage Albanians to leave the province, which some of 
them did.
Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK had a strategy that non-violent resistance from the Albanian 
side, which developed through circumstances, would attract sympathy within the international 
community and in particular from the EU and US. The direct aim was to internationalise the 
issue and passive resistance was the tool. While the Albanians were buying time, they 
believed that they had reason to expect support for their cause. This strategy was the primary 
reason why it was possible to maintain the status quo through the first half o f the 1990s. The 
Albanians had no capacity for military resistance and, they believed, no reason for embarking 
on a violent strategy, whereas from the point of view o f Belgrade there was no casus belìi as 
long as the status quo was maintained and the Kosovo knot did not burst.
^  This is in fact more or less also how it came to be \iewed in Belgrade. Maria Todorova has added a 
comparison with the Kurdish situation: Todorova, M (2000) “The Balltans: From Im cntion to Interv ention” in 
Buckley, W. J (Ed) (2000) “Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Inter\entions”, Cambridge: 159-169
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Diaspora, Pan-Albanianism and relations with Albania proper: the hopes for support for  
independence
The role of the Albanian diaspora in the economy of Kosovo has already been mentioned and 
it had an equally important role in politics. Some Albanian groups, especially those living in 
Switzerland, were well organised and politically radical. Estimations o f the size of the 
Albanian diaspora in Switzerland at different periods throughout the 1990s vary between 30 
000 and above 100 000, depending on whether one counts only those from Kosovo or include 
all Albanians and whether one include estimates for illegal immigrants or not.^“  Germany 
also had a large Albanian diaspora (more than 100 000), as did Scandinavia, but the largest in  
a single country was in the United States (between 250 000 -  500 000).^”* Diaspora networks 
played a crucial role in lobbying for the Albanian ‘cause’ (especially in the United States 
Senate) as well as in the financing o f  political parties, organisations, and parallel institutions. 
Albanians from Kosovo also played an increasing role in the political and economic life o f  th e  
Albanian state (Albania proper) during the 1990s.^**  ̂There were probably around 100 000 o r  
so Kosovo Albanian young men who escaped conscription into the JNA during this period, 
and many of them left Kosovo either for Albania proper or for Western Europe. Before th e
elections in Albania proper in March 1992 the oppositional ‘Albanian Democratic Party’ (D P ) 
announced that, if  it gained power, it would work for the unification o f all Albanian lands in to  
a greater Albania. From then on the Kosovo Albanians, and especially the diaspora, started to  
play an important role in Albanian politics by supporting and financing the ‘Democratic 
P a r t y T h e  northern Gheg Albanians had much closer ties to Kosovo than the southern 
Tosks did, and the increased connections between Kosovo Albanians and Albania proper 
contributed to internal divisions inside Albania itse lf When the Democratic Party gained 
power and Sali Berisha became President of Albania, expectations were running high among 
the Kosovo Albanians that they would receive external and even direct military support.
^  For example Maliqi, S (1998): 109, mentions 30 000 asylum seekers alone, whereas Vickers. M & J. Pettifler 
(1997): 152 suggest 100 000 Kosovars in Switzerland (the figure for Albanians if those from Albania proper arc 
included might be higher).
Compare for example the figures given in Vickers, M (1998): 272; Maliqi, S (1998): 109; see also Vickers, M  
& J. Pettifer (1997): Ch. 8 and Judah, T  (2000): p. 69. For the Albanian-American community see Nazi. F (2000) 
“Balkan Diaspora 1: The American-Albanian communiy” in Buckley, W. J (ed) (2000) “Kosovo: Contending 
Voices on Balkan Inter\^eniions". Cambridge: 149-152
Vickers, M & J. Pettifer (1997): Ch. 8
Cf: Maliqi, S (1998); Vickers, M & J. Pettifer (1997); Vickers, M (1998); Sevdije Ahmeti (1994) “Forms o f 
Apartheid in Kosovo” in Janjic, D & S. Maliqi (1994); 108-114. Ahmeti estimated tliat 17.000 Albanians w ere 
endangered for conscription every year.
Vickeis, M & J. Pettifer (1997):' Ch. 8
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Taken together with the Albanian lobby in the United States and with the non-violent 
resistance strategy, these factors all contributed to create a sense o f hope among the Kosovo 
Albanians that they would soon receive external and international attention and support in 
their struggle against Serbian repression. This psychological factor of relief did not last long 
though, because the DP in Albania -  once they were in power -  had to put priority on security 
in and for Albania itself, rather than engage in any conflict escalation with Serbia.
Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer have described the tensions this created between the 
Albanian DP and Kosovo Albanian leaders as well as between DP and certain diaspora 
g roups . Fo l l owi ng  Vickers and Pettifer, the DP in Albania were in a difficult position, since 
they relied on diaspora support and funding from circles which were quite radical with regard 
to the idea of unification of Albanian lands and on support for Albanians living in Kosovo.
The DP shifted its position a number o f times, but by 1994 started to urge Albanians in 
Kosovo to enter into a dialogue directly with Belgrade. The preconditions for a dialogue 
remained extremely difficult though. The Kosovo Albanians had declared independence and 
rejected any part in Serbian institutions as well as dialogue, and from Belgrade there was an 
equal absence of interest in discussion with the Albanians -  the interest was just to control the 
province. In addition there was the problem of representation and oiwhom  to have the 
dialogue with; the Serbian government was not interested in allowing Ibrahim Rugova to 
represent the Albanians, since that would have implied a recognition of the Kosovo Albanian 
parliament and president.^®®
The idea o f unifying Kosovo and Albania lived on, but was occasionally played down by the 
leadership, which nevertheless remained firm on the position o f an independent state. In 1996, 
Skelzhen Maliqi, a political moderate who also favoured unification, gave an interview to the 
independent radio station B 92 in Belgrade, in which he suggested that the road to 
independence could go via the introduction of an international protectorate and that after some 
twenty years of protectorate Kosovo could become independent.^®^ The position of the whole 
Kosovo Albanian leadership, often repeated by the President Ibrahim Rugova, was that an 
international protectorate was the only possible solution for Kosovo.
Vickers. M & J, Pettifer (1997): C1l7; compare Judah, T (2000): 96-97 
^  Formally, from the Seibian point o f view, tlie LDK as a political paii>' was quite legal but not the Albanian 
election of parliament and president.
Tlic interview is reprinted in Maliqi, S (1998): 222-261
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intra-Albanian disputes and change in strategy: From Dayton to KLA or Attention through 
violence
Although the LDK held a dominant position among the Albanians in Kosovo, and effectively 
marginalised any opposition, the strategy was not undisputed. Especially from autumn 1994 
there were growing divisions both within the LDK and with the smaller parties such as the 
Liberals and the Peasants Party. A split developed with a more moderate group advocating 
that autonomy within the new Yugoslavia was acceptable. There was also an increased 
opposition to the LDK dominance o f local government.^®* After the resignation of a number 
of leading moderates in the LDK in October 1994, a division started to escalate between 
moderates and ’’independentists” not only in Kosovo, but throughout the diaspora (especially 
in Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S).^®^
A particularly radical group in the diaspora existed within the so-called ‘popular movement 
for the republic o f Kosovo’ (LPRK), which had been founded in 1982. Most members in the 
LPRK had joined the LDK in 1990, but its most militant faction had founded the ‘popular 
movement o f Kosovo’ (LPK).®'® Members of this group existed in the diaspora in Sweden, 
Germany and Switzerland, and out o f this group grew the KLA, which was formed in the 
period 1992-1993.^^* It is important to distinguish between the KLA and the PARK (the 
armed forces o f the Republic o f Kosovo). The latter was the military arm of the government 
in exile, and was controlled by Bujar Bukoshi. It was primarily funded through the 3 % tax 
that was collected within the diaspora, it gathered former Albanian JNA officers, and was 
intended as the embryo o f a future army. This was quite distinct from, and had initially 
nothing to do with, the KLA. There were even clashes between the KLA and PARK during 
1998-99, but as the KLA received greater support, locally and internationally, parts of the 
PARK were eventually incorporated under the KLA umbrella. Although a first armed attack.
Vickers, M (1998): 281
Compare Vickers. M (1998): 281 onwards.610Judah. T (2000/)) “A History of the Kosovo Liberation Army” in Buckle)’, J. B (Ed) (2000) “Kosovo: 
Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions”, Cambridge: 108-115 
' Compare Judalv T (2000 by, Thaqi, H (2000) "Kosovo”. Judah claims that the KLA was formed by four 
members during a series of meetings in 1993. Hashim Thaqi. one of the KLA leaders, claims that it was formed 
in 1992. Apparently several meetings in Macedonia as well as in Switzerland (Zurich) preceded its formation. It 
should be noted that the KLA was in hiding for some time during the formative years, and altliough claiming 
responsibilit)' for some killings the very existence of the organisation was denied by the LDK. The LDK 
sometimes blamed the Serbian security forces for inventing the KLA in order to discredit the Albanian non- 
\'iolence resistance. After 1999 manv' Albanians came to see the KLA as liberators o f Kosovo, or otherwise had 
reason to a  ̂oid am discredit from the KLA. and there may be se\ eral indi\ idual motives for claiming a stake in 
Uie organisation (or at the time o f its foundation, its relevance during its early period et cetera)
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for which the KLA claimed responsibility, took place in Glagovac in 1993, the organisation 
had a very marginal existence with few members and little support until autumn 1995.®‘  ̂ It 
drew its collaborators mainly from the diaspora and a few clans, with concentration in the 
Drenica area, which is the region from where Hashim Thaqi, one of the co-founders and 
leaders o f the KLA, originates. Drenica is also among the poorest regions in Kosovo. It has 
been a widely accepted assumption, allegedly in many intelligence services, that it was these 
same clans that controlled much of the heroin trade and thus financed the organisation 
through, among other things, drug-trade and smuggling.^*^ A report by the ‘U.S Senate 
Republican Policy Committee’ (RPC) from 1999 refers to newspaper articles, which state that 
about half o f the funding for KLA came from the drug-trade and that around 900 million 
German Marks (of which half was drug-related) had reached Kosovo since the beginning o f 
the guerrilla campaign.^*"^ While any such estimates should be treated with caution, it must be 
considered quite obvious that the Albanian criminal networks operating throughout Europe 
and the United States in drug and arms trade, both had substantial financial resources 
available and a considerable stake in the political and security situation in Kosovo. Indeed this 
territory has been essential to their trading business. The RPC further draws on reports by the 
Paris-based ‘Geopolitical Observatory o f Drugs’, which identified belligerents in the former 
Yugoslav republics and Turkey as key players in the regions accelerating drugs-for-arms 
traffic.®”
In 1997 tlie Count>' Court of Prishtina held Adem Jashaii responsible forlliis attack. Jasliari oiganised his 
separate group, w hich was later included in the label ‘KLA’. Jashari was eventually killed, along with many 
members of liis clan, in the Drenica massacre on 4 March 1998 (See further below).
Numerous reports and claims have been made on this point and several dozens of articles on the topic, both 
from academic journals and ne^\'spapc^s, are collected in a u ebsite for im estigative journalism ‘Balkania.net’: 
hlin://menibcrs,triiX)d.coiiiBalkania/rcsources/terrorism/1<la-drugs.htnil (entered 8 October 2004). The site also 
includes articles on the stated connections between the KLA and Al-Qaeda. Sec also: United States Republican 
Policy' Committee (31 March 1999) “The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with 
Terror, Drug Ties?, www.kosovo com/rpe,litm (entered 18 October 2004); “The Albanian Cartel: Filling the 
Crime Void”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1995; “Life intlie Balkan ‘Tindeibox’ Remains as 
Dangerous as E\'er”, Jane’s Intelligence Re\ icw, 1 March 1999; “The Balkan Medellin”, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, 1 March, 1995; and Raufer, X (2002) “At the heart of the Balkan clraos; The Albanian Mafia”: 
www.xavier-raurer.coiti''english 5.ohp (entered 2 Febmary 2005). Hashim Thaqi denies any such allegations in 
the interview' “Tlie KLA Brought NATO to Kosova” in Buckley, J. W (2000); 282-290.
United States Republican Policy' Committee (31 March 1999) “The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton 
Policy' Support Group witli Tenor, Drug Tics?, www .kosovo.com/rpc.htm (entered 18 October 2004); p. 6-7 
RPC “Reports on KLA Drug and Criminal Links” : w v\ w .koso  ̂Q.com/roc2.htnil (entered 22 February' 2005); 
Cf; articles by Jerry' Seper “KLA finances war with heroin sales”, Washington Times, May 3, 1999 at: 
http://mcmbcrs.tripod.com./~sarant 2,/ksl8kla.html: and “Bin-Laden & KLA”, Washington Times. May 4,1999.
at: Avww.diaspora-net.org/food4thoughtybinladen_^kla.htm (both entered 22 Fcbruaiy 2005). These articles refer
to figures in the range of 1.5 billion US Dollars in drug profits being laundered annually by tlicse criminal 
networks.
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The KLA’s explicit agenda not only featured an independent Kosovo, but also the unification 
of all Albanians into a ’Greater Albania’, On a map published by diaspora groups in Sweden 
in the late 1990s this includes large parts o f Macedonia (including Skopje), south Serbia, the 
Sandzak, a good part of Montenegro (including Podgorica) and parts o f Greece. The KLA had 
a complicated ideological composition, one side derived from fascist ideology and the other 
from Marxist-Leninism.^*® The Marxist-Leninist tradition was rooted in the Albanian 
Movement as such through its development between 1968-81. Many o f the Marxist-Leninist 
groups in Kosovo disappeared, however, after 1990 and the fall of Enver Hoxha in Albania. 
Until autumn 1995 the KLA and other radical groups were effectively marginalized by the 
Rugovian leadership.
An important change in strategy in the whole Albanian movement came in 1995 and was the 
direct effect o f the ‘perception shock’ received from the Dayton Agreement. The issue of 
Kosovo and o f Serbian-Albanian relations was almost entirely ignored in Dayton. In the 
international community the problems in Kosovo were treated as a human rights issue, 
although Rugova repeatedly had stated that the Albanian aim was independence.^*’
The Albanian interpretation o f Dayton was that ethnic cleansing was legitimised (that is, the 
different entities in Bosnia-Hercegovina had been created through ethnic cleansing, and a 
precondition for Dayton was the elimination of Krajina -  and the Serb minority in Croatia -  
thereby legitimising ethnic clensing as a method for state-building).
In Dayton the question o f parallel relations (Banja Luka - Belgrade, and the connection of the 
Bosnjak/Muslim-Croat federation with Zagreb) was left open and in the Albanian perception 
this would also legitimise similar relations between for example Pristina/Prishtina and Tirana. 
Most important though was the message the international community sent, that there had to be 
a war if Kosovo were to get any attention. Here the Albanians had pursued a policy of non­
violence and now they were completely ignored. Instead, despite Kosovo Albanian protests.
Compare Judali, T (20006); on ideological roots of the Albanian movement see Maliqi, S (1998) m passim.
The good-will Rugova received in the West could from his point of view be interpreted as support for the 
Albanian claims, but strangely enough it w as almost as if the Western leaders and diplomats did not belie\ e that 
he was serious about those claims. They either ignored the meaning of them or believed that they could make 
Rugova change his mind. Leaving Kosovo out o f the Dayton process was necessary in order to have any result at 
all from Dayton, but it immediately transferred the conflict to Kosovo, just as the conflict had been transferred to 
Bosnia after the international recognition o f Slovenia and Croatia (and the invitation to Bosnia to hold a 
referendum on the issue of independence). By ignoring the region as a whole, and dealing w ith issues on a case 
by case -  country by country -  basis, the international policy actually stimulated a chain reaction of conflicts in 
the post-Yugoslav space.
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the EU unconditionally recognised FRY, while Germany started to repatriate 130 000 Kosovo 
Albanians to Serbia.^^^ It became obvious that the western powers intended to insist on 
ignoring the interconnections in the region as a whole, and instead merely deal with one 
selected problem at a time. To most Albanians the message was quite clear; i f  they were to 
receive any attention from the international community, they had to produce a war and 
humanitarian crisis, just as in Bosnia.
In fact Dayton had a direct impact on the Albanian elite in that it now became highly doubtful 
whether Rugova’s non-violence strategy would ever have any serious results at all. Ibrahim 
Rugova himself was in complete shock after Dayton, as it was a direct deathblow to LDK’s 
policy. At the same time it was still a problem to mobilise enough arms for a direct 
confrontation with the Serbian police, as the latter frequently raided Albanian houses in 
search of weapons. In 1997 the leaders o f the student union were elaborating a strategy o f 
“active non-violent resistance” as opposed to “passive”, and suggested the occupation of the 
university buildings.^'®
As a direct consequence of Dayton there was now a radicalisation and increased polarisation 
within the Albanian elite. Ibrahim Rugova was criticised from various stands as being too 
authoritarian in style, as being too single-minded in his strategy (some suggested he should 
have a more realistic strategy and lower the demands concerning the status o f Kosovo to a 
republic within Yugoslavia). The polarisation was not reduced by the fact that Rugova in 1996 
simply extended the mandate o f the parliament for another year. This mandate was otherwise 
supposed to expire in 1996.
The split formed and consolidated around three preferences: activist, pacifist, and militant. 
Rexhep Qosja (a literary historian and leading intellectual) challenged Rugova and opted for a 
Kosovo Intifada. Adem Demaqi favoured a confederal solution and suggested the 
construction of “Balkania”, an association o f sovereign states with Kosovo, Serbia, 
Montenegro (possibly also Bosnia and Albania), and perhaps a confederalised Serbia with 
Vojvodina and Sandzak. However, after Dayton it was the militants who had the strongest
61S Trocbst, M (1998) “Conflict in Kosovo; Failure of Pre\ cntion?” European Centre for Minoriw Issues 
Woiking Paper # 1, Flensburg
Compare for example Clark, H (2000): Ch. 6
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initiative and a few years later Adem Demaqi was eventually made a leader o f the political 
arm of KLA, but only after he had dropped his ideas of a “Balkania”.
The year after Dayton saw the slow building up o f a military resistance in Kosovo. In 
February 1996 several bomb attacks were aimed at Serb refugees from Croatia who were 
housed in camps in several towns throughout Kosovo.^^® The underground group LKCK^^^ 
claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they stated were only the beginning of their 
c a m p a i g n . T h i s  was followed by KLA attacks on individual Serbs in isolated incidents.^^^ 
The violence was still on a relatively small scale though, and by autumn 1996 the KLA had 
gathered, at the most, a few hundred men and they had to focus on building up a network o f  
militants who would operate in various areas when the time was ripe.
There were also open disagreements within the moderate fraction.^^"* BujarBukoshi, the 
Prime Minister of the 1992 elected government in exile, openly started to criticise Rugova fo r  
not making sure that the government would function. Mahmud Bakalli, who had been 
President o f the Kosovo branch o f LCY 1971-81 and still an important figure despite form ally 
being out of politics, considered Rugova's strategy too passive, and opted for more active 
resistance with daily protests, demonstrations, and so on. In this he was supported by many 
students. In late 1997, Demaqi and Quosja together with the Syndicate o f Trade Unions o f 
Kosovo, founded Democratic Forum as a counterweight to Rugovas LDK.
In order to strengthen his position, Rugova negotiated an education agreement with M ilosevic 
in 1996.^^^ According to that agreement Milosevic would return the buildings (schools, 
university) and withdraw the police while the Albanian students would return to the schools
Belgrade tried to place the Serbian refugees, who were etlmically cleansed from Croatia and Bosnia, inside 
Kosovo. Most of these refugees immediately left Kosovo for Serbia (many to Belgrade) since they eitlicr did not 
want to be placed as a minorit>- in a new erisis area, or for otlier reasons saw no future in Koso\ o. Tliis left 
Serbia and Montenegro with close to one million refugees. Still there were at this time some 10 000 Serbian 
refugees in Koso^’o. While this is a small number compared to the appro.\imatcly 1.6 million Albanians. Kosovo 
liad also been pressed with the influx of Albanians who had left Croatia and Slovenia when tliesc states opted fo r 
independence. These Albanians did not, however, receive the status o f refugees and rccei\ cd no humanitarian 
assistance from abroad.
Le\izja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves (National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo).
Cf. Vickers, M (1998): 290-291
This was largely ignored in Western Europe and tlic U.S. Indeed, as late as 1997 -1998 even as small bands 
roamed in Drenica and central Kosovo there was speculation in western intelligence ser\ ices and diplomatic 
circles whctlier tire group really existed (compare Hedges 1999) indicating the lack o f capaciri' in western 
intelligence services to comprehend the problem.
On the disputes discussed Itere compare: Maliqi, S (1998); sections on Dayton and in passim; Vickers, M 
(1998): Clrapter 14, especially pp. 300-305; Clark, H (2000); Ch. 6
Cf. Maliqi. S (1998): 172; Vickers, M (1998): 305-307; Clark, H (2000): Ch. 6
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and the university. There was also enthusiasm within the international community, and 
pressure that this should be implemented. The problem, and basis for misunderstanding in the 
international community, was that the agreement could not be implemented since it was never 
settled how the education system was to be financed. This was important since whoever 
financed the system would also have control over the curriculum.
The autumn of 1997 became a new turning point. According to the Rugova-MiloSevic 
education agreement the students were to return to the university in autumn 1997. As the 
agreement was not implemented, unrest grew among the students and student protests 
developed under the leadership by, among others, Adem Demaqi and figures from the right 
wing of the LDK. These student groups now became increasingly frustrated and developed 
into a good recruiting base for the radical KLA which many students later joined.
This coincided with the fantastic collapse of the Pyramid Games in Albania in 1997 and the 
following collapse of government and political unrest. An important contribution to the fall of 
the Pyramid scheme had been the lifting o f sanctions against Yugoslavia after Dayton, which 
meant a decreased market for especially oil-petrol smuggling, and shrinking revenues. 
Following the Pyramid collapse neigbouring Albania was suddenly brought into a virtual 
anarchy, which opened up new opportunities for collecting weapons from Albanian military 
deposits. The KLA and other rebels in Kosovo now began to arm themselves on a much 
grander scale. On 27 November 1997 they made their first public appearance at a funeral of a 
teacher, Halil Geqi, who had been killed by Serbian troops during clashes with the KLA.“  ̂
From then on masked KLA-fighters began to appear at funerals to display themselves and 
read statements before disappearing again, a trend which created fear among many Albanians.
The KLA now stepped up terror activities against Serbian police and civilians, as well as on 
Albanians who collaborated with Serbs or those who were considered too moderate. The 
strategy included both ambush killings and kidnappings. In some areas the KLA targeted 
Albanians who supported the LDK, as well as members of the FARK.^^’ Many Albanians 
feared these radical militant groups, since they knew that while the KLA was capable o f
Cf. Salihu, A, M. Hajrullahu & J. Xhana (2004) “Radicals Test the Ground in Drenica”, Balkan Crisis 
Report, No 498,20 May 2004, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Londoa
See IWPR Tribunal Update No 397, March 11,2005, Institute for War & Peace Reporting. London. The 
ICTY indictment of Ramush Haradinaj, who later formed the AAK party in Kosovo, and who became Prime 
Minister in Autumn 2004 (discussed in chapter 8), includes charges of murders in relation to these clashes.
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provoking the Serbian police and military it would not be capable of defending civilians 
against Serbian counter-attacks that were bound to come. The radicals thereby also posed a 
threat to Albanians and they brought the existing intra-Albanian divisions to a more serious 
level. But for the KLA the time was now ripe to provoke the necessary violence to get 
international attention. They had a network o f soldiers and they started to obtain the light 
weapons needed for ambushing, although they did not have any heavy weaponry nor a trained 
military organization; they had set up training camps in Albania, but they did not have the 
resources for training larger units.
On 28 February Serbian forces moved in on a few extended families in the Drencia area and 
killed 26 people. This was followed by an attack on a compound on 4 March in order to arrest 
a known Albanian villain and guerilla leader, Adem Jashari; the attack left 58 people dead.^^^ 
This became labelled the Drenica-massacre and had two immediate consequences. First, it 
provoked outrage among Albanians throughout Kosovo and the diaspora and clan elders in 
various regions now agreed to the military uprising. Second, the Albanian-American 
community, which until then had supported the LDK, now shifted their political and financial 
support to the KLA.^^^ Both these factors considerably strengthened the KLA. The 
organisation now grew to several thousand, perhaps tens o f thousand fighters, but it was 
unclear who was actually in c o n t r o l . E v e ry b o d y  with a gun could call himself a member.
See also Judah, T (2000A).
Cf. Magnusson, K (1999) “RambouilletaMalct: Texten. fòrhandlingama, bakgnindcn” Current Issues # 1. 
Centre for Multiethnic Rcsearcli, Uppsala: 69; Judah, T (20006) Tim Judah mentions Adcm Jasltari as a knot\ n 
villain, but not directly as a KLA leader. However, as cited in Magnusson p. 79, the KLA leader Bardhyl 
Malunuti stated himself tliat Jasltari a KLA-leadcr and furthermore tliat it was the KLA tliat started the w ar
in Kosovo and tlie Serbian troops tliat responded. In a booklet by Milan Pctkovió, it is claimed tliat Adcm Jasltari 
had received military training in Albania during 1990 and left with the rank of major. After liis return to Koso\ o 
he recruited members of his clan, and s>'mpatliisers. to a militant resistance group that attacked Serbs. Tlicy 
allegedly also attacked Albanians who did not sitare Uic goal of a greater Albania. The group liad its base in 
Jasliari’s home village of Donji Prekaz in Drenica. In 1997 the County Court in Prishtina held him responsible 
for, among other things, the attack on a police patrol near Glogovac in 1993. It seems likely that he either first 
led a quite separate militant group, which only later was incorporated under the banner of ‘KLA’, or perltaps 
fonned the KLA’s vere first militai^' units. Sec further Pctkovié, M (1998) “Albanian Terrorists”, Kalekom, 
Belgrade. Howe\ er. see also the critique of the Counri Court’s trial proceedings (and the presentation of 
e\'idcncc during them) by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights submitted to UNHCHR, 
Geneva 1997: w ww,hri ca/fortherecord 1998/dociimentatioa^corninission/c-cn4-19*>8-9.him (entered 3 March 
2(K)5). Jashari lias eventually been considered a ‘war-hero’ among the Albanians, and after the war in 1999 liis 
house w as arranged into a museum.
Nazi, F (2000) “Balkan Diaspora 1: Tlie Albanian-American Communit>” in Buckley, W. J (2000) “Koso^•o: 
Contending Voices on Balkan Intert entions” Cambridge, p. 152
Tlie command stmeture and organisation of the KLA is still not transparent. The KLA itself has an interest in 
keeping it so, both because the organisation may be used in the future -  for example in military operations in 
Macedonia, or against NATO troops if it should be considered an option for the cause of independence -, and 
because the specific stmeture of command is an issue for Uie ICTY in charging war-criminals. On the latter see:
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The KL A now moved on to mount attacks and managed to take territory in the Drencia area 
and beyond it. The Serbian forces responded, but only to find that the resistance disappeared. 
The KLA were hiding in the bush-vegetation / low forest areas or simply vanished among the 
local population.
The reaction from the international community at this stage was to condemn the use of 
excessive violence by Serb forces, while at the same time condemning all 'terrorist action' by 
the KLA. The same statement was repeated several times by the Contact Group and it was 
also the message in a series of UN Security Council Resolutions starting with SCR 1160 and 
later that year followed up with SCR 1199.*̂ ^̂  The message was that violence was 
unacceptable and that peaceful negotiations were necessary.
To the KLA these signals certainly rang hollow against the background of Dayton, after 
which Yugoslavia had been recognised, sanctions and arms embargo lifted, and Albanian 
refugees repatriated to Serbia. The now weakened LDK made an official attempt though and 
started to negotiate with Belgrade. There was however at this stage little possibility for the 
LDK to negotiate since it had no control over the KLA. The discussions broke down in May, 
when further military actions were taken by Serbian forces to stall and counter those o f the 
KLA. During the first half of 1998 the United States continued to label the KLA a terrorist 
organisation. Both Madeleine Albright and the spokesman James Rubin had stated as much 
during 1997 and the position was repeated by the U.S ambassador Robert Gelbard during a 
visit to Belgrade in February 1998.^^  ̂This position changed in the space of a few months. In 
June Richard Holbrooke held meetings with KLA representatives and James Rubin rejected in 
an interview that the U.S had ever said that the KLA were terrorists.®^'’
Serbian operations continued in the summer 1998 and in a large operation in the Drenica area 
in July they attacked and burned villages, leaving tens of thousands of displaced Albanian 
civilians. This sparked the attention of the international community and provoked immediate 
condemnations and demands that the Serbs should withdraw their forces from Kosovo. In
Farquhar, M “Structure o f KLA Explored’’, Tribunal Update No 383,26 Nov 2004, and “Trial Hears o f KLA 
Tactics”, Tribunal Update No 389,14 Jan 2005, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, London.
The Contact Group consisted of the U.S. Russia, France, United Kingdom, and Italy.
Magnusson, K (1999): 69-70; cf;
htfp:' Sfate.QOVM'MM' policy remarks 199S '9H0J23 uclhani bchrade.lum (entered 21 February 2(X)5) 
Magnusson, K (1999): 69-71
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October the U.S threatened air strikes unless Serbia withdrew and allowed a OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM) acess to the province. Inside Serbia also, there was open 
criticism against excessive use of violence by the regime. General Perisic, who had command 
of south Serbia was in long-standing open disagreement with Milosevic since 1996. In 
October he signed an agreement with NATO's supreme commander for the allied forces in 
Europe, General Wesley Clark, that tensions in Kosovo should be alleviated.®^^ Milosevic 
agreed to the KVM, but as the Serbian forces witdrew the KLA moved back in and reclaimed 
territory. The whole affair leading up to the Kosovo Verification Mission was an example o f  
bad diplomacy and poor political analysis from the Contact Group and western powers 
(especially the U.S) and it was doomed to fail. The idea was that the mission should monitor 
the withdrawal of Serbian forces while Milosevic should enter negotiations with the LDK.
The LDK had however already been seriously sidestepped by the KLA, which it had no 
control over. By now the KLA was no longer labeled a terrorist organisation by the U. S. 
government, and the U.S. had even threatened air strikes on Serbia. For the KLA it was clear 
that their strategy was paying off and that the result might become even better if  they 
escalated the violence.^^^ They were in fact not even bound by the agreement as the Yugoslav 
government was. Furthermore, the Americans ran a  parallel track in the KVM. They placed a 
number of CIA-agents (allegedly some 50-70 under the coordination o f U.S. Ambassador 
William Walker) within the KVM, with their own mission to prepare and help organize the 
KLA, as the ground-soldiers for a coming NATO-intervention.
It was thus only rational that the KLA should reclaim territory and do everything possible to  
provoke more violence, preferably with civilian casualties. After a short period the Serbian 
troops were send back to reclaim control over lost territory and in mid-Januaiy 1999 they had 
a confontation with a KLA-group in the village o f  Racak. This incident later caused
Allegedly the ICTY in the Hague has minutes of Seibian sources on a statement made by PeriSié to Clark in 
October 1998, that Serbia could be defeated if it had to confront NATO. PeriSic was fired from his post before 
the next meeting in November (1998). See IWPR Tribunal Update No 396,4 March 2005, Institute for War & 
Peace Reporting, London. PeriSió has himself been called to tlte ICTY, but any cliarges in relation to him liave 
not at the time of writing been made public.
Carl Bildt, the former High Representative in Bosnia, realised this and repeatedly suggested that pressure had 
to be exercised on the KLA as well, and that international troops sliould be used to cut off the supply links o f the 
KLA in Albania.
“  A number o f western diplomats and generals later complained about the parallel secret track by the U.S., 
about which apparently the Europeans liad no information. See for example: Loquai, H (2000) “Der Kosovo- 
Konflikt: Wege in einen vermeidbaren Kiicg” , Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden; Pcllnhs. B (2004) ”Naiv tro pà 
USA-myt om folkmord”, Dagens Nyheter, 7 February', 2004, Heinz Loquai (Germany) and Bo PcUnas (Sweden) 
are both retired Generals who worked in the KVM mission at the time. Compare also: Walker, T & A. La^ erly 
(2000) “CIA aided Kosovo guerrilla army”. The Sunday Times, 12 March 2000. The latter state that CIA agents 
have admitted to the allegations by the European diplomats.
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considerable controversy. From the U.S. and NATO, and as it was disseminated in the 
western media, the allegation was that some 45 Albanians (primarily civilians) were 
massacred there. According to some KVM monitors, as well as a French journalist who 
apparently had been present in Racak around this time, the incident had been staged by the 
KLA and by a U.S. team,^^* Regardless o f what actually happened, this incident became a 
new spark and the U.S. again threatened military action.
During the second half of 1998 the US Government had gradually shifted its support towards 
the KLA. It is evident that there were different, and contradictory, tracks of diplomacy here. 
On the one side the U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill had pursued shuttle diplomacy between 
Belgrade and Prishtina, vrith different drafts for some kind of agreement. Formally the 
demand to negotiate, during the Kosovo Verification Mission, was directed towards the LDK 
on the Albanian side. Increasingly though. Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright started to 
embrace the KLA. Kjell Magnusson has suggested that this shift in U.S. policy can be 
understood against the background of heavy lobbying groups in Washington, especially by 
such organisations as the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Balkan Institute (later the 
Balkan Action Council) and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP).^^^ In these groups 
there was not only strong support for the Albanian position, but indeed for the most radical 
claims and for the KLA. An important figure in the lobby was the former U.S. Ambassador 
Morton Abramowitz, who had close relations with Madeleine Albright. Already before the 
meeting in Rambouillet Madeleine Albright had signalled that the KLA was an important 
partner to the U.S. and that they eventually should receive training in the U.S. Well before the 
set-up in Rambouillet, the U.S. had dropped the LDK and moved towards supporting the most 
radical faction among the Albanians.
A number of references to articles in (especially German and French) news media are collected by: 
Pumphrey, D and G. “The Racak Massacre: Casus Belli for NATO” at: w-ww.nikor.dc/Artikcl/en-rac-c.htm 
(entered 1 March 2005); cf: Loquai, H (2000) “Der Kosovo-Konflikt: Wege in einen vermcidbarcn Krieg” 
Nomos Verlag. The claim presented here is that the Serbian troops had killed around 15 KLA-fighters. but that 
the KLA later liad collected bodies from elsewhere and ananged them so that it looked like a massacre. There is 
also the claim that Serbian troops had brought a television team along and that there was documented evidence 
of the operation. Tim Judah lias reconstructed a scenario based on the claims of a massacre: Judah. T (2000): 
193. Giv en the e.xtensive propaganda used in cases like these, and the heated controversies it still provokes, it is 
difficult to take a definite position on what actually happened. The incident is a case in the indictment of 
Slobodan Milosevic at the ICTY, and a verdict is yet to come. For the latest update at the time of writing see: 
Uzelec, A. “Witness Disputes Racak Findings”, IWPR Tribunal Update No 391. 28 Jan 2005, Institute for War 
& Peace Reporting. London.
639 Magnusson, K (1999): 71-76
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Rambouillet and NATO's war on Yugoslavia
The meeting in Rambouillet was initially suggested by Gennany, then held in France, and 
orchestrated by the Americans. It was staged as a negotiation, but had in fact very little to do 
with what -  at least in a European sense - is normally understood by this term.̂ "**̂  First, at 
Rambouillet there were two delegations that never met (allegedly the Albanians refused to sit 
at the same table as the Serbs). Second, there was a paper presented as an ultimatum rather 
than for discussion. The American idea was that i f  they could get the Albanians to sign a 
paper, then they could present this to the Serbian delegation with a ‘take it or get bombed’ 
kind of argument.^"^* Further, the Americans had two ambassadors (one of them being M orton 
Abramowitz) to sit as aides to the Albanian delegation and were thereby, so to speak, 
represented twice. In the Albanian delegation the LDK was now sidestepped and only 
constituted a third of the delegation. The delegation was lead by the KLA-leader Hashim 
Thaqi, and in addition there were a number of representatives from a small party (the United 
Democratic Movement) and independent representatives.
It turned out to be difficult to obtain an immediate Albanian signature on the document the 
Americans presented. The Albanian delegation had to obtain verification from others in 
Kosovo before they could agree to it. There were therefore a few different versions before th e  
Albanians signed an agreement.^"'^ It was all brought to a stage where it must have been 
evident that the Serbs would be unable to sign the proposal and then the Albanians were 
persuaded to sign so that the Americans could push for air-strikes on Serbia as a punishment. 
Once this was achieved the document was presented to the Serbian delegation, which refused 
to sign it. The reason for this can be found in the document they were asked to sign, which in 
fact contained elements, to which would be impossible for any government to agree. '̂^  ̂To 
mention just the most problematic points:
On the Rambouillet talks compare Magnussoa K (1999); Mandelbaum, M (1999) ‘'A Perfect Failure”. 
Foreign Affairs. Voi 78, No 5, September/October 1999; Dauphinec, E. A (2003) “Rambouillet: A Critical 
(Re) Assessment” in Bicber. F & Daskalo\'ski (Eds) (2003) “Understanding llie War in Kosovo” Frank Cass.
London: 101-121
Cf. Mandelbaum, M (1999)
Elizabeth Dauphinee discusses some o f the changes; I lia\ c not commented upon them here, but see: 
Dauphince. E. A (2003)
Rambouillet: “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo”, 23 February' 1999, Cologne. 
The best and most thorough analysis of the document is: Magnusson, K (1999). A good analysis in English is: 
Dauphinee, E. A (2003). Tlie following brief discussion is based on Uiese three sources, but I iia\ e found the
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•  The status o f Kosovo was not defined in the document. This would have been 
unproblematic if  the document was intended as an interim solution. In this context, 
however, it was contradictory that the document anyway contained a constitution. If 
the issue o f status was to be postponed, it is remarkable to produce a constitution, 
which one might expect should be left to a constituting power (Parliament).
•  According to the document (Article 1:6) Yugoslav law was not valid in Kosovo. If 
there were discrepancies between these and the Rambouillet document, then the 
former was to be revised. Aside from signalling Kosovo’s independence this also 
meant that Yugoslav law and the Yugoslav constitution would have to be revised. In 
effect this meant that the parliament in Serbia and Yugoslavia would have had to 
define the status of Kosovo in legal terms, something the foreign diplomats themselves 
wanted to avoid.
•  Although the document did not define the status of Kosovo, it specified the role and 
the function o f certain institutions in Kosovo as if for an independent state. The 
President was given excessive powers and, similarly to the U.S. President, was given 
the main responsibility for foreign policy. In effect the President would, in relation to 
the President of Serbia and the president of FRY, be able to act as a foreign statesman.
• While Kosovo would have no central bank of it own, it was given the right here to an 
equitable share of potential international loans as well as other federal resources 
(Ch.4a, Art. 1:5). The document did not specify whether the federation had a right to 
collect federal taxes (used for financing federal institutions, including security and 
defence). If Kosovo was not be affected by federal activities it would seem improper 
that its citizens should be subjected to pay tax for them. On the other hand it would 
seem improper that Kosovo could have claims on tax resources from the other 
republics, if  Kosovo itself was to be exempted from taxes.
•  The document was intended to be an interim solution for a three-year period. Still, the 
state and socially owned property would (Ch 4, art.II) be transferred to relevant
critique in the book by Magnusson (1999) particularly useful. See also Mandelbaum, M (1999) “A Perfect 
Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 78, No 5, Scptembcr/October 1999.
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political bodies in Kosovo. This would mean that the property o f the Serbian Orthodox 
Church also, which had been nationalised after the Second World War, would be 
under Albanian authorities.
•  The question of citizenship has been defined in eveiy Constitution in the region since 
at least 1945. In the Rambouillet document it was not defined. The question of 
citizenship was blurred here and remained open, which would have practical 
consequences for potential “minority rights” . This would have effects on the education 
system and the right for school- children to receive education in their native language.
• In Rambouillet, just as it was in Dayton, the language issue was simply forgotten. T h is  
left uncertainty about discrimination in public institutions, courts, and regarding 
employment. In addition the protection of minorities in the document was 
conspicuously weak.
• While the document stipulated the withdrawal o f Serbian forces, it did not do so for 
the KLA. There was no mention of how the KLA should be demilitarised or where 
they should withdraw to. In effect there was no demilitarisation of the KLA at all. 
According to the document the KLA would be able to move around freely in the 
villages and also be armed with lighter weapons. The only thing that was mentioned 
was that after one month they could no longer wear uniforms. Instead American 
diplomats (as well as journalists and Albanian representatives) stated that the KLA 
was to become the basis for the future security or police force. It was quite obvious 
that this constituted a threat to all minorities, particularly the Serb, which remained in  
Kosovo.
Even more conspicuous, and the main reason for why it was politically impossible for the 
Serbian government to agree to the document, were the aspects which would have opened up 
Yugoslavia for a NATO occupation;
•  The document stated that NATO would have unrestricted access to all territories o f 
FRY (not only to Kosovo). They were also to be exempted from all fees, customs, and 
taxes.
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• NATO was supposed to have free access to ali civil resources, including buildings, the 
free use o f airports, roads, and railroads. Furthermore to be allowed, without prior 
permission, to modify infrastructure if  it wished to do so. After its departure NATO 
would be allowed to leave all such changes as they were, and be exempted from all 
material damages it might have imposed, whether these were the result of military 
activities or not.
• NATO soldiers and representatives would enjoy immunity and not be subjected to 
investigation even if a soldier or representative had committed a serious crime. On the 
other hand NATO would have the right to arrest individuals also outside of the 
organisation.
These aspects alone would have implied a de facto  occupation o f Yugoslavia. Furthermore, at 
the end of the conference the Albanian delegation, with the support of Madeleine Alright, 
added to the document that after the three years o f interim rule, the ‘will o f the people’ in 
Kosovo should decide upon the question of independence. Since Albanians constitute the 
absolute majority in Kosovo, this in fact signalled a forthcoming independence. The Serb 
delegation was therefore presented with an ultimatum, which insisted that they should agree 
upon a NATO occupation of their country, accept the breaking loose and independence of 
Kosovo, under a new authority (the KLA) that was still branded a terrorist organisation in 
Belgrade, or otherwise they would be bombed. A conclusion which is difficult to avoid, 
unless these were fantastic diplomatic mistakes, is that the document was designed on purpose 
in a way that it could never have been accepted. The whole setting of the meeting also seems 
to point in this direction. In fact all proposals that came from the Serbian delegation were 
immediately rejected by the Americans, although some of them were accepted by other 
members in the Contact Group. The Serbs proposed for example that there should be a 
separate implementation agreement, that military presence should be in another form than 
NATO, and that the delegations should start by agreeing on some general points.
After the “failure” to get Belgrade on board this deal, the U.S. pushed for a NATO attack on 
Yugoslavia. NATO air strikes started in the early hours of 24 March 1999 and continued for 
78 days. The Clinton administration, in this case propelled by Madeleine Albright’s
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enthusiasm for bombing the Serbs, indulged in a series o f foreign policy miscalculations and 
mistakes that would plant the seeds for future problems.
First, there was no mandate by the UN Security Council (the U.S./NATO avoided to bring the 
case there, since it was clear that an attack on Yugoslavia would never be authorised). 
Therefore, since in no way could it be argued to be a case o f self-defence, this military attack 
upon another country was an obvious violation o f the UN Charter. '̂*'' The fact that it did not 
constitute self-defence meant that it also violated the NATO statutes. Second, it challenged 
the Helsinki documents of 1975, which stated that it was inadmissible to change international 
borders through the use of force.^"*  ̂The mode in which the Rambouillet meeting had been 
convened, and the document it urged for, indicated that this might now be what was 
happening. Third, the rhetoric used to present the attack as legitimate focused on the concept 
of ‘humanitarian intervention', that the attack was supposed to prevent a humanitarian crisis, 
an ethnic cleansing, or even genocide, and that it was a ‘just war’. However, there had been 
no direct attempts by Serbia to ethnically cleanse Kosovo before the war, and certainly 
nothing resembling genocide. There were serious violations of human rights, systematic 
discrimination, police violence and cultural suppression. It could even be argued that there 
was a form o f colonisation attempt (but a failed one) and perhaps a case could be made that 
the brutal response by the Serbian forces to the KLA intentionally targeted civilians. The 
problem is that the attack by NATO immediately created that response, that is, an ethnic 
cleansing and a humanitarian crisis, rather than preventing it. Following the bombing 
campaign Serbian forces ran amok in Kosovo, both as a kind of revenge and in order to 
eliminate the KLA -  which they now saw had been provided with air-support -  as well as to 
clear the ground o f any local support for a possible impending foreign ground-troop invasion. 
In this process several thousand (perhaps as many as ten thousand) civilians were killed in 
Kosovo and the majority of the population were either made refugees or internally 
displaced.^"^^ Although figures are highly uncertain it is probable that two thirds or more of
i.c.: United Nations Cliarier Art. 2 (4) and (7).
i.e.: Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1*' August 1975; Pari 1. 
paragraph III and IV.
^  Compare: Todorova, M (2000) “The Balkans: From Invention to intewentiori’ in Buckley. W. J (2000) 
“Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Intei\ entions”, Cambridge: 159-169; But note that the definition of 
‘genocide’ is vague and with some w ill can be extended to either of tire sides in the Yugoslav conflicls, including 
NATO: see tlic definitions in Article 2 of the 1948 ‘UN Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of tJic 
Crime o f Genocide’, which refers to acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group as such, and includes causing bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
Figures are uncertain: tliose coming to refugee camps in Macedonia were of course registered, but this u as 
not the case for all of those \\ ho crossed to Albania, w here a laige number were accommodated in pri\ ate
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the Albanians were either forced to leave their homes, or left out of fear during the chaos. 
NATO’s action did nothing to aid them, although western leaders later claimed that they knew 
that Serbia had planned such actions. On 6 April the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher 
claimed that he had German intelligence sources for a secret Serbian plan called ‘Operation 
Horseshoe’, intended for the ethnic cleansing of K o s o v o . T h i s  was embraced by all o f 
NATO and uncritically reproduced in all western media. It later proved to be a propaganda 
fraud, staged in order to uphold public support for the NATO bombings.®"*^
All in all it was highly unconvincing to claim that the intervention was made on humanitarian 
grounds; rather than showing concern for Albanian refugees the purpose of the whole 
operation seemed to be to punish Serbi a. However, the reason why the United States and 
the Clinton administration had been so eager to wage war against Serbia at any cost is unclear. 
It could be a spill-over effect from Bosnia, and U.S. anger over Slobodan Milosevic, whom 
Washington clearly was unable to control. It could be due to possible links between the 
Yugoslav army and Moscow (being an obstacle to U.S. strategic plans for NATO-expansion 
in the Balkans), or to display the power of and credibility for NATO, or it could be in order to 
control the western European states.
The U.S. government had initially thought that the bombing campaign would be a matter of 
days, or weeks at the most. This was a miscalculation, because the document the Serbian
houses. The UNHCR (10 June) leported some 781 000 refugees divided between Macedonia (245 000). Albania 
(444 200), Bosnia and Montenegro, and an additional 81 705 to third countries: see Clark, H (2000): 183-184; 
Judah, T (2000): 241. Tim Judali suggests a higher figure of some 850.000.
Again an unfortunate s>'mboIic date as this was the 58 year aimh ersaty of Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia, 
indicating that the Germans had learned nothing from the fact that this date was chosen for recognition of Bosnia 
seven years earlier.
Loquai, H (2000) “Der Kosovo-Konflikt: Wege in einen vermeidbaren Kricg”, Nomos Verlag. Baden-Baden: 
see also the collection of articles under the title “The Aflemiath of the Publications of the German Government 
Documents” (translated by Eric Canepa) at: www .j^iaiti.orQ/crisesairevts/pcnuandocsmore.him (entered 1 
March 2005); Schwarz, P “ ’Operation Horseshoe’-propaganda and reality'” at:
\n\-w.wsws.oru/;ìrticlcs/1999/inlì9*J9/lìs-i29 om shtnil (entered 1 March 2005); Cf. Judah, T (2000): 240-241. 
Allegedly the German report had also used the Croatian word ‘potko\'a’, rather than the Serbian ‘potkovica’ for 
‘horseshoe’
Cf Mandelbaum, M (1999). In fact Bill Clinton refers to ‘the punisliing bombing raids’ in Iris memoirs: 
Clinton, B (2004) “My Life”, Alfred A Knopf, New York: p. 858 (Bill Clinton however does not seem to have a 
clue of the actual content of the ‘Interim Agreement', and it is quite possible that he only ever read the U.S. State 
Department’s guide to it, or some even shorter briefing).
It could probably be a combination of tliese elements. For a general discussion on the rationale witli NATO’s 
war on Yugoslavia and the US-Euro relations see: Gowan. P (2000) “The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO’s 
Attack on Yugoslavia”, and: Arrighi, G (2000) “The Balkan War and US Global Power” both in: Ali. T  (Ed) 
(2000) “Masters o f the Universe? NATO’s Balkan Cnisadc”. Verso. London & New York. See also Gowan, P 
(1999¿) “Im  âg till Kosovo” Manifest, Stockholm (Swedish translation o f “The Twisted Road to Kosovo”, 
origirrally published in “Labour Focus on Eastern Europe”, No 62,1999).
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government was asked to sign was even worse than any bombing, since it implied a NATO 
occupation of its territory. In increasing the stakes the bombing campaign was gradually 
stepped up, which resulted in various types o f ‘collateral damage’, including the bombing of 
an Albanian refugee convoy and the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (killing three Chinese 
citizens). Occasionally civilians were bombed, including some Albanians in Kosovo. They 
bombed a skiing resort, schools and hospitals, TV-stations, and infrastructure including 
sewage, water and electricity supply. While some of this was by accident (the Chinese 
Embassy and the refugee convoy for example), American generals stated that the bombing o f 
all kinds o f infrastructure was purposeful in order to bring the war to the people.^^^ They used 
a large number o f cluster bombs over civilian populated areas; British authorities have stated 
that perhaps 60% of them missed their intended t a r g e t s . T h e y  thereby violated the Geneva 
C o n v e n t !o n .S o m e  of these acts were in fact conspicuously similar to acts that some of 
those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stood 
accused o f
Contrary to stabilising the region, the NATO intervention contributed to a humanitarian crisis, 
which threatened to destabilise Albania and Macedonia, and eventually did escalate conflicts 
and warfare to spread into Macedonia. Further consequences o f  the U.S. foreign policy 
failures include the deteriorating relations that followed with Russia and China. Nevertheless, 
Javier Solana, NATO’s Secretary General, was formally enthusiastic about the effects and 
proclaimed the whole endeavour a s u c c e s s . T h e  E.U. later rewarded him by making him 
spokesman for its foreign policy. In Britain, Tony Blair thought the war could signal the new 
kind o f ‘ethics’ for British foreign policy.
Numerous lists and studies have been presented on this, for example Charitos, P. G (1999) “The Crime 
Against Yugoslavia: 100 Violations o f International Law”, in Terzic, S ct al (1999) “Europe at the Crossroad; 
New Walls or a United Europe” Historical Institute of Seihian Academy o f Sciences and Arts, Belgrade; 
Hayden, R (1999) “Humanitarian Hypocris>'”, Centre for Constitutional Rights, University of Pittsburgh; 
Daupimee, E, A (2003); Daalder, I. H & M. E O ’Hanlon (2000) “Wiiming Ugly: Nato’s War to Save Kosovo”, 
Tire Brookings Institution Press, Washington.
Stated by NATO generals to the “Philadelphia Inquirer'’ on 21 May 1999, Hayden, R (1999).
Hayden, R (1999)
i.e.; The 1949 Gene\a Com ention, Protocol 1, Article 54.
Solana, J (1999) “NATO's success in Kosovo” in “Foreign Affairs” Voi 78, Nov/Dcc 1999.
But see the problems with such ideas in: Little, R & M. Wickham-Jones (Eds) (2000) “New Labour’s Foreign 
Polic>'; A New Moral Cmsade?” Manchester University Press. Later o f course, after the de^'oted support by 
Britain in the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and especially following the numerous reports of how U.S. 
and British soldiers engage in sj stematic n ar-crimes, torture and abuse of civilian Iraqis, all talk of ‘just war’, 
‘ethics’, and so forth, by Tony Blair has become an issue for scorn in much of the world (and partly e\ en within 
the opposition in Britain although to a lesser extent).
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NATO’s bombing continued much longer than was expected and increasingly public opinion 
in various European countries, as well as in much of the world, started to become a problem. 
Eventually a new deal had to be offered to the Serbs so that they could come to an agreement. 
In the new version presented to the Serbs both the reference to allowing the ‘will of the 
people’ in Kosovo to decide on independence, and the point of allowing NATO access to the 
whole of Yugoslavia, were dropped. Instead Yugoslavia’s integrity as a state was assured and 
NATO was to be confined to Kosovo. Moreover, the Russians were invited to take part in the 
operation and thereby some guarantee for the Serbian people would be provided. Slobodan 
Milosevic agreed to the new terms, the bombings stopped and NATO was allowed access to 
Kosovo, which became a UN protectorate.
After the NATO-led international force, and an international protectorate, had been 
established in Kosovo, the KLA embarked on revenge upon the Serbs. Many Serbs, and other 
minorities (like the Roma), were expelled in a new wave of ethnic cleansing.*^* Serbs were 
attacked and murdered, or forced to leave, property was looted, cemeteries demolished, and 
Orthodox churches and monasteries were set on fire.^^^ Having claimed to intervene in order 
to prevent ethnic cleansing, NATO was now able to monitor it as it took place around its 
troops, which apparently were largely unable to stop it.
The heritage of Madeleine Albright, the Clinton administration, and Javier Solana has not 
been easy to administer. The NATO intervention brought about a complex paradox and 
exceptionally difficult political issue, which remains unsolved at the time o f writing. On the 
one hand; NATO intervened against Serbia on behalf of the Albanians. The Serbian 
government was considered to be the villain, but paradoxically it had international law on its 
side in this issue. NATO had then agreed to respect the territorial integrity o f Serbia (and of 
the Yugoslav state, which still existed at the time in the form o f Serbia and Montenegro). If 
international law and the Helsinki agreements are to be respected, then the Albanian claims to 
national self-determination and independence have to be suppressed. This might imply that
Cliarges have circulated in the media and on the Internet that the Jewish Community was expelled. The 
number of Jews in Koso^•o w as however very small. After tlie Second World War there were only about 11 
indh’iduals in the town of Prishtina, who declared themselves Jew ish. With their cliildren included there could 
perhaps lia\ e been around 50 or so Jew s in Prishtina in 1999, being forced to leave (I base this on information on 
consultation of the Jew ish Museum in Belgrade).
More titan a hundred medic\'al churches and monasteries were destroyed in the first tw o years. The Orthodox 
Church issued several picas to tlie international communih' tltat tltey should help to preserve the mediaeval 
heritage in Koso^'o. and started to produce a list o f the cultural buildings being burned. The documentation has 
been updated in various revised editions, and can be obtained from the Serbian Orthodox Church.
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NATO simply takes over the task o f suppressing from the Serbs. The Albanians have already 
developed a parallel society, economy, and form o f resistance to the Serbian state and this 
could simply be continued against the operations o f the international protectorate and its 
system of governance. It could even result in an Albanian uprising against the international 
protectorate, in which case NATO would have to fight those whom they claimed that they 
intervened to rescue.
The hope that the Albanians at this stage can be persuaded to remain under Serbia, must seem 
a form o f optimism bordering on naivety. Their claim to independence, based on the principle 
of national self-determination is of course not illegitimate as such.^° It is a principle that has 
been pursued by the international community as a main standard for state creation, after the 
First World W ar (mainly in Europe) and then partly after the Second World War when states 
in the Third W orld broke loose from colonial powers. The Albanians, as they have come to 
see it, were simply latecomers in this process.
On the other hand: the principle of state sovereignty has been enshrined in international law.
It does not seem very likely that Serbia will voluntarily concede to the secession o f Kosovo. 
This means that if  Kosovo is granted independence then NATO has violated various legal 
principles, including the peace agreement they signed to stop the bombing and UN Security 
Council resolutions taken to guarantee Serbia’s rights as a sovereign state. Therefore such a 
violation would completely bury much of international law. If NATO can violate international 
law to such a degree, then so can everybody else who happens to have the military capacity to  
do so. In any case any international principles, norms or any legal texts can no longer be used 
to criticize those who take example from NATO. The dictum that ‘might is right’ would be 
elevated to norm.
Moreover, a violation of the sovereignty principle in the case of Serbia/Kosovo, would mean 
that the principle upon which the international community wishes to guarantee the Dayton 
agreement, and the Bosnian state, is no longer v a l i d . B o s n i a  could break up along ethnic 
lines to form new mini-states or, in the case o f Serbs and Croats, unify with neighboring 
countries. It would also imply that the Macedonian state could break up, with the Albanian
On the other hand this means that neitlicr are Croatian or Seibian irredentist claims, but in the Balkans they 
ha^’e been particularly dangerous.
Specifically w ith regard to the so-called ‘Badinter principles*, which were developed not only with the 
Balkans in mind, but in relation to potential future claims in the whole o f Eastern Europe.
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minority adjoining Kosovo and Albania. Further, there are Albanian minorities in Serbia and 
Montenegro, a Muslim minority in Serbia and in Montenegro, and so on. An independent 
Kosovo could be an invitation to a new circle of wars in various parts of the Balkans, which 
might be difficult to prevent.
In addition to the immediate problems generated for any Balkan formula, it would be highly 
difficult for a formal independent Kosovo to gain ratification in the United Nations. Russia 
and China are likely to remain strongly opposed to it, not least because it would set precedents 
for Chechnya, Taiwan, Tibet, among other regions.
The Albanians in Kosovo are therefore likely to be denied independence unless some bilateral 
formula can be negotiated with Belgrade and the local Kosovo Serbs. It would take a new 
order, a new international forum (such as a completely rearranged UN), and considerably 
revised principles of international law, before it could be achieved. Meanwhile the Albanians 
in Kosovo are likely to persist in their aspirations, which suggest that Kosovo will remain an 
international protectorate for decades to come. In the international protectorate, and under its 
governance, the frustration among the Albanians and the tension between them and the 
international administration could only grow with time. To live under foreign mie was not the 
aim of their strife, and unless considerable economic and welfare gains are resulting from the 
international governance, the seeds for rebellion might grow.
The international community, and its administration, is therefore challenged with a difficulty 
of the greatest order in Kosovo. It has adopted from Serbia the ‘Kosovo knot’, and in the 
process provided some additions to its entanglement. The next chapter will discuss the 
international administration in Kosovo, how its system of governance has been set up, and the 







POST-WAR GOVERNANCE, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
UNMIK Country, June 1999 -  March 2005
Introduction
The international, primarily U.S., support for the radicalisation of Albanian politics was not 
helpful for the UN administration of Kosovo. The core problem of Kosovo’s status, and its 
effects for international relations and a new international order, coupled with the new radical 
power-shift within Kosovo Albanian society, was bom into the UN administration from the 
outset. In Kosovo the UN adopted one o f the most difficult issues and tasks that the 
organisation has ever been confronted with. It is set to administer the whole of Kosovo, build 
institutions, re-construct society, to provide the conditions for self-government, and help 
foster a political process that eventually will provide a basis for the definition of future status. 
In addition to severe inter-ethnic conflicts, Kosovo constitutes a highly unusual specimen for 
any development work. The international institutions for development aid are designed to 
work with states, and even if  the ideology is neo-liberal and the focus is the non­
governmental or private sector, any development work is confronted with legal and 
administrative issues relating to the state. Kosovo brings to the fore all the weaknesses o f the 
international institutions and the fact that they have conspicuously weak instruments for 
coping with ethno-nationalism.
The policies have shifted with each new UN Special Representative, starting with Bernard 
Kouchner and ending, so far, with Soren Jessen-Pedersen. Attempts to find a balance between 
Serbian and Albanian demands, different factions within these groups, and international 
initiatives have led to an inconsistent policy and a lack of coherence and direction; they have 
also resulted in the transmission of contradictory messages. The UN administration started out 
in a period of ethnic violence that was brought under control only slowly, and then continued 
with a destabilised situation in neighbouring Macedonia, and South Serbia. Although there 
have been certain achievements with regard to institution-building, and immediate physical 
reconstruction, there have been very limited -  if any -  progress in the fields of
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démocratisation, reconciliation, security, or social and economic development. The situation 
deteriorated rapidly during 2004 and ended with large-scale ethnic violence in March 2004. 
This signalled the virtual collapse of the international administration, and the lack of progress 
in all fields. It forced another Special Representative (Harri Holkeri) to leave Kosovo, and his 
replacements’ (Soren lessen-Pedersen) attempts to stifle Serbian demands and bring control 
over the political dynamics resulted in the almost complete boycott of the parliamentary 
elections by the Serb minority. At the time of writing, early spring 2005, conditions in 
Kosovo have not improved and the prospects seem very dismal.
This chapter analyses how international governance in Kosovo has been set up and changed, 
and how the local political landscape has evolved. It examines the general social and 
economic condition in Kosovo, the main problems in relation to reconstruction and 
development and what progress has been made. It discusses the trends and problems from the 
beginning of the international protectorate until approximately January 2005. A few important 
events until 10 March 2005 have also been included.  ̂j
International Governance in Kosovo
The UN Security Council resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) provided the legal basis for the 
establishment o f a United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), led by a 
Special Representative (SGSR) to the UN Secretary General. In spite of an international troop 
presence o f close to 50 000 to help secure the UNMIK establishment, it took an initial period 
o f approximately six to nine months before any international control was achieved. During 
this initial period the KLA and the most radical political elements among the Albanians 
consolidated their position and took power in local administration in Kosovo. Hashim Thaqi 
formed a government of which he declared himself Prime Minister and although the UN 
officially considered this move illegal, they were unable to prevent it. For practical reasons 
they had to cooperate with those actors that had become legitimised in Rambouillet.
A wave of ethnic cleansing followed in which a large number o f Serbs, Roma and other 
minorities, such as the small Jewish community in Prishtina, had to leave the province.
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During this period some 230 000 people fled and some 1200 were killed.^^^ Private property 
as well as Orthodox monasteries and churches, were looted, burned or destroyed, and 
cemeteries were desecrated. The wave o f ethnically motivated revenge and violence took 
place in the presence of almost 50 000 troops led by NATO. This early failure or lack of will, 
by the international administration to stop violence became a marker for future developments 
in Kosovo.
Violence eventually spread to South Serbia first, which has an Albanian population in the 
municipalities of Medvede, Presevo, and Bujanovac. An Albanian guerrilla organisation 
called T h e  Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvede, and Bujanovac’ (UCPMB) started with 
attacks on Serbian posts in January 2000 and clashes continued throughout that year. In 
February 2001 the spill over effect reached Macedonia, where the local guerrilla force called 
the National Liberation Army, ‘NLA’, with support from KLA, attacked Macedonian police 
and took control of border areas, eventually spreading to capture parts of the town of 
Tetovo.^^^ The violence continued in 2002, but was eventually reduced after a series of 
diplomatic efforts. The latter included EU pressure on the Macedonian government and EU 
guarantees of amnesty for Albanian warlords. There was considerable Kosovo Albanian 
(KLA) influence in these actions, and they were strongly linked to criminal networks running 
smuggling operations in the area.^ "̂̂  There were also intra-Albanian clashes between different 
clans and crime networks.
Die figures stated here arc widely referred to by most international organisations. Die Yugoslav Red Cross 
listed some 234 000 w ho fled; the Danish Refugee Council apply tiic same figures (available at webpage:
nww dre■dk'Loso\ o) as does the webpage of Uic Serbian Orthodox Diocese of RaSka and Prizren at:
\v\v\v koso\ 0  coni/icstimonials. and the European Roma Information Office w cbpage at: www Romnct.Hu. In 
2001 the Orthodox Church issued an account of destroyed Orthodox cultural heritage in Kosovo, w here they 
state Uie figure of 360 0(X) Serbs w lio w here expelled from their homes: Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese of 
Ra§ka and Prizrca GraCanica. The higher figure may include the internali)’ (within Koso\ o) expelled. The 
Jewish community was very small. According to the Jewish Museum in Belgrade there were only 11 Jew s in 
Prishtina after World War H and w ith a rough (autlior’s) estimate of their families and children their number in 
1999 may ha\'e been around 50 or so.
Fora journalistic account see Phillips. J (2004) “Macedonia: War-lords and Rebels in the Balkans”, I.B. 
Taunis & Co Ltd. London.
^  Gounc\’, P (2003) “Stabilizing Macedonia: Conflict Prevention, Development and Organized Crime", in 
“Journal of International Affairs", Fall 2003: 229-240: Barnett, N “Balkans facing uncertain future", Jane's 
Intelligence Review', May 2003; cf. Hristov. B “DPA accuses; PDF's Ramadani and Aliti are smugglers, NDP 
are war profiteers". Reality Macedonia, 19 April 2002, at;
ŵ vw rcaliw ni;iccdonia.org.mk/wcb.'ticws pai:c asp?nid= 1800 (entered 28 September 2004)
Gclevska I “Breaking News: Albanians at War Against Albanians”, Reality' Macedonia. 26 March 2002, at: 
w WAV realii\ macedonia ore.mk/w eb/new s oago a.sp?nid= 1664 (entered 28 September 2004); Mitevski. R 
“Pow erful Etlmic Albanian Clans Clash in Debar", Reality’ Macedonia, 17 July 2002, at: 










Governing structureSf Hmited Self-rule^ and elections
In early 2000 UNMIK, then led by the first Special Representative Bernard Kouchner, 
managed to establish some form of control and reached an agreement on a Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure (JIAS). This consisted o f an Interim Administration Council (lAC) 
and a Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) with local representatives. The lAC had eight 
members: the three Albanian political leaders from Rambouillet, four UNMIK staff, and one 
Serbian minority representative to sit as an observer. The KTC had 35 members consisting of 
the I AC, various minority leaders and religious leaders, political leaders and members from 
some NGOs. On the municipality level there was an appointed administrator from UNMIK, 
who in turn selected representatives for a municipal board, which acted as a local executive, 
and a municipal council to advice on policy.
This governing structure legitimised the transition o f the KLA into a Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), which was to become a kind of fire brigade, and a Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The 
transformation o f the most radical Albanian units in Kosovo into protection and police units 
was, as may be expected, not well viewed among the Serb minority but it provided a formula 
for how to legitimise, eventually demilitarise and disarm the KLA, although the latter has 
proven exceptionally difficult. In order to provide the ground for any legitimate local 
administration, an international police force and judiciary had to be developed, which could 
train and work alongside a local structure. It took a year before this was accomplished and 
numerous obstacles to its operation have persisted, including an insufficient number of 
international police officers. Another problem has been strictly legal, and the judiciary has 
had to combine certain pre-1989 Yugoslav laws with selected international laws, which has 
partly created some confusion in relation to the rule of law.
In order to legitimise the local representation, UNMIK pushed for elections to be held at an 
early stage. Municipal elections were held in October 2000, and then again in October 2002. 
Parliamentary (assembly) elections were held in November 2001 and again in October 2004.
A general trend o f decreasing voter turnout can be noted. In 2000 general voter turnout was 
79 %, in 2001 it was 64 %, in 2002 it was 54 %, and in 2004 down to 51 %. Serb participation 
was lower in each case; sometimes they boycotted the elections, and in 2004 they went for an 
almost complete boycott. In the elections a proportional system has been applied, so that the
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percentage o f voters translates into percentage of seats. Ultimate power resides in the 
international administration o f Kosovo as a protectorate, and alongside and subordinate to it, 
has been the establishment o f the domestically elected administration.
The municipal elections in 2000 were tainted by a number of problems. They were pushed 
forward, and eventually orchestrated, by the U.S., which has generally been obsessed with the 
ritual o f elections, rather than with their quality, in post-conflict societies. There were 
particular problems with voter registration, as there had been no reliable census since 1981 
and since many documents had been lost during the war. Documentation such as birth 
certificates and proofs of residence were among the first required in order to register as a 
voter. The problem with documents was solved in ad hoc manners, sometimes with field 
investigations in order to prove an individual’s right to vote. However, as such investigations 
proved to be consuming in terms of time and resources this method was partially dropped in 
favour o f ‘random samples’, where investigations were made.^^^ A number of other problems 
included that rules and procedures changed constantly over the first number of weeks, that 
many of the local staff did not know the rules, that there were defective provisional voter lists, 
and in the case of the Turkish minority that there were no registration forms in Turkish (in the 
Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 Turkish was guaranteed as a minority language).*^^
The problem o f the quality o f elections, and the conditions for them has been quite enduring. 
While the UN representatives and other representatives of the international community 
(OSCE and so on) generally have praised various elections in Kosovo as being ‘free’, and 
meeting ‘European standards’, there has been a considerable amount of criticism from non­
governmental organisations, such as human rights organisations, and from individual election 
observers. The critique has targeted a number of essential factors, such as the apartheid-like 
situation in Kosovo, including the complete lack of freedom of movement for minorities, the 
existence of secret voting lists (due to sensitivity of names), the highly restricted access for 
election monitors, mono-ethnic polling station committees, intimidation, biased media, lack of 
transparency, the fact that there was less than 10 % participation at some polling stations, and
^  Cf. Gramstad, S (2001) “Kosovo Municipal Elections 2000” Noident Report, at: 
WWW hiiiTi:)nriL>his uio.iio/forskmng/piiblAvDA\D 2001 02.htm (entered 21 March 2005)
66 Ibid
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so forth.^^* The interpretation o f what constitutes ‘European standards’ in an election process 
is dearly contested and although the international organisations responsible for Kosovo have 
given their clearance to them, they might perhaps, at best, better be regarded as ‘ so-so’ 
elections.
After the local elections in 2000, municipal assemblies were established in 27 o f the 30 
municipalities in Kosovo. In three municipalities the election results were not certified due to 
the Serbian boycott and non-participation in the elections, and the UN appointed those 
assemblies instead. The “Democratic Alliance of Kosovo” (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, 
controlled 20 municipalities. There were however considerable intra-Albani an tensions in the 
formation o f some municipalities and a clear tendency towards lack of will to compromise. In 
ten municipalities the opposition boycotted the assembly. »
In this initial period the Serbian minority was alienated. During Bernard Kouchner’s period as 
Special Representative most Albanian demands were met, while the Serbian demands were 
rejected. The wave of ethnic cleansing and violence, the slow set-up of international control, 
and the eventual introduction o f a provisional self-government, signalled to the radical 
elements among the Albanians that their objective of an ethnically pure and independent 
Kosovo was, at least passively, sanctioned by the international administration. To the Serbs, 
and especially to all the minorities that had fled, it signalled that their return to, or stay in, 
Kosovo was neither welcome nor safe.
After the fall o f Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, there was however a new Government 
and a new climate in Serbia proper. The next Special Representative, Hans Haekerup, who 
took over in 2001, chose to seek some form of cooperation both with the new government in 
Belgrade and with the local Serb minority. This eventually enraged the Albanians however 
and after having signed a cooperation agreement with Belgrade he was forced to leave 
Kosovo.
^  See for example: “British Helsinki Human Rights Group” at v̂̂ ^̂ v■bhhrg■0 ^g/CountI^’Rctx>rt asn (entered 1 
May 2004); Cliandlcr, D (2001) “Faking Democrac}^ in Kosovo” Spike Politics, 17 Nov 2001, www.spikcd- 
online.com/.Anicles/00000002D2FA.Ììtnì (entered 1 May 2004)
Janjid. D (2004) “Kosovo; Five Years of International Administration” Paper for the Nintli Annual ASN 
World Com ention, Harriman Institute, Columbia Universi^ 15-17 April 2004.
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In May 2001, under Haekerup’s mandate, a ‘Constitutional Framework’ for ‘Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government’ (PISG) was signed, and in November 2001 elections were 
held for a National Assembly. Some 25 political parties registered, with the main Albanian 
parties being Rugova’s “Democratic Alliance” (LDK), and the “Democratic Party of Kosovo” 
(PDK) led by Hashim Thaqi. The PDK, which initially was called PPDK, was primarily 
populated with people from the KLA. There were also minority parties and coalitions, such as 
a block o f Serbian parties forming the “Return Coalition” (Povratak). Within the Serb 
community, there had developed a series of disputes over whether to participate in elections 
or not, and over the question of who had the legitimacy to represent the Serbs. The Serbian 
National Council (SNV), which was founded in 1999 by Momiilo Trajkovic and others, had 
split already after a year and was now led by Bishop Artemije. A major fault-line within the 
Serbian community had developed between the Serbs in Mitrovica, and those in Gracanica as 
well as the villages outside Prishtina. In Mitrovica there was a direct influence from Serbia 
proper, both in party politics and in administrative structures, including the financing o f the 
local village guards or so called ‘bridge watchers.^™ Hence, with a divided Serbian minority, 
Serbian participation in the elections was partial, and some strongly rejected its legitimacy. 
The voter turnout in these elections was about 64 %, but among the Serb population it was 
only 50 %. In some polling stations there was less than 10 % turnout. The LDK gained 46 % 
of the votes (43 seats), and the PDK became the second largest party with 25 % (26 seats). A 
third Albanian party, “The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo” (AAK), received just below 8 
% (8 seats). The AAK was led by Ramush Haradinaj and, just as was the case of the PDK, it 
largely consisted of KLA veterans. The Serbian bloc received some 11 % (22 seats o f which 
10 were guaranteed). In the pre-election “campaigns” the main political message of all the 
Albanian parties was independence for Kosovo, but the time frame and mode to achieve it 
varied. We shall return to the political party structure in Kosovo below.
The domestic governmental structure, which has been introduced in Kosovo, thus consists of 
a national assembly, or parliament, and of 30 municipalities. The National Assembly consists 
o f 120 seats, twenty of which are guaranteed for the minorities. These are divided so that the
The ‘bridge watchers’ were formed in 1999 and consisted o f some four hundred \'igilantes. but capable of 
mobilising probably some 2000. The ‘northern’ Koso\ o Serbs had direct support from Serbia proper, which 
apart from financial support included Serbian agents. There has also been extensive Serbian intelligence activiw 
in this area. See: “Balkans facing uncertain future" Jane’s Intelligence Rc^•icw. May 2003.
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Serbs are guaranteed ten seats, the Roma, Ashkalija and Egyptian minorities are guaranteed 
four seats, the Bosniac have three guaranteed seats, the Turkish two seats, and the Gorani one 
seat. The minorities can also gain further seats by competing for the 100 non-reserved seats. 
The presidency (cabinet) of Kosovo consists of seven members and one seat is reserved for a 
Serbian representative and one for ‘other minorities’. The political parties compete with close 
lists, so that people shall vote for a party rather than an individual candidate, and women shall 
comprise one third of the list (or every third candidate shall be a female). A proportional 
representation with the so-called Saint Lague formula is applied and the whole o f Kosovo 
counts as one single electoral district. The fact that the whole of Kosovo constitutes a 
single electorate works against the principle of geographic representation, which can be of 
significant importance in an agricultural society with traditional and regionally based loyalty 
structures, as in Kosovo. In effect the system favours the capital Prishtina, while some 
municipalities have had no candidate at all in the assembly.^^^ However, it is difficult to 
create a system that satisfies all dimensions and here the geographic representation has been 
sacrificed for the sake of ethnic and gender quotas.
The elections o f 2001 were followed by a few months of deadlock and internal disputes 
among the Albanians, but at the end o f February 2002 the three main Albanian parties agreed 
to form a coalition government. A division was made so that Ibrahim Rugova (LDK) became 
President and Bajram Rexhepi (PDK) became the Prime Minister leading the Government. 
The proto-state structure foresaw nine ministries, which eventually developed into ten. These 
were also divided between the parties (4 ministries to LDK, two ministries to PDK, two 
ministries to AAK, the two remaining ministries going to the Serb minority and the non-Serb 
minorities respectively according to the ‘Constitutional Framework’).
Further municipal/local elections were held in 2002. The turnout was now reduced to some 54 
% and the LDK won a majority of their own in 11 municipalities, whereas PDK had a
For the technical details of the Saint-Lague formula for proportional representation see: Lijpliart, A (1994) 
“Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study o f Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1999“, O.xford University' 
Press: Appendix A. Tliis appendix can also be found at > http://randa.org/c24/Rcadings/Lijphan.Liintmrt htinl 
(entered 21 March 2005).
 ̂“ Compare: UNDP “Human Development Report Kosovo 2004 - The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and 
Choices”, United Nations De\'elopment Programme; 59 
Ibid (UNDP 2004: 59)
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majority in 4. Serbian parties prevailed in 5 municipalities. These elections thus saw a 
decrease in the power o f the LDK. Women made up some 28 % of the new assemblies.
From 2002 onward, the proto-state structures of Kosovo, (PISG) gradually received 
increasing responsibility in the governing o f Kosovo. On the 30 of December 2003, a number 
of new fields were transferred to PISG responsibility. These responsibilities included financial 
and economic policy, budgetary issues, trade and industry, customs services, science and 
technology, education, health service, labour and social welfare, environmental protection, 
youth and sport, culture, public transport and post, telecommunications, tourism, human 
rights, and a number o f others. Ultimately, however, UNMIK was to determine whether the 
PISG rulings were in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution (1244).
In April 2002 the Special Representative, Michael Steiner, presented a ‘Standards Before 
Statues’ checklist (discussed below), which had to be fulfilled before any discussion over the 
future status of Kosovo could begin. The Albanians accepted it since they perceived the 
gradual transfer o f power to PISG as being a move towards independence. In November 2002 
Steiner signed an agreement with Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dindic, in which Belgrade 
handed over ‘parallel Serbian institutions’ to UNMIK and gave consent to the introduction of 
the Kosovo Police S e rv ice .The reby ,  Belgrade interrupted the support for some Serbian 
institutions in Mitrovica (at least temporarily as leverage), but continued to finance several 
others including the health sector and administrative structures.
The Serbian minority was divided and Steiner attempted to negotiate with the moderate 
factions. However, after a break-up in the alliance with the Serbian National Council (SNV), 
and a failure of Nebosa Covic (the President of Serbia’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo) to 
control the Kosovo Serbs, there were increased internal disputes among the Serbs, with a 
weakened ‘Return Coalition’ (Povratak) and a strengthening of the Serbs in Mitrovica, which 
resulted in Steiner being left without a negotiation partner.^^^ In early 2003 the Serbian Prime 
Minister Zoran Dindic took the initiative for opening up a dialogue over Kosovo with a
674 “Balkans facing uncertain future" Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2003; United Nations SecuriW 
Council. Report of the Secretan’-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Koso\^o, 
S/2003/113, 29 Januar>- 2003: 4
Janjid, D (2004) “Kosovo: Five Years oflntemational Administration” Paper for the Ninth Annual ASN 
World Convention. Harriman Institute, Columbia University 15-17 April 2004:2
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proposal to create a federal structure in which the Serbs were allowed some autonomy within 
Kosovo, that is, an ethnic federalisation o f Kosovo within a Serbian state. However, since the 
very idea o f remaining in the Serbian state was anathema to the Albanians, such a dialogue 
was premature. In attempting to find a balance between the various factions, Steiner shifted 
his position several times, but in the EU Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003, it 
became clear that the EU had a different standpoint to him on several issues and he was 
finally forced to l e a v e . H e  was replaced by Harri Holkery in July that year.
During Harry Holkeri’s mandate the UNMIK system was eventually brought to near collapse. 
The beginning o f his period saw an increased incidence o f ethnically motivated violence, and 
murders, and on 18 and 19 March ethnic violence escalated in a well* organised Albanian 
attack on Serbs throughout Kosovo, when 4000 Serbs were forced from their homes, 22 
people were killed and some 600 wounded. Around 800 private houses as well as Orthodox 
churches were looted and burned. Half a year earlier, during autumn 2003, there had been 
some attempts at dialogue, and a meeting was held in Vienna on 14 October. It was, however, 
largely a failure, and rather than dialogue there were a series of autistic monologues on the 
respective positions. The March riots showed that whole structures of the Albanian society 
either supported, or passively accepted, the violence against the Serbs. The Albanian media 
played an important role in increasing fervour and ethnic tensions. The violence was 
organised, started simultaneously in several places, and the Albanians showed great capacity 
to block the mobility of the international forces. Several international (mainly UNMIK) 
personnel were also targeted, and around 150 were wounded. The riots clearly indicated the 
level o f miscalculation and wishful thinking on the part o f the international administration in 
Kosovo, and it demonstrated to the Albanians, as well as to the Serbs and other minorities, the 
weakness o f the international military presence and civil administration. The international 
troop level had gradually been reduced to less than 20 000 and, in order to avoid an image o f 
occupation, so had its visual appearance in many locations.
The successive transfer of powers from UNMIK to PISG may be seen as steps towards an 
exit-strategy for the UNMIK, Tensions have gradually increased between the local authorities 
and UNMIK in relation to powers. Generally UNMIK has perceived the local authorities as 
trying to enter into those areas where power is reserved for UNMIK, and the local authorities
676 Janjic, D (2004): 3
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have perceived UNMIK as not respecting those areas that are not reserved. In addition the 
issue of the transfer o f power has fuelled tensions between Albanians and Serbs, and has been 
subject to their respective perceptions o f UNMIK. The Albanians have tended to consider that 
the transfer of power is a step towards independence, which in their opinion is not being 
pursued fast enough. For the same reason, the Serbs have feared such a power transfer. In the 
relationship between UNMIK and the local administrations there has been particular tension 
over the uncertainties in relation to the economic and financial sectors, not least regarding 
privatisation matters.
After the eruption o f violence in March 2004, UNMIK effectively lost its credibility among 
both Serbs and Albanians, and partly within the international community. The EU and NATO 
have appointed their own special representatives, and have opened up separate tracks for 
collecting information. Many individual governments and NGOs have also developed 
information channels of their own.
Harry Holkeri was replaced by Soren Jessen-Pedersen as new Special Representative and the 
latter immediately started to adjust to Albanian requests, since it was now obvious how deep 
the Albanian discontent was. However, combined with the fear created after the March riots, 
this move immediately frustrated the Serbs who therefore almost completely boycotted the 
parliamentary election, which was held in October 2004. Only about 1 % of the Serbs 
participated. In these elections the LDK won 45 % of the votes, the PDK 29%, the AAK 9%, 
and a new small party, the Civic List (ORA) received 6 %. Hashim Thaqi made it conditional 
for his participation in the new government, that he should become Prime Minister. When this 
was rejected the PDK formed the opposition instead together with ORA and two very small 
Serbian parties (the Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija, and the Civic List for Serbia). The 
government was formed in an unholy alliance between the LDK and the AAK. A newspaper 
supporting the PDK accused Haradinaj and the AAK for being traitors in prolonging the 
political lifeo f Rugova.^’^
Qirezi, A. “Old Foes Unite to form New Kosovo Govemmenr IWPR Balkan Crisis Report. Issue 524-530, 
November 2004, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Loixlon.
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At the time of writing this new government has just been operating for a few months. Ramush 
Haradinaj was made Prime Minister despite widespread outrage among the Serbs, and 
complaints among western diplomats over the fact that he was a suspected war criminal and 
that the ICTY planned an indictment o f him.^’  ̂During 2004 he was interviewed twice by the 
ICTY and in early March 2005 he chose to resign from his post as Prime Minister in order to 
cooperate with the t r i b u n a l . O n  8 March an indictment was announced and on 10 March the 
contents of it were made public.
The EU Regional Approach: *SAP*,* STM \ and ^Standards Before Status*
The framework o f the regional approach o f the EU is developed in the ‘Stabilisation and 
Association Process’ (SAP) for which the EU heads of state gave their support in June 
2000ƒ The aim is to achieve the fullest possible integration o f the Balkan countries into the 
political and economic mainstream o f Europe.^^* The ‘SAP’ is intended to  encourage regional 
cooperation and the normalisation o f inter-state relationships, and to promote a number of 
liberal democratic standards as well as market economy. Greater economic stability as well as 
respect for human rights, the rule of law, minority protection, and compliance with the Dayton 
Accords and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) is central elements 
for which relations with the EU have been made conditional. For the purpose of ensuring that 
reforms in various areas undertaken in Kosovo are in accordance with European Standards, 
and for the purpose of developing technical assistance from the EU, the ‘Tracking 
Mechanism’ (STM) was developed. The ‘STM’ is a joint technical working group of 
UNMIK, PISG and the EU Commission. It has held several separate meetings over various 
issues.
678 Limani, Z & M. Hajnillahu et al “Talk o f Haradinaj Indictment Unnerv es Kosovo“ IWPR Balkan Crisis 
Report Issue No 531-534, December 2004, Institute for War & Peace Reporting. London. Claims have been 
made that the ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte was delaying an indictment upon request by KFOR or UNMIK, 
in order not to disturb a delicate situation in Kosovo. Cf. Free Republic, “Kosovo PM Indicted for War Crimes”, 
Makfax Independent News Agency, Macedonia: http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-ncws/I353235.posts (entered 8 
March 2005).
Cf UNMIK Press Office, Press Release 8 March 2005, “SRSG’s statement on the Prime M inisters 
resignation”, UNMIK/PR/I325
See various programmes, such as the European Commission ‘Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006’ and other 
aid-related documents on EU webpages: httD://curopa.eu.int/comnveuropeaid/Droiccts/cards.bublications cii htni 
(entered 29 April 2004) and lmp://europa eu.int/coniin/cxiemal relations/scc/ncw s/ip03 920.htm (entered 2 Mav 
2004).
European Commission, External Relations DG Western Balkans: CARDS Assistance Programme to the 
Western Bakans Regional Strategj^ Paper 2002-2006:4
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The first meeting was held in March 2003 (discussing issues of democracy, rule of law, and 
market reforms), the second on 30 June and 1 July in 2003, and a third meeting on 26-27 
November 2003 (focusing on trade, customs issues, and economic legislation). In May 2004 a 
meeting was held where the Annual report of the SAP Tracking Mechanism was presented 
along with a draft European Partnership, and the discussion focused on economic and 
agricultural issues. A fifth meeting was held in September 2004, with focus on a number of 
economic, environmental, and other issues and on the question of European partnership.
As earlier mentioned, the Special Representative Michael Steiner elaborated a number of 
criteria during 2002, which had to be fulfilled before a final discussion on Kosovo’s future 
status could start. The question appeared to have been given a definite timeframe in late 2002, 
when the Contact Group announced that there should be a review o f the issue in summer 
2005. For this aim a number o f planning groups were set up in 2003 between UNMIK and the 
PISG.
In December 2003, UNMIK prepared (and the Security Council sanctioned) the checklist 
‘Standards for Kosovo’. These standards constitute the preconditions in the ‘Standards Before 
Status’ policy. The ‘Standards for Kosovo’ describe a Kosovo with representative public 
institutions, an effective rule o f law, the possibility for refugees and displaced persons to 
return without hindrance or intimidation, possibilities for all ethnic groups to travel and work 
safely as well as to use their language anywhere and in any institution, where the framework 
is in place for a market economy, where Prishtina is engaged in dialogue with Belgrade, and 
some other conventional liberal principles to fulfil a minimal condition of what is described as 
a ‘normal society’. O n  31 March a ‘Kosovo Standard Implementation Plan’ was elaborated 
in order to specify which actions were to be undertaken by PISG and other actors in order to 
fulfil the conditions on the ‘Standards’ roadmap.^*^ The ‘Standards Implementation Plan’
(p. 6-7) emphasised challenges for a multi-ethnic inclusive society without discrimination. It 
further identified what form o f institutional strengthening was needed, and what the problems
Kosovo Standard Implementation Plan. 31 March 2004. available at; 
www.kosovo.com/ksip english31 Mar.doc (entered 3 May 2004) and for more details the UN webpages under
‘Standards Before Status’ 
®^Ibid
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were in relation to corruption and service delivery. It enjoins the PISG to address these 
matters through:
- Involvement of all communities in a meaningful manner in decision-making, and 
promotion of an atmosphere o f tolerance and co-operation among them;
- Adherence to the overall legal framework for their respective activities;
- Enhancement of institutional efficiency by further consolidating legal and 
administrative systems and procedures in governance;
- Implementation of norms and procedures in all activities and effecting service delivery 
in a transparent, fair, equitable and sustainable manner and without discrimination or 
favour;
- Playing a constructive role in addressing issues such as decentralization o f local 
government and integration o f parallel structures in the PISG structures;
The ‘Plan’ furthermore has a checklist for a range of measures that should be undertaken by a 
number of different actors, including the media, municipal authorities, ministries, political 
parties, the Central Electoral Commission and its secretariat, as well as the responsibility of 
‘civil society’ (it is generally vague here what this concept is intended to contain, but from the 
context it appears to particularly include civil associations and NGOs).
The EU ‘SAP Tracking Mechanism’ can be seen as a complement to the ‘Standards’ for 
Kosovo. The difference is mainly in time perspective, where the ‘Standards’ are limited in 
time frame, while the ‘Tracking Mechanism’ is continuous and intended to bring Kosovo 
closer to the EU. The main instrument or ‘carrot’ o f ‘SAP’ is the financial aid provided 
through the ‘CARDS’ programme of the EU, as well as trade concessions.^**'* The EU further 
provides policy advice. The SAP produces annual reports, which analyse the development in 
various sectors and highlight the issues o f priority. The annual report for 2004 covers the 
period until February and therefore lacks an assessment after the emption of violence in 
March. In March 2004 the EU presented a draft partnership agreement, which basically 
functions as a form of conditionality for the relationship with EU.
CARDS = Community Assistance forReconstniction, Development and Stabilisation.
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A problem in relation to the EU strategies of partnership and conditionality is the earlier 
policy discrepancies. To a large extent policies have tended to be reactive rather than 
proactive and there have remained ambiguities in relation to conditionality and potential 
rewards. This concerns for example the potential for membership in the EU, and for whom 
and how that could apply (for an independent Kosovo or for Kosovo as a part o f Serbia- 
Montenegro for example? When could it be expected?), or which type of benefits a non­
membership partnership would bring. I f  the ‘carrot’ is not clear enough the policy which 
comes with it tends to be less effective.®^^ This has a bearing on aid policy and development 
strategies on, for example, the question of the level of coordination of the EU donor states 
with regard to conditionality for reconstruction and development aid (including bilateral aid). 
Although the EU is the largest contributor of aid to Kosovo, there is the possibility that the 
United States and other powers can be used as leverage in negotiating conditionality. In 
addition there may be other policy goals among the Kosovo Albanians, which are more 
important than cooperating along a partnership scheme, such as the issue of status as well as 
independence in pursuing goals. It must also be considered that even if  the most important 
political actors and financial aid contributors, such as the U.S., the EU and the multilateral 
institutions they control (IMF, WB), share the same orientation towards economic 
development in Kosovo and the region in general, there is not really a coherent development 
strategy (discussed below). The strong political dimension of aid policy comes to the fore 
here. Conditionality is probably the strongest instmment for the EU to pursue policy 
objectives in the region, but conditionality is a weaker instrument when membership o f the 
EU is not at stake, and the alternative ‘carrot and stick’ o f ‘independence’ cannot really be 
pursued independently of concern for Serbia as well as for other international actors 
(including Russia, China).^^ What remains for political leverage is reconstruction and 
development assistance, which is a weak tool both in terms of credibility for its being 
withheld and in tenns of the cost-benefit it carries.
This lias been discussed by Missiroli, A (2004) “The EU and its changing ncigbouihood -  Stabilization, 
integration and partncrsliip" in Dannrculher, R (Ed)(2004) "European Union Foreign and Security Policy -  
Towards a neighbourhood strategy ” Routledge: 18 
Cf partly: Missiroli (2004); 19
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Perceptions and perception disturbances in relation to *SAp* and ^Standards*
Despite ambitious and benevolent intentions laid out in the ‘SAp’ framework, as well as the 
‘Standards before Status’, it should be noted that there have been and are, a number of 
political ‘double-bind’-signals transmitted from the International Community, including the 
EU, which undermine the clarity and sincerity of p o l i c y T o  mention but a few examples, 
there was the ‘unintentional’ signal to the Kosovo Albanians in the Dayton peace process that 
only by provoking violence would their ‘case’ come onto the political agenda and be taken 
seriously. This derived from the somewhat naïve position by the main international actors that 
the problem in Kosovo was contained and could be treated in isolation from other cases in the 
former Yugoslavia. The ‘perception shock’ than went through Albanian society when the 
international community chose to deal with Bosnia separately tilted the political-strategic 
agenda and discredited the non-violence strategy o f Ibrahim Rugova. The radicals’ strategy o f 
provoking violence (as in Bosnia) in order to elevate Kosovo to an international issue was 
eventually proven the most fruitful. Similarly, radical groups among the Albanians in 
Macedonia perceived that increased violence might provide better negotiating positions, 
which it eventually appeared to do following EU pressure on the Macedonian government. 
Other double-binds have been questions o f high standards o f minority protection, human 
rights, rule of law and so forth, where single cases could be interpreted as negotiable. For 
example; Slovenia proved to be able to ‘go it alone’ to the EU apart from the ‘regional 
cooperation’ approach to the Balkans; Estonia entered the EU despite issues with a Russian 
minority as ‘B-class citizens’, and the international administration in Eastern Slavonia 
allowed for the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia, quite effectively through the agreement 
of conscription for Serbs.***
Claims for the levels or standards on certain issues have in several cases been severely 
compromised. The elections in Kosovo were officially praised as being successful although 
there have been considerable problems in relation to minority issues, and security for 
example. More global and geographically remote issues could be seen to affect the political
Tlte term double-bind (dubbel-bindning in Swedish) is borrowed from psycholog>^ It refers to a situation 
w here two opposite signals are transmitted, for e.xample by a mother to a child (i.e. the motlicr says ‘I love you’ 
while slapping the cliild, or ‘I hate you’ w hile caressing it) so that the meaning of the message is confused, 
perhaps believed to be the opposite o f the stated one for e.xample.
* Tlie agreement tliat Serbs in Eastern Sla\'onia should get tw o > ears suspension from sen ing in the Croatian 
Army may have been praised as a successful negotiation by the UNTAES. but it w as a \ ei}* effecth e wa>’ of 
forcing the Serbs out of Croatia and legitimising the Serbian exodus. Clearly tw o years of suspension w as hardly 
enough for people who feared to ser\ e in an Ann)', which recently had been an enemy.
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perception o f actors in the region. An obvious case is the U.S. Bush-Administrations U-tum in 
relation to refugee-return in Israel during 2004. Clearly it could be interpreted that political 
conditionality is negotiable and that various proclaimed standards do not provide a ‘fixed’ 
framework. The EU (internally), and the U.S., have a recent history in the Balkans of being 
everything but united in their policies. Shifting positions among international actors have 
proven possible to exploit, the PR and media-climate have proven essentia! in creating short­
term turnarounds in policy, and so on. Within the western diplomatic community there have 
of course been different ideas o f which strategy is the better in order to promote compliance 
with certain standards; some may believe that ‘pressure and sticks’ is better, while others 
believe that a more ‘liberal’ approach to conditionality, and early inclusion, is the correct 
option. All in all, double bind, different principles applied to different actors and cases, as 
well as general discrepancy between stated principles, rhetoric, claimed policy, and acts have 
in the very recent past contributed to the possibility of quite a selective reception of 
transmitted political messages. This provides for a possible perception that standards and 
conditions indeed are highly negotiable and that the time factor may be essential in finding the 
‘opportune moment’ for when to introduce changes, or pursue another agenda.
The Contact Group initiative, and its associated ‘implementation map’, has been perceived as 
a fixed schedule (mid-2005) on the road towards recognised independence. Independence has 
been the only conceivable option for the Kosovo Albanians and is very likely to remain so 
(they definitely opted for this already in the 1990s). The idea of mere ‘autonomy’ is 
hopelessly lost in Socialist Yugoslavia (obviously ‘autonomy’ in Serbia-Montenegro has a 
completely different meaning than autonomy in the old Socialist Yugoslavia. For Albanians 
the idea has been dead since Slovenia seceded). While the agenda is widely shared throughout 
the Albanian community there are differences in time- frame and method for achieving this 
goal. The issue continues to create tensions within the Albanian community as well as 
pressure on PISG. At the same time it provides PISG representatives with leverage towards 
the major parties within the International Community (Contact Group et cetera.) that unless 
there is a certainty and pace towards the status of independence the Albanians will move 
unilaterally. As determined as the Albanian aim is for independence, the Serbs position is 
against it. For the vast majority of Serbs in Kosovo this would be inconceivable. It is equally 
anathema in Serbia proper. Various suggestions of double-autonomy (that is autonomy for 
Kosovo within Serbia and autonomy for Serb enclaves within Kosovo), and/or partition have
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been suggested instead. The whole issue remains extremely sensitive and will very likely 
become a trigger for future conflict.
Démocratisation as party  politics an d  elections
Essentially there has developed an institutional framework o f  government, largely based upon 
earlier existing ‘parallel institutions’, in Kosovo. Although there were attempts to promote the 
inclusion and participation o f the ethnic minority communities, the ‘multi-ethnicity’ of the 
government has not reflected the divided society. Security has remained a concern for all 
minorities in Kosovo, and the Serbian population has been confined to enclaves. Ethnic 
violence has been reported in virtually every quarterly report by the UN Secretary General to 
the Security Council and the social climate has been permeated by internal disputes not only 
between the ethnic groups, but also to some extent within the Serbian minority as well as 
among the Albanians (often crystallised as conflict between LDK and PDK). Ethnic violence 
has been reduced only temporarily and then largely as a result of the departure o f wide 
sections o f the ethnic minorities, mainly the departure of Serbs. Individual representatives 
from the minorities have to travel in guarded convoys, and destruction o f property, threats and 
intimidations, arson, and ethnically motivated murders have remained a common feature of 
every-day reality. There ¿r/'c certain exceptions to this; examples of inter-ethnic, Serb- 
Albanian, cooperation can be found for example in a project at the railroad track from 
Prishtina, and in some settlements in the municipality of Kaminica, but these exceptions do 
not constitute a trend.^*^ Apart from the hard ethnically delineated conflict, there has also 
been a general conflict and mistrust among various Albanian parties, especially between the 
LDK and PDK.
The character o f poUticalparties: ethnic and dan-hasedpolarisation and UNMIK 
stimulated ethnification
The political parties in Kosovo can be considered neither democratic, nor as ‘parties’ in the 
conventional liberal sense. Rather they are authoritarian pyramids of power. They do not have 
an ideological basis, and there is no bridge to social groups in society and no communication
At the railroad track both ethnic communities have an interest that the particular strip of rail-track is 
operating. In Kaminica the toleration and. sometimes, mutual protection, has been spontaneous.
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between the political elite and the citizens. These kinds of characteristics are sometimes noted 
by international organisations, such as for example the UNDP, which considers the 
establishment o f democratic structures to be essential to human development as they define 
it.̂ ®̂ UNMIK and the international community are therefore supporting a small authoritarian 
elite rather than ‘democracy’ as such. Partly flowing from this there are numerous weaknesses 
in the local government, which in many respects has been dysfunctional. It is inhabited by a 
conflict-ridden coalition, which has divided up the institutional framework, portfolios and 
ministries between the different parties, and has no capacity or competence to administer a 
number of issues.
The political parties in Kosovo have no clear ideological basis or division between them, nor 
any clear economic programmes. Instead, the question o f independence for Kosovo, and 
questions o f which party cadre played the leading role in freeing Kosovo from Serbian 
domination, have been the central issues discussed among the Albanian parties, and the 
question o f whether to boycott elections and institutions or not, has been the main concern of 
Serbian parties. Political parties in Kosovo are strongly based on ethnicity as the first criteria. 
The Albanian parties are further strongly connected to traditional social loyalty structures, 
such as clan and family alliances, and in some cases with a strong regional basis.
While the unit o f extended family in Albanian society is connected to other families in the 
clan {fis\ there are also alliances with other extended families outside the clan. Regardless 
whether the alliances derive from the Jis or are formed on the basis of connections in the 
village community or alliances betM>een families, the relationship is based on loyalty and a 
duty to return favours. In order for a political leader to emerge on a public stage, he has to be 
able to mobilise such networks within society. Conversely, such networks of clan or family 
alliances will seek to promote a member to important positions in society, such as in politics, 
in a company, or even in an NGO and thereby have their interests promoted or receive favours 
in return. The success of an individual is thereby beneficial to the whole family and its allies. 
Indeed, capturing the state, or some institution, provides for a new privilege structure.
^  UNDP “Human Development Report Kosovo 2004 - The Rise of the Citizen; Challenges and Choices”, 
United Nations Development Programme: pp 60-63 for political parties, see chapter 3 for their view on the role 
of democratic structures in human development.
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The Albanian parties AAK and PDK, exemplify the elements o f extension of the social 
structure into politics and they both have strong regional anchoring. The PDK is particularly 
strong in four municipalities in the Drenica area, where the KLA was concentrated, and the 
AAK has an even stronger regional base in the Dukagjini area where it has control of the 
municipality of Decani. Both these parties have additional strength in a few other 
municipalities in their respective regions.
An example from the municipality o f Skenderaj in the Drenica region helps illustrate the 
tendency of clientelist relationships. Here the Association of KLA War Veterans, and the War 
Invalids Association, both function as extended welfare provision branches of the PDK, and 
provide welfare assistance to poor families as well as veterans and their families.^^‘ The claim 
of PDK to represent the people is backed here with direct welfare provision, and also the state 
social assistance program is manipulated so that more flexible criteria for beneficiaries are 
applied.̂ ^̂
In contrast to this, the LDK has drawn support from a more widespread base, even after the 
war in 1999. The Norwegian anthropologist Aasmund Andersen has suggested that a 
transgression o f clan-alliance or regional networks can be achieved through a charismatic 
leadership, where the leader appeals to an all-Albanian cause, or to the unified ethnie, as in 
the case of Ibrahim Rugovas passive resistance against the Serbs.^^^ In such a case political 
bridge building would require a strong emphasis on the (ethnic)-national interest, and 
especially an emphasis on the capacity to achieve independence. This would be more 
important than, for example, having a ‘democratic’ profile. Ibrahim Rugova has lost much o f 
his political credibility among the Albanians and has gradually been marginalized, but he still 
has cultural capital as the leader of the passive resistance movement. The LDK as a party also 
appeals to people who favour a more moderate position, and it has a Kosovo-wide range.
Fred Cocozzelli has argued that the AAK has a stronger influence in politics than its electoral 
results would indicate partly because it has developed a high level of professionalism, partly
Cocozzelli, F (2004) “Political Parties in Kosovo 2003”, GCS Quarterly 11 (Winter 2004), Social Science 
Research Council. Available at; www.ssrc.org/Drograms/gsc.^Dublications/auiuterlv 11 /cocozzelli pdf (entered 8 
March 2005)
®^Ibid
Andersen. A (2002) “Transforming Ethnic Nationalism -  the politics of ethno-nationalist sentiments among 
the elite in Kosovo” thesis for the Cand polit degree in Social Anthropology, University of Oslo. Available at: 
\v\nv, aasmimdandcrscii. net (entered 2 March 2005).
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because it has assumed a centrist position (that is, less radically nationalist than the PDK), and 
partly because it has a large number of women, as well as young members, which is perceived 
well among international organisations and NGOs.^^"* The indictment of Ramush Haradinaj 
for possible war crimes, and the widespread mmours that he is a major figure in a drug­
smuggling network does not affect the fact that UNMIK considered him to be one of the more 
skilful politicians in Kosovo.^^^
It should be clarified here that the extension of social structure into politics is not direct, and 
that there are no absolute or fixed boundaries. On the contrary, there are many fault-lines 
within Kosovo Albanian society that have nothing to do with the traditional form of social 
organisation. These include for example generational fault-lines, urban-rural differences, and 
international experience versus communal life. There is an increasing number of, especially 
young, Albanians with experiences o f ‘western-style’ modem culture, ranging from music and 
sub-culture to foreign university education. Through the internet and through friends in the 
diaspora, or direct personal experience, some of them may have embraced, for example, 
anarchist or liberal ideas. Even so, however, they cannot disregard the traditional loyalties or 
social structure that still shape Albanian society in Kosovo. As everywhere else, there is a 
structural limitation and  cultural context, to the choices a person can make, and many 
elements o f this change relatively slowly.
The Albanian parties have all positioned themselves in relation to the demand for 
independence, a claim which they all share but pursue with different levels o f aggressiveness. 
With some exceptions this has been the prime issue in political debate (a notable exception is 
that the AAK chose to broaden the debate to economic and developmental issues in the 2004 
elections). Further, the parties portray themselves on a ‘nationalist-patriotic’ scale in relation 
to their role in the war and in liberating Kosovo from Serbian rule. Their goal is not 
démocratisation but independence.
The Serbian party scene is divided mainly between the Serbs in north Mitrovica, and the 
Serbs in Graèanica and the hamlets outside Prishtina. The Serbian parties are typically 
extensions of parties in Serbia proper, and the so-called ‘northern’ Serbs have had support
CocozzcIIi, F (2004)
695 The indictment lias been discussed above. The assumption that Haradinaj has an important role in the shadow 




from Serbia in their administrative structures. The coalition ‘Povratak’ has had a shifting 
composition throughout its existence and often with strong influence from Serbia proper. The 
Serbian National Council (SNV), based in Gracanica, has had a shift in leadership and it has 
generally represented a more moderate stance. It has, however, been openly criticised for not 
being representative of the Serbs. A number of small parties have existed alongside these 
poles. ■
The ‘other minorities’ in Kosovo, are primarily the Slavic-speaking Muslim groups, Gorani, 
Torbesi, and Bosniacs, the Turks, the Roma, an Albanian-speaking Roma-related group called 
Ashkalija, and the “Egyptians” . U N M I K  has had a clear strategy of achieving legitimacy 
for these ethnic minority groups, by promoting them through political parties that can gain 
access to the institutions, and for this reason contributed to the role of ethnicity being 
enhanced in p o l i t i c s .H e n c e ,  the emphasis on ethnic politics has been directly promoted by 
the international governance system in Kosovo. It can certainly be argued that this has been 
necessary, since political and social life is so heavily shaped by ethnic identity politics from 
the outset, but the international promotion o f political pluralism has in effect become part of 
the process of stimulating ethnocratic (rather than democratic) pluralism.
The institutionalising of party pluralism can be a way of organising polarised groups into a 
new framework o f conflict-management (a parliament), but generally has little to do with 
liberal ideas of democracy. In a case where the basis for political organisation, and division, is 
‘ethnos’, rather than ‘demos’, and where clan-based or regionally-based political parties 
become a dominant or important feature, the result gives particularly limited room for voters 
flexibility, and the issues at stake become higher, since they directly affect personal identity 
and security. The phenomenon, with regard to ethnic criteria, is well known from studies on 
consociational democracy.^^*
j '
A process of démocratisation, or new forms of pluralism, is not only highly sensitive to local 
social, cultural, and historical factors, but is essentially directly shaped through them. External 
support for a démocratisation process, which is based on criteria and models from a different
The boundaries betu een these latter three groups are not clear and they ha\ e shifted in time (the ‘Eg> plians’, 
for example, is a recently created group), but see: Duijzings, G (2000) “Religion and the Politics ofidentitj' in 
Kosovo” Hurst & Company', London (especially chapter 6); Andersen, A (2002): 70-79 
Andersen, A (2002): 78-79
For example: Lijphart, A (1984) “Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian Rule and Consensus Government” 
Yale UniversiW Press
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historical and cultural heritage and a different kind of social structure, may therefore promote 
fragmentation and re-institutionalisation o f conflicts rather than stability and democracy. In 
this regard one may distinguish between what we can call ‘organic’ and ‘mechanic’ 
governance structures and institutions, where the former would be developed through the 
historical heritage of society, and the latter would be frameworks derived from external 
theoretical models. The experience from the introduction of party pluralism in neighbouring 
Albania has been clan-based polarisation as well as regional polarisation, where clan-based 
politics has shaped the allocation of state resources and investments.^^ Individuals, or 
families, who are not members of the clan that controls the particular party may benefit 
anyway from allocation of resources to the particular region where they live and thereby share 
the interests of that clan.™“ The crystallisation of clan-based polarisation in party systems and 
other institutions is therefore never strictly pure even if  they configure them. Although 
institutions help shape social and political life, there is a direct shaping of the institutions 
through the character of local social structure, power-relations and culture. This fact has been 
demonstrated also in the experience of Socialist Yugoslavia. The capturing of institutions is 
an important way to increase political and economic power, but it is not the institutions as 
such that play the major role in re-shaping society, but rather a number of cultural and 
historical factors -  including social structure and power relations - which in combination with 
the changing institutional framework, form a basis for the direction of social change. This 
setting operates within the given macro-structural and global political opportunity-structures 
that are provided. Therefore, the particular, local, historical factors have to be carefully 
considered and then placed within a macro-structural (political-economic) framework in order 
to understand social change. It is within this context the limitations of the introduction o f an 
international governance structure should be understood.
Gcrxhani, K & A. Schram (2005) “Clan-Based Polarization in Transition; A Political Economic Analysis”, 
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies & Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 
University of Amsterdam; cf. Geixhani, K & A. Schram (2000) “Albanian Political-Economics; Consequences 
o f a Clan Culture” in “Journal of Institutional Inno^ ation. Dcx clopment and Transition”, Voi 4.2000; 5-14 
GCrxhani. K & A. Scluam (2000) “Albanian Political-Economics; Consequences of a Clan Culture” in 
“Journal of Institutional Innovation, De\ clopmcnt and Transition”, Vol 4, 2000; 5-14
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Post-W ar Reconstruction, Econom ic and  Social Development
A considerable number of donors and NGOs started to operate in a variety of fields in Kosovo 
after the war in 1999. The initial phase o f  physical reconstruction did however primarily 
rebuild infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war, and that was worn down after 
ten years o f sanctions, under-investment and shadow economic life. Following the 
establishment o f  the protectorate, much ‘private’ business became legalised and open, and 
small-scale initiatives of business started to grow. Conventional measurements indicate that 
there has been some economic growth in Kosovo over these last couple o f years. According to 
the World Bank the adoption o f  the German Mark, and subsequently the Euro, as well as the 
liberal trade regime, resulted in a high degree of macro-economic stability.^*^  ̂Following the 
World Bank, domestic revenues now cover expenditures under the Kosovo Consolidated 
Budget and an increasing portion o f the public investment.
The World Bank figures state that average GDP growth per capita doubled from being below 
US $ 400 in the year 2000 to almost US $ 790 in 2003. Growth then started to slow down 
again as the aid flow decreased. Counted in Euro, the donations to Kosovo were around 313 
million in 1999, over 975 million in 2000, just below 570 in 2001, just below 324 in 2001, 
and around 120 million in 2003.™^ The reconstruction assistance from international NGOs 
decreased every single year starting from 635 million Euros in 2000, to 270 million in 2003, 
and the donor grants to the Kosovo General Budget decreased from 161 million in 2000, to 25 
million in 2003.™  Estimates o f general GDP growth suggested it to be 11 % in 2001, 
decreasing to 7 %  in 2002, and 4.5 % in 2003.™ It should be noted that the ‘World Bank’ 
highlights that all the statistics for Kosovo come with a high degree of uncertainty. The lack 
of statistical data is a considerable problem for practically any sector in Kosovo and all 
estimates are about as rough as they can come in an official document. The GDP estimates.
Document of the World Bank: “Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association 
to the Executive Directors on a Transitional Support Strategy of the World Bank Group for Kosovo” Report No 
280006-KOS (available at uvvw.worldbank.org. entered 26 April 2004)
Taken from Janjic, D (2004); 29. Janjic’s source is the RIMS Database, December 9,2003. The RIMS 
(Reconstruction Inter\’cntion Monitoring System) database is held in the Ministr}' of Finance of the PISG, in 
Kosovo.
Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group (ESPIG) “Towards a Kosovo Development Plan; The 
state o f the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward”. Policy Paper No. 1, Prishtina, August 2004: 8 
Note that these were estimates, cf. Holzner, M (2003) “Kosovo: A Protectorate’s economy” The Vienna 
Institute Monthly Report 2003/1, at:
w\\w.wiiw.ac atAialkan/riles.'Kosovo%20wiiw%20Monthlv%20RcDort?4202003-l .Ddf (entered 5 May 2004)
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for example, have been continuously revised downwards every year.’'̂  ̂The different 
ministries o f the Kosovo provisional self-government (PISG) even have different calculations 
of the population in Kosovo, so that the Ministry of Trade and Industry assume a population 
of 2.4 million and the Macroeconomic Policy Department in the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy calculate on the basis of between 1.7 and 1.85 million.^'^ Some other ministries 
have their own suggestions. The lack o f data for even the most basic elements of the formal 
economy, and the lack of census data over the population of Kosovo, is of course a 
considerable obstacle to any policy planning.
The initial ‘recovery* of the formal economy in Kosovo created a certain premature optimism 
among many international agencies. The very unsustainable nature of it was however 
gradually recognised by all agencies as it became clear that the economic growth was, and is, 
narrowly based and heavily dependent on donor flows. The first years of recovery were a 
typical effect of immediate ‘post-war’ physical reconstruction (houses, basic infrastructure, 
some agricultural recovery, and so on) and the coming into open and new opportunities of the 
economy, which in the 1990s had been suppressed in the so-called ‘parallel society’. It was 
also a typical effect of the large presence of international organisations, and largely dependent 
on this. These two factors include for example the local organisation and production o f some 
of the material for rebuilding houses and some production of furniture, as well as new cafés 
and taxi drivers appearing and hotels operating mainly to serve the influx o f ‘internationals’ 
from the UN, various aid agencies, NGOs, military staff, and journalists. Further, the new 
jobs created in the various international agencies as interpreters, drivers, assistants, and sub­
contractors, as well as various forms o f aid financing provided for the boom. A single 
individual’s salary from work in an international organisation can support a family. However, 
very little is in fact produced inside Kosovo. Most goods need to be imported and the export 
is considerably small (some timber, scrap metal, and mushrooms are now exported). During 
the past two years the economic and social situation has rather stagnated, as the ‘emergency 
assistance’ has not been followed by any development strategy.
Economic Strategj' and Project Identification Group (ESPIG) “Towards a Koso\ o De\ elopment Plan: Tlic 
state of Uie Kosovo economy and possible ways forward". Policy Paper No. 1, Prishtina, August 2004; 7. This 




There are specific problems for how to even create a development strategy. The unresolved 
status o f Kosovo continues to effectively block any traditional development work, since the 
latter unavoidably becomes confronted with legal considerations and depends on the existence 
of a judicial state. This is discussed further below. Another problem relates to lack of data and 
the fact that no census has yet been undertaken in Kosovo.
As discussed in chapter 2, since the 1990s much of the focus o f  the World Bank and other 
international development agencies has been centred on poverty reduction and privatisation. 
These are primary concerns in contemporaiy aid discourse, and the assistance to create and 
develop institutions, including legal bodies, is also shaped by these two parameters. We shall 
therefore discuss these two dimensions. Along with the discussion of poverty we take a brief 
look at education and health, since they are strongly connected.
Poverty
The UNDP, FAO and World Bank jointly undertook poverty assessment in Kosovo, in 2000. 
The results were published in two reports in December 2001, and the discussion o f poverty, 
education and health in the following sections relies primarily on the estimations in these 
reports.™^ A new poverty assessment has been delayed but is expected from the ‘World 
Bank’ in 2005. In other more recent reports (not primarily focusing on poverty) by the ‘World 
Bank’ and ‘UNDP’ slightly different figures appear, and where this is the case the latter have 
often been used.™* It should be noted that the study was not considered statistically 
representative for the ‘other’ minorities (that is for those who are neither Serb nor Albanian).
Kosovo is still among the poorest areas in Europe. Poverty is widespread with some 12-15 % 
of the population living below the extreme poverty line (2100 calories/adult per day), but with 
a drop in general poverty of US$ 1.65/ adult per day from 50 % (2000) and 36 % (2002) to 10 
% (2004).™^ This relationship (between general poverty and extreme poverty) indicates a 
complex poverty situation, where the gap between people is increasing.
World Bank, Poverty and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region “Kosovo Poverty- 
Assessment” Voi 1 and Voi 2, December 2001. Document of the World Bank Report No 23390-KOS,
Document of the World Bank Report No 280006-KOS; UNDP “Human Development Report Koso\ o 2002” 
and “Human Development Report Kosovo 2004” (available at n  Avw ks.undo.orgi.
The WB/UNDP/FAO “Poverty Report” of 2001 states 12 %  for e.\treme poverty (p. viii), while the WB 
Report No 280006-KOS state 15 % (p. 5). They also have differences (50% and 36% respectively) for the 
po\-erty- line. Whether these variations reflect adjustments in assessments due to better statistics or an actual
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Although poverty is widespread it is not very ‘deep’. The poverty gap, or gap between actual 
consumption and the poverty line, is relatively small and in the 2000 study it was calculated 
that 400 DEM per person per year would be enough to get the household out of poverty. The 
extreme poverty gap, or consumption deficit of the extremely poor compared to the poor, is 
also quite small, being only 2.5 % o f the food poverty line. For this reason, that poverty is 
widespread but shallow, the WB /  UNDP / FAO has suggested /o fo a ts  efforts on the 
extremely poor and to leave the issue o f the poor to the separate growth strategy.
There are correlations between extreme poverty and landlessness, poverty and gender, poverty 
and low education, poverty and disability, high number of children, as well as poverty and 
ethnicity. Extreme poverty prevails in rural areas, but this is also a reflection of the fact that 
Kosovo is a very rural society (more than 60 % of the population in rural areas). Households 
of extreme poverty are typically quite large if they are Albanian, but typically quite small if 
they are Serbian. The correlations indicate other characteristic features o f a household of 
extreme poverty, so that extreme poverty is typical in rural areas in households with one 
hectare of land (or less), and in urban areas where there is unemployment or a disabled person 
in the household (especially if  it is the head of the household). Further, extreme poverty 
would be typical in families with a damaged house, where there is lack o f sewage and piped 
water.
There are ethnic and gender dimensions, so that one can find correlations between extreme 
poverty and female-headed households, as well as extreme poverty and some ethnic minority 
groups -  especially Corani and Roma. Extreme poverty also has a geographical dimension 
and is more widespread in certain regional locations such as Mitrovica, Peja/Pec and 
Ferizaj/Urosevaci. Extreme poverty among the rural Serb population is especially frequent in 
the North and Southeast regions (defined as ‘area of responsibility’ by country among the 
international forces). The difference between the urban and rural is also that there is a higher 
poverty risk in the rural areas (since the majority o f the population is rural), but more extreme 
poverty risk in urban areas. The latter is because those in urban areas cannot rely on
change is not clear. If the latter is the case it would indicate that po\ cm- has been reduced, w hile extreme 
po\ ert>' has increased in the span 2001-2003. This seems to be confirmed by UNDP’s “Human Development 
Report Koso\’o 2004”, which states that povert>' in Kosov o is more complex than originally understood. Here, 
tlie UNDP (Introduction: p. 2; chapter 1 in passim-, and various annexes) concludes that a substantial amount of 
the population has fallen out of human povert>% which has been reduced to some 10 % of tlie population in 2004, 
but that the population living in e-\treme povertv  ̂has increased (to 13 %).
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foodstuffs from the land, and the majority of the internally displaced households are now 
located in urban areas (comprising 11 % of the urban population).
Sensitive groups in extreme poverty are: internally displaced persons (‘IDP’s); certain ethnic 
minorities, especially the Roma; and households with a disabled ‘head of family’, especially i f  
Serb, and especially if in an urban area. However, given that Albanians constitute an 
approximate 88 % majority in Kosovo, the majority of the extremely poor are Albanian.
People with no regular income, lack o f  land or destroyed harvests, without livestock, with 
little education, and economically and/or geographically isolated often live in very poor 
housing and eat poor quality food. Often they dress poorly and cannot afford to wash their 
clothes. They cannot afford to buy medicine if  they are ill. These people cannot recover their 
lives without assistance, and aid should target these groups to help them create decent 
livelihoods and raise life-chances.
Education
Low education has a strong correlation with extreme poverty, and children bom into poor 
households tend to get locked into a vicious circle -  low family income translates into poor 
education for the children. Access to and enrolment in primary education (6-14 years) has a 
general figure o f  97 % enrolment. Among the non-Albanian and non-Serbian ethnic 
communities the figure is only 76 %. In addition to this ethnic dimension, there is a gender 
dimension: within those minorities 83 % o f the boys enrol, compared to only 69 % of the 
girls.
Whereas the difference in the level o f  received education is quite small between Albanians 
and Serbs, only half a year, the other ethnic minorities generally receive two years less of 
education (the standard should be ten years education). Education levels are higher in urban 
areas than in rural, with about two fewer years o f education in the rural areas. The ethnic and 
gender differences are also especially strong in rural areas. Illiteracy rates have increased 
among the non-Serb ethnic minorities over the past years. This may be due to the fact that 
they were not equally included in the parallel education system, which was set up among the 
Albanians during the 1990s (the Serbs could access the state-run system). In urban areas some 
20 % o f the children in the lowest consumption decile were not enrolled in school. The 
majority o f  these children, about 66 %  were from other ethnic minorities (neither Albanian
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nor Serb). In secondary education all the factors mentioned continue to produce increased 
inequality.
Health
There was not sufficient data at the time of the joint WB / UNDP / FAO study to allow any 
analysis of inequalities on the various indicators. However, the limited data suggest that 
Kosovo ranked lowest in Europe on every health indicator, such as: infant mortality (45 per 
1000); maternal health; lowest percentage of ante*matemal care in Europe (in 1999 about 20 
% o f the birth deliveries were performed without professional attendance); decline in 
immunisation and so on. Tuberculosis and Hepatitis A are endemic in Kosovo, although there 
has not been any recent large outbreak. There are indications of ethnic and gender inequalities 
in health. Samples of the Serb population report worse health than those of Albanians, and 
they are not just a reflection of the difference in age pyramid. Women have poorer health 
outcomes than men, except for on the ‘disability’ indicator. Access to health care also appears 
to have inequalities on the various indicators (less access for poorer people, for certain 
minorities, and so forth)
Privatisation
Privatisation is, as discussed in chapter 2, a cornerstone in contemporary aid thinking, and 
UNMIK has placed much hope in the idea that the creation of a private sector will generate 
economic development, create jobs, and attract foreign investment,’’® To this end UNMIK 
established the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) in 2002. The KTA is set to administer socially- 
owned enterprises which have lain dormant, and to restructure and privatise them. A series of 
privatisation tenders has since been undertaken, where a number of enterprises have been 
announced for privatisation. In May 2002 a regulation was passed in relation to the land in the 
possession of socially owned enterprise and it transformed the right to use into a right to lease 
for 99 years, with the possibility to cede this right for a loan. The whole privatisation 
procedure has however been highly contested. The Serbs have objected to it as robbery of the 
Sertjian state and people, since Kosovo is part of Serbia. The Serbian government in Belgrade
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretan -General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, 22 April 2002, S/2002/436: 3
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has tried to intervene several times, but initially this was ignored by UNMIK. However, in 
autumn 2003 the process was effectively halted after the KTA had been charged in an 
international court.’ "  The whole program was then suspended since it was illegal.’ ’̂
An additional problem involved was how to solve the question o f debts in the socially owned 
enterprises. One o f the ‘solutions’ to this was that the buyers should take over debts along 
with the assets of the companies. UNMIK further asked for clearance from the UN Security 
Council and the Contact Group to go ahead with expropriation of property, before it could be 
privatised. In 2003 the UN rejected a request by the KTA to grant legal immunity to its staff, 
along with a request to revoke two Serbian laws from the 1990s. The entire policy o f the KTA 
was subsequently re-examined.
Several months of disputes over procedural issues also halted the programme during the first 
half of 2004. Then, following the eruption of ethnic violence in March 2004, the SRSG Harry 
Holkeri dismissed the head o f the KTA, Marie Fucci, for not having proceeded rapidly 
enough with the work. The privatisation process was then resumed in summer 2004, earlier 
privatisation tenders were confirmed and new rounds were announced. The KTA has 
gradually sold several hundred companies, such as hotels, wood-processing factories, 
fishponds, pharmacies, brick, textile, and tobacco factories, and so on. Despite numerous 
problems there have been some successful cases, such as for example with working 
cooperatives, which have brought enterprises back into production as well as provided job 
opportunities. There have, however, also been cases of corruption. While corruption has been 
a problem of general concern in Kosovo, it became a particularly embarrassing issue for 
UNMIK, when cases involving UNMIK staff were revealed.
Within the international community there have been different standpoints as to how a 
privatisation process may be conducted. The United States has pushed strongly for 
privatisation and for selling o ff socially-owned enterprises to local or international 
entrepreneurs, but the EU has been more in favour o f promoting working cooperatives. The 
question of the legality of the privatisation / lease process has remained a central problem. In
Koha Ditore, Economic & European News, 9 October 2003
The legalii}' o f privatisation was not only contested by the Serbs, but was also questioned by international 
lawyers: cf. Koha Ditore, Economic & European News, 16 May 2003. This issue of Koha Ditore cites the 
Cambridge Professor o f International Law-, ^ r t i n  Dickson, as staling that Serbia legally is right and that there is 
an issue o f misappropriation.
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addition to the potential for creating future conflict, it also has a hampering effect on foreign 
investors. The dubious introduction and the changes in policy have not contributed to creating 
confidence among potential investors. At the same time, local capital is scarce and where it 
exists it may have been accumulated illegally, such as from smuggling and organised crime, 
with the potential for creating a similar situation to that experienced in Tirana, with 
companies becoming front offices for underground operations or money laundering.
However, the alternative under the present neo-liberal ideology has been no economic activity 
at all, no production and no work opportunities. Effectively the KTA has proceeded with the 
privatisation, while Serbia has continued to object and stated that they may bring charges to 
the international court.^*^ Overall, the level of foreign investment in Kosovo has remained 
conspicuously low.
Unemployment, income gaps and growing dissatisfaction
Formal unemployment in Kosovo is estimated to be around 50-60 %, and has remained at the 
same high level during the international administration, or has even perhaps been growing.^^'^ 
These figures do not cover actual attivity however, and for example subsistence farming for a 
family’s own consumption is not counted as employment. The demographic structure of 
Kosovo shows that perhaps 70 % of the population is below 30 years of age, and a large 
number of the unemployed belong to the younger section o f the population. The latter is a 
particular problem, since the young male population may have a greater readiness to resort to 
violent solutions, and since this provides a good recruiting ground for organised criminal 
networks. Estimates from the UNDP indicate that income gaps in Kosovo have been 
increasing, and that the regional development gap as well as urban-rural gap has been 
increasing.^*’ This is not least an effect of the concentration of international aid in certain 
areas, such as Prishtina, and that there has been a growing population drain from poor rural
Updates can be found at the website of the Serbian Ortliodox Diocese of RaSka and Prizren: 
wwvv kosovo.com: for example “Initiative for Stopping Privatization Process in Kosovo”, 19 Nov 2004,
w\vw koso\ o.coni'^ncw s/arclìive/tickcr/2004/Novenibcr 19/17.htinl (entered 8 March 2005). and “No 
Privatization Witliout Belgrade”, 18 Nov 2004,
\^^v\v.koso^ O■COlVncws/a^:hi^•e/tickc^/2004■/No^•cmbcr 19/6.htinl (entered 8 March 2005)
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, 22 April 2002, S/2002/436: p. 3. Tliis report states 50 % (in 2002). while the 
report of 26 Januarj' 2004, S/2004/71: p 12 stated between 50-60 % (in 2004). TIic figures from the 2004 report 
(“Kosovo in Figures 2004”) of the newly established Statistical Office of Koso\ o stated tliat unemplo>'ment in 
2002 was 55 %.
UNDP “Human Development Report Kosovo 2004 -Tlic Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and Choices”, 




areas. The UNDP produces quarterly ‘early warning reports’, which give a good indication 
of the general social and opinion climate among the local population. After the decrease in 
foreign aid-flows since 2003, coupled with the lack of political and economic progress, these 
reports have showed an increasing dissatisfaction with the local as well as international 
administration, growing dissatisfaction with the economic situation, growing frustration, and 
an increasing readiness to migrate for work.’ *̂
The question o f  status and the lack o f  a development strategy
International development work does not constitute merely technical or practical issues, but is 
profoundly political. This is the case everywhere, since it constitutes bringing resources into a 
society, to promote certain groups, and to embark on an adventure of changing a society. 
However, exactly how political the endeavour is becomes particularly clear in the case of 
Kosovo. Here, the problem with Kosovo’s status, whether it will become an independent state 
or remain in Serbia, has been an effective block to  the whole development approach. Again, 
the status issue is quite a ’gordian knot’ since;
a) Remaining in Serbia is unthinkable for the Albanians, and would imply quite a novel 
situation now that Yugoslavia has been dissolved. Should the Albanians be forced to 
stay in Serbia they might well take up arms against the international forces, who 
would then have to fight Albanian guerrillas in much the same way as the Serbs did 
during 1998-99. Tendencies to reactivated violence and new guerrilla formations 
already exist, and the spread o f violence is an imminent possibility.
b) On the other hand, independence for Kosovo would imply that state-borders have been 
altered through the use o f force (by NATO) thereby violating international law (upon 
which the UN rests) and the Helsinki agreements o f 1975 (upon which the OSCE is 
founded) as well as violating the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 upon which 
UNMIK was established. It would be the deathblow to international law and to the 
UN. Further, to bring the issue o f independence through in the UN would be
Ibid
717 Compare \ arious quarter!}' ‘early warning reports’ for Kosovo, for example; UNDP Early Warning Report 
Kosovo: Report # 5, September-December 2003; Report # 6, Januar> -April 2004; and ‘fast facts on Early 
Warning Report # 8, Januar>' 2005. See also the trends noted in UNDP ‘'Human Development Report Kosovo 
2004”.
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extremely difficult, at best, and would almost certainly be blocked by Russia and 
China, who have their own areas of concern (Chechnya, Taiwan) if  such a precedent 
should be attempted. Further,
c) Independence for Kosovo would directly contradict the so-called Badinter principles, 
and the upholding o f  a Bosnian state. It would in fact open up the whole Balkan area 
for renewed potential conflicts, state-disintegrations and state-building. Should 
Kosovo become independent from Serbia, then so could the Serbian and Croatian parts 
o f Bosnia, and so could the Albanians in Macedonia, perhaps the Albanians in South 
Serbia or in Montenegro, and perhaps the Sandzak in Serbia / Montenegro could be 
negotiated, and so on.
d) The only possible road to independence would therefore be through negotiations 
between Belgrade and Prishtina. In any such negotiations the Serbian state would 
insist on its legal rights and, in the very least, demand considerable compensation, 
extensive guarantees for the minorities and for local autonomy, and probably even 
partition, A formal partition is on the other hand unacceptable to the Albanians, at 
least for now, and even this would open up possible turmoil in relation to South Serbia 
(suggestions to swap land perhaps) and Macedonia. It would also risk the reopening of 
Bosnia. Finally, at present there seems to be no will on either side for any such 
negotiations, and the UNMIK has not really involved Serbia proper in any dialogue 
over the governing issues in Kosovo.
The problem is that all conventional development work is designed to work with states. This 
is perhaps best illustrated with regard to the World Bank, which has maintained a weak role in 
Kosovo, for the very reason that it needs a state partner to work with. A Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRSP), for example, is supposed to be undertaken by a government, which then can 
turn to the Donors for support in fighting poverty. With an unresolved status, Kosovo has not 
even been able to obtain SWIFT/BIC codes; and, again, with no census, there is the problem 
of the lack of statistical data, which would have to be solved first in order to produce any 
strategy. The build-up of a statistical office has been underway over the past number of years, 
but data on a census is not expected to be possible before 2005 at the earliest, and probably 
not even then. Hence, until census data is available, it would not be possible to develop a 
proper poverty reduction strategy even if  there was a formal state. With an ideological focus
II !
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on poverty (for which there is no strategy) and on privatisation (which is legally contested) 
the World Bank has faded into the background as an agent in the development process in 
Kosovo. The World Bank has provided credits o f some $ 15 million per year, but has been 
unable to provide any clear strategy. Neither has the UNMIK been able to present any clear 
strategy.’ *̂  Rather the policies have changed with each new Special Representative, balancing 
between Serbian and Albanian demands, and with a schizophrenic approach to state o f  the
art o f economic thinking, namely privatisation, which has been pushed by the U.S. (and the 
Albanians), contested by the Serbs, found illegal by international lawyers, and then again 
been refurbished after scrutiny in the UN. In practice UNMIK was still in 2004 run by the 
Department o f Peacekeeping Operations. Unable to address the issue o f status, UNMIK is 
further without any exit strategy. How long it is to remain or which direction governance is 
going to take is far from clear. Overall there appears to be no aim or objective with UNMIK. 
This has contributed to Albanian frustration with the administration.
The UNDP, as another member of the UN-family, is in practice linked to UNMIK. Without a  
clear plan for development, without a poverty strategy, and directly affected by the 
dissatisfaction with UNMIK, the UNDP has been reduced to  running a number of ad-hoc 
projects in Kosovo. It often has taken the blame for failures connected to UNMIK. However, 
a particularly valuable UNDP project in a conflict-ridden society as Kosovo is the ‘early 
warning report’ system. If coupled with a general political analysis and a monitoring of media 
reporting, these reports could probably in fact have been used to predict the outbreak of 
violence in March 2004; predictions o f dates are o f course impossible, but that a higher 
preparation for readiness was imminent might have been concluded. It seems, however, that 
these reports have not received the attention they deserve, at least not outside the UNDP itself 
The EU is another important actor in Kosovo, and provides the bulk of international 
assistance, although also this has been gradually reduced. Apart from having an EU 
Commission presence, there has been the creation o f a specific reconstruction agency - the 
European Reconstruction Agency (EAR) -. Still, the EU suffers from the problem that it really 
does not have a joint foreign and security policy (after the US invasion o f Iraq it seems even 
further away), and no real capacity to address central issues, such as that o f status, or whether
An intei\devv with a. hear anonymous, high official at UNMIK in May 2004 confirmed this picture. The idea 
presented for how to deal with the post-March riot situation in Kosovo was that UNMIK intended to “create a 
feeling o f partnership w iili the PISG, to ‘talk’ with the politicians” and that “the politicians then had to talk to the 
people”. Further, it was important “to stop witli mutual allegations between UNMIK and PISG”, to “tiŷ  to find a 
plan” and “stop discussing who should be responsible for w liat and instead find a solution”.
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EU membership can come into question, under what conditions and for whom (just for 
Kosovo, or as a part of Serbia, for example). The EU policy in Kosovo has largely been 
directed by the so-called quint-group, which consists of the five major contributors to the 
NATO-led K-FOR. Further, there is the United States, which has had its own agenda, 
especially in relation to privatisation, and vrith a particular connection to the Albanians and 
especially to the radical groups it has supported.
Following the first years o f physical reconstruction after the war, and the build-up o f a formal 
governance structure, the whole political and economic process in Kosovo went into a 
standstill. By 2004 the international community had effectively lost momentum in Kosovo. 
Meanwhile, after the riots in March 2004, the talk among broad segments of the Albanian 
population moved towards viewing UNMIK and K-FOR as an occupation force, and that 
there now was need for a ‘second liberation*.’’’ Organised radical groups who wish to take 
matters in their own hands are already active. On the 12 April 2004, at the five-year 
celebration of the death of two KLA soldiers in Drenica, three masked men appeared from 
behind a hill and started to read a statement to the crowd, on behalf of the Albanian National 
Army, in which they called for a fight for the freedom of Albanian lands not being controlled 
by K-FOR and for Albanian interests wherever they are.” ® The appearance of the Albanian 
National Army (ANA) was conspicuously similar to that o f the KLA in the 1990s, and the 
year before it had claimed responsibility for the bomb attack of a bridge in north Kosovo.’ *̂ 
Just as the ANA, the KLA originated in the Drenica area, and started its operations in a series 
of test-attacks, and by appearing suddenly at funerals to read statements. Although the ANA 
may be just a marginal phenomenon, at least for the time being, it should nevertheless cause 
some concern. In 2003, the UNMIK labelled it a ‘terrorist organisation*.” ’
Personal observ^ation and com^ersations in Prishtina in May 2004. Interv iewed UNMIK staff, which here liavc 
to be anonymous, were also well aware of these sentiments.
Salihu, A et al (2004) “Radicals Test the Ground in Drenica”, Balkan Crisis Report No 498,20 May 2004, 
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, London.
For example: ERP KIM Info-Senice, Newsletter 18-04-03, “Steiner: Albanian National Army is a Terrorist 
Organization”, 18* April 2003 at; .koso\ o .coni^cinkim 1 SaniDB.htmI (entered 2 March 2005).
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Shadow economy; In lieu of a state. Networks of Adjustment and Adaptation
The consolidation o f organised criminal networks, and the continuity between organised 
crime, the KLA, and political parties in Kosovo (and also in Macedonia and Albania), 
constitutes a particular problem for the development of a formal economy and for inter-ethnic 
relations in the region. Some o f the contraband smuggling has been pushed towards 
Macedonia and Albania proper, but there is a considerable problem of ‘corruption’ in Kosovo 
itself UNMIK estimates that the public revenue collection in Kosovo operates at only 50 % 
of its potential, with 80 % of the shortfall resulting from black market activity by organised 
criminal groups.
The incorporation of the former KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps or local police 
provided a dilemma in itself On the one hand, the need for demobilising the KLA and 
providing an alternative for its veterans, could be solved through the formation o f the KPS. 
Further, the international police, and UNMIK, depends on locals -  not least for pure language 
reasons -, in combating organised crime. On the other hand, this has meant that a certain 
incorporation o f the local networks, which were most radically anti-Serb, and which were 
mobilised through resources from the black economy, became transformed into the police and 
security structure of Kosovo.
The greatest opportunity in resource mobilisation, financially, has been provided through the 
black market. The economy of Kosovo has become constituted of five prime elements. First, 
an expansive criminal economy -  or black sector -, which is controlled by powerful networks 
with considerable links to, and influence on, politics in Kosovo, Albania proper, and the 
Albanian parties in Macedonia. Second, remittances from the diaspora, which probably 
provides for a third, or perhaps even half, o f personal incomes in Kosovo.^^"* Third, the 
informal economy of individual survival strategies, including moonlighting or illegal work 
abroad, pure barter economy, and subsistence farming. Subsistence farming is a backbone o f 
the individual economy for many people in Kosovo, since the region is predominantly rural.
United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretaiy-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, 22 April 2002, S/2002/436: p. 3.724 Economic Strategy' and Project Identification Group (ESPIG) “Towards a Kosovo De\ cIopmcnt Plan: The 
state o f the Kosovo economy and possible ways fonvard” Policy Paper No. 1, Prishtina, August 2004:8, 
suggests that incomes from remittances exceed those that come from work in Kosovo.
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Fourth, incomes derived from aid, including from the support of NGOs, or from work in 
international organisations. Fifth, there has been a partial revival offormal economic activity 
in all sectors. Here, however, the formal economy is so weak, and so marginal in the 
international economic context, that it can be considered just a marginal or even part-time 
activity.
The sustainability of the (formal) economy in Kosovo is very weak. The agricultural sector is 
not strong enough to provide for the population, and there is a continuous drainage o f people 
from the countryside, especially of young people who seek out better opportunities than 
traditional farming. Neither is there any sustainability in diaspora remittances, since 
immigration to EU countries is increasingly difficult, and even those who already live there 
may be able to send less back to Kosovo as they create families of their own, which they need 
to support. International aid is on the decrease and with the status problem unsolved it is 
largely blocked. For the same reason there are few stimuli for foreign investment, which 
simply is too risky even if there were any good investment opportunities. Many o f those who 
have the resources and interest to invest may have this from illiberal sources and for illiberal 
objectives. Finally, the local market, which largely depends on international presence through 
direct employment and its spin-off effects, is not sustainable once the foreigners leave. These 
dismal facts have been noted by several international agencies, but although numerous 
economic policy documents and strategy outlines are produced, they all remain confronted 
with the problems discussed above.
The most sustainable part of the economy may in fact be the shadow economy, especially the 
organised criminal activity, which can be further expanded. As opposed to the formal 
economy, the shadow economy thrives well in state-fragmentation, disintegration, new 
borders, and political violence or war. A problem with discussing shadow economies and their 
role in conflict or post-conflict societies is the inherent risk o f ‘orientalism’ or ‘balkanism’, as 
well as the tendency to sensationalism. It is ever more apparent that neither research, nor 
policy-makers, can neglect the scope and calibre o f shadow economies, but at the same time it 
should be emphasised that this does not mean that the entire economy of any particular region 
or area is illiberal. Further, there has been a strong tendency within the literature, and 
certainly among policy-makers, to approach the problem from strictly legal, or even worse,
The non-sustainabilit>' of various economic sectors and income sources are noted for example in the ESPIG 
polic}' paper (Ibid).
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from a moralistic point of view7^^ Although this is partly necessary, especially in relation to 
legal procedures or in cases where w ar crimes are involved, such an approach becomes 
problematic when there is a division o f people into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘morally corrupt’ 
‘perpetrators’ versus ‘victims’ and so on. Certainly there is an element o f this regarding who 
may be involved in a particular activity, but for the purpose o f understanding the political 
economy of conflict, it is necessary to place this economic basis, and economic 
transformation, within the opportunity structure given by the global political economy.
The social transformation and changing power-relations taking place in this process is 
historically contingent upon global, as well as local, structures. The new political project, and 
the particular economy and resources it mobilises, is an integral part of and contingent upon, 
global processes within the global political economy, rather than an external disorder.
Most, perhaps even all, forms o f political economy provide for exclusion and inclusion of 
groups. All economies are part and parcel of a political project, which generate exclusion and 
inclusion. The neo-Iiberal form of global capitalism (the ideology which informs 
contemporary aid-policy) is massively exclusive o f  large parts of the globe, and wrecks the 
political economies, and safety-networks of millions of people on our planet. It further brings 
cultural destruction. Here, the very institutions o f the international economic infrastructure, 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation, along with private 
capital, assist in bringing down the safety-networks and bases for livelihood of millions of 
people. It does so through structural adjustment, through debt collection, through enforced 
privatisation, through imposing unfavourable trade relations, and through accumulation by 
dispossession. Ultimately, the formal economy is also based upon violence, and the use of 
force, just as the illiberal or shadow economies are. The latter, alternative forms of economy, 
as well as political projects connected to them, must be understood in this context, as an 
integrated component of, and adjustment to, this wider global process. However illiberal, and 
although based upon violence and the exclusion o f  large groups of people (whether the basis 
is ethnic, or other criteria), the economies that include criminal activity do provide some 
people with livelihoods, as the example o f welfare-provision in many areas show. In this 
regard the networks operating in this sphere establish some form of legitimacy.
For example Stcfano^’a, R (2004) “Fighting Organized Crime in a UN Protectorate; Difficult, Possible, 
Necessary” in “Sotheast European and Black Sea Smdies”, Vol 4, No 2, May 2004; 257-279; Kaldor, M (1999) 
as has been criticised in the Introduction In fact the dominant way of addressing the problem, including se\ eral 
of Ute references I have used above, suffers from this lendencj\
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In the Balkans it has often been stated that one ethnic group’s ‘war criminal’ is another ethnic 
groups ‘war hero’. Similarly, the warlord and the drug-trader is a criminal to one, but can be 
the welfare-provider and police for the other. The element of state building and state 
fragmentation is integrally linked to the political economy, and power struggles over the 
direction of change concerns both. However, while formal liberal economies (especially neo­
liberal) may require a strong functioning legal state and regional cooperation and integration, 
the opposite is often the case with illiberal forms o f economy. Shadow economies thrive with 
the opposite trend of state fragmentation, disintegration and political violence, but can 
incidentally also be consolidated within the state apparatus of a strong state if the networks in 
power can utilise the latter for the former.
Kosovo is a small and underdeveloped area in the epicentre of a wider region affected by 
ethno-nationalism and illiberal economy. Its path to development cannot bypass this region 
within which it is so firmly politically and economically embedded. A formal economic 
development and political solution can only come through the recovery of a regional political 
and economic framework, and through this frameworks incorporation within a global 
economy.
Concluding remarks
After almost six years of direct foreign intervention, and more than five years of international 
administration o f Kosovo, the record shows that the international community -  through its 
governing and aid structures, military establishment, and non-governmental participation -  
has not been able to provide basic security for the minorities, not been able to integrate the 
Serbs in a political process over Kosovo, not been able to come up with a development 
strategy, not been able to provide reliable statistics (there are no census data), and not yet 
addressed the volatile issue o f what status Kosovo shall have. Further, there has been no real 
alternative to shadow, informal, diaspora or aid-subsistence economy, and the international 
community has been able to provide neither any regional solution, nor local multi-ethnic 
solution for future social, political and economic development. Instead the latest SRSG has 
accepted that a suspected war criminal, who was later indicted as such, became the Prime 
Minister o f Kosovo’s self-governing structure, following the latest election. Patchwork aid 




first five years o f  international governance in Kosovo. Ethnic violence, and even ethnic 
cleansing, as well as organised crime have not been stifled, nor has ethno-nationalist identity 
politics been reduced. Extreme poverty has increased, income gaps and regional development 
gaps have increased, dissatisfaction with the international administration and with the local 
government structure has increased, and dissatisfaction with economic and unemployment 
level is growing, and the general voter turnout has decreased in every election. All parameters 
pointing to a coming crisis and reactivated physical conflict are there. The period is likely to 
go down in history as a waiting game for the coming storm when the status issue eventually is 
addressed or becomes the basis for renewed violence.
Kosovo’s development trap can be summarised as follows:
1. Without a defined status there is no possibility for a development strategy, no 
instmments for international Donors to give credits or work with development, and no 
climate for foreign investment.
2. Without a development strategy there are no real programmes for funding. Foreign 
donations are decreasing. The lack of development strategy leads to ad hoc and 
patchwork projects.
3. Without any census, and without statistics, there are no proper data, thus no possibility 
for proper strategy or planning.
4. The decreasing aid, which is the result, leads to higher unemployment and a further 
aggravated state of the economy.
5. With closed possibilities for immigration to the EU there will be less Diaspora 
remittances, and higher domestic pressure on the various sectors of the economy, 
including unemployment.
6. The status issue itself is a highly explosive issue, both within Kosovo, for the whole 
region, and within the international political system.
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CHAPTER 9
OUTSOURCING THE STATE or MANUFACTURING CIVIL SOCIETY? - The 
biopolitics of aid
In this chapter we shall look at the element of biopolitical aid policy through the promotion of 
civil society. The objective is to analyse and highlight certain problems with the whole 
governance and aid approach in relation to civil society and the position the latter has in the 
new aid and governance paradigm. The term ‘civil society’ has, throughout the 1990s, 
become a leading buzzword in all aid-policy documents among international organisations 
(such as the UN, World Bank, OSCE), donor governments (for example Sida, USAID, DFID) 
and the growing number of non-governmental organisations. The idea of promoting and 
‘building’ civil society as a precondition for, and safeguard of, democracy and ‘modem’ 
liberal values has become pivotal in aid policy towards so-called ‘transitional’ countries as 
well as in ‘post-conflict’ reconstmction missions. Taken as a concept it is however vague and 
under-theorised. In a sense this is both a strength and weakness. The strength is that the term 
can be used as a concept in order to mobilise actors and support as well as serve to legitimise 
policy activity, whereas the weakness is that it tends to hide real differences in policy outlook, 
priorities and in the understanding o f the nature of societies to which it is supposed to be 
attached. In other words it is too blunt to have any real meaning for assessing policy outcomes 
and the nature of social change.
Albeit playing a highly dominant role in democracy assistance as well as démocratisation 
studies, the term has been so detached from traditional conceptualisations within the history 
of the state and liberal theory that it hardly has any meaning within this context. On the other 
hand, if  deconstmcted in relation to aid-policy documents there appears the highly 
problematic picture that the term refers to non-govemmental organisations (and sometimes to 
the media), which in the case of western NGOs have become so incorporated into the donor 
government policies that it is questionable whether there is any meaning in regarding these as 
a separate sphere from state power. The NGOs may equally well be analysed as constituent 
parts in an assemblage of governance and should as such be understood as a logical and 
integral component of a neo-liberal international political economy and a geoeconomic 
project in which biopolitics have a central role. These points will be elaborated in this chapter.
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The chapter opens with a conceptual and theoretical discussion, following on from the 
introduction, and then critically scrutinizes how some major donor agencies relate to civil 
society and NGOs. Then follows a discussion o f problems with the NGO«based aid policy, 
after which the actual growth o f  the NGO sector in Kosovo is outlined. The growth and 
character of the NGO sector in Kosovo emphasises the problems of démocratisation, 
representation, and sustainability, as well as inherent problems with the dominant aid-donor 
conception o f civil society. The NGO sector in Kosovo has grown considerably, and has 
consequently resulted in an abundance of documents as well as numerous projects. Here, the 
discussion will be restricted to the main trends rather than enter into details of this 
phenomenon. The chapter then moves on to the issue of social trust and its relation to civil 
society, and finally discusses biopolitical aid policy as a part of a neoliberal geoeconomic 
project.
A note on the concept of ^civil society’ and the problem  of context
The concept ‘civil society’ goes back to antiquity (Aristotle, Cicero) in literature o f the state 
and of the public. For a long time the idea of a civil society was however equal to that of the 
‘state’ and simply implied a society ruled by law. For Cicero, it was essentially synonymous 
with the Roman state, and thereby the city of Rome. By definition, the state {civitas) was a 
partnership in law {societas) and was the property o f the public (respublica).^^^ Medieval 
political thought, with the Latin term societas civilis, built on this tradition although it became 
embedded in Christian doctrine. From the high and late Middle Ages and especially in early 
modern European history, a body o f literature was developed which dealt with questions of 
sovereignty and liberty, particularly the relations between the monarch and the pope, and 
between the monarch and his subjects. Numerous writers, such as Marsilius of Padua and Jean 
Bodin, for example, debated the rights of a monarch, the rights of the people, and the rule of 
the Christian Church.^^® The idea o f a  society ruled by law^ continued to dominate various 
deviations o f the idea o f ‘societas civilis’, or as the term is translated in English, German or
Cicero, “The Republic”, 1 :39,41,49, in Cicero (1998) “The Republic and The Laws”, in translation by Niall 
Rudd, Oxford World Classics, Oxford University Press; cf. Black, A (2001) “Concepts of civil society in pre- 
modem Europe” in Kaviraj, S & S. Khilnani (2001) “Civil Society’: History’ and Possibilities”, Cambridge 
University Press: 33-38
Marsilius of Padua “Defensor Pacis”, in translation by Gewith, A, (1956/2001) for ‘Records o f Western 
Civilization’, Columbia University’ Press; Bodin. J “The First Book of a Commonweale”
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French.’^̂  Gradually, critique of the organic view o f a ‘body politic’ with princes and 
subjects, based in Christianity, developed within two traditions. They were, the natural law 
conception of politics, on the one hand, and the republican tradition, on the other. In either 
case the concept was connected to the state, although not always to ‘government’. 
Translations o f  the term between for example Latin, German and English may often alter the 
meaning of the concept since the term is then transported between different cultural contexts 
and traditions in which it has been used.^^“ Consider for example the change in connotation if 
one translates the German term '‘bürgerliche gesellschaff into English as ^civil society* or as 
'‘bourgeois society*. Clearly the latter term has a different connotation in English, than that of 
the former. Similarly, a straightforward translation o f the latin 'societas civilis* or ‘civitas’ 
into 'civil society* is not entirely unproblematic, since the idea was elaborated differently in 
the Catholic and Lutheran traditions. In the Lutheran tradition ‘society’ was made up of three 
‘regemente’; the housefather (family), the clergy (church) and the g o v ern m en t.H ere  
government is a part of society and thereby the concept becomes all- em bracing .H ence, 
certain caution with translations may be motivated.
For the great number of thinkers throughout the early modem and modem period who 
discussed the relationship between the government and the people, the definition o f the state, 
polity or commonwealth, and the right of the sovereign over the people, the idea o f ‘civil 
society’ was central, but always deeply connected or equivalent to the polis, city, polity, 
commonwealth or what we call the state. In the late seventeenth century, John Locke 
elaborated the concept as an ideal for a state (rather than just a state) and he developed a 
distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘government’ and claimed that the former was a wider 
concept than the latter.^^^ Locke nevertheless maintained the tradition of understanding ‘civil 
society’ as a society ruled by law, and as such it was opposed to the 'state o f  nature*, which
A societv’ ruled by law staiKls in contrast to, on the one hand, the state of nature, and on the other, to a society 
ruled by Uie arbitrai}' commands of a prince.
™ By ‘term’ I roughly mean a word, denotation, or name for something, whereas ‘concept’ refers to the idea, 
notion, or content given to it.
Quite generally see: Brett. A (1997/2003) “Liberty-, Right & Nature”, Cambridge University Press 
Althusius is perhaps the best-known thinker on this issue, although he was a Calvinist. See: Van Cielderen, M
(2002) “Der Moderne Staat und scine Alternative: Althusius, Amisaeus und Grotius” in Politische Begriffe und 
Historisches Umfeld in der Politica Methodice Digesta des Johannes Althusius“, Sonderdruck band 100, 
Wolfenbutteler Forschungen, Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbuttel.
See John Locke’s “Tw o Treatises of Government” in for example the Eveiyman edition by Mark Goldie: 
Locke, J (2002) “Two Treatises of Govermnent”, Everyman, London; Compare the e.\ccllent discussion on 
Locke’s political ideas and their rele\ ance today in: Dunn, J (2001) “The Contemporary political significance of 
John Locke’s conception of civil society” in Kaviraj, S & S. Khilnani (Eds) (2001)
I ■ I
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people leave through entering a ‘social contract’ and thereby forming a '‘civilsociet/P ^^  This 
idea is central to ‘social contract theory’ and to the work of a number o f political thinkers 
from Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Immanuel Kant, up to contemporary writers like John Rawls. It is also present in republican 
thought and we can here distinguish the conception o f ‘civil society’ from the conception o f  
the ‘body politic’ as consisting of kings and their subjects. Civil society was a political and
legal society and to be ‘civil’, in this context, meant to behave as a citizen.
With Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson, who pursued the republican 
tradition, the concept ‘civil society’ was increasingly distinguished (from government) and 
developed to encompass the economic s p h e r e . I n  the elaborations on the nature o f the 
economic sphere, and the development o f a theory o f political economy, a route was opened 
for a separation between the state and civil society, which is notable especially in the Anglo- 
Saxon tradition during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.^^^ However, it is 
Friedrich Hegel, in the early nineteenth century, who is usually credited with an important 
redefinition o f the concept by distinguishing between the state and civil society {bürgerliche 
gesellschafi), and Hegel’s definition now became a departure p o i n t . I t  should be noted 
though that Hegel, in common with the tradition in which he wrote, included the economic 
sphere and the market in his definition, as for him this was the central problem  underlying the 
inherent conflicts within civil society. Hegel reacts to the Anglo-Saxon (Scottish) tradition, 
and is critical o f the whole notion of the ‘invisible hand’ (from Adam Smith); he claims that 
without some form of control the inherent conflicts in civil society are potentially destructive, 
and thus that market forces constitute a threat to ‘civil society’, but he then suddenly drops the 
whole subject and moves on to discuss a theory of the state. One might, in line with David 
Harvey, assume that this indicates that Hegel sees the state as the necessary regulator and
Locke, J (2002) “Two Treatises of Govemmenr, Eveiyman, London.
A major work on republicanism is; Van Gelderen, M & Q. Skinner (Eds) (2002) “Republicanism: A Shared 
European Heritage”, Voi. I & II, Cambridge University Press.
Ferguson. A (1767/1995) “An Essay on the Histoi>' of Civil Society”, Cambridge Universi^ Press
C f Oz-Salzberger, F (2001) “Civil society in the Scottish Enlightenment” inKaviraj, S & S. Khilnani 
(Eds)(2001) “Civil Society; History' and Possibilities”, Cambridge University Press”. Oz-Salzberger’s article 
incorporates a discussion of how’ the concept was rendered in the ‘republican’ versus the ‘natural law’ tradition.
Hegel, F “Elements of the Philosophy of Right” in translation by Nisbet, H.B (1991), Cambridge Uni\ ersity' 
Press. First published in 1821, tliis work was partly based on lectures held earlier.
Hegel, F “Elements of the Philosophy of Right”: Section 2, pp. 220-274 in passim'. See also David Harvey's 
comparative discussion in “The Spatial Fix: Hegel, VonThunen, and Marx” : Haney, D (2001) “Spaces of 
Capital” Routledge, New York; Ch. 14
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intervener, which can bring civil society under control/"*^ Hence, ‘civil society’ is here both 
inherently conflict-ridden and polarised, awi/connected to and in need of the state for its very 
existence and survival. Hegel explicitly states that justice is a major factor in civil society.’"** 
However, from such a single statement one cannot immediately infer that the ‘state’ is a 
prerequisite, for one could ask the question if customary law (such as the Kanun), upheld 
through the judgement of clan elders, is not an equally valid form of law as that provided 
through the institutions of a state. But clearly Hegel was writing in the context of the West 
European state tradition (and specifically Prussia) and was thinking exactly of such a ^judicial 
state". Consider the following proposition by Hegel:
|. I
In actuality, therefore, the sta te  in general is in fact the prim ary  factor; only 
within the state does the family first develop into civil society, and it is the idea
of the state itself which divides into these two moments. 742
In a number of places Hegel emphasises the connections between ‘civil society’ and the 
‘state’ and there can be no doubt that the distinction he makes is placed within a context 
where he considers the latter a precondition for the former: without the state there is no civil 
society.
Although Karl Marx criticised Hegel and so to speak turned around the distinction between 
the ‘ideological-spiritual’ and the ‘material’, in order to enter into a systematic historical 
analysis o f the material conditions for social life and more specifically of the capitalist 
system, he was of course very close to Hegel on many positions. Just as Hegel considered 
conflict within ‘civil society’ to be a central problem, so did Marx (only more so). For Marx, 
the social relations are at the centre, and thereby the consolidation o f power and wealth by the 
bourgeoisie is the central characteristic in society and the state under the given capitalist 
order. He did not elaborate much on the concept ‘civil society’ though and eventually dropped 
the term altogether. Later, in Marxist thinking, Antonio Gramsci developed his concept o f 
‘hegemony’ in relation to struggle taking place within civil society., but here the family is
Harv ey, D (2001) “Spaces of Capital”: Ch. 14, p. 288. David Han ey further discusses Hegel's point on an 
inherent drive for expansion (i.e. colonialism) within ‘civil society', which is in line with Marx later analysis of 
capitalism's crisis of overproduction (or under-consumption) and the imperative for further expansioiL 
Hegel, F  (1991); § 229, p. 259.
Hegel, F (1991): § 256, p. 274. The “two moments” here refers to the ‘town’ and the ‘country'’, and in a kind 
oigemeinschaji and geseltschaftA^e. distinction he sees the ‘countij ’ as the seat of an ethical life based on the 
family, whereas the town is the seat of civil trade and industty*. Such a dichotomy was later elaborated by 
Ferdinand Tonnies.
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included/"*^ Here we have a contrast with Hegel, who saw the family as a private sphere 
where special values and rationalities, such as love, motherly care, and deep friendship 
defined and permeated the relationships. The term ‘civil society’ then fell from fashion and 
for many decades it was mainly of interest to students of intellectual history, or the history o f 
thought, but eventually had a public revival in the 1980s. In Eastern Europe groups of 
dissidents and regime-protestors started to use the term as a concept in contrast to a 
‘monolithic’ communist state. In the Anglo-Saxon world, John Keane paved the way for a 
new debate with two books on the concept in 1988 and the discussion now took place in 
relation to resistance movements in Eastern Europe and against totalitarian states/'*'* Here, the 
groups of dissidents and regime-protestors, especially from the 1970s and 1980s, were 
considered sparks of civil society, with the emphasis laid on their oppositional and critical 
role with regard to the regime. In the German language, the concepts zmîgesellschaft and 
(later) bürgergeseîlschaft came into use, both as translations of ‘civil society’ leaning more to 
this new tradition and the gradual separation from the state, whereas hiirgerliche geseUschaft 
tends to be understood in the continental historical tradition. Civil society has since become a 
concept as widely discussed by academics as used by activists, politicians, and within the aid 
industry. Most intellectual historians would however probably not recognise its contemporary 
usage, since it has become disconnected from earlier traditions.
It is probably fair to say that from here on there are two separate tracks in the literature: on the 
one hand the concept has been used and studied by historians, within intellectual history, or 
mediaeval and early modem history, for example, on the evolution of guilds, issues of 
sovereignty and concerns connected to the state and the market.^'*^ On the other hand, and 
often not relating to the first, the concept has been revived by political theorists and 
sociologists, first in relation to the study of contemporary governing systems -  such as 
authoritarian and communist rule in Eastern Europe, and the role o f ‘dissidents’ -, and then in 
relation to globalisation (global civil society), social movements, global governance, and a
Gramsci. A (1995) “Selections from the Prison Notebooks” International Pub. Inc, New York 
Keane. J (1988) “Democracy and Civil Society”, Universitv' of Westminster; Keane, J (Ed) (1988) “Civil 
Socict>' and tlie State” Verso, London. It should be noted that Keane’s field is political thcoiy and not Eastern 
Europe, of wliich he has limited knowledge. In “Civil Society and the State” his Introduction reveals tliis when 
he lumps together ‘Yugoslavia’ with the rest o f Eastern Europe as a totalitarian state w ith no political pluralism 
and with a ‘morbid’ planned economy. This was of course a complete misunderstanding of tlie whole Yugosla\' 
political and economic s> stcm, especially since it w as w ritten in the 1980s.
For c.xamplc: Black, À (1984) “Guild and Civil Society” Methuen Press. A new edition of this book was 
published in 2003, w ith tlic title cliangcd to “Guild & State” . Perhaps Anthony Black felt iltai the term ‘civil 
society’ liad assumed such different connotations from tlic late 1980s onward, tlial he preferred to drop it from 
the title; Van Geldcrcn, M (2002)
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range of other fields. It is no coincidence that there is a parallel development from the concept 
o f ‘government’ towards ‘governance’. Since the 1990s, there has been an explosion in the 
usage of the term in public policy, aid policy, and by the continuously growing number of 
NGOs. In this context, the World Bank has developed a whole separate branch for working 
with what it calls ‘Civil Society Organisations’ (CSO’s), and it estimates that there was a 
growth of NGOs worldwide from 6000 in 1990 to 26.000 in 1999.^'^
The fact that there has been such a considerable growth of NGOs, and various civil 
movements, in the third world, during the past decades, along with the growing 
communication possibilities through the internet, has provided for an optimism of an 
alternative to state-centred politics by advocates of a ‘global civil society’ among liberal 
internationalists and cosmopolitan theorists.’'*’ Just as within aid-policy, there is in the body 
of ‘cosmopolitan theory’ both a normative and analytical vein, and a corresponding usage of 
the term ‘civil society’.’'** Hence, ‘civil society’ is used here both to designate a growing 
norm-system, and its carriers outside the power of the state, as well as highlighting the power 
of the state, and as a political aspiration or model for increased citizen participation and 
promotion o f human rights, justice and so on.’'*̂  Thus, where previously within liberal theory 
the idea of ‘civil society’ may have been used as distinguished from the state, it was 
nevertheless dependent on the legal order of the state, but now a further step has been taken 
where ‘civil society’ is seen as a way beyond the state, and essentially a ‘democratic 
alternative’ independent of the legal order of the state. Moreover, the economic sphere has 
now, for the most part, been excluded.
This brief discussion should suffice as a warning that the term ‘civil society’ is applied in a 
wide range o f different contexts, that as a concept it is extremely context-bound, and that it is 
virtually useless as an analytical concept in social and political analysis unless a clearly
The World Bank Group homepage, see The World Bank and Ci\ il Society at: 
http://web.worldbank.orgAVEBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,.contentMDK:200...(entered 25 July 2005) 
Kaldor, M (2003) “Global Civil Socictj': An Answer to War” Poliw; Keane, J (2003) “Global Civil Societ> ?’ 
Cambridge Univcrsitj’ Press; Compare, quite generalh-. critique by Chandler, D (2004) “Building Civil Sociew 
from Below”, Millennium: Joumal of International Studies. Vol 33, No 2, 2004: 313-339
Cf. Pugh, M (2001) “The Challenge of Civil-militan' relations in International Peace Operations”, Disasters, 
2001, 25(4): 345-357
See also the critique directed at this in Chandler, D (2004)
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delineated definition is stipulated. Any such stipulated definition, in turn, might render the 
concept inapplicable to many fields and contexts where it is actually being used.^^°
Civil Society as an  entity
Although often not defined, the usage of the term ‘civil society’, within public policy, for all 
practical purposes, indicates that it is understood as a ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, rather than as 
processes or social relations. The idea of promoting, or even ‘building’ civil society then 
achieves meaning, as it is the (non-state) associations, with which partnership can be formed, 
that are being singled out as agents for social change. In this manner NGOs become 
representatives for ‘civil society’ and, as we shall see later, ‘civil society’ becomes the 
representative for ‘culture’, which is supposed to be transformed in some way or other.
This way of conceptualising civil society is problematic and may even stand in conflict with 
some of the theoretical heritage to which transitional thinking is indebted, such as various 
discursive fields of liberal theory. Now, there is no real point in lamenting that a concept is 
used in different ways, and thus context-based, or that a particular usage in contemporary aid 
policy may be a-historical. It must be noted, however, that even if various historical meanings 
attached to the concept are absent in contemporary aid discourse, these contemporary usages 
nevertheless draw much o f the positive connotation of the term from that particular European 
heritage. Connotations of a term may thereby be transported although important elements o f  a 
concept are not. With this in mind, it is more useful to discuss what a concept actually does in 
the particular context in which it is used.
The World Bank has provided its own term, ‘Civil Society Organisations’, and their definition 
of the concept. It refers to:
— the wide array o f non-governmental and non-profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or 
others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of
We can only study how it is used and with nliat purpose and consequences. See also Jolin Dunne’s critique in 
op. cit. Taking Locke’s concept o f civil society as a pwint of departure, Dunne forcefully objects to some of the 
contemporary’ elaborations of the concept, and seems to find them ouirightly imellcctually offensri e.
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array o f organizations; community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations and foundations’ *̂
Thus, the concept ‘civil society’ is merged here with ‘organisations’, which for all practical 
purposes is necessaiy in relation to aid since the donor agencies need an organisation, and a 
legal body, from which to receive a project application, with which to write a contract and to 
which to transfer their funds. Thereby we can exclude from the concept ‘civil society’ 
everything that is not an organisation, at least from the operational purpose o f the aid- 
industry.
Problems with the NGO-based aid architecture and conception of Civil Society
Now, it seems clear that ‘civil society’ and NGOs are regarded as something good and 
something a society should possess. One might say that it is a building block for a liberal 
democracy and market economy, and something the aid-industry must put in place. Both the 
OSCE and the USAID refer to NGOs and ‘civil society actors’ as “watchdogs” of government 
and of democracy and that this is a purpose for supporting them, and the OSCE claims: “Their 
empowerment will eventually counterbalance governmental institutions—
The picture becomes a little blurred, though, if  some NGOs at the same time may become 
actual parts of government, which the USAID suggested in its assessment o f the NGO sector 
in Kosovo during 1999: “Some of the more sophisticated NGOs may evolve into government 
institutions” .’”
However, it must be clear that not all ‘civil society organisations’ are necessarily good for 
liberal democracy, multiethnic tolerance and peace. Strictly applying the World Bank 
definition one could ask the question whether the Ku Klux Klan would qualify. As a “non­
governmental and non-profit organisation, with a presence in public life, expressing the 
interests and values of its members, based on political considerations”, one must agree that it 
probably qualifies. Yet, it is not necessarily good for safeguarding liberal values, or
TIic World Bank and Civil Society' at:
htip:/Aveb.\vorldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0„contentMDK:200...(entered25 July 2005) 
USAID Kosovo Civil Society Fact Sheet “Ci\ il Society' and Go\'emment” at: 
ww-w'.usaid.gov/missions/kosovo/USAID_Kosovo_fact_shceis/civsoc_fact_shc... (entered 25 July 2005); OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo “Civil Society ” at: u w\\ .oscc.on;/koso\ 0''133761itml (entered 25 July 2005)
USAID Kosovo NGO Sustainability* Index 1999, p. 59: \vu \\ .us;Hd.gov (entered 25 July 2005),
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promoting inter-ethnic tolerance. Clearly there are numerous organisations that are no good as 
watchdogs o f democracy, but nevertheless qualify as civil society organisations. We can 
produce a number of rhetorical questions and are here only limited by our own imagination: 
does the KLA qualify? The Scientologists? How about A1 Qaeda?
Now if this seems unnecessarily provocative, I have only wished to highlight the fact that 
there are conflicts within such a defined ‘civil society’, and exclusivist organisations with 
goals or operations running counter to all liberal or democratic values. Obviously then, for the 
aid donor, there are other considerations, beyond mere definitions, for who receives funding 
and who does not. We shall return to this below.
But we can now see that the concept ‘civil society’ has a problematic relationship to 
‘ethnicity’, since the former is generally associated with universal values and not ethnic 
criteria, whereas the latter have been central in many conflict areas, not least in the 
B a l k a n s . I f ‘civil society’ is to promote or safeguard liberal traditions (that is, democracy) 
it cannot be based on ethnic exclusion and therefore the promotion of NGOs has had to take 
into consideration the orientation o f the individual NGOs. In many respects this may imply a 
conflict between actually existing forms of local loyalty and association, and it highlights the 
question of how representative an individual NGO is.
However, for the USAID this has not seemed to be a problem. The USAID operates with 
what it calls an ‘NGO sustainability index’, in which it rates various parameters for the NGO 
sector in different societies (in 1999 Kosovo received the overall rating figure 4.4, although 
what this means escapes this author) and in its 1999 evaluation of the NGO sector in Kosovo 
it states:
Despite the lack of previous democratic and civil society experience, as a result 
o f a long history of communist and Serbian dominated rule, Kosovar society 
provided itself with social, cultural and basic community services over the past 
ten years, through a largely voluntary civil society system^^^
Baubock, R (1996) “Social and Cultural Integration in a Civil Societ> ”, in Baubock, R; Heller, A & R  
Zolberg (eds) (1996) “The Challenge of Diversity: Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration“.
A\ ebui>'. Tliis study theorises the relationsliip benveen ‘ethniciw’, ‘civil socicri ’, ‘citizenship' etc. (Note tliat 
the study does not deal with ‘post-conflict societies’ like those in the Balkans).
USAID Kosovo NGO Sustainability Index 1999, p. 58: www.usiiid.uov (entered 25 July 2005)
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Hence, the parallel society, or para-state structures, which we have discussed in chapter 7 are 
regarded here as ‘civil society’. In chapter 7 we discussed in some detail how this was a 
highly ethnically separated structure and that, to a considerable extent it was brought under 
the control of a single political party umbrella (LDK) until increasing radicali sation and 
growing divisions after 1996. Now, the problem is not whether one uses the label ‘civil 
society’ or not (although I would suggest a more restricted usage o f the term), but the fact that 
‘civil society’ (thus defined) was deeply polarised and ethnically divided, and that this is a 
central phenomenon which must be probiematised. Curiously enough the USAID does not 
mention the parallel structures developed by the Kosovo Serbs after 1999 as examples o f 
‘civil society’, and indeed, within the UNMIK structure, these are seen as obstacles rather 
than opportunities. Thereby the question o f ethnicity in relation to civil society is immediately 
brought to the fore; can civil society -  in an ethno-plural state - be monoethnic and if  so, how 
can it be justified that only some ethnic groups qualify? The implications o f USAID’s 
conception indeed gives us reason to question whether the USAID has the intention o f 
addressing the issue of ethnic divisions and their relationship to democracy at all. With regard 
to US policy one may ask whether it is political intention or analytical capacity one should 
question.
The idea o f isolating civil society as an entity or sphere which is better for democracy and 
pluralism than the government en large cannot just be stipulated without empirical analysis 
and critical scrutiny of social and political processes. Such a positivist and functionalist 
separation, simply stipulated, misses the whole problem with an ethnically divided society, 
that is, where ‘civil society’ (thus defined) itself is permeated by divisions and identity 
politics! Civil society, if the concept is meaningful in this context, is not isolated from the 
forces o f conflict, but is itself destroyed by war, and it is the locus where polarisation takes 
place, not in terms of entities but in terms of a public space o f interaction where tolerance, 
social trust, and coexistence are practiced and tested. Even if  certain individuals maintain a 
high level o f toleration and a reconci liatory democratic attitude, they do not constitute ‘civil 
society’, for then the whole term becomes quite m e a n i n g l e s s . Y e t  this is in fact the idea 
which the aid industry builds upon, with the assumption that investment in individual 
entrepreneurs can result in a multiplication of those ‘good values’ through attitude change.




even under conditions where there is no security, employment options, rule of law, or 
functioning ‘liberal’ economy.
Now, does the fact that people organise themselves to provide various services really 
constitute ‘civil society’? Is a nomadic or tribal group o f people evidence of a ‘civil society’? 
Does it matter whether it is based on kin, ethnicity, tribal, or religious grounds? Are the 
Amish-people in Ohio or Pennsylvania a good example o f ‘civil society’? Is self-organisation 
among Palestinians the expression o f ‘civil society’? If ‘civil society’ is perceived as 
inherently democratic, or a safeguard for democracy and liberalism, then one must largely 
ignore and avoid considerations to social conflict and social exclusion.
The USAID does not define the self-organisation o f Albanians during the 1990s as ‘ethnic 
society’ or ‘ethnic-based community organisations’ or something in that direction, but as a 
‘civil society system’ (elsewhere in the referred document they talk of “shadow 
government”). Indeed, it is referred to as the first actual civil society, after the experience o f 
communism and Serbian rule. But how can this Albanian para-state structure form the basis 
both o f the new government institutions and  the basis for its watchdog ‘civil society’, as well 
as promote peace, democracy and toleration? Does it by itself transform both into government 
institutions, o f a state that it has proclaimed independent in 1990, but which is illegal 
according to international law and according to the UN Security Council Resolution, and  (at 
the same time) into a watchdog civil society stmcture providing the checks of that very 
government? The answer is obviously that it does not. It needs some help in doing so. Only by 
liberal education and moral training from the donor governments and the western NGOs can 
there be established both an acceptable governance stmcture and  a ‘civil’ society.
This general objective and approach is shared by all western aid agencies, even though some 
present a considerable qualification to the NGO-based and ‘utility’ conception of civil society. 
The British and Swedish aid agencies, for example, generally acknowledge that ‘civil society’ 
offers a more complex dimension than the one suggested by the World Bank or USAID. The 
British Department for International Development (DFID) offers a fairly nuanced presentation 
of civil society and notes how it is rooted in western European (and North American)
Why so? Was not similar self-organisation within tlie Ottoman Empire or the First Yugoslavia equally a ‘civil 
sociew’ in that case?
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intellectual and political tradition.’ *̂ On DFID’s Internet homepage several links to further 
readings are offered and DFID explicitly warns about the tendency to reduce civil society to 
non-governmental organisations. Instead the following definition is offered:
Civil society is located between the state, the private sector and the family or 
household, where society debates and negotiates matters of common concern 
and organises to regulate public affairs. It embraces;
• Institutionalised groups: such as religious organisations, trades unions, 
business associations and co-operatives.
• Local organisations: such as community associations, farmers’ associations, 
local sports groups, non-govemmental organisations and credit societies.
• Social movements and networks.
Moreover, DFID emphasises the problem with demarcations to the concept, used analytically 
(or empirically) in relation to the state, political parties and the market. The issue of 
distribution of power within civil society and the necessity of addressing values and ideology 
is also acknowledged, and within a brief description o f various contexts in which the concept 
has been used, DFID brings up the notion o f ‘social capital’ with reference to the work of the 
American political scientist Robert Putnam (to which we shall return below). By way o f 
information, and in terms of historical and contextual sensitivity, DFID is probably the donor 
agency offering the most elaborated discussion, but the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) is not far behind. In Sida’s policy for civil society, it is noted that 
civil society is neither good nor bad, and, in line with the discussion above, it is noted that 
many networks and organisations, such as criminal networks and mafia-alike groups or 
undemocratic groups, are a part of society as well and cannot easily be excluded in an 
operational definition of civil s oc i e t y . He n ce ,  civil society is ‘multi-faceted’. It is 
emphasised that a society’s forms of social groups, organisations and networks have emerged
Sec the subheading ’civil societ> ’ on the DFID homepage at: u~Anv.dfid.gov.uk (entered 25 July 2005) 
Cited from: w^vudf^d. gov.uk/aboutdrid^ imhcuk/workvvithcs/sc-how-to-work-n Lit .asp (entered 25 July 
2005): pp. 1-2
Sida, Department for Cooperation with Non-Govemmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance & 
Conflict Management, “Sida's policy' for civil society” April 2(X)4, Stockholm. Available at: .sida se
(entered 25 July 2005).
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in a historical process and can be regarded as an expression of the values, customs and needs 
that exist in society at large^*^* Sida defines civil society as:
An arena, separate from the state, the market and the individual household, in 
which people organise themselves and act together to promote their common
interests. 762
Although we now have a couple o f  donor definitions o f what civil society is about, the 
question is how they work with it. I f  we look at the above definition offered by Sida, we 
notice that the connection to the state has been dropped. With this definition it does not seem  
necessary at all to have a legal order or rule of law, in order to have civil society. The latter is 
merely a separate arena where people organise themselves for promoting common interests. 
Indeed, the connection to the market has also been dropped. Such a reading o f Sida’s view is 
confirmed by the fact that Sida considers ‘civil society’ to exist in every society, even one tha t 
is fragmented or characterised by conflict between different armed groups. As Sida formulates 
it:
Under authoritarian regimes, or in devastated and fragmented societies in w hich 
there are conflicts between different armed groups and where the government 
apparatus is weak, it can be difficult to identify civil society. Nevertheless, w ith  
the above mentioned view of civil society it is difficult to imagine a country in 
which there is no civil society at all, even if  it may be fragmented and weak, or 
difficult for an outsider to detect.
With Sida’s definition both the historical tradition of positioning the concept within a context 
o f the state and the tradition o f liberal political theory, with the idea o f a hypothetical social 
contract, are lost. Instead, civil society can exist under war, in fragmented societies, or even in 
a hypothetical ‘state of nature’. It could exist under anarchy. As long as people, beyond the 
individual household, act together in an organised manner to promote common interests, we 
have civil society (even if  it may be hard to spot for an ‘outsider’). Thus, one must assume, 
there is civil society among the bushmen in the Kalahari desert of Namibia, as they organise




themselves for hunting or for the annual reuniting of small nomadic groups, which can be 
taken to be of common interest. So, civil societies exist practically everywhere, although it is 
sometimes difficult to detect. But exactly what is there one should detect? Or rather, exactly 
M'hai is so difficult to detect, that we might educate ourselves about in order to become better 
in detecting it? Is it difficult to detect ‘people acting together to promote common interests’, 
outside o f the family, market, and the state? One would wish to assume that this is not what 
Sida intends to suggest. The definition is indeed too liberal and tends to mystify the social 
phenomenon o f human interaction. If  all that is required for ‘civil society’ to exist is an arena 
separate from the state, the market, and individual household, in which people organise 
themselves and act together to promote their common interests’, then international piracy, or 
an invading tribal army (where there is no state) must qualify as civil society, since both the 
tribal army and the pirates act together to promote a common interest (invasion and looting). 
We must simply assume that Sida does not literally mean what they say with their definition 
and that we need some context in which to place it. Clearly the definition is both too generous 
and not sufficiently exhaustive to really have much operational meaning for aid-policy. The 
point to be made here is of course that the state is paramountly significant and cannot easily 
be dropped if the definition of civil society is to be meaningful. One might suspect that the 
reason the state is missing is simply that it is taken for granted, but it may as well be a 
symptom of the neo-liberal trend in which the state, and especially its role in the political 
economy, is consistently downgraded. However, elsewhere Sida indicates that the state is a 
context of central importance, because the promotion of ‘an environment’ for civil society, 
such as legal reforms, is listed under the types of civil society promoting aid, that Sida is 
involved in.^^ Sida further states that it does not support ‘all organisations in civil society’.
In actual activity Sida is focused on: i) various legal reforms; ii) support to (independent) 
media; iii) support to various NGOs.
The first o f these concerns a state framework for an open society (or liberal-democratic 
society) and the external infusion of a normative-judicial framework. Although there may be 
particular problems in relation to actual correspondence between the externally implanted 
normative-judicial framework and indigenous value systems, it is the latter two that pose 
particular problems. Regarding the second point, independent media, it has proven very 




support. The reason for this is that the broader objective for the donors is a reconciliatory and 
democratic, as well as critical, reporting conduct, which does not necessarily overlap with 
strict definitions o f ‘independent media’ in terms of division o f ownership and editorial 
control. Thus, for example, one may have a newspaper or electronic media station with full 
editorial independence (from the state as well as the private owner), but with strong 
nationalist bias, or alternatively a small station or paper with high journalistic standards and a 
democratic orientation, but where the owner is also the editor. There may also be ‘sham’ 
independence, with strict formal separation but strong informal connections and affiliations to 
a political party or movement. In the final decision for project support a donor therefore often 
has to rely on individual political judgment and assessment, rather than any strict criteria 
relating to formal ‘independence’.^^ The sector with the largest individual project support 
however, is that of the NGOs and below we shall focus on the problems with substituting this 
sector for civil society.
NGOs and democracy
Although the involvement o f NGOs often has been portrayed as a démocratisation of aid 
policy (or other policy fields) through the active participation o f ‘grass-roots’ and as a kind o f 
alternative ‘participatory development’, involving ‘stake-holders’ and so on, it can be claimed 
to represent the opposite. First, the NGOs are not accountable to the local populations 
anywhere, but just to the donors. For this reason they do not need to build bridges in society 
to any social groups, or other agents, like a political party needs to. Rather, they can operate 
as lobbying firms for a particular issue, which is favoured and funded by the western donor 
governments. In this manner they may be utilised for propaganda campaigns aimed at attitude 
change on arbitrary foreign funding basis and thereby function as the implementation unit in a 
biopolitical project. Second, individual NGOs do not usually represent any broader groups in 
society, nor do they reflect the wider population. They do not elect their leaders and 
representatives, and they do not formulate or operate policies on the basis of a democratic 
process.^^^ Whether they provide a service, or pursue a campaign on morality and attitudes, 
they in fact take these programs away from the decision or debate of the local people, hence 
disconnecting policy and social programs from the 'demos \ Third, the funding of fragmented 
policy-conducting units, without involvement o f the wider population, may in fact contribute
Tlicrc are many cases of this in relation to media support in the Balkans Unoughout tlie 1990s. 
Compare Petras. J & H. Veltmeyer (2001): Ch. 8 and in passinr. and partly Chandler, D (1999)
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to political and social fragmentation, rather than to pluralism, which can create strictures that 
prevent actual dialogue and compromise in society. This is not necessarily so, but it is a 
possibility that is ever present throughout the process of operating on populations and 
attempting to shape social environments. The forms of inclusion and exclusion of social 
interest groups, some with and others without access to NGOs and donor funding, does not 
represent a democratic process o f policy articulation, dialogue, compromise and contest, but a 
process o f selection and favouritism that may contribute to social tension and even to 
authoritarian tendencies. The idea o f a ‘civil society’ as a separate sphere from the state, and 
as a democratic check on that state, without further problématisation of the inherent social and 
political relationships, is a stereotype and tends to mask the fact that there are different 
interest groups, classes, and policy ambitions within that society.’ *̂ Rather than being 
channelled into a democratic process there is the risk that, through NGOs, they are built upon 
platforms without need for broader alliance formation or articulation of actual local or 
domestic concerns.
NGOs as service-providers: outsourcing the state
Some NGOs are partly or exclusively service-providers. Although some NGOs provide 
services and contribute in society by providing relief, self-help, or other forms of aid to local 
recipients (such as food distribution, medical assistance, repairing houses, and so forth) and 
even to some extent protection (through their actual presence), it is de facto  a selective 
service. Even the largest NGOs are capable of providing their services in only some areas, for 
a iim ited  period of time, and on the basis of a limited contract.^^^ As such, a service is 
provided in lieu of the state, or as outsourced from the state. For the donor governments this 
model often means a cheaper form of aid on the level o f services, and an increased possibility 
to control the service-providing agency through the latent threat o f cutting funds at any time. 
Instead o f building service-providing structures and empowering local structures, there is a 
selective service provided not on the basis o f ‘social rights’, but on the basis of charity or 
even deservedness.
A similar critique exists in Petras, J & H. Veltmeyer (2001 ) and has also been taken up by me in Sorensen, J. 
S (1997) “Pluralism or Fragmentation” WARREPORT May 1997, IWPR, London: 34-35
The IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent organisations) is an exception and is not a 
typical NGO in this sense. The IFRC (as the ICRC) has a clear mandate in international conventions and an 
organisational stracture to provide relief in areas of conflict or if it is otherwise difficult to access, which was 
established not as an alternative to state services, but as a complementary instrument for particular 
circumstances.
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The NGO revolution in Kosovo: civil society under Fordist production?
The NGO scene that today exists in Kosovo is a product o f the 1990s, but has undergone a 
considerable expansion and consolidation phase since the establishment of the protectorate.
It follows the same trend as throughout the former Yugoslavia, where the expansion o f the 
NGO sector in the 1990s primarily was the creation of an urban middle class. The new ethnic 
states rewarded supporters o f the ruling party, and under a rapidly changing opportunity 
structure, parts o f the politicised middle class, which effectively was squeezed in the social 
transformation in the new republics, could find a niche in NGOs.^^° The cycle of expansion 
and consolidation is the same as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, but the character o f 
this new sphere o f organisational bodies has an important feature, particular to, or at least 
stronger in, Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, the main purpose of international (primarily 
bilateral) aid to NGOs in the post-Yugoslav states, especially in Serbia, was to support ‘anti- 
govemmentaT organisations that were critical of the ethnic nationalist and racist regimes. In 
addition there was support to  numerous service-providing NGOs, working with relief, with 
children, with psycho-social treatment, and the like, but also here it was important that they 
were perceived as oppositional to, or at least largely outside the influence of, the 
governments. The rhetoric and conceptual logic behind this orientation was that the aid was 
‘building’ or ‘promoting’ a ‘civil society’, which would be the safeguard or promoter of 
liberal democracy, peace and reconciliation.
However, in the case of Kosovo, where the whole ethnic Albanian community stood in 
opposition not only to the Serbian regime, but to the Serbian state as well, the effect was to 
support an ethnic society against the Serbian state. Although some activity involved other 
ethnic communities in Kosovo (such as Serbs or Roma), the actual aid assistance promoted 
organisational development within ethnic communities in an ethnically divided society and in 
effect provided an external source o f funding to the para-state functions in Kosovo during the 
1990s, which was discussed in chapter 7.^^'
Cf. SCrensen. J. S(1997)
As a measure towards potential misunderstandings it should be e.Kplicitlv stated tliat the purpose here is not 
to criticize the fact that such organisations liave actually received aid. It is obviously eas>' to argue that all 
communities should have the right not only to basic services and access to education, but also to their own media 
and cultural associations (it would be much more difficult to argue the opposite). The point is rather to elucidate 
die actual processes at work and consequences ^o^^'ing from the new t> pe of aid-go\ cmance model and to 
highlight the problematic within it.
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Some organisations had an important role in the parallel structures of the 1990s, such as the 
(Catholic) Mother Theresa Society, with a history as service provider and charity 
organisation, but most of the present-day NGOs are the result of the increased access to 
funding from foreign donors, or even directly created by foreigners.
The rapid expansion of the NGO sector in Kosovo indicates that these staictures are quite 
disconnected from any ‘organic’ social development within the communities in Kosovo, and 
that they are a direct adaptation to the new financial opportunity-structure provided by the 
foreign intervention. With approximately fifty NGOs in Kosovo in 1999, the number 
increased to some 642 registered NGOs by July 2000, out of which some 400 were ‘local’ 
(Kosovo) organisations.’^̂  By 2004 the total number of NGOs registered to operate in 
Kosovo was more than one thousand (1000).”  ̂This not only indicates that the whole sector 
is an external implant, but it also shows how the NGO sector is not merely complementary for 
donor organisations, but indeed a prime instrument and channel for aid.
An example of an externally implanted NGO is the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), which 
was created in 1997 by an American, as a support group for students and NGOs.” '* The 
‘KAN’ works in the fields of education, human rights and social issues, as well as art, and 
receives funding from various international donor agencies for projects on an annual basis, 
but no core support. It gathers dozens o f activists, mainly students from Prishtina, and in 
addition there may be international volunteers and organizations involved. The local branch in 
Kosovo started its work in 2003 and is the creation of foreign activists who have involved 
locals. This is an extreme case of a foreign implant, whereas many NGOs have been formed 
through local initiatives in response to the new opportunities provided by foreign funds. 
Another example is the Kosovo Women Network (KWN), which consists of 56 NGOs and 
which has worked in Kosovo since 1999.”  ̂ Specific support to women’s groups has been 
stimulated by some donors, including Sida, since the mid-1990s, but immediately after this 
network was formed a large number of donors were attracted to it. Promoted by donor interest
The Advocacy' Project: \v^v\v-ad '̂ocacvnct■onz/nc^vs view/new s 6S.htinl (entered 25 July 2005)
See: Freedom House “Nations in Transit 2004: Serbia and Montenegro with an addendum on Kosovo”, p. 10: 
www.frecdoinhousc.org (entered 25 July 2005); and:
htTD:/Ainpanl.un.ore/intradoc/grotiDS/public/docunicni$/NlSPAccc/UNPANOI65S7.ixif (entered 25 July 2005) 
Interview with ‘Kosovo Action Network’, représentâm es Albin Kurti and Dardan Velija, in Prishtina on 13 
Ma>' 2004. The following information on KAN is based on this interv iew.
interview witli ‘Kosovo Women Network’ reprcsentaüve Igo Rogova in Prishtina on 14 May 2004. The 
following information on ‘KWN’ is based on this interv iew.
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the network has come to work on ‘hot issues’ such as trafficking and the elevation of ‘gender- 
awareness’ among the local population. In this context Si da sponsored the translation of the 
Swedish play film Lilja 4~ever into Albanian (as well as Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian) in order 
to broadcast it in villages throughout Kosovo as ‘information’. A single project among many, 
this reflects the trend of working on attitude change among populations rather than providing 
resources or building inclusive welfare-oriented institutions.
The wide focus on NGOs as a primary instrument in the promotion of attitude change may 
have a long-term effect in the sense that they can exercise a discursive influence in society, 
but there is no evidence for it so far. As such the entire concept is highly questionable, but as 
will be discussed below this type of aid policy should be understood in terms o f the role o f the 
western aid industry in the international political economy, rather than in terms o f actual aid 
effects or impacts on local society. The utilisation o f NGOs in aid policy is equally important 
when it comes to providing a variety o f social services and apart from the abovementioned 
critique relating to continuity, accountability and equality in service, there are direct practical 
problems as well. In Kosovo a number of important services are provided by NGOs, but as 
noted by the USAID:
However, the goods and services that these NGOs provide do not necessarily 
reflect the needs of their constituencies, but rather the priorities of their 
respective donor organization.’^̂
Regardless o f the sphere in which the NGOs work, all the projects run over one year and 
activity is financed on an annual basis, which thereby makes ‘civil society activity’ in 
Kosovo, as elsewhere in the region, highly sensitive to the fluctuations in the fiscal year 
priorities among western donors.’”  With the western donors conception of civil society, it 
must be emphasised that the creation is a project-based ‘civil society’ with one-year project 
lives. Far from exhibiting a thriving movement for democracy and reconciliation the trends in
' USAID “NGO SustainabiliK Index 2003”, p 105:
.iisaid.gov/Jocations/curopc enrasia/dem iiov/neoindex/2003/kosovo.pctf (entered 25 July 2005)
' ■ ' Steve Sampson has critically suggested labels as ‘Project S o c ie ty an d  ‘Uncivil Societies’ in a series of 
articles, for example Sampson, S (1996) “Tlic Social Life o f Projects: Importing Civil Society’ to Albania” in 
Hann, C & E. Dunn (Eds)(1996) “Ch il Society: Rethinking Western Models” Routledge London: 120-138: 
Sampson, S (2002) “Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands o f NGOs: Benevolent Colonialism in the 
Balkans” in Rcsic, S (Ed)(2002) “Cultural Boundaries of the Balkans” Lund Univ ersity Press.
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Kosovo are ethnie segregation, mono-ethnic organisations and communities, and an ethnically 
divided society.
Civil society and Social Trust
Through the 1990s connections have been made between democracy, civil society, social trust 
and economic prosperity. Such connections have been influenced by the work of Robert 
Putnam who studied the effects o f the régionalisation (and decentralisation) reform in Italy 
from 1970 o n w a rd s .P u tn a m  concluded that it is the density o f social networks, or civil 
society in terms o f associations that generates social trust between individuals in society, and 
that this in turn stimulates democratic efficiency as well as economic prosperity. Here, there 
seems to be a fairly solid empirical case for the role of civil society, in terms of associations 
and networks in a number of aid policy relevant objectives including démocratisation, 
reconciliation (social trust) and economic development (prosperity or just poverty reduction). 
Putnam was able to compare different regions in Italy and came to the conclusion that 
northern areas, and regions which had been city-republics, had a higher density or degree of 
‘civil society’ (associations, networks), as well as social trust and more effective democratic 
institutions and higher economic prosperity. The problem for aid policy, however, is that 
Putnam explained these differences by referring to long historical traditions traced back to the 
mediaeval city-republics. Later, Putnam conducted similar comparative studies in the United 
States and again concluded that culture was im p o rtan t.W ith in  aid policy the former set of 
conclusions, that civil society -  in terms o f  associations and networks - promotes social trust, 
democracy and prosperity, have taken root, while the latter conclusion, that there are deep 
historical and cultural reasons for this, has been largely ignored. The former can be promoted, 
or so it seems, but the latter cannot be reproduced. The influence of Putnam’s work (although 
not referred to) is evident in many aid-policy documents on civil society, such as Sida’s 
policy for civil society.^^'’
The Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein has approached the issue of social tmst from 
another an g le .D isco n ten ted  with the long historical and cultural context in which Robert
Putnam, R (1993) “Making Democracy Work” Princeton University Press
Putnam, R (2000) “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Re\’i\al of American Community ”, Simon & Schiister, 
New York.
For e.xample Sida’s policj' for Chil Society-: 11-16
Rothstein, B (2003) “Sociala fhlloroch tillitcns problem” $NS Fòrlag, Stockliolm
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Putnam located the phenomenon, Rothstein suggests that there must be some relatively 
contemporary political considerations involved and advocates the thesis that the high level of 
social trust in Sweden may be explained by the institutions o f the welfare state and the 
egalitarian-oriented social institutions and welfare project.’^̂  Although Rothstein’s thesis 
allow far better opportunities for aid policy to influence the issue of social trust in aid­
receiving societies, this is unfortunately not relevant for the contemporary design of aid 
policy, since the latter has largely abandoned the project o f building welfare-institutions (and 
a social state) in favour of a neo-liberal project in which privatisation, outsourcing, and 
biopolitical intervention, have the upper hand.
Here it might be useful to introduce the terms Gemeinschaß and Gesellschafl. This binary 
couple was elaborated by Ferdinand Tönnies (one o f the forgotten founding fathers of 
sociology) in the late nineteenth century and denotes two contrasting images o f social life.’®̂ 
While too complex to be quickly summarised here, we may remember that Gemeinschafl is 
modelled on community life with family and friendship relations, prevalent in the village, 
while Gesellschafl is modelled on the impersonal relations in business life or in the city. 
Further, it should be highlighted that these concepts may be understood in terms o f a ‘puzzle 
picture’, rather than as actual analytical descriptions of existing forms o f society; in other 
words, there is no such thing as a ‘pure’ gemeinschafl or gesellschafl except as mental images, 
for in the real world elements o f both coexist everywhere even though one may dominate.^*'"’ 
The translation into English has posed some problems and has gone from ‘Community and 
Association’, to ‘Community and Society’, and most recently ‘Community and Civil 
S o c i e t y N o w  it could be argued that all these translations have their complications, but it 
depends on what one is looking for. I f  civil society is understood in terms of contemporary aid 
discourse, then it does not translate well as gesellschafl. However, if civil society is 
understood in the historical sense, as used by Thomas Hobbes or Adam Ferguson, with strong
'«=lbid
Tönnics, F (1887/2001) ‘'Gemeinscliaft und Gesellschaft; Abliandlung des Communismus und des 
Socialismus als empirischer Culturformen” Leipzig; recent English translation by Harris, J & M. Hollis (2001) 
"Community and Cicil Socieri ” Cambridge Texts in the HistoiX' of Political Thought Cambridge UniversiW
Press.
Compare tlic interpretation by Asplund, J (1991) “Essä om Gemeinscliaft and Gesellschaft” Bokförlagct 
Koipen, Göteborg.
Tönnics. F (1955) "Communiw and Association” (translated by Cliarles P Loomis). London; Tönnics. F 
(1957) "Communitj- and Socieri” (American Edition), East Lansing. Micliigan; Tönnics, F (2001) "Cominunit) 
and Civil Society” (translated by Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis). Cambridge University Press. An excellent 
discussion in Swedish regarding the binary  ̂couple, including translation problems, has been provided by 
Asplund, J (1991) "Essä om Gemeinscliaft och Gesellschaft” Bokförlaget Korpen, Göteborg.
connection to the state as a legal order but including the sphere o f the market, then the 
translation is much more reasonable, and this is indeed how we should understand the 
translation.^*^ As such it differs considerably from the NGO-based idea of civil society in 
contemporary aid policy, which constitutes something other than gesellschaft, and which is 
probably more akin to a form o f pseudo-Gemeimchaft,
If civil society is supposed to promote, and be based on, universal democratic principles, 
rather than ethnocratic or kinship-based institutions, then we have to look at ihQ gesellschaft 
analogy, which breaks away from traditional forms o f organisation. In other words society has 
to be transformed away from, and transgress, traditional loyalties, o îgemeinschaftA\V& values, 
into a gesellschaft (I allow myself a fairly liberal use of these terms here, well aware o f the 
many different connotations they may have including the problem of translation). Further, if  
civil society is expected to promote ‘social trust’, then it has to be a social trust, which is 
accommodated'm gesellschaft. The question is how social trust is promoted and generated. It 
would be fairly meaningless to pose this question with reference to gemeinschaft since 
gemeittschaft by its very definition and nature is based on friendship and f a mi l i a r i t y ! I n  
gemeimchaft we have to frame the meaning of ‘social trust’ differently, because although the 
people living in a gemeinschaft do not need to tmst everybody in it, they at least know with 
whom they are dealing. In gesellschaft, by contrast, they relate to strangers and thereby the 
question o f social trust has a different meaning. We may say that \n gemeinschaft there is a 
‘trust’ in those one knows and is familiar with (even if  it may be a hated neighbour), whereas 
in gesellschaft the relations to strangers place emphasis on the term ‘social’ (as opposed to 
‘communal’). In gesellschaft social trust implies that you have to place some confidence in 
the goodwill or just common interest of your fellow citizen or fellow urban dweller. Hence, 
the question of how social trust can be generated only makes sense in gesellschaft, since 
gemeinschaft is trust, but of a different kind than that which can be generated in gesellschaft.
A village or a clan, where people can identify an individual with reference to a family or a 
village location, can be seen to correspond to the idea of ei gemeinschaft. The gesellschaft 
analogy requires anonymous spheres and specific rules for relationships between individuals
Personal communication (via email) with the translator Jose Hanis. Please note that I do not wish to criticise 
the translatioa but merely highlight (again) the problem with the discontinuity and different conception 
of the term ‘civil society^’ in contemporaiy aid discourse. Agaia positive connotations arising from the term arc 
transported from a historical usage to which there is little reference.
Please note that this does not imply that Gemeinschaß should be free from conflicts, for certainly it is not 
(neither are families or friendships); it simply implies that social trust and familiarity' are part of how the concept 
\̂ ■as elaborated by Ferdinand Tönnies, in opposition to Gesellschaft.
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who are mostly or principally strangers to each other The crucial point to be made here is that 
the remoulding of a traditional society into one with universal liberal (western-style) values 
may in fact require a breaking down of traditional social institutions and networks, including 
the kind o f social trust embedded in them, and thereby may generate social conflict. The 
alternative is that traditional networks and informal institutions are reproduced within a new 
formal institutional framework, that they become embedded in them and thereby shape them, 
which in turn makes those institutions less universal. Such a process might generate conflicts 
with the ‘out’-groups, such as the ‘ethnic other’ or other ‘clan-family networks’. Social trust 
is high within clans or ethnic groups which are in conflict with other clans or ethnic groups, 
and the problem is how to create social trust between them  and thus reconciliation; how to 
transgress traditional loyalty networks and extend  social trust beyond them. A requirement for 
the latter, and in order to create trust in universal institutions, may be the weakening of 
existing loyalty networks, which could otherwise be perceived as a threat to fair and non- 
corrupt institutions. The western liberal ideal type requires an atomisation o f traditional 
structures and an individualization o f society. The whole idea of ^one person one vote \ as 
well as the idea of meritocracy \s founded upon such an individualisation process. The 
requirement o f such transgressions constitutes a dilemma, and the promotion o f social and 
cultural change through contemporary biopolitical aid policy, may thereby generate social 
conflicts as well as diffuse them.
What actual evidence is there that civil society and NGO-based aid can help promote 
reconciliation and social trust between ethnic communities? Thus far the record for Kosovo 
has been bleak, which became particularly evident in 2004. In Bosnia, which has been studied 
slightly more and which has received an additional five years of direct foreign control and 
involvement, the record does not seem much better. Any comparison with Bosnia should take 
into account that the cultural distance between the ethnic groups there is actually smaller than 
in Kosovo. Nevertheless, four years after Dayton a study by David Chandler concluded that 
there was little evidence o f any progress in terms o f ‘civil society development’ or 
démocratisation.^** Several years later a multi-disciplinary study undertaken for Sida in 2005 
showed that there was no significant progress whatsoever in terms o f reconciliation or social 
trust that could be recorded as a result o f foreign assi stance. ̂ *̂  The evaluation was conducted
Cliandler. D (1999)
Cukur, M et al (2005) “Returning Home: An Evaluation o f Sida’s Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina", Sida Evaluation 05/18.
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in relation to the direct material aid o f Sida’s integrated area programmes, and three separate 
studies involving surveys and anthropological fieldwork showed the same results. Although 
foreign assistance was effective in terms o f the material conditions it produced, there was no 
sign of reconciliation or increased social trust between ethnic groups and the report concluded 
that the popular assumption that cohabitation will lead to interaction and subsequent 
integration is a false one.^^° Even with a fairly modest definition o f reconciliation, the report 
stated that there was little or no sign o f it:
Since interaction is so rare one could hardly speak of social reintegration, and
certainly not of reconciliation.’ *̂
The report further concludes that although reconciliation is one o f the aims with Sida’s 
assistance, the evaluation in Bosnia confirms findings from studies in other parts of the 
w o rld .H o w ev er, as already mentioned above one need not understand current aid policy 
fashion in terms of how effective it is in relation to promoting reconciliation, démocratisation, 
and economic self-sustainability in the societies of concern, and not even its effectiveness in 
relation to the donor’s own explicitly stated aims. Instead one may understand current aid 
policy as an expression of a wider political project, within which aid institutions are given 
certain opportunities through a new form of involvement. Subcontracting and biopolitical 
intervention is not just a characteristic o f the aid industry, even though it takes certain features 
there, but a much wider phenomenon in western forms o f governance. In this context aid 
policy should be understood as a reflection of western governance and global ambitions, and 
in terms of the possibilities provided, and what can be made possible through, biopolitical 
intervention.
The biopolitics of aid and the promotion of cultural change: in service of liberalism?
Liberal training and moral education implies the promotion o f attitude change in society. As 
such it works with the ambition of influencing and controlling whole populations. Such 
western liberal ideas as gender-awareness, political individualism, market economy, inter­
ethnic and inter-confessional toleration, and various programs against corruption, trafficking.




and a wide range o f related matters must be implanted in the population. The society needs to 
be provided vÁih such liberal values and any existing loyalties based upon kin, clan, ethnicity, 
must be transgressed or transformed into a liberal culture. The shaping o f a new society 
entails cidtural change.
We here see the donor agencies, and the western intermediary NGOs, as the morally and 
culturally superior teachers, who train the morally and culturally inferior. For such a condition 
the concept o f imperialism is more accurate, analytically and descriptively, than the term 
‘development cooperation’. Rather than providing resources for self-governance or service- 
provision, it is a matter of preparation for self-governance. Self-governance is not an 
automatic right, but a conditional concession given by the Empire. It is conditional on free 
market, privatisation, and on certain style and language suitable to liberalism. The western 
NGOs are an instrument here for imperial penetration in the borderlands.’^̂  In this manner 
‘biopolitics’ and therapeutic intervention with attitude control is a tool for the control of the 
borderlands o f the global political economy or for the direct extension o f its penetration. In 
cases where this form of aid-policy is not successful it is necessary to bring direct military 
intervention, control and containment. In this manner biopolitics with the focus on attitude 
and cultural change is an integral instrument of the new geoeconomics, but in the background 
as an alternative conventional geopolitics lurks. Returning to the discussion in the 
Introduction and chapter 2, and the distinction between geopolitics and geoeconomics, which 
was made by Neil Smith, we can here connect biopolitics to the geoeconomic imperial 
project. Geoeconomics is focussed on global economic control but without the need for 
territorial control. Geopolitics and direct territorial control is always a latent possibility, as in 
Vietnam in the 1960s or Iraq after 2003, or in contemporary military protectorates, but it is 
considered a transitory stage towards the equilibrium of geoeconomic control. In order to 
shape the geoeconomic environment the most effective form of control is when states and 
populations voluntarily concede to the imperial project. In this manner the biopolitical 
ambition is a resource and instrument for the geoeconomic project and it is only when 
biopolitics fail that direct military control is deemed necessary. Hence, there is a direct neo­
liberal international political economic framework for biopolitics. Geoeconomics and 
geopolitics express two forms of imperial rule, but it is not a question of either-or. They entail
Compare Pctras, J & H. Veltmcyer (2001) in passim and Chapters 7-8.
Similar critique has been formuiated by Haidt, M & Negri (2000); Petras, J & H. Veltmevcr (2001); DufTield. 
M(2001)
See Introduction and Chapter 2; Smith, N (2003) and (2005)
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their separate logics of realpolitik and the shift to geoeconomics accentuates the mobilisation 
of biopolitics, but does not exclude retreats to geopolitics. Geopolitical control is however not 
necessary if  biopolitical governance can sufficiently sustain the geoeconomic project or, at the 
very least, contain the particular area from disturbing that project. In this new form of 
governing, and in order to implement the new radical agenda, the NGOs are a quite necessary 
tool and provide a more controllable, malleable, and probably cheaper structure for governing 
than would be possible with any donor-receiving government, whether it is one under 
democratic ‘pressure’ or under authoritarian rule. Through the NGO-model, donors can pick 
and choose, stimulate the direction of programmes through new funds, close off or cut 
funding at any time, test new avenues without being directly accountable for failures, 
discriminate between areas for operations, and so on, as well as reach directly into 
populations in the ‘project society’ of the operations. Furthermore, it is cheaper than investing 
in state institutions. In the geoeconomic imperial project some areas are more important than 
others, just as in geopolitics, and certain areas are only relevant in terms of containment and 
to ensure non-disturbance of the global project. The analytical power of these concepts 
obviously connects to ideology. One may like or dislike the imperial project, view it in terms 
of ethics or in terms of a ‘national interest’ but the asymmetric global re-stnicturation and 
reaffirmation is a continuous process. The project is good for some people, groups and 
individuals, and bad for others, and the winners and losers can be found both in the periphery 








This research took a departure in a critical scrutiny of international aid policy and its 
governing conceptions, and then developed a macro-historical approach in order to 
understand two sets o f interrelated problems. First, it set out to answer questions of how 
Yugoslavia was transformed from being a model of development, in much of the Cold-War 
period, into becoming a symbol of state collapse, international aid, and intervention, in the 
post-CoId War period. Second, it outlined the changes in aid policy over the same period, and 
analysed how contemporary aid policy is conceptualising post-Yugoslav change, how it 
addresses issues of post-war social reconstruction and transition, which agents it identifies in 
the process of social political and economic change, and how it addresses issues of ethnicity, 
political economy and state-building. The research has analysed social change in the 
Yugoslav space, with focus on the reworking of the nexus between the political economy, the 
state, and ethnicity, a//£/international aid policy, with focus on social reconstruction in 
Kosovo, and how it address the abovementioned nexus, within a single theoretical and macro- 
historical framework.
It is the struggle over reworking the nexus between state, ethnicity, and political economy, 
which constitutes the Yugoslav crisis, historically as well as today. Moreover, aid policy, of 
necessity, must address these issues and has historically as well as today been concerned with 
how to create development vrithin a stable polity. The particular approach and perspective in 
focus has however changed over time and quite generally the emphasis on the state has given 
way to an almost extreme preoccupation with private agents. It is the contention here that both 
the changes in the Yugoslav system, especially the crisis leading to its collapse and the 
resulting political economy, and  the character o f contemporary aid policy, are expressions o f 
a change in global capitalism and the international political economy, which has moved 
beyond its state-centred anchoring. Indeed the term globalisation, so popular since the second
I ha\ e refrained from using footnotes, or references to authors and documents, for the arguments in this 
concluding summai>’. Such are instead to be found where more e.xtensh e argumentation is applied in the \  anous 
chapters.
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half of the 1990s, aims at the process o f reshaping the relationship between the state and 
political economy.
Aid policy is in this manner an integral part of, and an expression of, the broader changes in 
international political economy, and the reshaping o f global centre-periphery relations, rather 
than a mere independent mediator and mitigator o f the exigencies induced by them. 
Contemporary aid policy is heavily governed and permeated by neo-liberal (market-liberal) 
conceptions and teleological assumptions of social change. As such it tends to focus on 
domestic causes of conflict or poverty, which in turn can be mediated by foreign assistance to 
the promotion o f liberal democracy cum  market economy, recently coupled with poverty 
reduction in the most severed areas. It thereby tends not only to  screen off its own role in a 
wider system o f political economy but also, and more seriously, it fails to account for social 
change and actually existing political economies and loyalty structures that themselves are a 
part o f a political and economic project o f conflict, or post-conflict.
The latter projects can be analysed as adjustments to the marginalisation induced by an 
untamed global market economy going under the name globalisation. Globalisation produces 
marginalisation of large areas in which alternative forms o f  political project and political 
economy are cultivated, with alternative forms of integration into the global political 
economy. In this respect the forms of political economy, or illiberal economies (shadow 
economies) that emerge in the periphery, and their connection to radical exclusivist political 
projects, such as ethno-nationalism, are interpreted as counter-movements to the disrupting 
effects o f the wider movement o f global neo-liberalism. In the same manner as Karl Polanyi 
(1944/57) analysed the emergence of fascism and communism, in the first decades o f the 
twentieth century, as a countermoveraent, or second phase in a double-movement, to the 
ravaging social consequences o f capitalism unleashed, i.e. the first phase of the double­
movement, we may see the same logic at work in the post-Cold War period. Here too, laissez 
faire capitalism, a broken world order, and the disruption o f social security and welfare 
systems, have the consequence o f producing alternative forms o f political economy, safety 
networks, and political allegiance.
Within this general framework of global process, the specific historical, cultural, political and 
economic, conditions in Yugoslavia shaped the outcome. Thus, the particular conditions in 
Yugoslavia must be analysed within the framework o f the opportunities and limitations
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provided by the changes in the global political economy and political order. It is in the 
interplay between the wider global opportunity structure and the particular local domestic 
political and social conditions and cultural heritage we can identify the space for political 
alliances, political and economic agency^ and essentially choice, in Yugoslavia. Hence, the 
historical analysis must be undertaken at several levels.
The problem of contemporary aid policy accentuates such a perspective. Contemporary aid 
parlance in relation to the Balkans in fact invites us to explore the historical perspective at 
various levels, since it so often applies the analogy o f the Marshall Plan to contemporary aid. 
Aid policy aims at intervention in societies, but rather than offering a bulwark against, or 
cushioning effect to, the potential strictures provided by the global political economy, aid 
policy itself is an expression of changes in the latter. Thereby, the macro-scope perspective 
offers a structure within which separate processes of social and political change, whether in 
terms of western aid policy or in terms o f  social change in the periphery, are contingent. 
Contingency, however, does not imply reduction!sm or determinism. The historical heritage, 
in the form of economic and cultural regional variations, informal and formal institutions, 
political and social alliance formations, are a necessary ingredient in any analysis of the 
specific outcomes at a regional or local level. Moreover, these ingredients themselves merely 
provide the conditions, opportunities and limitations, with which social and political agents 
are operating, and a full analysis has to address specific strategies used by those agents in 
order to understand the arrival at a particular trajectory o f political and social change. In other 
words: capitalism as a system has an inherent logic and dynamic of its own in that it needs to 
expand or deepen in some direction but, within this logic, specific policy choices among the 
most powerful agents in the system shape the directions it takes and thereby the conditions for 
less powerful agents. Actual adjustments and their character, in turn, are the outcomes of 
particular political struggles and strategies (including discursive and conceptual ones) and 
should thereby, at that level, be interpreted as emergent rather than causative.
A shortcoming of contemporary aid policy and the conceptions governing it, is that the 
problems it wishes to address primarily are located within the receiver society, i.e. as 
endogenous. Further, there is a tendency towards teleological and linear conceptions of social 
change, by means o f social engineering, bereft of a historical and social analysis of contingent 
social transformations taking place through the ongoing crisis itself, to which aid presumably 
responds. The alternative suggested here has been, on the one hand, to focus on the aid
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industry as part o f a wider system of political economy which itself is part to the crisis and, on 
the other hand, on the fact that the actual state collapse and crisis itself, contains and 
expresses a social transformation, with reworked networks o f governance, social allegiance, 
and political economy. Since the Marshall Plan has been considered a particularly successful 
historical example of post-war reconstruction, and since it has been so widely appealed to, by 
way of analogy, to contemporary aid efforts in the Balkans, this deserves some scrutiny. 
However, a comparison with the Marshall Plan reveals that this analogy stands out by the 
contrasts to contemporary aid, rather than its similarities. The Marshall Plan was launched 
under a complete reconstruction of the global political economy and international order, 
towards a completely different conception o f the economy, and the role o f the state, nnc/under 
the conditions that the receiving countries were absolutely vital to a future global economy as 
well as security structure. Moreover, it was essentially provided to the already rich and 
industrialised, with cooperative governments, and it involved a transfer o f resources of a 
considerably different scope than contemporary aid. This highlights the historical perspective, 
and the necessity to qualify historical comparisons on several levels, including the macro­
scope. The Marshall Plan and its aftermath is also the starting point for international 
development aid as a phenomenon as such. Since then, aid policy has however undergone 
considerable changes in trends, perspectives, practice and structure. One o f the major changes 
has been a switching focus from the role o f the state towards the role of the market in the 
development process and an increasing importance given to non state agents in general and 
non-govemmental organisations in particular. Curiously, it is of course the state itself, and the 
potential welfare provisions it could provide, which is weak in those areas subjected to aid 
policy. In turn, all this is a reflection as well as an expression of changes in the international 
political economy. Thus, the wider context o f international political economy and global 
orders remains a crucial frame o f reference for the whole analysis,
A central thesis on the macro-historical level, is that the global political economy, and balance 
of power system, remained of central importance to the Yugoslav state in terms o f its creation 
in 1918, then destruction and recreation during and after the Second World War, its peripheral 
position throughout this period, its consequent modernisation project from the 1950s onward 
and partial integration into the global political economy, and its eventual collapse and re­
perì pheralisati on since the 1990s. The twentieth century opened with a disturbed balance of 
power system between the major European powers, with an increasing competition in the 
decay o f British hegemony, and with severe social consequences and responses to an earlier
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unleashed unregulated market. The two world wars may be seen as an extensive struggle with 
these problems. The United States rose as a leading power following the First World War and 
was set on opening up the world for its economic interests. The first move was in Europe, 
where the idea o f national self-determination was launched as an ideological foundation for 
state-building upon the crushed European empires, the Ottoman and Habsburg (and further 
north Russia and the Hohenzollem part o f Germany). However, the global systemic issues, 
and the institutional foundations for the international political economy, remained unsolved. 
Various attempts to return to the gold standard, which had been safeguarded by British 
hegemony, failed. The unleashed market forces resulted in a counter-movement in the form of 
communism and fascism, which both provided alternative ideas of social order. A new 
balance of power order and new institutions for a global political economy could emerge only 
after the Second World War, when fascism had been crushed.
This new order and these institutions were both dependent on the United States and its 
hegemonic position. However, US hegemony and its global economic aspirations were partly 
blocked by the Cold War with the Soviet dominated communist block. The new superpower 
and hegemonic safeguard of liberalism, the United States, could pursue its aspiration to a 
global economic space only in one half o f the world, and was locked in a geopolitical struggle 
with its competitor in various areas across the globe. In half of the world, the United States 
could now, for its own economic interests, open up the colonial areas which formerly had 
been blocked under west European powers. The phenomenon of development aid policy, 
centred on state and nation building in former colonies, was instrumental to this purpose and 
aim of a global economic space. Here, the realpolitik was no longer based on geopolitics, or 
direct territorial control, but on geo-economics, or economic control. Building nation states o f 
former colonies was a central aid policy and geo-economic concern. Geopolitics was however 
always present as a necessary backup where geo-economics failed. Thus, geopolitical 
considerations were at the centre in the bi-polar power struggle with the Soviet Union and in 
ensuring that former colonies did not fall in the communist camp. In this regard 
decolonisation was a form of re-colonisation under the pressure of geopolitical competition 
between the United States and Soviet Union. Elsewhere, geo-economic control was ensured 
through the United States absolutely dominant position, economically as well as militarily 
(and thereby politically in the vital international institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF).
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The first Yugoslav state was created after the First World W ar on the opportunities provided 
by the collapse o f two European Empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg, and inspired by 
earlier existing ideas of uniting the southern Slavs into one polity safeguarding their 
autonomy from more powerful neighbours, Albania too, had been created when the Ottoman 
state declined, largely as an externally driven process, but it had found a large part o f its 
population outside that state, in Slavic lands. As such these states were under the auspices of 
the Versailles treaty, but continuously challenged. Yugoslavia was so both from its 
neighbours and from within. To the disappointment o f the Croats, and the Albanians, the first 
Yugoslav state was largely dominated by the Serbian bourgeois elite. It survived for two 
decades largely as a bulwark against external threats, but was increasingly drawn under 
German economic influence and eventually taken under control by Hitler during the Second 
World War. Here, in the struggle for liberation from foreign powers, and in the struggle 
against foreign exploitation, the communist partisan movement was able to offer an 
ideological and institutional recipe, which gained increasing support. The second Yugoslavia, 
socialist and federal, was to a large extent a break with the first Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav striving for independence clashed with the Soviet Unions aspirations for 
complete domination in the communist world. Soon, Yugoslavia found itself in a communist 
interdict, and in the difficult position o f being communist outside the communist block. 
Gradually, it developed its own form o f  liberal socialism and non-alignment, which came to 
heavily rely on the west. It opted for a strategy of integration into the global economy and the 
international division of labour, based on a highly decentralised system o f market oriented 
self-management socialism. Yugoslavia was however a highly heterogeneous area both in 
terms o f ethnic national, cultural, divisions, and in terms of regional development. To a large 
extent this also precipitated political divisions within the federal state. A balance of 
decentralisation and fédéralisation, to concede to national and regional economic interests, 
and an economic policy to ensure Yugoslavia’s credibility among foreign powers, constituted 
its continuous policy dilemma and created new strictures within the polity. Within a few 
decades it achieved considerable industrialisation and modernisation, but in the process 
became highly dependent on economic centres in the west, foreign credits and loans, foreign 
licences and market conditions, as well as partial export of its labour force. Meanwhile, in the 
process o f decentralisation and fédéralisation, its institutions became considerably shaped and 
permeated by traditional loyalty structures, nepotism and clientelism, and in the case of 
Albanians in Kosovo by clan allegiance as well. Such stmctures were empowered and became
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increasingly important, and the formal institutions increasingly exclusivist, under conditions 
of economic hardship and unemployment, which became manifest in the 1980s.
In the late 1960s expressions o f legitimacy crisis became prevalent, which concerned the 
organisation of the state and the specific form of socialist political economy, but not the 
Yugoslav state itself, nor socialism as such. It led to a renegotiated state accompanied by a 
purge of liberal critics in several republics. In the 1970s the extensive decentralisation and 
fédéralisation resulted in Albanian domination in Kosovo, which until 1966 had been 
dominated by Serbia. With new institutions, including the university in Prishtina, came the 
formation of a new Albanian elite. It emerged in parallel with a growing social crisis and 
unemployment, as well as a continuously expanding regional development gap despite efforts 
to halt it. A crisis started in 1981 when the Albanians in Kosovo demonstrated and demanded 
the status of a republic. In the 1980s the Yugoslav economic and, consequently, social crisis 
grew increasingly as Yugoslavia struggled with the manifestation o f the international debt 
trap and highly unsuitable international credit and loan conditions and reform prescriptions 
informed by the emerging neo-liberal dogma. In Kosovo inter-ethnic relations between Serbs 
and Albanians grew tenser. Moreover, a change in leadership at the federal top level was 
underway after three of the most prominent Yugoslav leaders, including Tito, had died within 
the span of a few years. The expression o f Albanian nationalism in Kosovo became the 
sparkle for Serbian nationalism during the second half o f the 1980s. Serbian complaints about 
discrimination and ill treatment in Kosovo merged with complaints over the 1974 federal 
constitution, considered unfavourable to the Serbs, and with the more general economic and 
social crisis throughout Yugoslavia. Eventually, as the whole global bi-polar order crumbled, 
along with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union itself in Eastern Europe, the core 
pillars for the raison d* être of the Yugoslav state were in question. Its breakdown was 
however not an evident consequence of these changes, yet highly contingent on them. 
Nationalist and irredentist identity politics grew everywhere once its dynamic had been set in 
motion, and became a central legitimising principle in the struggle for political constituency. 
In Serbia the nationalist path was first a response to the situation in Kosovo and in the years 
1989-1990 series of laws and measures were adopted which in effect abolished the autonomy 
o f  Kosovo. In response the Albanians boycotted the Serbian state and organised a completely 
parallel society, with their own education system, sport, media, political and cultural 
organisations. It was financed through taxes, remittances from the diaspora, as well as through 
so called illiberal economic activity and to some extent foreign aid. Throughout the whole
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region, alternative forms o f  political economy expanded as an adjustment and adaptation to 
global marginalisation of the formal economy. The structures here were built on earlier 
existing networks and traditional loyalties. With the complete marginalisation of the formal 
economy, the illiberal -  or shadow -  economy, more suitable and adaptable to global 
competition and integration, grew increasingly important. At the very local level it was 
supplemented by individual survival strategies, informal trade and services, and subsistence 
farming. Part o f the illiberal economy is pure black market, or criminal, activity. It has thrived 
well on the conditions of war and imposed international sanctions. The networks through 
which it operated were directly linked to state organisations and institutions, and in the case o f 
Kosovo to would become state-builders. The networks had partly dissimilar characteristics in 
Serbia and Kosovo, with the Serbian characteristic being more loosely knitted informal 
networks but directly linked to parts o f the state machinery, while in Kosovo they have tended 
to be tightly knitted around family and clan allegiance, and in direct opposition to the Serbian 
state. This has however not intimidated joint business across ethnic borders. Moreover, 
international democracy aid through the 1990s tended to aim at anti-state organisations in 
Serbia, and to an opposition and resistance in a society characterised by political 
fragmentation and atomisation, whereas in Kosovo it tended to support the organisational 
infrastructure for ethnic exclusivism and irredentism and hence legitimise the parallel society. 
The parallel Albanian society was further radicalised in the second half of the 1990s, and 
eventually the United States, drawing with it much o f the international community, came to 
support the most radical and ethnic exclusivist forces within it while at the same time de- 
legitimising the more moderate forces. The effect o f this has been notable ever since.
The fact that democracy aid in the 1990s ended on disparate regional targets was a logical, but 
partly unintentional, consequence, o f  the principles and aims under which contemporary aid 
policy operate. These contemporary principles and aims are themselves an integral part to a 
new form of governing, of defining development and security, and more fundamentally, an 
expression o f  new trends in the international political economy. Contemporary aid policy 
operates with subcontracting and outsourcing and extensive networks o f private actors, such 
as consultants and NGOs. It aims at working directly on populations and on transforming 
attitudes and behaviour. Where previously the state and its institutions, and the idea of 
creating development and welfare services and provisions in nation-states, where at the 
centre, the focus has now shifted to direct intervention in societies on the level of populations, 
through a large number of agents and implementers that can be engaged on short-term basis.
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and excluded or included in a more flexible and selective manner. Whereas conditionality and 
desert (deservedness) is calculated where resource transfer is concerned, a more ambitious 
effort at transforming society through moral training and adtura l change has consolidated 
and expanded. In this manner a global biopolitical ambition is operated through contemporary 
aid policy and its networks. These aid operating networks are themselves an integral part of a 
wider system and network or global governance. Moreover, there has been a re­
conceptualisation of security and development and a merger o f them, in the sense that 
underdevelopment as such is defined as a security concern (producing conflict, refugee flows, 
harbouring criminal networks, and more recently terrorism), and that development is 
impossible without security and vice versa. Here there is an inbuilt pressure for more 
intervention and even of using military force whenever the biopolitical project fails. In some 
cases, such as Kosovo, the opportunities for biopolitical intervention are opened up through 
the military intervention, and military force is an essential back-up to the whole project. 
Kosovo is at the same time governed directly through international agents and through aid 
policy networks working on cultural and attitude change.
The form of governing through biopolitical control and intervention is an important aspect of 
securing geo-economics as an imperial project. Geoeconomics, or ruling through economic 
control, is an alternative to the direct territorial control of geopolitics, but the former has an 
inherent potential to resort to the latter. Geopolitics, and territorial and military control, is 
therefore by no means irrelevant, but remains a necessary complementary. Regions like the 
Balkans, especially Kosovo, may be o f a peripheral importance to the global geo-economic 
project, but they belong to the anomalies that need to be contained from, or absorbed in, the 
norms of a global geo-economic project or empire. The term empire is here more conceptually 
and analytically accurate and precise than the term ‘globalisation’. The latter term, rather than 
concept, tends to obscure agency, power relations, and beneficiaries within this order and 
indeed mystify the reshaping o f relations as a kind o f inevitable process without agency, 
almost like a ‘natural law’ to which states (and other actors) merely have to adapt. It is 
nothing of the sort. Instead it is a political project, propelled by policies and power relations 
that secure geo-economic supremacy. Adaptation and adjustment come in many forms, one 
being the expansion of illiberal economies connected to traditionalist networks of loyalty and 
welfare security as well as particularistic ideologies.
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The term civil society has achieved an important role in the new biopolitical project and 
contemporary aid discourse with its focus on NGOs and populations, as opposed to state and 
welfare institutions. The term has a long history in western European political thought, where 
it has been intimately connected to the state and conceptualised as a society ruled by law. It 
has, as such, a positive connotation. In the modem period, from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, it was gradually redefined to refer to activity in a public space located between the 
two poles of the state and the family. Nevertheless, it was connected to the state, which was 
the essential framework for any possibility of civil society, and it typically included the sphere 
of the market and market relations. It is only very recently, in the past decades, the term has 
become applied to non-state organisations, or to organisations in opposition to the state. This 
way o f conceptualising civil society started with reference to communist states in Eastern 
Europe, and was then expanded into a more general conceptual tool within aid policy. As such 
the term has remained the same while the concept has changed considerably. Today, the 
concept is historically empty and highly ambiguous as it tends to be completely detached 
from the state, and even the market, and viewed in terms of non-profit private agents. 
However, this vagueness, and historical emptiness, serves a practical political purpose within 
aid policy since it without specificity enables a redirection o f financial support, and agency, 
away from the state and to an organisational infrastmcture o f private agents. It enables a 
completely novel assemblage of agents and discursive practice for aid policy and international 
governance. It has become instmmental to global biopolitics and empire.
A primary assumption is that so called civil society organisations constitute an infrastructure 
upon which democracy and liberalism can be built. A problem is that, if  considered as such, it 
does not fit well with ethnic particularism or traditional structures, which form the basis for 
trust, allegiance, and social security in places like Kosovo. Attempts at transgressing such 
forms o f social organisation, norm and value systems, have so far been without success. In 
fact, the international community has instead politically legitimised and supported the forces 
of ethnic nationalism and structures of ethnic organisation. The international administration 
that took over Kosovo in June 1999 had, in the first six years o f its rule, not been able to 
mitigate inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo. Instead, it drew upon it a considerable frustration 
and growing mistrust from Albanians as well as Serbs. A large part of the problem for the 
international administration was bred into it from its very birth, through the radical forces that 
had been supported from the outset. Ethnic cleansing, violence, and destruction o f property 
and religious monuments took place in the midst of international presence. In 2003
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international financial support diminished, after an initial physical reconstruction. Serious 
miscalculations were made by strategic international agents when they mistook the initial 
reconstruction o f buildings and roads, and the economy coming to the surface and thriving on 
international presence, for a potential trend of revival. A set-back, sobering the UN 
administration, came with the sudden eruption of ethnic violence in May 2004. There has 
been no development plan, no coherent strategy, not even a poverty reduction strategy, no 
reliable statistics upon which to base any form of planning, and no viable alternative to 
shadow, informal, diaspora or aid-subsistence economy. Ethnic violence, ethnic exclusivist 
identity politics, particularism, traditional loyalty structures empowered through emerging 
institutions, and consolidation of organised crime, has been the trend. Further, no regional 
solution has been provided, nor a local multi-ethnic solution for social, political and economic 
development. Although there has been a great deal o f activity, patch-work aid projects, 
considerable international presence, and an explosion in foreign-sponsored NGOs, one must 
not mistake activity for achievement.
After several years o f protectorate it appears that the international administration had lost 
initiative in Kosovo. Here, all the weaknesses of international instruments have come to the 
fore, and especially the lack of instruments for addressing ethnic nationalism. A profound 
dilemma was created at the very beginning through the NATO intervention in Kosovo with 
military means. For the Albanians the objective is an independent state and for the most 
radical forces that were supported this is means to an end of a unified greater Albania. For the 
Kosovo Serbs this is an unthinkable solution, which they believe would threaten their very 
existence in Kosovo. And, disregarding minorities, an independent Kosovo would mean that 
the borders o f a state were altered through the use of force, and a new state thus created. This 
would violate the very foundations of international law, the Helsinki agreement, and the so 
called Badinter principles, which are applied in order to uphold Bosnia as a single state. Thus, 
if  Kosovo becomes independent, an international precedent is set, which can have 
repercussions globally, for example in places like Chechnya or Kurdistan. It could, 
potentially, open up the issue o f Bosnia and the question of its Croatian and Serbian 
populations. It could open up the issue of the Macedonian state, which has a large Albanian 
minority. Thus, independence for Kosovo is a hard nut to crack. On the other hand, if Kosovo 
is to remain a part of Serbia against the explicit will of the, at present perhaps close to 90 %, 
Albanian population, then new violent conflicts are an imminent risk. Violence could then be 
directed at the international presence there, if  it becomes perceived as an obstacle to the goal
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of the local majority population. Should the international military presence then fight a war 
against those on behalf of whom it claimed to intervene, in order to force them under a state in 
which they do not wish to live, o r should international law and principles be trashed? 
Moreover, which international forum can address the issue? The UN Security Council is an 
unlikely candidate since one may assume that Russia (with Chechnya) and China (with 
Taiwan) would be highly reluctant to opt for Kosovo’s independence, for the pure fact that it 
would set precedents. Thereby, the only avenue is a bilateral agreement between Serbia 
(Belgrade and the local Kosovo Serbs) and the Kosovo Albanians. Still, disregarding the poor 
political atmosphere for such negotiations, even a bilateral solution could send messages of 
possible precedents to minority and majority populations elsewhere in the Balkans and across 
the globe.
The undefined status of Kosovo is thereby a heritage to the international community, offered 
by the United States and NATO, which has provided them with a pressure to solve the 
squaring of the circle. Moreover, thus far it has directly blocked the possibilities for 
conventional development work. Conventional development work is necessary for creating 
state institutions and a legal and institutional framework for implementing the conditions for a 
liberal market economy, as well as for ownership over a poverty reduction strategy targeted at 
the most sensitive groups. Such institutions are also necessary for having a capable local 
partner in combating threats to the liberal world in terms of fighting black market activity, 
containing and reducing refugee flows, and more recently terrorism. A problem is that 
conventional development work was designed to work with states. In practice almost any 
development programme will soon be confronted with issues relating to the state, including 
legal issues. A judicial state is also necessary for international credits as well as agreements. 
The consequence in Kosovo has been that as long as its status is undefined, any development 
process, as well as investment, has remained blocked. A consequence, in turn, which 
contributes to further frustration, unemployment, political, economic and social dire straits, 
and a good recruiting ground for an illiberal economy and radicalised networks.
While the specific strategies and forms o f adaptation to global marginalisation are as 
particular for Yugoslavia, Serbia, or Kosovo, as for any other region, they are an expression 
of a more general dismal trend. The global political economy, shaped by the most powerful 
state or states and the institutions they control, and ultimately backed by military capabilities, 
greatly impacts all areas in the world by establishing a particular opportunity stmcture for
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policy choice. In its present form of geo-economic imperialism it contributes to the 
destruction of formal economies and the social contracts they uphold, in many marginalised 
areas, and thereby propels the reshaping o f states and societies, which may well be pushed, at 
least partly, into illiberal trajectories as an alternative path to integration into the global 
economy. Economies are always socially and politically embedded, and adaptation to global 
marginalisation constitutes a re-embedding in alternative and more particularistic political 
projects and social networks. As such, they can be interpreted as counter-movements, or the 
second phase of a double movement, where the first movement is laissez faire market 
capitalism unleashed upon the globe. This first movement is by no means a ‘natural’ historic 
process, but the consequence o f policy choice. Across the field o f policies, contemporary aid 
policy is itself shaped by it and thereby an integral part o f the process. Moreover, aid policy is 
instrumental in the new security policy, which often produces unintended consequences and 
outcomes. Although many individual aid projects provide services, poverty reduction, 
emancipation, or increased life chances for selected individuals or groups, the dismal 
conclusion here is that a general trend has been that the aid industry is part of a wider 
superstructure of a new geo-economic imperialism. The conceptions through which it is 
governed are intimately anchored in this project, and it is organised according to the 
principles in it. Regarding the design o f specific aid policy, there are ideological and cultural 
elements which shape the conceptions o f any particular area in which it operates. Such 
conceptions may be deeply detached from actual processes or empirical realities in the aid- 
receiving society and serve primarily as a reassertion o f  the self-assumed role o f the industry. 
At some point one must hope that a new global political economy and security structure, 
allowing inclusion as well as diversity, cultural and regional particular solutions, public and 
social welfare for the multitude, environmental sustainability, and a more fair deal for the 
marginalised, will come in place; in the meantime one may prepare to witness much 
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